British-Iranian Relations

Viscount Waverley Excerpts

Thursday 23rd February 2023 Grand Committee

[Viscount Waverley (CB)]

My Lords, freedom is a precious commodity but nobody knows with any degree of certainty where and when the situation in Iran will finally end. However, its people have sent an indisputable message to the mullahs and the revolutionary guard that enough is enough and their time is up. The people must always come first; the indicators are that the wind is in their sails. Arabian and Middle Eastern near-neighbour states are already pushing back against regime change but now is the time for the Government in London to become more assertive and be on the right side of history by supporting root-and-branch change away from corruption, illegal imprisonment, capital punishment, the confiscation of homes and the pillaging of the wealth of the nation.

Since the regime controls the economy, joining the revolutionary guard is an assured way to advance in a difficult life exacerbated by crippling sanctions. A long-term necessity is that the conditions are such that the economy can be opened up, to the benefit of all. The new generation in the IRGC is far removed from the original purpose of the Islamic revolution; given the incentive to do so, lower ranks could come out as sympathetic to the uprising given that the regime is now recognised as being so unpopular. The flight of capital from the country by senior members of the Government is testament that the end could be near.

However, I make a note of caution: the Islamic Republic has a strong lobby outside Iran, most particularly in Washington. A certain leftist ex-Prime Minister is being groomed to take over the mantle and, if this ploy is successful, will serve as a puppet of the regime by implementing cosmetic change only. The “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement has not yet found a single voice. It should be encouraged to do so post-haste in the same manner as the way in which Khomeini orchestrated the uniting of disparate factions in 1979. There is a consensus in Iran that the West is not doing enough. However, I remain of the belief that the leadership will buckle when faced with continued condemnation and pressure. Frankly, everything hinges on the strategic support that the uprising receives from the United Kingdom Government and others.

I join others in saving my concluding remarks for matters relating to the pending BBC closure. I can do no better than join the dots with what I said the other day in the Chamber:

“Our foreign policy and strategy should deem this an entirely illogical move … closure will send conflicting messages about the support we have in this country for the uprising.”—[Official Report, 21/2/23; col. 1616.]

Raid of BBC Offices in India

Viscount Waverley Excerpts

Tuesday 21st February 2023 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Waverley (CB)]

My Lords, can the Minister give an insight into what advice, if any, has been given by the BBC India legal and accounting team on what might be the best moves in this regard? Is the FCDO connecting directly with these professional services to be assured that everything is being done in the way which we know that it will be being done, and that we have the good advice of professional services within India?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I cannot comment too much on this ongoing investigation by the Indian authorities, but the BBC is engaging very constructively. We all know that the BBC is a professional organisation, independent editorially and in its governance and structures. It is important that we look to resolve these particular issues. The BBC is a valued asset of the United Kingdom around the world. As we saw in the earlier Statement, it provides valuable sources of information as well. It is important for us to seek, through our relationship with India, to resolve in a constructive way any issues that arise across the piece on human rights or any other matters. Both countries are absolutely committed to strengthening our relationship bilaterally.

Horn of Africa: Famine

Viscount Waverley Excerpts

Tuesday 7th February 2023 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park) (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans for tabling this hugely important and timely debate. I am also grateful for the insightful contributions of other noble Lords who have spoken. I echo the tributes that previous speakers have paid to the late Lord Chidgey, with whom I had a number of exchanges; he was always polite, positive and constructive, usually on issues relating to the environment, which was a passion for him. Although I have not been here as long as other noble Lords in the Chamber today, I know that he will be missed.

The humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa has pushed tens of millions of people to a cliff edge, driven by a combination of conflict, the worst drought in 40 years and the rocketing prices that have resulted from Russia’s illegal war—a point made by the right reverend Prelate.

Before I continue, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for the regular information he provides via email and the bundle of reading material that I will take away after this debate. Having looked at it, some of which I had seen before, it makes for grim reading but is enormously important. In answering his question specifically, I say that we agree with the World Food Programme’s assessment of needs across the region. Unfortunately, we think that these figures are correct, but we wish that they were not.

Across east Africa, more than 71 million people are in need of aid. As the noble Lord, Lord Collins, and others said, rates of food insecurity and malnutrition are, sadly, soaring. In drought-affected areas across Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia, almost 24 million people cannot access enough drinking water and over 9 million livestock have died. In the Horn of Africa, more than three-quarters of a million people are predicted to fall into famine-like conditions by March, with millions more teetering on the edge. The situation is grave and at risk of deteriorating much further.

In Somalia, the number of people facing extreme food insecurity is likely to double by April. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, I will pinch an answer from the noble Lord, Lord Collins, who touched on this. Famine declaration is a matter for the independent classification process. However, we know that, if aid is not sufficiently scaled up by June, famine is very likely to return.

The UK Government are committed to alleviating suffering and are playing a lead role in the international humanitarian response. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, I say that this financial year we will provide at least £156 million of humanitarian aid across east Africa, which will benefit millions of people.

Last month, the Foreign Secretary and the Development Minister both travelled to Ethiopia and Somalia, although separately. They saw the impact of the crisis, heard sobering testimonies from some of those affected and saw how UK aid is providing a lifeline.

In Ethiopia, nearly 30 million people—more than in any other country in the world—are in need of emergency aid. Since April 2021, the UK Government have helped over a million Ethiopians, with more than £100 million of UK aid. On 20 January, the Minister for Development announced a new £16 million package of UK support that will reach hundreds of thousands of people.

Tigray is another issue that the noble Lord, Lord Alton, raises diligently and relentlessly—in the positive not negative sense, certainly from my time as a Minister. It is difficult to give a precise response. We are cautiously optimistic. We cautiously welcome the peace agreement and the commitment that both sides have made to facilitating humanitarian and aid access. Based on what we know and believe, access is improving, so this is more than just a paper agreement, but the situation, as he knows better than most, is extremely complicated.

In Somalia this financial year we will allocate more than £61 million for life-saving humanitarian, health and nutrition programmes, and in Kenya we have provided more than 30,000 children with life-saving nutrition. This latest support builds on years of UK government humanitarian work in the region. Since 2018, over 9.3 million people in Somalia have benefited from humanitarian and resilience-building programmes supported by the UK. From 2018 to 2022, we provided nearly 1.9 million people with better access to water and 3.9 million people with support for agricultural production.

In drought-prone areas of Ethiopia, we have worked since 2015 with the Government to provide financial support and means of conserving water to 8 million people each year. In Kenya, a similar programme in drought-prone areas has reached over half a million people.

The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, mentioned trade. I thank him for doing so. While we are on Kenya, I was looking to provide him with a decent answer to this question, but, if he does not mind, I will give him only part of a decent answer. Since 2017, the regional economic department for investment and trade programme, which we support, has successfully supported tariff reform and facilitation of development of physical infrastructure with a view to boosting the prosperity of Kenya and the wider region. That is not aid, although aid has a role. The noble Lord is absolutely right to focus on trade. Although I am not a Trade Minister, I am having increasingly frequent exchanges with colleagues in the Department for International Trade as a Foreign Office Minister, because there is no doubt that effective facilitation of trade can so often be more effective than deployment of aid. So I thank the noble Lord for raising that point.

Noble Lords will be all too aware that climate change increases the risk of prolonged droughts. Indeed, everyone who spoke raised the issue. The UK Government have stood by their pledge to commit up to £11.6 billion of climate finance between 2021 and 2026. It is absolutely essential that the Government honour that pledge. I encourage all noble Lords to keep a very close eye on us: Governments can be tricky things. It is absolutely critical that the pledge is honoured, for so many different reasons, beyond even climate change itself. Our reputation as a country hinges absolutely on our having made that pledge and having used it to leverage generous commitments from other donor countries. Without it, we would not have secured the kind of increase in finance commitments that we have seen at and since Glasgow, so it is really essential.

It is not just about reputational issues. As the noble Lord, Lord Collins, said, climate change is not an academic discussion point for the countries that we are discussing today. For so many on the front line, it is an existential issue. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, made the point that Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia contributed around 0.6% to the problem. I think that that was the figure he used—I hope that I did not get it wrong. Yet those three countries have had just two normal rainy seasons since 2016. It really shows that those countries most on the front line tend to have contributed least and urgently need support.

The noble Lord, Lord Collins, made the point that we should be focusing much of our support on those countries that really are on the front line, the poorest and most vulnerable. He is right, although our climate approach has to be balanced on prevention and mitigation of climate change; we will not always be focusing on the very poorest countries. We all need the Amazon, the Congo Basin, and Indonesia’s forests and peatlands to be protected and restored. Those do not necessarily coincide with the poorest people in the world, but if they go, we are all finished. However, when it comes to adaptation, it is about the poorest and most vulnerable people in the world. He is absolutely right to make that point. I hope that that is reflected in the way we invest in the commitment I mentioned earlier.

In response to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, we are working in tandem with our international partners to address the risk of famine and help the region build resilience. For example, our humanitarian aid partnership with Saudi Arabia has led their humanitarian agency to provide match funding of £1.7 million in Somalia. We are also expanding our work with Germany and the World Bank to strengthen agriculture and the response to droughts.

I fully acknowledge the impact of the ODA cuts, as I have done many times in this House. The point was initially raised by the right reverend Prelate, then by other speakers. I will make just two points. Despite that reduction, the UK is the third-highest spender of ODA in the G7 as a percentage of GNI, spending more than £11 billion on aid in 2021. In recognition of the unanticipated and significant costs incurred supporting people from Ukraine and Afghanistan, the Government are also spending an additional £1 billion in 2022-23 and £1.5 billion in 2023-24 to try to accommodate those costs. I agree with the speakers today that we absolutely must return to 0.7% as soon as we possibly can. There really should be no delay.

The noble Lord, Lord Collins, made a point about the quality of investment, not just the quantum. He is right there as well. We need the quantum, but we also need transparency and monitoring. That applies very much to the Tokyo commitments. So that point is very much noted, and he is right to have made it.

The severity of the drought and food insecurity facing the Horn of Africa is crystal clear. The situation is at risk of getting, and is likely to get, worse. Our humanitarian support to East Africa is providing millions of people with essential services, and we will continue to work with partners to save lives and build resilience. Once again, I thank noble Lords for their insightful contributions and the right reverend Prelate for initiating the debate.

[Viscount Waverley (CB)]

I thank the Minister. It really has been a most distressing tale that we have heard this evening. I, too, wish to thank everyone who has brought such an insight into this area. Concentration has been made on many of the countries and regions within the Horn of Africa, but very little attention or mention has been given to Djibouti and Somaliland, which are two very important parts of countries within that region. Would the Minister care to offer any message of lessons learned as a result of their circumstances in that region?

[Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park (Con)]

I thank the noble Viscount for raising that point. I certainly would not want to pretend to be an expert on either country. One of the problems with Somaliland is that technically and legally it belongs to Somalia. Therefore, when we talk about Somalia we are often talking about Somaliland, but they are really two very different countries with different Governments. In so many respects, Somaliland is a beacon: it is a place where elections are held, people shake hands afterwards and do not contest them. Iris technology is used to avoid fraud. Despite its really horrific back story, which the noble Viscount will know well, and all the cards being stacked against it, it has flourished and succeeded. There are lessons to be learned there and I hope the UK will be able to increase its support for that region.

While we are on this issue, I did not mention the ever-present threat of al-Shabaab, which is a key driver of the humanitarian crisis. I do not think that anyone else mentioned it, either; I apologise if they did. I reiterate that the UK is supporting the African Union’s efforts to counter al-Shabaab. We are looking for opportunities to continue to do so with the African Union and elsewhere. We provide aid to Somalia in a way that avoids enriching the wrong people. That is an issue that all deployers of aid need to be very aware of at all times.

I thank the noble Viscount for raising Somaliland. It is a remarkable place and a story that needs to be told more often.

EU: Trade in Goods (European Affairs Committee Report)

Viscount Waverley Excerpts

Thursday 2nd February 2023 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Waverley (CB)]

My Lords, it is a sad day to be contributing, during a debate that has included valedictory remarks from the noble Baroness, Lady Chalker. Her long and distinguished reign as the premier friend of Africa is the stuff of legend. She understands what makes Africa tick. She will be missed, and I wish her well.

The noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, was spot on in his remarks, and in part drew attention to many observations that I wished to make—but I shall press on. I shall not comment on the whys and wherefores of the effects on the economy resulting from EU withdrawal and the current complexities of intra-European trade, other than to note that we have not risen to the challenge of Brexit. We are where we are, with the only relevant question being, “What are we going to do about it, moving forward?”

Nevertheless, notwithstanding the remarks from the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, and the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, I should put on record that, at the meeting I attended in Birmingham this week as the guest of Midlands Engine and Midlands Connect, it was underlined that the Midlands region now exports 40% fewer products than at the start of 2019, with the biggest impact being on SMEs. One in five of all England’s exports comes from the 800,000 Midlands SMEs that employ 4.4 million people. It was also stressed that the region’s total exports are £7 billion below those levels. Losing those exporters could break the pipeline for future export growth and significantly harm the UK’s frail productivity.

The APPG for Road Freight and Logistics has embarked on a year-long 2023 assessment to lay strategic preparedness to serve for 50 years hence, which, when combined with the parallel APPG for Trade and Investment conducting a review of the United Kingdom’s export promotions strategy, has been long overdue. The last endeavour in that regard was the 2012 review by the noble Lord, Lord Heseltine, entitled No Stone Unturned. I serve as co-chair of both APPGs and look forward in that capacity to sitting next to the Minister for Exports in order to understand the Government’s thinking on export promotion, in respect of which the essential galvanising of trade with countries on the continent must surely be one for mandatory consideration.

I am in no doubt that there is a desire in this United Kingdom of ours to work together in public and private sector partnership, but to be less reliant on central government interventions and spearheaded by focal points such as Midlands Engine in order to drive economic growth and achieve our shared goal of greater prosperity, unlocking the opportunities for investment and trade and maintaining our status as an economic player on a rapidly changing global stage. An underlying principle is that there should be a spirit of reciprocity with trading partners for trade to thrive. Trade with, rather than into, should be the mantra.

Additionally, a solution to trade is assisting our exporters, providing them with clear guidance and training on new regulations. They must be supported so that they do not feel that it is all too much hassle to bother. Those on the front line must be supported. I visited the Port of Dover, the UK’s busiest international roll-on roll-off ferry port, handling £144 billion of freight and one-third of the UK’s trade, whose biggest single trading partner is the EU. The key elements for success are ensuring that border fluidity is adequate in a post-Brexit world, along with road investment and a decarbonised supply chain, thus ensuring delivery of the resilience, time and cost benefits that supply chains rely on into the future.

A key message I wish to offer the Government, therefore, is for border procedures and management, allowing for the consequential training required, to be planned quicker and more in depth than currently is the case. A takeaway is that the Government should be doing more to inform those that are an engine room of trade: namely, those engaged on border management procedures on both sides of the channel. They need to be better informed. I can further vouch for that, having hosted a meeting of Nigerian Government agencies that were unaware of the UK import regulations that resulted in 60% of a particular product range being rejected by the UK authorities. So more needs to be done in that regard to explain what our regulations are, so that people around the world can comply, not least our own organisations.

While not wishing in any way to prejudge the review to which I have referred, the original guide on how the border with the EU works, entitled the Border Operating Model, originally published in July 2020, was subject to two complete revisions as most of the dates set in the original BOM for implementing new arrangements were not met and had to be delayed. The most recent change was made to reflect the Government’s decision to delay the implementation of sanitary and phytosanitary checks on agricultural goods and foodstuffs imported from the EU, which should have been introduced on 1 July 2022. This should have been published in autumn 2022, but still has not been so, leaving importers of such goods from the EU unable to plan for their introduction or train staff accordingly.

Additionally, in December 2022 the TCA published instructions setting out the rules of origin—touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay—that goods had to meet to be considered as qualifying for the purposes of claiming preferential rates of duty. These have proven difficult for companies to follow, as has the process for issuing documentary evidence of the origin.

EU exporters making a statement of origin on their commercial invoices to allow the UK importer to claim the preferential rate of duty must have a registered exporter number if the goods are valued at more than €6,000. A large number of EU exporters still seem unaware of this requirement. A UK exporter has to provide only its economic operator registration and identification number to make an origin statement, which creates confusion. Many smaller traders, particularly those who had only ever traded with the EU and therefore had no customs experience prior to Brexit, have struggled with this legislation and do not feel supported in their efforts to understand it.

The policy paper for the 2025 UK border strategy, published in December 2020, referred to as the target operating model, described the border we are intending to create. Does HMRC intend to use trusted trader programmes when implementing both the single trade window and the 2025 UK border strategy? Will the simplifications offered to traders under the new strategy be available only to trusted traders, for example?

The UK already participates in the World Customs Organization’s authorised economic operator programme, with many companies undertaking a lengthy and onerous application process to prove their levels of compliancy and security to HMRC in order to achieve accreditation. In the lead up to Brexit, many companies thought that AEO would be beneficial post Brexit as it would offer accredited companies a green lane for their EU goods to enter the UK. This did not prove to be the case and many companies are now questioning the value of the scheme. The accreditation is meant to be subject to a reassessment by HMRC after three years, but many traders are now saying that they would rather let the accreditation lapse as it does not offer any benefits. This is disappointing. HMRC should be encouraging traders to apply for AEO as it focuses on compliance and ensures that traders have systems in place to self-audit their customs declarations, thus allowing HMRC not to do so and freeing up limited resource to focus on non-compliant businesses.

HMRC is possibly missing a way of improving customs clearance standards and potentially raising more revenue by ensuring that the correct duties and taxes are paid on import declarations. Why do customs clearance providers not have to be licensed or qualified, or to be members of a professional body in the UK? The customs declaration service, the replacement for CHIEF—the customs handling of import and export freight—was finally implemented for imports in October 2022. The CDS for exports was meant to be implemented in April this year. However, this has already been delayed by eight months, to December 2023. Why is that?

In summary, and to help in this process, it would be helpful for those tasked with border management if the Government replied to nine detailed technical questions. The Minister may be relieved to hear that I do not anticipate full responses due to ministerial time constraints, but I request that they be given full consideration. I will be placing them today as Parliamentary Questions for Written Answer, but for the record of the House, these are they. When will the target operating model be published? Can goods imported into the UK be repackaged, sold to the EU and referred to as being of UK origin? When will the 2025 UK border strategy be released? When will details of “ecosystems of trust” and how trusted traders will be identified be published? Is it intended that HMRC will continue promoting authorised economic operator status to businesses and will it commit to ensuring that successful applicants will receive the published benefits? Is it intended that HMRC will make authorised economic operator status mandatory for customs declarants? Will the customs declaration service for exports be implemented on time? Will the single trade window really start to deliver in 2023? Finally, have the Government sufficiently resourced HMRC to manage an anticipated 270 million additional customs declarations each year from UK companies for the import of EU goods, with a similar number expected on the EU side of the border?

Sri Lanka: Truth Commission

Viscount Waverley Excerpts

Thursday 1st December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, notwithstanding the continuing prioritisation we are giving to human rights, which have to remain part of the discussion to ensure that the issues arising from the previous civil war are not forgotten, including the targeting of particular communities, I assure my noble friend that we remain resolute in what we are doing at the HRC. But I take on board the specific element of the economic empowerment of communities as a way to build a country. Earlier this year, as the then Minister responsible for our relations with Sri Lanka, I met President Wickremesinghe. I have also recently met Foreign Minister Ali Sabry. Our focus has also been on the current IMF package and how it should act as a lever to ensure economic prosperity for communities across Sri Lanka.

[Viscount Waverley (CB)]

My Lords, following on from the tail-end of the Minister’s remarks, does he agree that one of the best ways to assist Sri Lanka in these challenging times is to speak up for the country where opportunity exists, and that partnering would be a win-win situation, geo-economically and geo-strategically?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, in part I have already addressed that issue, but I agree with the noble Viscount that the economic prosperity of a country is an enabler to allow that country to move forward. At the same time, we remain very focused on ensuring that the important elements of reconciliation and justice also prevail.

UNCLOS: The Law of the Sea in the 21st Century (International Relations and Defence Committee Report)

Viscount Waverley Excerpts

Monday 28th November 2022 Grand Committee

[Viscount Waverley (CB)]

My Lords, I identify with much of what the noble and gallant Lord said, and I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, and her committee. I should reflect on the committee’s first conclusion that

“Enforcement is a weakness of international law”,


which I will build into my principal remarks on Russia, China and NATO, including the United States, on matters Arctic.

I will refer to practical challenges on the excessive claiming of maritime zones, given legal problems with UNCLOS permitting states to claim or designate exclusive economic zones—EEZ status—around uninhabited islands and rocks, thus extending territorial rights. Notwithstanding the Philippines-China case study, and China building rocky outcroppings into major installations, with airfields in the Scarborough Shoal, this establishes a quandary on how international law will adapt when islands must be above high tide and when the sea level rises through climate change. Does the state lose EEZ status if an island is submerged or is the reality, in practice, that a ruling against yields little or no practical effects, with limited arbitration processes to adjudicate on the question of propriety on “that rock”, in terms of claiming it to be an exclusive economic zone? This requires examination.

More generally, is it the case that domestic law must incorporate international law to take effect and so have legitimacy? How does the United Kingdom view international law and are all NATO countries aligned? Do China and Russia recognise the provisions of UNCLOS?

In this challenging year of global power competition, this report on the law of the sea correctly surmises that the Arctic shipping route along Russia’s northern coast—commonly referred to as the northern sea route, or NSR—has long-term security implications. President Putin attaches enormous significance to the NSR and the economic development of the Russian Arctic. As a petrostate, many of Russia’s remaining oil and gas prospects lie in the Arctic, along with significant minerals and other resources. For the Kremlin, energy is bound up with Russian national security and is a principal means of projecting influence abroad; it is deemed to have become strategic in the post-2020 framework, as global competition for resources and markets intensifies.

Putin has also ordered that shipping along the NSR reach 80 million tonnes by 2024, from 30.5 million tonnes in 2019. If fully realised, the vision of the Russian Arctic would be a string of resource hubs producing oil, gas, coal and minerals, linked by a vibrant international shipping route that could take resources west to Europe or east to Asia, as the geopolitical and economic winds blow. Russia has formally designated the waterway that runs from the Kara Sea in the west to the Bering Sea in the east. Along the way, the NSR runs through several straits separating the Russian mainland from adjacent islands—Novaya Zemlya, Severnaya Zemlya and the Novosibirsk islands. The Soviet Union drew straight maritime baselines around these archipelagos, enclosing them and declaring the adjacent straits to be internal waters; in making this an internal waters designation, the Soviet Union relied on UNCLOS language on “historic title”.

Here is the difficulty: Arctic waterways have not historically been used for international passage, given their frozen condition. This legal argument is therefore time-sensitive, as navigation is increasingly practicable. The Soviet Union also pointed to UNCLOS Article 234, which grants coastal states special abilities to manage ship traffic in ice-cold waters—another legal base that may be eroding in the Arctic. Here and now are important, but it is the potential quandaries 10 years down the road that make long-term policy decision-making—including on considerations of access to Arctic natural resources, be they fisheries, mining, or oil and gas reserves—essential and political.

The Russian Arctic is already responsible for roughly one-quarter of Russian GDP and the importance of the region will only grow. Given this, the region is of core national importance to Russian leadership, and it is no surprise that the Russian military has been arming it.

Russia has military components in the Arctic—including longer-term play by China, to which I will refer in a moment—and security interests. It has established a military presence there. There is increased aeronautical traffic, including in recent years the installation and refurbishment of advanced radar systems, airfields, small bases and air force missile systems, and Russian strategic capabilities on the Kola Peninsula—the major concentration on the western side of the NSR—have advanced.

Then there is China’s increasingly ambitious current activity and plans in the Arctic. We should not lose sight of the fact that China was a related signatory as far back as 1925 but, not wishing to be left out, it has recently opened its first scientific research station in the Arctic, because of its economic value. This coincided with China’s first Arctic policy White Paper in 2018, outlining its polar silk road plan and defining China as a near-Arctic state.

Should China’s interests be viewed as an opportunity or a threat? It is important to understand the drivers behind its ramping up of activities in the region, particularly in the shaping of economic development, with the NSR opening a new sea lane with a seven-day sailing time from Shanghai to New York.

It is significant that the war in Ukraine has significantly depressed shipping along the NSR, in particular by foreign vessels, with China’s main shipping company, COSCO, sending zero vessels through the NSR in 2022. It is unclear to what extent China’s interests are a larger strategic play, and to what extent it is being fully transparent. It is clear that China intends to be involved in the governance of the Arctic, with the introduction of the new polar code.

It should be on record that China is interpreting the Arctic and South China Sea issues in different ways, with the core differentiator being sovereignty, and the Arctic being about access. China says that it wishes to enter into strategic and economic partnerships with Arctic and non-Arctic states in new ports and communication infrastructure, thus expanding its belt and road initiative. This has relevance when considering global supply chain issues.

What of the response and strategy by NATO, and particularly the United States, the Arctic Council and observers such as the United Kingdom in all this? Are we to abide by international laws and norms? The Arctic has always had a strategic relevance for NATO as the gateway to the north Atlantic, with the hosting of vital trade and communications links between North America and Europe, so ensuring that the Arctic remains free and open must surely be a priority. However, the United States contests the Soviet—now Russian—designation of the straits along the NSR as internal waters, so the question remains whether the US and UK should conduct a freedom of navigation operation in the Russian Arctic, as has emerged in recent years in conjunction with tensions with Russia.

There are, however, important legal and operational questions about the particulars of the NSR, and the prospect of a FONOP is questionable. An added wrinkle is presented by Canadian claims in the Northwest Passage, which closely mirror Russian claims in the NSR. The United States deems both sets of claims excessive. Therefore, Russia’s NSR presents a set of diplomatic challenges to policymakers from a freedom of navigation perspective. I am curious to hear from the Minister the thinking behind what rights non-Arctic stakeholders have—or will have.

If all that was not enough, the list of factors goes on, with the critical undefined climate considerations that could haunt the generations to come. As a whole, the Arctic region is warming faster than any other part of the globe. For example, the Norwegian islands of Svalbard have already warmed 3 degrees centigrade since 1979. The Barents Sea subregion is warming especially quickly, in both air and sea temperatures.

One practical impact of this warming is that the Northern Sea Route is now ice-free for a longer period each year. However, it is important to note that the NSR is frozen in the winter, and the spring and fall “shoulder seasons” are unpredictable. In 2021, more than 20 vessels in the NSR were trapped in ice when an early freeze-up took shippers by surprise.

What is the strategy on the development of deep-water ports, search and rescue issues and oil spills? How do the complexities of the mandatory provision for all ships to be escorted by Russian icebreakers play out? A crucial question is what the role and purpose of the Arctic Council moving forward will be. As and when the Arctic moves up, there will be a probability of more states wishing for recognised observer status, which may entail Chinese push-back. Could or should the council’s role be better defined—questioning the overall effectiveness of UNCLOS, with the need to strengthen it more generally?

Ukraine: Post-conflict Reconstruction

Viscount Waverley Excerpts

Thursday 24th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Clancarty (CB)]

My Lords—

[Viscount Waverley (CB)]

My Lords—

[Lord Howell of Guildford (Con)]

My Lords—

European Political Community

Viscount Waverley Excerpts

Monday 31st October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park (Con)]

My Lords, as I understand it, there are no plans for a formal secretariat. That is not to say that some kind of structure would not be set up on informal basis, but there are no plans for a formal secretariat. I point out to the noble Lord that there are numerous forums—not least NATO and the UN—where countries can meet in the event of emergencies.

[Viscount Waverley (CB)]

Does the Minister agree that the strength of a bilateral relationship is when the participants in that relationship come equally to the table? There is a real benefit from having parliamentarians engaging first-hand with colleagues around the EU, as indeed with the Commission, just to help out the overall form of camaraderie and get things moving.

[Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park (Con)]

The noble Viscount makes an important point. That is true across all issues in all sectors. One of the most valuable organisations that I have been involved in is called GLOBE. It is about bringing legislators together from around the world to compare, and sometimes helpfully compete with one another in relation to, environmental legislation. That worked beautifully, and no doubt it works in every important sector.

Armenia and Azerbaijan

Viscount Waverley Excerpts

Wednesday 26th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord on both fronts and of course, ultimately, we need a political settlement. We are fully supportive of the EU as well as the OSCE.

[Viscount Waverley (CB)]

My Lords, negotiations are of course key, but are solutions made more complicated by the promotion of disharmony, particularly when the UK has no real leverage to bear on this quagmire? Doing so is counterintuitive, restricting the ability of Armenia to attract direct inward investment.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I do not agree with the noble Viscount on the UK’s position. We are active in our engagement with our EU partners, but we are also central to, and support, the efforts of the OSCE. In terms of stability and security, we need peace between those two countries, which will see the resumption of inward investment, boosting the economies of both Armenia and Azerbaijan.

China: Security and Trade (IRDC Report)

Viscount Waverley Excerpts

Thursday 20th October 2022 Grand Committee

[Viscount Waverley (CB)]

My Lords, I absolutely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, but will express it differently. That difference is contained in the title of the report, which refers to a “void”. We are far short of understanding how to deal with China—and rather worryingly, that pertains to the US as well.

The noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, referred to the next update of the integrated review possibly being delayed until next May. Continuous review is fundamental in today’s fast-moving world. I suggest that a rolling update should become the norm. She also referred to supply chain issues. Having returned from India and the Gulf last week, I believe that there is merit in encouraging countries such as India, and including countries such as Turkey and Brazil, to assist in the diversification of supply chain issues—not just for the UK but globally. This can also help the economies of developing nations.

The Government have become increasingly hawkish towards China and formally designated it a threat to Britain, with the redesignation bringing the UK’s official position towards China closer to its stance on Russia. I reaffirm at the outset that the Uighur situation is an abomination, the Taiwan threat real and regrettable, and the Hong Kong circumstance sad and unbecoming for a state of the importance of China. My overall assessment is that China is becoming more inward-looking and protectionist, which is not helped by constant hostile rhetoric, with the deterioration of relations transitioning from hesitation to deep freeze and China signalling alignment away from being a rule-taker to a rule-maker in the international community.

China is a major trading, investment and supply chain partner, but its economy is at a crossroads, with slowing growth and increased debt and facing a property crash crisis. However, it is currently the world’s second-largest economy and the world’s second-largest public capital market, with the third-largest stock exchange and an IPO market of importance. It is responsible for one-third of global emissions, but is also the world’s largest producer of renewable energy and committed to reaching peak carbon emissions by 2030 and net zero by 2060.

Its strategy is, on the one hand, to make its economy more resilient against external shocks and to fulfil self-sufficiency to counter the hostile geopolitical environment by being more reliant on the economies of scale of its large domestic market and increasing control over supply chains where import dependencies exist, most particularly for food, energy and high-tech inputs. The dual-circulation strategy, the interplay between domestic circulation of production, distribution and consumption by insulating the domestic market, whether in terms of natural resources or technology, is to vertically integrate its production. Chinese decoupling from the US is advancing, with China’s master-plan to enhance its position through third-market engagement available through the belt and road initiative.

It should be remembered that the UK became the first western country to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, with a previous US Administration accusing the UK of “constant accommodation” with China. London’s stance towards Beijing has now shifted from the so-called, perceived “golden era” to a complex phase of diplomatic and military tensions and scrutinised economic relations, compounded by US pressure. US national security strategy since the integrated review reflects a world order where great power competition is back in town, representing a profound move away from a not-distant past advocating for a deeper relationship.

The integrated review made an economic and military case when it stated that the PRC is

“the biggest state-based threat to the UK’s economic security”

and that its military modernisation and assertiveness threaten British interests in the Indo-Pacific. To China, a Cold War mentality of encirclement exists. It believes that London, with its Pacific tilt, is advocating an anti-China diplomatic and military coalition in the Indo-Pacific, with the Government’s U-turn on Huawei, combined with the first deployment of HMS “Queen Elizabeth II” aircraft carrier to the Pacific, and the trilateral AUKUS security pact between Australia, the UK and the US, escalating the relationship to a new hostile era.

How comfortable is the UK, in reality, in attempting to organise a unified anti-China front behind the Build Back Better World label? The G7 Cornwall meet suggested a differing narrative in the making, but now increasingly there appears acceptance of the US narrative and Washington’s framing of the US-China strategic rivalry as a life or death struggle between democracy and autocracy, treating China as an adversary. There is no question but that the urgent need is to conduct an overall review and analysis of our relationship. We cannot afford to ignore China and must seek to balance the relationship in a manner which draws together shared interests and aligns on underlying challenges, or we will face a steady drumbeat.

All this is a far cry from the economic mantra of a global Britain, with a view held by some that if we deal only with countries that share our values, we will have a limited range of countries with which to engage. Constant barking, confrontation and economic sanctions, including diplomatic restrictions and isolation, can have their place, but I wonder how effective and sustainable they are and whether they are likely to achieve positive outcomes. We should be wide-eyed when taking a tough policy line on China without clearly understanding what the impact, including economic, will be. I have already mentioned that, for me, the key takeaway from the report before us was the use of the word “void”, which encapsulates our lack of understanding of the techniques required to engage in a manner that advances or contains a relationship.

So, how to engage with the Chinese state? Engage we must, but we must certainly lead by example. I fear that, if we fail to do so, it will have consequences for the longer term, including a clash of ideals that would include the likes of Russia and Iran, which are anxious to drive a wedge between our immovable principles. An accommodation must be sought, otherwise I see no alternative other than a slow drumbeat emerging over the horizon. The outcomes of the current party congress, which will set the tone on domestic policies and international trade relations for the next five years, should be analysed with care and taken as a renewed engagement starting point.

I ended a recent contribution with the conclusion that

“a window still exists to pour oil on troubled waters”.

However, I went on to say:

“Western policymakers and diplomats need to up the game and face the gravity of the situation with a supercharged, innovative carrot-and-stick strategy.”—[Official Report, 14/7/22; col. 1629.]


I remain of that view.