(2 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am sure that the ECB has heard the reminder; it should reply to the noble Lord and take him up on the offer of his insights and expertise. He is also right to point to the work of Kick It Out. Cindy Butts, who the ECB has appointed to chair its Independent Commission for Equity in Cricket, has experience working with Kick It Out in football and will be known to your Lordships as a lay member of the Conduct Committee. We are very glad to see her appointment and the work that she is taking forward.
My Lords, may I make a more general point? Does my noble friend agree that one should be rather slow to criticise individuals, or to take action that can cause damage to individuals or institutions, unless one is aware of all the relevant facts? Is there not a danger that, out of a spirit of political correctness, people are saying and doing things rather prematurely?
I do not entirely agree with my noble friend. He is right to point to the need for evidence. That is why we are very keen to see the full report and are glad that it has been provided to the Select Committee in another place. However, this case, sadly, has been going on for a number of years. It has not been dealt with with the speed and thoroughness it ought to have been, and we are glad that that finally is happening.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberBefore my noble friend moves on, would he care to tell your Lordships why he is making a serious distinction in law between IPSO and Impress, because to the minds of many of us, IPSO is a perfectly well regulated and constituted regulator?
My noble friend makes an excellent point, which I shall come to in a moment.
The third claim is that the Leveson system is unnecessary, as the new IPSO is much better than the previous Press Complaints Commission. I dealt with this in Committee by identifying some, but not all, of IPSO’s deficiencies. These are, first, that IPSO is not obliged to consider discrimination complaints from a group—for instance, a religious or ethnic group. It has also not yet dealt with a matter so serious as to merit levying even a £10 fine. Finally, in three years of operation, IPSO has not arbitrated a single case. In Committee, I was not challenged on any of those assertions, and I am not surprised, because they were checked very carefully.
I hope that noble Lords will support me in the Division Lobby in order that the House of Commons is given the opportunity to provide the vital costs-shifting protection that the public need and deserve in respect of data protection claims. Of course, this would also send a clear message to the Government that they should bring into force the rest of Section 40 immediately, as Parliament agreed to and voted for in 2013.
My Lords, I declare an interest. When I was a commander in the Metropolitan Police service, my personal details—this was in breach of data protection—were secured by Mulcaire, the private detective employed by a newspaper. This was discovered by the Metropolitan Police in 2002, but I was not told about it until 2010, when the Guardian alerted my lawyers to the fact that this had taken place. However, in the course of what subsequently transpired, I was shown an internal memorandum of the Metropolitan Police service, which showed that in 2002 it was aware that my phone and that of the then Deputy Prime Minister had been hacked into, and it never informed me of that. Therefore, noble Lords will understand that I should declare that personal interest.
However, I want to tell the following story to the House. I went with the family of Milly Dowler to see the then Prime Minister, the then Deputy Prime Minister and the then Leader of the Opposition to talk about the family’s experience. Noble Lords will recall that Milly Dowler went missing, was kidnapped and murdered, and that her family kept trying to call her mobile telephone. However, the phone relayed the message that the voicemail box for that number was full. Therefore, the family was losing hope that she might still be alive. Then they tried to phone again and found that some of the messages had been listened to. That gave them hope that she might still be alive. However, it transpired that there was room in that mailbox because journalists had hacked into her voicemail and had listened to some of the messages.
On the evening before the first of those meetings with the then Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, Milly Dowler’s father was telephoned by Surrey Police to tell him and the family that Surrey Police knew in 2002 that journalists had hacked into Milly Dowler’s voicemail, thereby allowing further messages to be left, as the journalists involved had called the police incident room to tell them that they had illegally hacked into the voicemail. However, it was not until nine years later and the imminent meeting with the then Prime Minister, the then Deputy Prime Minister and the then Leader of the Opposition, that the police felt obliged to tell the Dowler family that they knew from the outset that her phone had been hacked into. They did not offer any explanation for not having taken any action in relation to that illegal hacking into that phone.
These are the sorts of issues involved. This is not just about the conduct of the media. The aim of part 2 of Leveson is to examine the relationship between the police and the media and between politicians and the media, not simply the conduct of the media themselves. That is why we need part 2 of Leveson, and that is why I support Amendment 127A.
My Lords, I will speak briefly, both to the proposed new clause in the amendment moved by the noble Baroness and the proposed new clause moved by my noble friend.
I am against the suggestion that we should have an inquiry. I share the view of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that we know enough already. The facts have been canvassed time and time again, in inquiry, in criminal cases and in civil cases, and the time has now come for policy. We do not need new facts—we need a policy decision, and that is essentially a matter for government and Parliament. If we call for a further inquiry, the policy decisions will be postponed. A further point is that, if the proposed new clause is carried, the pressure will be on a judge-led inquiry. In the generality, I am against judge-led inquiries when they address matters of major general policy. Judges are good at identifying facts and deficiencies in existing legislation, but they are not well placed to address general policy issues.
The noble Viscount said a few moments ago that we do not need an inquiry because we have all the evidence and all the facts we need. What are the Government hesitating for, then? If we have all the facts and the evidence we need, the Government must have them too. However, they are not proceeding. That is the dilemma that the House faces, and that is why I strongly support the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins.
But the irony is that if we have a new inquiry, we will postpone the moment when the Government come forward with a policy. The only way you will get a policy decision is to press the Government to make their policy decision, not by holding a further inquiry.
The second point I want to deal with is my noble friend’s Amendment 147. I am not in support of it. First, I am against making a distinction in law between an approved and an unapproved regulator. I am bound to say that when I look at IPSO, I do not find it lacking; it seems to be a perfectly constituted and responsible regulator. I certainly do not want to make a distinction in law between Impress and IPSO. I very much hope that IPSO, which is backed by the industry, will get much greater support than it has hitherto received.
Secondly, on the issue of costs under my noble friend’s amendment, I believe that an award for costs should be within the discretion of the trial judge. The consequence of this proposed new clause is to make an award against a successful defendant when the institution and carriage of the litigation was conducted by the unsuccessful plaintiff or complainant. That seems to me to fly in the face of every notion of justice I have ever encountered. I suspect that the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, would agree with that proposition. Therefore, I very much hope that your Lordships will not agree to this proposed new clause. I accept that my noble friend has referred to the provisos, which enables the unapproved regulator to gain the costs. However, if my noble friend will forgive me, the second of the provisos is drawn in such general and loose terms as to be unintelligible, even to the cleverest of judges.
Of course, my amendments are entirely modelled on Section 40 of the Crime and Courts Act, which Parliament passed.
That may be so, but Parliament makes errors, and this House is in the business of looking again at what we have done in the past. We have to ask ourselves: what is just and equitable in the context of this case? I therefore very much hope that we will not approve a new inquiry and that the proposed new clause so eloquently moved by my mentor will fail.
My Lords, I am one of those who backed the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, and I want to intervene briefly to make a point about the beast with which we are dealing. I refer noble Lords to the piece in today’s Times—a newspaper at which, incidentally, 25 years ago I was deputy to the editor. The headline reads:
“Peers hijack data bill to attack free press through back door”.
In today’s Times, evidently, the facts are free but comment is sacred.
My Lords, I came intending to support the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, asking in effect for Leveson 2, and the amendment of the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, in effect introducing Section 40 for data protection. The more I have listened to the debate, the more I am absolutely convinced that both those amendments are correct.
I have found it appalling to listen to the smug reassurances of the apologists for the media that everything is now fine as far as data protection is concerned. The noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, drew our attention to the experience of the Bowles family when their son was killed in an accident. While Leveson 1 was going on—the latest moment at which it was alleged that the media had reformed—they were breaking the Bowles family’s data protection rights, to publish whatever they liked.
I do not know the extent to which the media were tricking or are continuing to trick people into giving out medical records, banking information and private photographs, or taking photographs from sources they should not, or going to the police and getting information from them. I am pretty sure that it is still going on, but I do not know the extent of it. The thing that will reveal the extent of it and the extent to which media owners are involved would be Leveson 2. That is what we as politicians promised at the time. The assertion, made in particular by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Black, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, that we should just stop now because everything in the garden is rosy flies absolutely in the face of the evidence. We would look like politicians who are continuing to collude with the media.
The point is not that everything is right. We accept that it is not, but the facts are already known. What now needs to happen is that the policy needs to be formulated and brought to Parliament. An inquiry would postpone the day when that could happen.
I disagree with what the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, says—namely, that the facts are already known—because the apologists are saying that everything is okay now; I do not include him as an apologist because he has a slightly different position. I point to the case of the Bowles family, which indicates that things were not okay when the first Leveson inquiry was going on. The basis on which it has been asserted by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Black, along with others, that we should not go ahead is because everything is okay. Well, it is not.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the Government introduced quite late in the proceedings in Committee a group of amendments that set up a parallel system under which data processing undertaken by government departments could be considered to be governed. Our Amendment 176 attempts to ask some questions, and in that sense it is a probing amendment. It probably does not work as it stands, on reflection, but it raises important points. Because the Government introduced the amendments so late in the day, I feel justified in asking for a response to some of our questions around them. The scrutiny that we could have given to the amendments did not take place, and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for adding his name to the amendment and look forward to his comments later.
The main purpose of the amendment is to get on record from the Secretary of State a set of answers to questions. To be clear, we are talking about the framework for data processing by government to which the original amendments apply, and to which our amendment refers, covering all data held by any public body, including the NHS. It is both outside the ICO’s jurisdiction and under the direct control of Ministers. The courts are bound by the framework, as are tribunals, and a special case exists only for international law. I am not quite sure how that works, so maybe we can get some answers on that. There may well be updates, but if there are changes, they will be applied retrospectively. It is quite a significant package in terms of powers. I understand that there may be nothing wrong with that if everything else is working. In a sense, if one wants efficient government and effectiveness, one is asking for such things to be in place. I am not criticising that.
There are questions. First, on the name, why is it a framework and not a code of practice? Codes of practice are defined in the Bill and have considerable consequences as a result. There is a standard for developing them and a process under which they take place. There are regulatory arrangements and the involvement of Parliament, but that does not apply to the framework. In other words, the Government’s own data does not go through the processes that apply to other data.
Why do the Government’s proposals exempt public sector processing from normal data protection law? Surely if the concern is about making sure that a subject’s data is always looked after properly, and data controllers, whoever they are, are doing it in accordance with the procedures set out at length by the Bill, in the GDPR and in the derived legislation that will take place—if we leave—under Brexit, all we are getting is a way of keeping people out of any consideration regarding the data that is held by government. Citizens’ data should really belong to citizens and we should not have a situation where it is looked after by Ministers on behalf of Ministers and there is no external view.
One could make a strong case—I am not necessarily doing that, but others have—that the Secretary of State has the power to create their own framework for the data protection of their own data and their own department. They can ignore completely what the Information Commissioner may say about that framework—she has no locus in that. The framework can be brought to Parliament but it is a negative procedure, not an affirmative one, so it is very difficult to scrutinise. We can vote against it; we can certainly discuss it if we see it in time, but it will not be at the same level of scrutiny as perhaps applies to other matters. Barriers can be raised, and the ICO’s enforcement mechanisms can be fettered, extended or changed.
I am sure that the Minister will have good answers to that and I am in no sense trying to attack the basic principle. I just wonder whether there is not a case here for Caesar’s wife—excuse the old-fashioned language, but it is a quotation, not a reference. Caesar’s wife was always required to be above suspicion, above any other public person in Rome of the day. I say that with detailed knowledge having just been to the RSC’s performances of the Cicero plays, as I think I already mentioned. Sorry if I am boring people.
Nevertheless, it raises in one’s mind the issues of standards and propriety in public life in a forceful way. Blood was more common then than it might be today, but the issue is right. If you are in a public position and a public responsibility is placed on you, you must not only be above reproach, you must be seen to be above reproach. I am not sure that the government amendments satisfy that. I beg to move.
My Lords, I have only two brief observations to make, one supportive and one otherwise. My supportive observation is that I am very much in favour of the use of the affirmative resolution procedure for the approval of regulations, rather than the negative one. I add in parenthesis that I have always believed that we in Parliament should be able to amend under the affirmative resolution procedure. When we come to the European Bill, that will be particularly important, but that is for another day.
Where I disagree with the noble Lord is on his proposal that the commissioner should be responsible for preparing the document. That seems to me essentially a matter for the Secretary of State, because of the principle of ministerial responsibility. Ministers can be questioned and quizzed in a way which is utterly impossible for Parliament to do with the commissioner. There is also a small technical point. If a Minister has to come to Parliament—for example, under an affirmative resolution procedure—to argue in favour of regulations which he or she has not made, but which have, rather, been made by the commissioner, that could be at least a trifle embarrassing.
My Lords, I hear what the noble Viscount said about the amendment, but the problem is that even the affirmative resolution procedure is not necessarily a good way to test the framework. The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, was unusually kind about the Government’s framework. As he said, the Secretary of State can produce a framework that applies data protection to his own department; ignore what the Information Commissioner says about the framework; lay his own framework for Parliament through the negative procedure—I take the noble Viscount’s point about the affirmative procedure—which means it is very unlikely to get much scrutiny; and raise barriers against the ICO’s enforcement mechanism. He can then, as part and parcel of the framework, extend or introduce frameworks to include any other public sector body. Frankly, the Secretary of State can pretty much do what he or she wants. We should not be saying that the framework is essentially like a statutory code of practice; it is a very different animal.
This is our first debate on the architecture that the Government have imposed. In Committee the Minister produced a whole raft of amendments introducing the framework and we did not have a chance to scrutinise it properly. The Information Commissioner is not very happy with this architecture either. That is utterly clear. It is not just opposition parties or organisations such as medConfidential that are unhappy. The ICO has stated:
“The Commissioner understands the needs for government departments and public bodies to be clear about the legal basis for undertaking the functions and this is particularly true when processing personal data. However the provisions as drafted appear to go beyond this limited ambition and create different risks that must also be considered. She has made clear her concerns to government and these are set out below”.
I should very much like to hear what sort of dialogue the Government have had with the ICO because, frankly, at the moment they seem to be overriding any powers or involvement that she has in this framework. I am afraid that I am raising the temperature slightly at this time of night, but the framework for government data protection is not in fact data protection at all.
(6 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am grateful to the noble Lord for that intervention, which I think supports my contention that there is nothing in the inclusion of the Impress code that strikes at the heart of press freedom.
As I was saying in concluding my remarks, it would be perverse if the Bill did not include a code such as that of Impress but one of an organisation that is not approved by the Press Recognition Panel and does not meet Leveson criteria, such as IPSO. I hope that the Government and the Minister accept that, but at the very least I hope that the Minister will be prepared to assure the House that the Government are not opposed to the Impress standards code being listed in the Bill.
My Lords, I follow what the noble Lord, Lord Low, said, which is of considerable importance. In doing so, I address Amendment 55, which has not yet been spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson. I have both an observation and suggestion to make and I would be very grateful if he could let me have his views on them.
I suggest to your Lordships that Amendment 55, as it stands, goes too far, in that it gives great power to the commissioner, who is in no way subject to parliamentary control. Given the nature of the powers to determine appropriate guidance and practice, that is undesirable, on the face of it. That said, I have considerable sympathy for the proposition that the commissioner should be involved in the formulation of policy and in identifying amendments to the list. One way to address that is as follows: under subsection (6) of the clause we are dealing with, the Secretary of State has a power to make regulations that amend the list, which is itself subject to affirmative procedure. If we were minded to do so, we could make it explicit that the power exercised by the Secretary of State under subsection (6) should be used after representations made to him or her by the commissioner, and furthermore that, in any event and at all times, the power to amend the regulation should be used after consultation with the commissioner. If we went down this road, it would enable the commissioner to play a proactive role in shaping a very important list; in any event, it would involve the commissioner in the policy-making process.
It may have gone unnoticed in Committee, because we considered no fewer than 432 amendments, but I say this in the context of Amendment 55—to be spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson—and in the light of observations made by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham: the then Amendment 181 amended Clause 169 to ensure that when regulations are made to amend the list of codes of practice, the Secretary of State must consult the Information Commissioner.
That is extremely helpful and I am grateful to hear it, but I do not think that it says that the commissioner can be proactive in the regulation. The point made by my noble and learned friend is that the Secretary of State must involve the commissioner in discussions but it does not make it explicit that the commissioner can be proactive by making suggestions to the amendment of the list. My suggestions are twofold and I would be grateful if the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, would share his thoughts on the matter.
Does the noble Lord accept that the amendment he supports will tilt the argument against free speech and chill the ability of the press to publish?
No. The amendment I have put forward is exactly the finding of Leveson—that what was wrong in the 1998 Act was an imbalance the wrong way. That is what Leveson found and suggested that Parliament put right. There may be many other ways of putting it right, but to say that what Leveson did was somehow to be totally ignored ignores not only Leveson itself but the findings and support of both Houses of Parliament. Since Leveson and the setting up of the royal charter—I was the Minister involved with that—nobody could have tried more than that set of Ministers to find a solution that was as far away from state regulation as we could possibly find.