Great British Energy Bill

Viscount Trenchard Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 15th January 2025 Grand Committee

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)]

My Lords, any noble Lords who were not able to speak on Monday and who wish to speak before the opposition spokesman may now do so.

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

At the point when the Committee decided to adjourn its deliberations on Monday, I was about to make a brief intervention in support of my noble friend Lady Noakes and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. As my noble friend Lady Noakes explained, GBE will be a private company, which would normally allow it nine months in which to file its accounts. As my noble friend explained on Monday, Amendment 88 changes that to six months, in line with the requirement for public companies. GBE may not be a public company technically, but it certainly is a company of huge interest to the public. It is therefore obviously right that the company should be required to prepare its accounts in accord with the rules applicable to public companies, rather than taking advantage of the more lenient requirement applicable to private companies.

In his remarks in the House yesterday, the Minister said that he recognised that it was the role of the Opposition to scrutinise legislation. But I ask the noble Lord: is it not actually the role of the whole House to scrutinise legislation, including the Government’s own Back-Benchers? He probably did not mean it when he said that it was the role of the Opposition.

[The Minister of State, Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (Lord Hunt of Kings Heath) (Lab)]

The point was that I was responding to a comment made by the Opposition Chief Whip about scrutiny. But of course I very much take the point that this is a matter for the whole House. The very fact that my noble friend Lady Young spoke to this group shows how effective that scrutiny can be.

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

I thank the Minister for his kind explanation, which certainly clarifies that. As far as my interventions on Monday are concerned— I spoke at length and several times—I take issue with and very much resent being accused of having filibustered. If the noble Lord looks at my contributions, he will find that they were all different.

I suggest that one reason why there have been so many amendments to the Bill is that so little was included in it. It is very thin Bill, but it has £8 billion of public money. Many of us are puzzled that GBE is being established effectively with £8 billion of public money, whereas Great British Nuclear, which has no public money to speak of, continues to operate in a kind of silo. I recognise that the noble Lord attempted to reassure the Committee about how GBN and GBE will work together, but I do not think that they can be described as comparable organisations.

I had intended to support my noble friend Lady Noakes and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, on Amendment 88, and I added my name to it. I think that it is necessary because although GBE is intended to be structured as a public company, it will have only one shareholder, the Secretary of State. As my noble friend explained on Monday—she is well known as an expert in these matters—we must be sure that GBE will be managed according to the standards that would be expected by shareholders in public companies. That is why changing the nine-month provision for filing accounts to six months is so necessary.

I have also added my name to Amendment 89, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Vaux and Lord Cameron, and my noble friend Lady Noakes. It is particularly important that the accounts must comply with the stipulation in proposed subsection (d), to provide

“an assessment of the extent to which”

any investments made or partnerships entered into

“have encouraged additional investment by the private sector”.

It is clear that the very long incubation period for nuclear projects places them outside the criteria for many private sector investors, but some public investment can be effective in unlocking private investment through match funding, as the Rolls-Royce SMR programme has already shown.

I also support Amendment 92, in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes and that of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, which would ensure that the Comptroller and Auditor-General must audit GBE’s accounts.

[Lord Roborough (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 88, in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes, would require more timely publication of GB Energy’s accounts, in line with public rather than private company reporting. I also support Amendment 89, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden. On earlier groups I have addressed the limitations of private and public company reporting versus that of listed companies. I made that argument, given that taxpayers’ money, raised at great cost through tax increases impacting pensioners, farmers and all businesses in this country, is being invested. All this appears to have fallen on somewhat deaf ears with the Minister, who seems determined to avoid anything but the lowest level of scrutiny, transparency or accountability as to how GB Energy invests this, at least, £8.3 billion.

I also alluded to my comments in the debate on the King’s Gracious Speech and I remind the Committee of exactly what I said:

“it is private capital that has driven the rollout of renewables and infrastructure in our country, and it appears that Great British Energy will be targeting investments that private capital alone will not finance. That does not fill our Benches with confidence that these investments will necessarily be judicious. Please can the Minister assure the House that GB Energy will report on the performance of its investments regularly and in detail and that the Government will be held accountable in this House for the performance of those investments?”.—[Official Report, 18/7/24; col. 36.]

In response to this question, I received the following reply from the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock:

“The cost to the taxpayer of its set-up and investments will be carefully managed and monitored through Parliament, and investments will be subject to safeguards and risk assessments, similar to established public finance institutions”.—[Official Report, 18/7/24; col. 126.]


That answer may not have been the answer that I was looking for, nor the answer that I may be seeking today, which many amendments tabled to the Bill have also sought, but it does seem to offer at least some scrutiny through Parliament. It does not appear to me that the Minister here today is offering even that level of scrutiny in the Bill. His response in previous groups to amendments seeking this transparency and accountability has been:

“the existing reporting requirements are set out in the Bill, which makes provision for GBE to produce and publish an annual report and accounts”.—[Official Report, 13/1/25; col. 942.]

It is hard to disagree that the reporting requirements as determined by the Government are set out in the Bill. However, the point that these amendments, and many others already debated, make is that this is simply not adequate. One set of accounts published annually up to nine months after the year end, with the potential for minimal levels of detailed reporting, is effectively writing GB Energy a blank cheque, with next to no external oversight.

As other noble Lords have suggested to the Minister, if the Government were willing to table amendments to allow for greater scrutiny in a timely manner of the financial performance of investments, and the progress in achieving the overall objectives of increasing employment, reducing household electricity bills and reducing carbon emissions, I am sure that the Committee could be satisfied, without taking so much time making similar points. On previous groups the Minister has called this filibustering. That is an unfair characterisation, at least of the groups that I have taken part in. The Government have proven deaf to the Committee’s reasonable requests, but that will not make them go away.

I am particularly taken by Amendment 89 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and not in the least surprised to see that it has so many supporters. It avoids amendments to Clause 6, which the Minister has pointed out is the wrong place in the Bill for such amendments, and to which my noble friend Lady Noakes has given authoritative support, but it addresses key reporting requirements around the receipt of subsidies, reporting on individual investments, achievement of objectives and strategic priorities, and impacts on the wider financial ecosystem. For these reasons, I believe it is an excellent amendment. However, it may still be lacking by relying on the relatively lax Companies House requirements for limited companies, so I also support Amendment 88 in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes to make reporting in line with that for public companies.

As I have argued in previous groups, in support of my noble friend Lord Petitgas, who is in his place, there is a strong argument that quarterly reporting should also be required, in line with the listing requirements for publicly traded companies. As I have pointed out, if companies worth less than £100 million can comply with this, I do not believe it is a challenge for the £8.3 billion-plus GB Energy. This would also impose more disciplined reporting on GB Energy’s investees.

Why is it that the Government are so resistant to GB Energy showing proper transparency and accountability, even less than the modest commitments that I read in my response to the King’s Speech? What do the Government fear, if they are so convinced that it is worth while taking so much taxpayers’ money and investing it in energy, which in theory will be a good financial deal for the taxpayer? Last year’s business-unfriendly Budget, despite the protestations that it was pro-business and pro-growth, fills us all with concern that this Government do not understand business.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, with the leave of the Committee I shall move Amendment 93 at the request of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, who, as I say, is unable to attend today. I will speak also to Amendment 121A, also in her name.

Amendment 93 says:

“The Secretary of State must prepare a framework document”


to cover

“the relationship between the Secretary of State, Great British Energy and any other relevant public sector bodies … The framework document must cover the operating and financial principles”,

at least, to be adopted by Great British Energy. Once finalised, the framework document must be laid before Parliament.

Amendment 121A goes a little further and would defer commencement of the Act until the framework document has been laid before Parliament. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and I have several times contrasted the parliamentary passage of the UK Infrastructure Bank Bill with that of this Bill. In particular, she has raised the absence of a draft framework document for Great British Energy. All we know in relation to GBE is that the founding statement published for it last July said that a framework document would be established in due course. The Minister has not yet given any indication of the timing for that framework document.

I would not normally expect a Bill establishing a public sector body to contain a requirement for a framework document. That is because it is a document routinely put in place between the Government and public bodies, and there should be no question of a body commencing operation until all the details are in place. Hence, when we scrutinised the UK Infrastructure Bank Bill, an advanced draft was made available to those of us taking part in the Bill, which was extremely helpful in our debates. We knew the detail of what the Government were planning, and how they were intending to deliver it, which is missing from this Bill.

Although framework documents have no legal force, they set out in some detail what the Government expect of the new body. Sometimes they cover detail that could have been included in primary legislation, but usually the detail is of a nature likely to change over time and, hence, is inappropriate for statute. The important point, however, is that considerable thought and work are put into the contents of that document.

As we have discussed, it is clear that with GBE, the Government have not yet put in all the hard work on how it is to operate in practice, and what rules and restrictions will be necessary. The Minister has confirmed that this is under way and explained the thinness of the Bill on the basis that the Government had to get on with legislating, and that details would follow. That is not a sound basis for legislating, and failure to provide fuller details on things such as the framework document or strategic priorities treats the process of legislative scrutiny in a somewhat disrespectful manner. We have already discussed the concerns raised in that respect by the Constitution Committee.

I will quickly run through the key contents of the framework document for what is now the National Wealth Fund—what was the UK Infrastructure Bank—which will illustrate the things that we should have expected to see advanced drafts of by now. It sets out the strategic objectives for the National Wealth Fund. These might, or might not, be the same as required by Clause 5 of this Bill. We have seen no draft or even an outline of the strategic priorities that the Secretary of State will set under Clause 5, so we do not know whether to expect strategic objectives in the framework document. Objectives and priorities ought to be different things, but we are completely in the dark at the moment.

There are a number of operating principles, which are extremely important. They include the requirement to make a positive financial return over time, and a double bottom line—a phrase used frequently during passage of the UK Infrastructure Bank Bill, another complicated Bill—of achieving both the strategic objectives and financial return. We ought to know the financial objectives of GBE by now, especially in view of the open-ended financial assistance power in Clause 4, which might mean that GBE will not be required to make a financial return.

Another operating principle is that of additionality, by prioritising investments where there is an undersupply of private sector finance. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, asked whether additionality applied to GBE at Second Reading but did not receive a suitable answer, and I have raised this principle a number of times, including in the previous group. It would be helpful if the Minister spoke a little about the expectations for additionality for GBE. It is another fundamental question that Parliament ought to be informed about before allowing this Bill to become law.

Another section of the framework document sets out investment principles. It describes the kinds of investment that are to be undertaken and those which are not allowed. Not only must individual investments support its core objectives, they must also be intended to deliver a positive financial return, and to crowd in significant private capital. We have no idea what the guiding principles for investments made by GBE are. There is also a lot in the framework document on governance and other matters.

The key questions are whether we will see a framework document and when. I would not go as far as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, in Amendment 121A, which would delay commencement, but it is essential that we see a framework document as early as possible. Given the lack of detail in the Bill, it is important that the company should have to do that. I beg to move.

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to follow the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, in speaking to Amendment 93, which he moved on behalf on my noble friend Lady Noakes. I have also added my name to this amendment.

As has been said several times in our debates, this is in essence a framework or enabling Bill but one that gives a large number of Henry VIII powers to the Secretary of State. A requirement to produce a framework document setting out the operating and financial principles that GBE will use would be a significant improvement to the Bill, as the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, explained so eloquently. It is essential that the principles underpinning the relationship between the Secretary of State and GBE should be publicly understood and supported. The arguments that I have previously used in relation to my Amendment 86A also apply here; other relevant public bodies, as mentioned in that amendment, clearly include GBN, NWF, NESO, Ofgem and Mission Control.

I also support my noble friend Lady Noakes in her Amendment 121A, which I think is justified in the circumstances, but I would certainly like to hear the Minister’s view on it. Amendment 121A would ensure that the framework document is laid before Parliament before the Act comes into force.

[Earl Russell (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak briefly on this group of amendments.

I generally give my support to Amendment 93. I understand that these things are being done quickly and urgently to get GBE established and that the Government need to get that done, but there is a general lack of detail in the Bill and we do not have the framework agreement. If the Minister could update the Committee on where that framework document is and what stage it is at, that would be useful. In the interests of trying to find a compromise and a way forward on these issues, I do not know whether it might be possible for the Minister to provide the equivalent of heads of terms or to say something from the Dispatch Box about what he would expect the framework document to cover or to send us an outline of what is likely to be in that document. We are keen to support the principles of this Bill, but the Bill is extremely short and lacks detail.

On the other side of the fence, there is a slight feeling that we are being asked to approve things without knowing what it is we are approving. If it were possible to find a way forward on these issues before Report, that would be appreciated, but I am interested to hear from the Minister what stage these documents are at and what impediments there may be beyond the Minister’s control in these matters.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 103, and thank the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Dillington and the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, for their support. As we have heard, once again we are returning to transparency and accountability.

Amendment 103 is similar to Amendment 94, which has just been introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Offord, but with some important differences. As we have discussed before, and as the noble Lord, Lord Offord, has just mentioned, most of this Bill has been copied across from the UK Infrastructure Bank Act, but with most of the transparency and accountability provisions removed. In particular, Section 9 of that Act, which provides for independent reviews of the effectiveness and impact of the bank—now the National Wealth Fund—has been omitted.

The Minister has previously explained that the reason for this omission was that no such reviews were included in the Energy Act in respect of Great British Nuclear, and he feels that this is the precedent which should apply here. That argument holds no water at all. Great British Nuclear is a completely different entity, with completely different activities. It has a clearly defined and specific role initially to administer the process to select which small modular reactor technology the UK will choose. It has a relatively small budget—I think it was £157 million initially—and it is not intended to invest directly in those technologies. Great British Nuclear has an important role, but it is very different to what is apparently planned for GBE.

GBE will, in effect, take over a substantial and important area of the National Wealth Fund’s activity, investing directly in projects and businesses. It has an initial budget of £8.3 billion, which is nearly a third of the National Wealth Fund’s budget. It is worth reminding noble Lords that there is no limit in the Bill on how much public money GBE can spend. Indeed, the activities of GBE and the National Wealth Fund are so close that, initially, the National Wealth Fund will carry out the activities of GBE on its behalf, so let us drop this pretence that GBE is like Great British Nuclear; it is not. GBE is taking over a part of the National Wealth Fund’s activities and has a substantial budget. A body with the ability to spend billions of pounds of public money should be subject to rigorous transparency and accountability, and not just to the Treasury and the Secretary of State. It must, therefore, be appropriate for GBE to have to follow at least equivalent accountability disciplines to the National Wealth Fund. It is doing very similar things.

Amendment 103 is an almost direct copy of the independent review process that the National Wealth Fund is subject to. That arose from lengthy debate during the passage of the UK Infrastructure Bank Act and was supported by the Minister’s party at the time. It is not clear why, in government, they have decided to omit it from the Bill. Accountability seems to be a good thing, so long as it does not apply to them.

For GBE, I have changed the provision slightly from how it is in the UK Infrastructure Bank Act, in two ways. I have limited the scope to reporting only on how GBE has met its objectives and how well it has encouraged private sector investment alongside its activities. This latter point—additionality—is critical, as I have mentioned before. I do not have time to get into the details of crowding-in and crowding-out theory, but if all that GBE does is invest in projects which could easily have been financed by the private sector, that would be a complete waste of taxpayers’ money. Indeed, it would be actively damaging, as it would undermine the emergence and growth of a thriving industry providing the finance for our move to net zero.

We had lengthy discussions around the additionality principle during the passage of the UK Infrastructure Bank Act. I asked the Minister to comment on it in a previous group. He has still not commented in any detail, but it is critical. I would like to hear from the Minister what the expectations of GBE are in that respect. The Government have stressed the importance of it, and I have referred previously to the £1 of public money capitalising £3 of private investment that has been claimed. Crowding in is fundamental to its success, so it should be part of the measurement and review of GBE’s performance.

The second tweak I have made to the section from the UK Infrastructure Bank Act is on timing. The 2023 Act requires that the first independent report should be after seven years and then every five years. Infrastructure is by nature long-term, so those timeframes made sense in that context. However, GBE is intending to have decarbonised the power sector by 2030, in just five years’ time, so we should logically be reviewing progress before then. I have suggested reporting every three years; that is probably the major difference between my Amendment 103 and Amendment 94 of the noble Lord Offord, which proposes an independent report every year. I think an annual independent review is probably unduly onerous, but we need an independent progress review before the end of the target period of 2030, so I hope that three years is an acceptable compromise. However we do it, as currently drafted, the Bill falls woefully short on transparency and accountability.

I hope that the Government look seriously at having an independent review of effectiveness. It was hard-wired into the UK Infrastructure Bank Act for good reason: routine annual reports and accounts are simply not a good vehicle for a deep dive into the effectiveness of what are often quite complex investments and other financial activities. A separate, independent review was a good idea for what is now the National Wealth Fund, and I cannot see how a valid distinction can be made between the two organisations. The Government should want to ensure that they both operate equally effectively. Again, I would be very happy to discuss this further with the Minister and I hope that he is receptive to strengthening these aspects of the Bill, just as he and his party, when sitting on the other side of the Chamber, were on other Bills including the UK Infrastructure Bank Bill.

I say in passing that I support Amendment 102 of the noble Earl, Lord Russell, which requires a biennial report on GBE’s relationship with other public sector bodies. We have talked about this previously and it is another example of the opacity that currently surrounds GBE. In particular, I have no idea what its relationship with the Crown Estate means in practice, as well as that with Great British Nuclear and the UK Infrastructure Bank. It would be very desirable to have reports on how those relationships would work.

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Offord’s Amendment 94, to which I have added my name. I have also added my name to Amendment 103 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Vaux and Lord Cameron, and my noble friend Lady Noakes.

The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, made the same point that I tried to make on Monday much more eloquently than I did: GBE and GBN are not comparable institutions. Unfortunately, it seems that the Minister’s department does not recognise that. I refer to the Explanatory Notes at page 6, paragraph 22. The power to give directions in the hands of the Secretary of State

“is consistent with the power that the Government has to direct comparable institutions, for example: the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero has a statutory power to direct Great British Nuclear, although, to date, this has never been used”.

I repeat the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, that, despite what this says, I cannot think that they are comparable institutions.

Both Amendments 94 and 103 require an independent person to carry out a review of GBE’s effectiveness. Of the two, I prefer Amendment 103, which requires the independent person to review the extent to which investments by GBE have encouraged private sector investment in those projects. Amendment 94 requires an annual independent review, whereas Amendment 103 requires such a review only once every three years. Perhaps we could compromise at two years.

I have also added my name to Amendment 102, in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Russell. This requires GBE to report on its relationships with other connected bodies and is, to some extent, similar to some of the other amendments we have debated. It is obviously a requirement of working together on strategic objectives and directions that GBE should maintain excellent relationships with its stakeholders. One of the ways to achieve that would be by adopting the noble Earl’s amendment, and I look forward to hearing him speak to it and to hearing the Minister’s response.

[Earl Russell (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to my Amendment 102 in this group, which concerns independent review and governance. It would insert a new clause after Clause 7 on Great British Energy stakeholder relationships. To be honest, it is a bit of a probing amendment and one that is looking for a bit of reassurance from the Minister.

The amendment argues:

“Within one year of the day on which this Act is passed, and every two years thereafter, Great British Energy must publish a report regarding its relationship with … Great British Nuclear … the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) … National Energy System Operator (NESO) … the UK Infrastructure Bank … the Crown Estate”.


Obviously, it is essential that Great British Energy publishes reports and that these are available. It is important that we have a good understanding of how Great British Energy is working in practice. That involves understanding how it is establishing its working relationships alongside other partners and fulfilling its missions and goals, as we work towards net zero. It extends to objectives and joint projects and asks, “What problems are happening?” These are all key issues in the energy transition, which is itself a complicated business that involves lots of partner organisations and joint and crossover responsibilities. This is already a crowded space—or a tangled web, if you like—in which Great British Energy is being created. Indeed, the delivery of GB Energy’s goals will happen only if the new organisation builds strong and lasting relationships that develop well and help create both joint working and good outcomes.

I want to say a word about the Crown Estate Bill, if I may. It is the cornerstone of GB Energy’s relationship with the Crown Estate; their partnership was announced on the same day that GB Energy was created. Clearly—certainly for the initial part of GB Energy’s life—that partnership will be about developing floating offshore wind with the Crown Estate. As part of the Crown Estate Bill, an amendment was agreed in order that the Crown Estate produces an annual report on its relationship with GB Energy. So that is already happening on the Crown Estate side. I ask the Minister to give an assurance that, from the Government’s point of view, there is no reason why that requirement would not be mirrored on GB Energy’s side. I cannot see one; it seems like common sense to me. As others have said, reporting is a general issue running across this Bill.

I note what the Minister has said today in relation to group 10. I also note what he has said about the possibility for ongoing parliamentary scrutiny. Ministers are responsible, of course, for example at Question time. As the Minister has confirmed today at the Dispatch Box, GB Energy will be subject to scrutiny by all the Select Committees across both Houses of Parliament, but it is important that these relationships are reported on via an annual report. I would like to hear some reassurance from the Minister on that.

I turn briefly to the other amendments in this group. As we have heard, Amendment 94 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Offord of Garvel, and the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, would require the Secretary of State to appoint an independent person to review annually the effectiveness of Great British Energy in delivering its objectives, meeting its strategic priorities and complying with its directions. The independent review would be required to cover Clauses 3, 5 and 6 of the Bill.

I would be interested in the Minister’s response to this amendment. My worry is that this would be overly burdensome for the organisation. I am not certain that I was able to find another comparable organisation where these conditions applied, so my concern is whether we are asking for something that is not on a level playing field with other, similar types of organisations. I note as well that strategic directions can be given and, as I said, there are also other methods of scrutiny, so it would be the Minister’s right, at any point, to give the strategic direction for that to happen.

Amendment 103 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, would require an independent review of the effectiveness of Great British Energy in achieving its objectives and the extent to which it had encouraged private investment. But this would be every three years. I was interested to hear what the noble Lord said in relation to the UK Infrastructure Bank. Again, my worry is whether this is a level playing field, but I was interested that the noble Lord said that that is part of that organisation and how it works. That makes me more inclined to lend support to his amendment.

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[Lord Offord of Garvel (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to the two amendments in this group regarding the appointments of the chairman and board of Great British Energy. These amendments, in the names of my noble friends Lord Frost, Lady Noakes and Lord Trenchard, attempt to fix a glaring omission from the Bill as it stands. As drafted, there is no mechanism to govern the appointments process of the chairman and the board, and this is a concern as we have heard on many occasions that GB Energy will be responsible for £8.3 billion of taxpayers’ money. Those at the top of the company will have enormous responsibility and therefore it is paramount that adequate scrutiny is given to these appointments.

My noble friend Lord Frost has attempted to address these concerns with his amendments in this group. Amendment 98 requires the chairman of GBE to undergo pre-appointment scrutiny in front of the Treasury Committee. This amendment has not come out of the blue: it is exactly the same process as the appointment of the chairman of the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets, otherwise known as Ofgem, which is the regulatory authority for the energy sector. Once the Secretary of State appoints the chair, they must appear before the House of Commons Energy Security and Net Zero Committee. This is also the case for the chairs of the Climate Change Committee and the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority. The Commissioner for Public Appointments keeps a list of significant appointments, which details the public bodies of which the chairs must undergo pre-appointment scrutiny by Parliament. There are no fewer than 40 current chairmanships of public bodies for which this appointments procedure applies.

There is clearly precedent for the chairmen of significant public bodies with responsibility for large sums of public money to be subject to pre-appointment parliamentary scrutiny. If this is the case for these three other public bodies with responsibilities in the energy sector, why should the chair of GBE not also be subject to the same pre-appointment parliamentary scrutiny process?

The Bill also fails to detail the procedure for the appointments and tenure of the directors of Great British Energy. As drafted, there are no requirements for the composition of the board, no limits on the number of directors that may be appointed and for how long a director may serve on the board, and no statutory duties to be conveyed on the board. The amendment from my noble friend Lord Frost plugs this gap.

Once again, there is precedent for having this level of detail regarding appointments to the board of a major public body. The Utilities Act 2000, which created Ofgem and which—we must not forget—was passed by the last Labour Government, did exactly that. Schedule 1 to that Act lays out, for example, that:

“An appointment of a person to hold office as chairman or other member must be for a term of not less than 5 years and not more than 7 years”.


So that Act includes details of the tenure and the appointments of the chairman and the board, yet the Bill does not. I ask the Minister why Labour thought it pertinent to specify the executive composition of Ofgem but does not believe it necessary to do the same for Great British Energy.

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Frost on his two amendments in this group, which deal with the governance of GBE. There is, as has been said in previous debates, almost nothing in the Bill about the corporate structure of GBE or how it will be managed. I welcome my noble friend’s proposals to require that the chair should be full time and be required to attend the office in Aberdeen, from which it follows that he must be based there. That would also ensure that the person will be fully committed and be a real check on the powers of the chief executive, who may need oversight in interpreting the priorities and actions needed in response to directions received from the Secretary of State. My noble friend’s proposal that the board must comprise at least five and no more than eight directors makes perfect sense and provides for the assembly of a group of people with the appropriate skills and experience.

I have also considered and support Amendment 101 in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Russell, which requires scrutiny of any proposed appointments by the Energy Security and Net Zero Committee of another place. That committee should ensure that an appropriate balance of skills and experience among the directors is maintained at all times.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I was not going to speak on this, but I just point out very quickly that the other Act that has a clause that is not quite the same but similar to Amendment 99 is the UK Infrastructure Bank Act. As I have already pointed out, that is the really analogous organisation to Great British Energy, so it must be appropriate, I think.