Pension Schemes Bill

Viscount Trenchard Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 26th January 2026 Grand Committee

Even if that was to happen, £25 billion is not large enough for an individual scheme because no scheme would sensibly invest more than 10% in infrastructure. That is only £2.5 billion in each scheme. It is just not enough. It is not going to touch the sides. They need to bulk up into bigger schemes, but the Bill prevents the LGPS in particular, and by extension the other schemes, participating in more than one pool. We know what the Government are trying to achieve, but this is not the way to deliver it.

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, I will not go into too much detail. I should, because I was not here last week, declare an interest, in that I am a director of a Guernsey-based, open-ended protected cell company and a London-listed, closed-ended investment company. Neither of them begins to approach the necessary size to qualify under the scale criteria that this Bill introduces.

I agree entirely with the points made by my noble friends Lady Noakes, Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lord Fuller and the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. Scale is nothing to do with this. I find it quite extraordinary that the Government assume that big is good and small is bad. All big funds were once small: they started with nothing and built up. There is also some evidence that, if you get really big, you become a big complacent and do not have to be quite as sharp as you do when you are making a small fund bigger and more successful and establishing its reputation.

Interfering with the fiduciary duties of pension fund trustees in this way is risky, bad, potentially dangerous and unlikely to be in the interests of the pension beneficiaries, so I strongly support all the amendments in this group. I do not think that the minimum size of a master trust should be specified in the Bill. Trustees will have their own criteria for the maximum proportion of funds that they may own in any one fund, and for the maximum percentage of their funds’ assets that may be invested in any one fund. I think these are better ways to achieve the obvious need to reduce risk, and pension fund trustees are the right people to deliver them.

[Lord Ashcombe (Con)]

My Lords, I remind the Committee of my interest as an employee of Marsh, which owns Mercer, a pension and investment advisory management company.

I did not intend to speak on this group but I do not believe that financial size is the be-all and end-all. In my world, working for a very large insurance broker, we think we have advantages in the marketplace. However, it would be remiss of me to ignore not only the smaller operations but the many small boutique entities that are experts in a very narrow and small field. It is very unlikely that they will ever become one of the large operations. Although size can be useful, the smaller experts are essential to the marketplace and, you might argue, keep the larger operations honest.

I do not believe this picture is anything different from that of the pensions industry. These amendments address the benefits of the new and smaller entities being a necessary part of the market, and should be welcomed.

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[Lord Remnant (Con)]

My Lords, I will comment briefly on the amendments in this group, tabled by several noble Lords, relating to the suitability of private markets and a potential cap on the allocation of funds to those markets. Equity and debt markets often now tend to be positively correlated; in other words, they move in the same direction. That was not normally the case in the past, when negative correlation brought better balance to a portfolio and to its risk and reward characteristics. So-called alternative investments—of which private markets form a part—that fall outside the traditional investments of stocks, bonds and cash can offer a sensible diversification.

The Mansion House Accord refers to the higher potential net returns that can arise from investment in private markets, but that comes with higher risks, less liquidity and, typically, less regulation. Given the disadvantages of the open-ended nature of the vehicle that would deliver such investments, to which I referred on an earlier group—and given that private markets, however defined, should be part only of a portfolio’s allocation to the alternatives class—I would certainly be in favour, as a matter of principle and practice, of a cap not exceeding the 10% mooted by my noble friends Lady Coffey and Lady McIntosh of Pickering. I cannot envisage any well-run, prudently managed and appropriately diversified pension fund wishing to exceed such a percentage in normal circumstances.

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, briefly, it is not appropriate for legislation to tell the trustees of pension funds, in any case, that they can make investments in some types of structure but not in others. It should be entirely up to the trustees, in exercising their fiduciary duties, to determine what investments they make and the structures through which they make them to deliver a maximum level of risk that they are happy to accept.

The Government will succeed in realising their target of increasing pension fund investment in UK infrastructure by adopting fiscal and economic policies that encourage growth. We will then see a natural return to the much higher levels of UK equity investment by pension funds that used to obtain many years ago. If the Government require, nevertheless, some potential or possible mandation, it is right that there should be a cap. But, as my noble friend Lord Remnant said, it is inconceivable that any pension fund manager would be likely to invest more than 10%—I would say considerably less than that—in asset classes traditionally defined as alternative assets.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, briefly, this group again underlines a central point that we have been making: mandation should not be in the Bill. Time and again, we have heard concerns about the risks of picking winners and the unintended consequences that inevitably follow. I raised these issues on the previous group, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles and Lady Altmann, have today and previously put those concerns firmly on record.

However, I am grateful to noble Lords for their thoughtful efforts to limit or mitigate the impact of the mandation power. I thank my friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, supported by my noble friends Lady McIntosh of Pickering and Lady Penn in particular, for their remarks on these issues. However, our view remains unchanged and, for reasons already rehearsed at length, asset allocation mandates have no place in this legislation. There is no compelling evidence that they are either necessary or effective in increasing productive investment in the UK.

If we are serious about addressing the barriers to UK investment, we must be honest about where those barriers lie. They include governance and regulatory burdens; risk-weighting and capital requirements; liquidity constraints and scheme-specific funding; and maturity considerations. None of these challenges is addressed, let alone solved, by mandation. If, notwithstanding these concerns, the reserve power is to be retained, significantly stronger safeguards are essential: a clear cap on the proportion of assets that may be mandated; more robust reporting and evidential requirements before regulations are made; explicit conditions for access to any transition pathway relief; a strengthened savers’ interest test; and rigorous post-implementation review. The question of when and on what basis the power should be sunsetted is one that we will return to on the next group, but the fundamental point must be clear: mandation is the wrong tool and the Bill risks embedding unjustified and anti-competitive discrimination between equivalent investment vehicles, driven not by evidence or public interest but by a narrow and self-interested approach. I will address those issues in more detail in a later group but, for now, I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to the specific amendments raised.

However—before she gets up—I wish to turn to Amendment 118 in my name. It probes the power that allows regulations made under new Section 28C to include assets of various classes under the broad heading of private assets and to permit the future inclusion of additional asset classes. I appreciate the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, on this part.

I touched on this matter in some detail in the previous groups, so I will not repeat those arguments here. However, this amendment once again draws attention to our concern about the specific types of asset that the Government have chosen to list on page 46 of the Bill. It remains an issue about which we are deeply concerned, and one on which we will continue to work closely with other noble Lords though to Report.