(1 year, 8 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I was waiting to hear what the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, said on this amendment. I am afraid I cannot support her this time, although we agree on a lot of things. I accept that this is a hard call. The way I look at it, this goes back to our discussion about whether you follow rigid rules or you want people to think about what they are doing. Ultimately, there has to be a desire for people operating in financial services to think about what they are doing in all circumstances. Therefore, I see that as a proper override.
What has been portrayed as the ultra-right wing libertarian approach of just doing things and then being for the high jump if you get it wrong—that is a caricature, I accept—relies on your having done what is right in principle. Some things will not be fair if you merely follow a rigid set of rules. Therefore, it is right that there is a “fair and reasonable in the circumstances” backstop. It is right that if such things happen, there should be discussions about what it means for the generality.
However, it is not right for the FCA to have an automatic override and say, “We’re right, and our rigid rules derived from principles”—because they abandon principles once we have rules—“can never be wrong”, and that people should not have been thinking actively about these things, particularly while they were dealing with customers and individuals. I understand where the noble Baroness is coming from, but I cannot support this. I plug again that we should expect that extra level of thought. This again goes to the heart of having a duty of care. It is the same argument. A duty of care does not mean, “I just do what I’ve always done and got away with” or “I just do what everybody else appears to have done, turn the handle and don’t think about it.” It is a fundamental principle of caring for the consumer that at least the ombudsman can continue with. I heartily think that we need a dash more of it in the Financial Conduct Authority.
My Lords, I support my noble friend Lady Noakes in her amendment. As she has explained well, Clause 38 requires the FCA, the FOS and the FSCS to co-operate and to consult with each other in exercising their statutory functions. However, it is important that FOS decisions with wider implications do not diverge from FCA rules, or there may be unintended consequences, and predictability and consistency may be negatively affected.
As my noble friend just said, this does not mean that the FCA or the FOS should act without thinking very carefully about what they are doing. Her amendment takes account of that and would be likely to encourage real thought about the consequences of making a particular decision in any case. Besides, Parliament never intended the FOS to be a quasi-regulator. UK Finance has recommended that the FCA should be given a power to overrule a decision by the FOS where it believes that the decision could have wider and perhaps unforeseen implications. My noble friend’s amendment would deal effectively with this potential problem.
Of course, the granting of additional powers to the FCA strengthens further the case that the FCA must be properly accountable to Parliament, and I regret that I have not yet heard my noble friend the Minister acknowledge that, as drafted, the Bill does not provide adequate arrangements for this. I firmly believe that a properly resourced joint committee is how to achieve that.
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, for the purposes of today’s debates I again remind Grand Committee of my financial services interests as in the register.
I have signed Amendments 103 and 104 and agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, so I will not repeat what has already been said. It is a subject that the noble Baroness pursues with diligence, and it is right to do so, even if at times—at least as far as I am concerned—the scope and content of impact assessments are a little disappointing. The amendment relates to the final impact assessments as rules are coming into effect, although, of course, to be useful, impact assessments are needed at each stage. Indeed, if proportionality is to be properly taken into account, that is surely a prerequisite for the regulator.
But returning again to the FiSMA theme, where much of the proportionality, flexibility—call it what you will—will be done on an institution-by-institution basis, so the rules will enable that but not demonstrate how it is to be carried out, I am not sure how that will be properly assessed in an impact assessment based only on the rules. Therefore, it will also be important to be able to capture what actually happens after the rules have come into operation. That might be by way of a retrospective impact assessment after a period of time, and would seem to be another matter that Parliament will need to investigate.
Included in that, it should be relevant to capture the effects of frequency of rule change, which is presently greatly emphasised by regulators and the Government as part of the reasoning behind the Bill, yet somehow I doubt that rule churning was what industry felt it was signing up for by supporting FiSMA. It will be important to understand the scale and nature of that rule tweaking. Amendment 104 gets in part to that with the Government producing a report, but perhaps it should be part of the annual report or an annual impact assessment from the regulators, so that it can be further queried and those regulated can be interviewed by the relevant parliamentary committee. So perhaps the Minister can confirm how this frequency of tweaking will be tracked, what is the Government’s planned part in it and would they support Amendment 104 in particular as part of the way to do that?
My Lords, I declare again my interests as stated in the register in respect of financial services companies. I am delighted to support Amendments 103 and 104 in the name of my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe. My noble friend is a champion of impact assessments and she speaks from experience. The impact of many financial services regulations on smaller firms has been very damaging. I mention just two examples. The unbundling provisions contained within the MiFID II directive, requiring asset management companies to pay separately for research, have been disastrous in their effect on smaller companies with interesting strategies, which have either been forced out of business or forced into mergers where their innovative strategies have not been taken forward. The effects have been less choice for customers and less coverage as a result of the significant reduction in the number of securities analysts, particularly those covering smaller and growth companies.
The effects were predictable, but ESMA ploughed ahead and the FCA acquiesced. It is small comfort now that ESMA itself realises that the unbundling provisions were a mistake, and may move to make changes, but much damage has been done. An impact assessment, such as recommended by my noble friend, would have avoided this.
I also mention the alternative investment fund managers directive. When I worked in Brussels as director-general of the European Fund and Asset Management Association —EFAMA—my French and German colleagues said that they did not think that the EU should move to regulate alternative funds; that was London’s market, and largely London’s alone. Furthermore, it was of interest only to professional investors, who did not need protection from investment risks. They thought that it would be wrong for the EU to try to regulate it. However, three years later, Michel Barnier, as Commissioner for the Internal Market, moved to introduce the AIFMD. Again we were overruled and reluctantly went along with it. An impact assessment might have encouraged the FSA to fight harder against it than it did.
For the reasons so well explained by my noble friend, I support her amendments and look forward to hearing the Minister’s reply.
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, has reminded us that this is the clause where the legislation on the CRR gets waived away into rules without any legislative replacement. This follows the pattern that the Government proposed in their consultation: once there are rules from the regulators, the statutory instruments are revoked.
Paragraph 2.25 of the Financial Services Future Regulatory Framework Review states:
“The default approach would be for any retained EU law provision that is in scope of the regulators’ FSMA rule-making powers to be taken off the statute book to become the responsibility of the appropriate regulator.”
Therefore, although there may be consultations on replacement rules at the point of revoking the SIs, there are no checks further down the track, so at some time further on all the rules could be revoked too. As a practical matter, that will not happen, but it is possible that for some things big changes could happen. It is probably more of a worry when it is happening to the wider generality of financial services legislation than with standards that are underpinned by Basel provisions, but I make this point because the Minister said on Monday at the start of Committee that everything is being listened to in the context of the consultation, although I must say that his replies so far do not inspire too much confidence.
It may seem convenient to have a more flexible arrangement of having regulators doing everything and not bothering Parliament with statutory instruments, and the view being pushed by the Government seems to be that Parliament should not become too bothered by rules because they contain frightening Greek letters such as Σ that really just indicate some very simple sums that could easily be explained in a sentence. Underlying that is that there should not really be challenge, only fig leaves and what the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, called the rear-view mirror.
Even though I have no great love of statutory instruments as a measure for showing parliamentary consent, there is a qualitative difference compared with rules, and I want to flag up that this clause is where the notion that we will no longer have any firm policy against which to hold the regulator accountable is endorsed. From here on, the regulator makes the policy, and there is no policy guidance between the regulator’s rules and the simple objectives, have-regards clauses and perhaps a few generalised statements, such as supporting UK economic growth. I do not like this sparseness, and it is ridiculous to suggest that rules are constantly, rapidly needing change. That is not true and not internationally sustainable.
To some extent the Government acknowledge this, otherwise there would not be the statement in the consultation that some things may have to be put into SIs as a consequence of equivalence decisions. So other countries can measure our standards, but not Parliament. How embarrassing. I heard what the Minister said in reply to my equivalence information point in the first group today. He said that such things may have to stay out of the public domain—at least until they become a statutory instrument—but I never suggested that they be public, just that there should be some sharing with Parliament about the policy direction. I am pretty sure that the EU will take the view that regulator rules alone are not enough and are potentially too transient when it comes to such a large financial centre as London, not least when it comes to looking at the lavish use of “bespoke”, which was always one of Brussel’s most hated words because it thought, and I tend to agree, that it was tailoring cut to flatter and trick the eye. That is fine for clothes, but not so good for financial services rules.
As I want to mark resistance to this passing of all policy to the regulators so they end up held accountable only to their own rules, I support the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, in the suggestion that Clause 3 does not stand part.
My Lords, I understand the purpose of Amendments 24 and 25, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, but do they suggest that he would like to stick with the enormously detailed and prescriptive provisions of the CRR as they are in retained EU law? The Government’s intention to transfer most of the provisions of the CRR into more flexible rules is right. The PRA will be able to react more quickly if it needs to change particular rules, and this should reduce the risk of failure of banks in the future.
The Government have been clear that the UK’s regulators are the right people to set the detailed, firm-level rules to implement the remaining Basel standards. Of course, as discussed in previous debates, and supported by noble Lords on all sides of the Committee, we need proper parliamentary oversight of the PRA before it starts to use its new powers. The wording in the noble Lord’s amendments suggests that he wishes to reduce the degree of flexibility that the Treasury will grant the PRA, but I think that that might be counterproductive. Does he not accept that, as we move to a simpler, more flexible, outcomes-based regulatory framework, there should be less detailed prescriptive rules?
The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, wants to retain all the CRR rules in legislation. I cannot agree with her approach, which might damage the attractiveness of the City as a financial centre. She referred to Singapore-on-Thames, which is becoming a fashionable way to describe a light-touch regulatory regime, but is she not aware that Singapore is one of the best and most strictly regulated centres in the world? It is strict, yes, but much simpler and less cumbersome and bureaucratic. Does the Minister agree that we need to return to a simpler, different, more flexible and agile regulatory style?
(4 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I share the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, about the creeping power of HMRC to demand information, potentially from anyone, without any controls or supervision. I am a member of the Finance Bill Sub-Committee, and this is a matter that we, too, are investigating in our current inquiry.
Here in the Bill there is another swathe of powers, or potential powers. I am not against powers to investigate or to make sure that any taxes due are properly paid; the problem comes with generalised powers that can then be used beyond what might be called their proper limit, or exercised by individuals at relatively junior level without appropriate training. We have seen that before. HMRC also has a track record of being rather heavy-handed on innocent or easy victims—as with the loan charge—and missing the big fish.
Against that background, Clause 7 is drawn too wide. Clause 7(1), which kicks off the provision, is worded to cover any person. It is not limited to whether they have an interest or are connected in any way with the trade, business or profession. It could enable fishing anywhere—and potentially compulsorily under regulations made via Clause 7(3). Clause 7(3) also seeks to be able to amend Acts of Parliament on the type of information required and how the request is to be made, again without limitations. If it follows HMRC’s present trend, that could include seeking the disclosure of information that would normally require the approval of a court. I expect that that is intended, as it is in the current Finance Bill. That is already unacceptable, but at least it is in a Bill; it would become even more unacceptable were it done by regulation.
Once HMRC had got such information, Clause 8 would permit it to allow the onward disclosure of that information—again, at HMRC’s own discretion—which should not be allowed, and most certainly not in blanket form.
My Lords, I support Amendment 84 in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes, which she moved so eloquently. Like her, I am a strong supporter of the Government’s trade policies, but I share her wariness about the Bill’s powers to require disclosure of information. I believe that it is not the kind of thing a Conservative Government should do, in so far as those powers go beyond what is absolutely necessary.
I also agree with my noble friend’s Amendment 87, and I ask my noble friend the Minister to explain exactly which other functions the Government had in mind when they drafted the rather convoluted language of subsection (2). I also agree with my noble friend’s Amendment 88. Why does the Minister think that HMRC should have the power to disclose what may well be sensitive information, the disclosure of which might have an anti-competitive effect?
I also have some sympathy with Amendment 85 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton. Can the Minister explain in what circumstances he thinks it would be necessary and reasonable to use this Henry VIII power?