Financial Services Bill

Debate between Viscount Trenchard and Lord Sikka

Report stage
Wednesday 14th April 2021 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe is a tireless advocate of impact assessments. I support her proposal to require the Treasury to provide an annual impact assessment of the regulators’ activities. Some of our existing financial services regulation, such as AIFMD, Solvency II and parts of MiFID II, has already had a devastating effect on small business, innovation and the competitiveness of our financial markets. My noble friend’s Amendment 24 will mitigate further damage that might otherwise be done by the application of disproportionate or unduly burdensome rules.

The FCA’s first operational objective is consumer protection, so I do not understand the purpose of the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, in Amendment 25, which I think would make my noble friend’s amendment read rather strangely. It is a pity that the Minister is not willing to raise the importance of competitiveness of the markets as an objective of the FCA, but, in any event, I hope he will agree that the consumers’ interests are not assisted by measures that damage competitiveness, innovation and small businesses.

Amendment 37, in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, and the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, also refers to impact assessments in its heading. But it is too wide in its coverage. It is not reasonable to make the regulators responsible for matters such as poverty, regional inequality and economic development. Market distortions such as those which would be created by the adoption of this amendment would have an adverse effect on prosperity and economic development across the country, creating more poverty and reducing the scope for the alleviation of regional inequality such as the Government are championing through their levelling-up campaign.

[Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, on her amendment and her speech. I would like to speak to Amendment 37. The amendment requires the FCA and the PRA to embrace social responsibility by considering the impact and costs/benefits of the financial services industry. Currently, that receives little attention. There are such obligations on companies—in other words, they have to embrace social responsibility—so why not on regulators?

The noble Baroness has drawn attention to the finance curse upon the UK, which has inflicted at least £4,500 billion-worth of damage to the UK economy. It would be helpful to hear from the Minister about the limits of this negative impact on the UK and whether there are any limits to the growth of the finance industry, which can drive out other industries. After all, other industries also have to compete for resources.

For far too long, the social effects of the finance industry have been dismissed as externalities, and little weight is attached to them in any annual report of the FCA or the PRA. Under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000—FSMA—the FCA is required to

“promote effective competition in the interests of consumers in the markets for regulated financial services and services provided by a recognised investment exchange”

in carrying out certain regulated activities.

The FCA website states that one of its duties is to

“make markets work well—for individuals, for business, large and small, and for the economy as a whole.”

What analysis supports the claim that the FCA actually does this? It is hard to see how any of its statutory objectives can be met or demonstrated to have been met in the absence of any cost-benefit analysis, especially relating to the disappearance of bank branches or the very restricted access to financial services by the masses. This point was raised earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Naseby; I reuse it as an example to illustrate the failures of the FCA.

The absence of bank branches has a direct impact on poverty, regional inequality, economic development, production, distribution and the consumption of goods and services. The FCA acknowledges that 27.7 million adults at the moment are experiencing vulnerability to poor health, low financial resilience or recent negative life events. This is an increase of 15% since February 2020, when 24 million people were considered vulnerable. Yet no formal assessment is offered by the FCA as to why this is, what the role of the finance industry is and how these negative impacts can be alleviated.

I return to the issue of bank branches. Bank branch networks are a vital part of the financial infrastructure, but they have been shrinking at an accelerating rate, with many town centres and districts having no bank branches at all. Some banking services began to be provided by post offices—or bank branches moved into them—but they are closing too. Cash machines are also vanishing and increasingly require a fee, especially those located in the poorest areas. I have seen cash machines charging up to £4.99 for a withdrawal in a relatively poor area of London.

Branch closures result in exclusion from access to financial services. Many citizens, especially the elderly and those in low-income groups, do not have access to fast broadband connections or a computer. Computers in local libraries and homes are not necessarily secure and online fraud is a major risk. Strong signals for smartphones are not available throughout the country and there are too many blackspots. People without computers and smartphones cannot easily access any financial service. This cannot easily be reconciled with the government policy of reducing exclusion from financial services, and the FCA has not really said much about it.

The closure of bank branches means that the banking market is not working well, as many individuals and businesses are unable to access timely and effective financial services. Maybe the FCA interprets the “competition objective” given to it in very narrow economic terms and neglects the social dimension of making markets “work well”. It has done little to address the consequences of branch closures.

The closure of bank branches has severe consequences for financial services, local economies and the erosion of local competition. Bank branch closures impose costs on people, such as going to the next town for your banking: that is, the money spent on transport, the time taken up, extra pollution emanating from travel to the next town, road congestion and searching for the nearest suitable financial services facility—and, of course, there are cyber risks as well.

Some people may well trek to another town with a bank branch, but affordable and efficient transport from many locations, especially in rural areas, is not necessarily available. Trekking to another town is not an easy task for the elderly, the infirm, women with small children, or local entrepreneurs just keeping their head above water. A trader cannot afford to close business for a day, or half a day, to visit a bank branch in another town. In any case, the additional travel generates extra pollution and damages the environment. When people visit another town for their banking services, they end up doing their shopping there, which means that the local economy in the place where they live is also damaged.

Without local bank branches, local shopkeepers, traders and the self-employed cannot easily bank cash takings and cheques. This then increases the risks that they face. Without a local branch, banks cannot easily build an intelligent picture of local businesses, risks and opportunities, and thus cannot provide required financial support for local economies. One study has estimated that bank branch closures dampen SME lending by 63% on average in postcodes that lose a bank branch. This figure grows to 104% for postcodes that lose their last bank branch in town.

The closure of local bank branches increases commercial decline, as I indicated earlier, because people end up shopping in the town where they go for their banking. This accelerates economic decline and has effects on the local housing market, as well as on the provision already made for schools, healthcare and other facilities.

In the absence of local banking facilities, many people, especially the low-paid, may become victims of the payday lenders who charge exorbitant interest rates.

The amendment tabled asks the regulators to discharge their duties because, currently, it is one-way traffic: traffic from the state, taxpayers and people to the banks, and very little in return. On behalf of citizens and taxpayers, the state has bailed out banks; provided quantitative easing to lubricate their liquidity; acts as a lender of the last resort; provides almost free raw material—that is, cash with very low interest rates; protects bank deposits of up to £85,000; and bolsters the bank customer base, and thus the ability of banks to sell services to newer customers, because the state insists that social security payments are made through banks. What exactly is it that the banks offer the public in return? It is hard to see what we are getting in return. We are not getting competition in financial services; we are not getting bank branches that are open and accessible to the masses. There appears to be no quid pro quo from the finance industry. All that people are getting is shrinking access to financial services.

The FCA, as a regulator, has a duty to see that the markets work well for everybody. It has not done so. How can it deliver that duty when people simply do not have access to financial services or have very restricted access?

It is quite likely that, in meeting the objectives of the proposed amendment, the regulators might actually talk to normal people and ask how they are affected by changes in the financial services industry. If this amendment was to be enacted one day, I hope that it would make the regulators more people-friendly.

Financial Services Bill

Debate between Viscount Trenchard and Lord Sikka

Committee stage
Wednesday 10th March 2021 Grand Committee

[Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I wanted to provide some examples of the kind of questions which the supervisory board might raise. For example, it could ask the FCA/PRA executive board to explain the delay in securing compensation for the victims of the HBOS and RBS frauds—that could be one question; I shall give a few more examples. It could ask why no one at the board level of HBOS and RBS has so far been prosecuted or why HSBC took 20 hours to respond to calls on its fraud helpline—which is of concern to many people. It could ask whether it was appropriate for the FCA to commission Section 166 reports from organisations involved in antisocial practices, or what progress the FCA had made in dealing with the issues relating to banks forging customers’ signatures. It could ask what policies were being developed to deal with global warming—which, again, is of interest to many people. It could ask what the regulators were doing to protect people from predatory lending practices—payday lending problems have not gone away, as we all know—or to protect businesses, especially small businesses, from excessive charges by credit card companies. It could ask what the PRA was doing to address the shortcomings of the Basel III recommendations. Lastly, as we all know that a remit of the FCA is to promote competition in respect of financial services, the supervisory board could ask how the FCA would do that given that many towns now lack bank branches.

These kinds of probing questions do not interfere with the day-to-day running, but they provide oversight and they push back against regulatory silence and capture. A supervisory board will erode the space for regulators to sweep things under their dusty carpets. It can transform our country and ensure that regulators work to protect the people and address their concerns.

Ministers often say that regulators are there to serve the people, so what objections can there be to empowering people to sit on the supervisory boards and democratise the regulatory structures and our society? Empowering people has a much lower cost than that associated with scandals and financial crisis.

I beg to move the amendment.

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, I understand that Amendment 120 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, seeks to establish a supervisory board for the two regulators. My first thought was that the noble Lord intended that this board should function in the same way as a joint co-ordination committee, as proposed in Amendment 86 in the name of my noble friend Lord Blackwell, which we debated on Monday. The explanatory statement, however, does not suggest that the board would co-ordinate the activities of the two regulators; rather, it would simply monitor the executive boards of the regulators and provide a diversity of views on their conduct.

From his opening remarks, I understand that the noble Lord’s intention is very different. While there have inevitably been some mistakes, I do not recognise the picture that he paints. The regulators have always been willing to learn from what has not gone as well as it might have. As long as the PRA and FCA remain separate organisations with different functions and objectives, it seems to me that this supervisory board would, in effect, have two separate personae or incarnations. It would have to function separately as a supervisory board of the FCA and as one of the PRA. I think it cannot be a part of the legal structure of either regulator or of both regulators. It would seem to duplicate the arrangements for parliamentary oversight which we have discussed and on which I would ask my noble friend the Minister to tell the Committee how his thinking is developing.

The amendment refers to the executive board of the PRA, although the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, should be aware that the board of the PRA was replaced by the Prudential Regulation Committee of the Bank of England in 2017. I do not think that such a supervisory board would replace the need for parliamentary scrutiny of the regulators, which will in itself provide appropriate transparency and accountability, rather than the completely crushing, destructive oversight that I believe the noble Lord’s new board would cause. It would be a cumbersome, expensive and bureaucratic body that would have a negative effect on the future attractiveness and competitiveness of the City of London as a global financial centre, so I cannot support his amendment.

Financial Services Bill

Debate between Viscount Trenchard and Lord Sikka

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 24th February 2021 Grand Committee

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interests as stated in the register. I support both Amendments 10 and 26 in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes. They do not mean that Parliament would be seeking to usurp the role of the regulators, or to attempt to rewrite MiFID II which, according to Forbes Magazine, has required 30,000 pages to explain its regulations.

It is right that the Bill enables our regulators to act quickly and flexibly to respond to changes in the markets or the introduction of new financial products. However, without the scrutiny formerly carried out by the European Parliament of each and every detail of regulations and directives, it is necessary that Parliament should have oversight of the regulators’ work. My noble friend is right that we need to agree the optimum balance and how this will be done before the powers conferred upon the PRA and FCA are made available for them to use.

Amendments 18 and 19 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, are motivated by a desire to continue to align to EU regulation, even though there are no expectations that the EU will make any further significant equivalence declarations in the short term. Amendment 19 places a large, poorly defined burden on the FCA to show where and how its draft rules have been influenced. It is clear that the FCA will consider many external factors in drafting its rules. As your Lordships know, it is intended to agree a basis on which both regulators will be made accountable to your Lordships’ House and another place for the way in which they carry out their work. Accordingly, I think it would be too restrictive on the FCA if this amendment were supported. It would also create uncertainty over the Bank of England’s ability to act quickly as necessary in exercising its macroprudential responsibilities.

Similarly, Amendment 20 seeks to allow committees of your Lordships’ House and another place to publish a report on proposed Part 9C rules. It is not clear which committees these will be in the future. It would slow down changes that the FCA will want to make quickly, which could be damaging to the standing and competitiveness of the City. Perhaps my noble friend can tell the House how the Government intend to amend the Bill in order to provide for the necessary scrutiny of acts of the regulators. I am not sure that that would be the effect of Amendment 22, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. The Government’s intention, which I support, is that we should move away from the cumbersome, codified nature of rules. I would expect the PRA to try to make rules that are shorter and clearer than the regulations they replace. It would not always be appropriate for them to include the full text of the general rules to be replaced.

Amendment 27, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, seems to place a very heavy demand on Parliament to become closely involved in what our regulators do at international conferences, in a way that might be too restrictive on their freedom to participate fully at those conferences. This would be likely to weaken British influence on the outcomes of discussions and decisions made at such conferences.

In Amendment 38, the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, seeks to duplicate other arrangements which will be made to institute the necessary parliamentary accountability and again appears motivated by a desire to continue to align to EU rules. If the Government can bring forward an amendment to increase the attention that the PRA is required to give to the competitiveness of the markets, as strongly proposed by several noble Lords on Monday, I would suggest that Amendment 38 might be unnecessary.

While considering this matter, can the Minister confirm that it remains the Treasury’s intention to advise the Bank of England not to adopt a similar measure to the EBA to permit banks to capitalise software investments for the purpose of stress testing? This is one example of where, instead of equivalence, we will have higher standards than the EU, although regulatory standards are often not two-dimensional, high or low.

The effect of Amendment 39 is surely to transfer back to Parliament the detailed rule-making powers. Quite apart from the fact that neither your Lordships’ House nor another place is equipped to carry out such detailed, line-by-line scrutiny, the amendment would seriously slow down rule-changing, removing agility and flexibility from the regulators.

Amendment 40 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, does not remove the ultimate power to change rules from the regulator but introduces a cumbersome process involving the issuance of reports by committees of both Houses. Does the noble Lord intend these committees to be new standing committees, and how will they be resourced? I also note that in the case of a draft being laid, say, a week before Parliament rises in July, it might be three months before 20 sitting days of either House have elapsed.

I do not understand the intention of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, in introducing Amendment 71—a requirement separately for the Treasury Committee in another place to assess the FCA’s conduct prior to the appointment of a new chief executive.

My noble friend Lord Blackwell’s Amendment 85 makes an interesting proposal as to how the regulators should be made accountable to Parliament. Does my noble friend Lord Howe think that, as far as your Lordships’ House is concerned, scrutiny would come from an existing or soon to be established Select Committee, such as the strangely named Industry and Regulators Committee, or whether a new standing committee should be set up to exercise these functions?

The noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Bennachie, in his Amendment 137 seeks to place a statutory duty to consult the devolved Administrations over a reserved matter. We await with bated breath the publication of the Dunlop review, which should inform us of how the Government intend to manage relations with the devolved Administrations in the future, including on reserved matters. However, I cannot support the noble Lord’s amendment, which is unnecessary and provocative to certain elements within the devolved authorities.

I look forward to other noble Lords’ contributions and the Minister’s reply.

[Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 71, which is in my name and supported by the noble Baronesses, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle and Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans.

The amendment seeks to strengthen the effectiveness of financial regulation and calls for scrutiny of the FCA’s conduct by the Treasury Committee prior to the appointment or reappointment of its chief executive. It effectively calls on the committee to act as a guide dog to the watchdog. We all know that effective regulation is a necessary condition for protecting people from malpractices, holding miscreants to account and promoting confidence in the finance industry.

The FCA has failed to deliver robust and effective enforcement and it needs to be helped. Its failures are documented everywhere. The recent report by Dame Elizabeth Gloster on the collapse of London Capital & Finance noted that the FCA did not discharge its functions in respect of LCF in a manner that enabled it to effectively fulfil its statutory objectives and that there were significant gaps and weaknesses in its practices. From my perspective, even more damning was the revelation that FCA staff were not even trained to read financial information to recognise unusual or suspicious transactions.

Another report on the scandal-ridden Connaught Income Fund concluded that the FCA’s regulation of the entities and individuals was not appropriate or effective. We are still awaiting the report on the Woodford Equity Income Fund, when thousands of investors are trapped. Regrettably that is not an independent investigation, but we await the outcome with considerable interest.

The FCA failed to act in the case of Carillion, a company that collapsed in January 2018. Carillion inflated its balance sheet and profits through aggressive accounting practices. These included the use of mark-to-market accounting, enabling the company to leave at least £1.1 billion-worth of worthless contracts on its balance sheet. It failed to amortise £1.57 billion of good will, which was effectively worthless. The company was disseminating that misleading information to the markets but the FCA took no action whatever. Curiously, on 18 September 2020, nearly 21 months after Carillion’s collapse, the FCA issued a warning notice saying that the company and some of its directors had recklessly misled markets and investors over the deteriorating state of its finances before the company collapsed. Where was the FCA for all the earlier years while Carillion was publishing that misleading information? It was nowhere to be seen.

There is now considerable public evidence that the banks have been forging customers’ signatures to alter key documents and repossess customers’ businesses and homes, and that evidence has been published in the mainstream media. I understand that there are over 500 documented cases and the FCA has not even started any investigation. A senior Metropolitan Police fraud officer wrote to the Treasury Select Committee in 2017, stating that the executive boards of some of the most prominent banks were “serious organised crime syndicates”, yet that has not resulted in any action by the FCA.

The bank RBS has systematically defrauded its customers but the FCA has been dragging its feet, often pushed by parliamentary committees and others to do its job. In November 2013 a 20-page report prepared by Lawrence Tomlinson summarised this abuse of bank customers and small businesses at RBS’s global restructuring group, or GRG. The Tomlinson report stated that rather than nurturing small businesses, the bank actually pulled the financial rug and sent them to premature bankruptcy. GRG operated from 2005 to 2013, and at its peak handled 16,000 companies with total assets of around £65 billion. A proportion of those companies were not viable but a great number were and had never defaulted on loans. The FCA’s approach was to bury its own Section 166 report on the RBS frauds. In February 2018, the Treasury Committee ignored the FCA’s reluctance and published the report. The committee said:

“The treatment of vast numbers of SME customers placed in RBS’s Global Restructuring Group was nothing short of scandalous.”


In June 2019 the FCA published what it described as its final report on the investigation into RBS’s treatment of small and medium-sized businesses. The co-chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Fair Business Banking and Finance said:

“This report is another complete whitewash and another demonstrable failure of the regulator to perform its role.”


The timidity of the FCA is also evident from the long-running HBOS frauds, which show no sign of resolution. In 2013, a report codenamed “Project Lord Turnbull” was published by Sally Masterton, Lloyds senior manager in credit risk oversight in the regulation and governance section of its risk division. It was prepared in response to inquiries made during Thames Valley Police’s investigation into the frauds at the Reading branch of HBOS, and also covered the period before the 2007-08 banking crash and bailouts and the subsequent takeover of HBOS by Lloyds Banking Group. The report noted that HBOS executives had “concealed” asset-stripping frauds at its Reading branch ahead of the bank’s takeover by Lloyds in 2008. The FCA did nothing to bring fraudsters to book.