Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Debate between Viscount Goschen and Lord Cameron of Lochiel

Committee stage
Thursday 26th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Goschen (Con)]

My Lords, I have not heard too many debates in which your Lordships have moaned about the lack of lawyers participating, but we have listened to two people who claim not to be experts.

I will touch on Clause 13 in the context of Amendment 36 from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. This is really a question for the Minister: I do not understand Clause 13(3)(b), which is the “reasonable excuse” related to whether the individual concerned was

“acting on behalf of an organisation which … aims to assist asylum-seekers, and … does not charge for its services”.

That is an extraordinarily widely drawn and unqualified reasonable excuse ground.

It would certainly help me and may even be of assistance to the broader Committee if the Minister could give a couple of examples of the types of scenario envisaged and could provide some reassurance that this is not too broadly drawn as an area to provide a reasonable excuse. I genuinely do not know and do not have a particular view about that, but, on the face of it, without further qualification, it seems to be very broadly drawn. I look forward to the Minister’s explanation.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, the Opposition Front Bench’s view on this is that we side with my noble friend Lord Jackson on the group of amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. At their core, as others have said, the amendments would rewrite the structure of the offence in Clause 13 by placing the burden of proof for the test of reasonable excuse squarely on the prosecution. The implications of the change would be significant—I will come back to the law in a moment—as it would dilute the seriousness with which we treat those who are convicted of supplying articles for use in immigration crime.

Let us be absolutely clear about what Clause 13 addresses. It addresses the supply of forged documents, false identity papers and materials designed to facilitate illegal entry into the UK. Those are not minor infractions; they are serious crimes that underpin the business models of trafficking gangs, enable the circumvention of border controls and directly endanger lives. In such cases, it is entirely appropriate that, if an individual is found supplying such items, it should be for them to demonstrate that they had a legitimate reasonable excuse.

I would suggest—it has been some time since I practised criminal law—that that is not some obscure or novel principle. Of course, the usual legal position is that it is for the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. But it is not unusual to reverse the burden of proof on to an accused in some circumstances. It reflects well-established frameworks in other serious areas of law, most notably in the Misuse of Drugs Act, in firearms legislation and in the Companies Act, where it is for an accused director to prove that all reasonable steps have been taken to avoid committing an offence.

In legislation on firearms and the misuse of drugs, the burden of establishing a lawful or innocent reason rests with the person accused of being in possession of or supplying the prohibited article. So, this is not an unusual path to take, and to shift the burden back to the prosecution, as these amendments would do, would make it harder to secure convictions, weaken the deterrent effect of the law and send precisely the wrong message at a time when we face record levels of illegal entry and organised criminal facilitation across our borders.

The public expect us to ensure that the law acts as a meaningful deterrent to those who seek to undermine it. This group of amendments would not do that. It would make it easier for those facilitating unlawful entry to escape liability and place an unnecessary an inappropriate burden on prosecutors, who are already contending with highly complex cases. Let us not forget that those convicted of supplying articles for use in immigration crime are not passive actors but deliberate enablers of lawbreaking. To demand that the prosecution proves not only the supply but the absence of any reasonable excuse would be to fundamentally misread the nature of the offence and the damage that it causes.

This goes to the heart of the problem that we have debated all afternoon: the people we are talking about are organised criminals who make money by endangering the lives of those they profess to help. It is not the time to rewrite what is, in my view, a long-standing legal norm in a way that would weaken enforcement. It is time to uphold the seriousness of the crime and ensure that our legal tools are effective in tackling it.