Online Safety Super-Complaints (Eligibility and Procedural Matters) Regulations 2025

Viscount Camrose Excerpts

Tuesday 15th July 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Wrottesley (Con)]

My Lords, I want to add a few comments to the discussions on these regulations. I am sorry; I was a little slow off the mark.

I want to say from the outset that I believe we are going to need much more oversight to protect everyone —in particular our children and other vulnerable groups —from tech, particularly relating to online risks. I will say more on this during the passage of the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill, which is currently before the House. The situation is always evolving and, unfortunately, predators always seem to be one step ahead.

I have always felt that internet and tech companies could do, but choose not to do, more to make their products safer. I know this from personal experience; as I said, I will say more about this in our proceedings on the other Bill before the House. I strongly feel that such companies are complicit in this. It is regrettable that we have to regulate this area in the way we do, but here we are. Having this draft online safety super-complaints regulation is a welcome piece of the jigsaw. If implemented robustly, it has the potential to contribute meaningfully to a safer and more accountable online environment. I worry, though, and want this to work. I have a few questions for the Minister.

Following on from a concern that other noble Lords have raised, I would appreciate hearing from the Minister whether there is going to be a new ombudsman and how this might be funded. I know that there is funding ring-fenced, but we really need to involve appropriate leadership and expertise. How much is enforcement likely to cost?

As currently worded, the regulations do not seem to allow smaller groups, such as victim support groups or small NGOs, to feed information and complaints into the regulator. I feel that allowing for smaller groups would be beneficial to the online safety of the vulnerable.

Appeals were again raised by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, and others. We know that, in these regulations, a group needs to apply to have their case approved to be heard. If it is rejected, is there a mechanism for appealing? Is it correct that summary decisions are the only material published after investigations? If so, I believe that we should offer more transparency than this for the public and for case law.

Finally, what powers would a regulator have against the largest companies with their related resources and well-funded legal departments? I am thinking of Instagram, Facebook, various other social media and internet companies, gaming companies and other tech organisations. Will the regulator really have the powers to enforce punishments and change? I sincerely hope it will. A lot is at stake here; we need to get this right not only for today’s users but for future ones.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My Lords, as we have heard, the purpose of the super-complaints mechanism is to allow eligible entities with expertise in online safety matters, such as civil society groups, to raise systemic issues with Ofcom. Such issues may include instances where the features or conduct of regulated services may be causing significant harm, adversely affecting freedom of expression or otherwise adversely impacting users, members of the public or particular groups.

We welcome the Government’s decision to bring forward these regulations, which will help Ofcom to understand the kinds of risks, issues and threats to users identified by the specified groups. We continue to believe that the regulations strike an effective balance between the need to learn from the experience of users and the need to prioritise the testimony of those with experience, expertise and knowledge when considering complaints. It is important that we construct a feedback mechanism, but it is also important that this mechanism can be wielded by Ofcom in a way that is genuinely helpful and can lead to targeted and effective action. The point about concrete outcomes from the process was well made by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson; I look forward to hearing the Minister’s remarks on that.

The regulations make it clear that eligible groups must meet a required standard before their complaints will be considered. To be eligible to submit complaints under the regulations, an entity must: represent the interests of users, the public or specific user groups; be independent of regulated services; show expertise in online safety, such as regular expert contributions to public or media discussions; and be expected to consider Ofcom’s guidance in its work. In other words, this feed- back mechanism is designed to facilitate communication between Ofcom and independent expert groups. This is right and we very much hope that it will ensure that the case load for Ofcom—I take on board the points and concerns about this—will be such that genuine and proper consideration is given to each complaint raised.

That being said, I hope the Minister can give us some information on how this will be reported back to Parliament. Will we have sight of the volume of cases taken on by Ofcom and will we be able to see how many complaints have been upheld and how many rejected? I appreciate that, as part of the process, while any super-complaint is live, it must be subject to protection from outside interference, but having this information after the fact would make an important metric that noble Lords and Members in the other place will be able to use to assess how well the machinery and Ofcom overall are working. As has been discussed, the regulations are in the public interest and our collective ability to monitor their effectiveness would be greatly aided by this information—particularly in the context of the Minister’s welcome remark about the need for agility in this fast-moving space.

Further to this point, as I said at the beginning of my remarks, the regulations relate to complaints about systemic issues that could negatively affect freedom of expression, pose a risk of harm to the public or cause other adverse effects for users. Can the Minister, when she rises, please share some more information about how users and members of the wider public will be informed about such harms? It seems to me that it is possible to foresee circumstances where, if a complaint is made by an authoritative body to Ofcom under the regulations, it would be wise to warn users and members of the public of this even before Ofcom concludes its investigations, which, as the regulations make clear, could be completed after a period of as many as 105 days. I think that that is the total day count; I may disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, but the point stands in any case.

Does the Minister agree that, if there is a chance of a serious risk being posed to users, the public should know about it as soon as possible? Can she tell us whether there are circumstances in which the Government will issue warnings once complaints are raised, or will they rely on the relevant complainant group to do so? Once Ofcom has concluded its investigations, if it finds that there are risks posed to users, will the Government or Ofcom undertake to inform users at that stage?

Finally—this is, I am afraid, a slightly more trivial question about the mechanics of the eligibility criteria—the fourth criterion for a complainant group

“is that the entity can be relied upon to have due regard to any guidance published by Ofcom”.

Clearly, this is testable in the negative, but can the Minister comment on how entities that have not actively demonstrated unsuitability will be assessed and monitored against this important criterion? Clarity on these points would be much appreciated and would provide us with valuable further information on how the Government envisage using these regulations to keep people safe.

In conclusion, we support the intent behind these regulations and the way in which they have been constructed; I look forward to the Minister’s remarks. We feel that, on the whole, these regulations offer a clear framework for expert, independent entities—

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[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

To pick up exactly where I left off, as with any regulatory mechanism, transparency is key to ensuring public trust and parliamentary accountability. We therefore urge the Government to clarify how the outcomes of this process will be communicated to Parliament and the public, particularly where serious harms are identified. Only then can we be confident that this mechanism will not only protect users but uphold the openness and scrutiny that must underpin all aspects of the Online Safety Act.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their valuable contributions to this debate, including those who have rightly identified that we have taken the comments from the stakeholder engagement to heart and made changes to the eventual proposals. I will go through the very many questions that noble Lords have asked. I pay tribute to the work of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee; we welcome its report and the scrutiny it has given to our proposals.

In no particular order, I will first pick up the question of scrutiny. The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, asked about Parkinson’s law—if I can put it that way. We have spoken about this and there have been a number of different discussions about it. We recognise that the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee and the Lords Communications and Digital Committee play a vital role in scrutinising the regime. The SI was shared with those committees in advance. He will know that Parkinson’s law is not as emphatic as it might be—it is a caveated law—but we nevertheless take on board the concerns raised about it and have met the chairs of those committees to talk about how we can take these issues forward. We have had a very good dialogue with them, on the understanding that we do not want to delay what can sometimes be very important and game-changing regulations by having a long extra scrutiny process. Nevertheless, we are trying to find a way to resolve this issue and discussions are continuing with officials.

Data (Use and Access) Bill [HL]

Viscount Camrose Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments and / or reasons
Wednesday 11th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as the chair of the Authors’ Licensing and Collecting Society. We should all be grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, for the very gracious way he introduced his amendment, particularly given the history of this inter-House discussion.

Whether it is betrayal, disrespect, negligence, bloody-mindedness, a bad dream or tone-deafness, whatever the reality, we find ourselves once again in this Chamber debating an issue that should have been settled long ago. I share the profound anger and frustration expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and admire her unwavering determination, even if she, for very honourable reasons, will not be voting today. As she pointed out, the Prime Minister, who entertained the tech industry at Chequers and Downing Street, is complicit in the situation we are in today.

We are here today because the Government have point-blank refused to move, repeatedly presenting the same proposition on three occasions while this House, by contrast, has put forward a series of genuine solutions in an attempt to find a way forward, as the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, pointed out. The only new element seems to be a promise of a cross-party parliamentary working party, but what is so enticing about merely more talking when action is desperately needed?

Amendment 49U, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, and designed to amend the 1988 copyright Act, is a reasoned compromise. It requires identifying the copyrighted works and the means by which they were accessed, unless the developer has obtained a licence. That seems to be a fair trade-off. The noble Lord also pointed out that Minister Bryant has rather inadvertently made it clear that today’s amendment does not invoke financial privilege on this occasion. The Government argue that legislating piecemeal would be problematic, but the historical precedent of the Napster clause in the Digital Economy Act 2010 demonstrates that Parliament can and should take powers to act when a sector is facing an existential threat. There is an exact parallel with where we are today.

This is not about picking a side between AI and creativity, as we have heard across the House today. It is about ensuring that both can thrive through fair collaboration based on consent and compensation. We must ensure that the incentive remains for the next generation of creators and innovators. Given how Ministers have behaved in the face of the strength of feeling of the creative industries, how can anyone in those industries trust this Government and these Ministers ever again? Will they trust their instincts to appease big tech? I suspect not. I do not regard the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, as personally liable in this respect, but I hope she feels ashamed of her colleagues in the Commons, of the behaviour of her department and of her Government. In this House we will not forget.

There is still time for the Government to listen, to act and to secure a future where human creativity is not plundered but valued and protected. If the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, chooses to put this to a vote, on these Benches we will support him to the hilt. I urge all noble Lords from all Benches, if he does put it to a vote, to support the UK creative industries once again.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My Lords, as everybody has said, it is deeply disappointing that we once again find ourselves in this position. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has brought the concerns of copyright owners to the attention of the Government time and again. Throughout the progress of the Bill, the Government have declined to respond to the substance of those concerns and to engage with them properly. As I said in the previous round of ping-pong—I am starting to lose count—the uncertainty of the continued delay to this Bill is hurting all sides. Even businesses that are in industries far removed from concerns about AI and copyright are waiting for the data Bill. It has been delayed because of the Government’s frankly stubborn mismanagement of the Bill.

I understand completely why the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley of Knighton, feels sufficiently strongly about how the Government have acted to move his very inventive amendment. It strikes at the heart of how this Government should be treating your Lordships’ House. If Ministers hope to get their business through your Lordships’ House in good order, they will rely on this House trusting them and collaborating with them. I know that these decisions are often made by the Secretary of State. I have the highest respect for the Minister, but this is a situation of the Government’s making. I note in passing that it was very disappointing to read that the Government’s planned AI Bill will now be delayed by at least a year.

All that said, as the Official Opposition we have maintained our position, as ping-pong has progressed, that protracted rounds of disagreement between the other place and your Lordships’ House should be avoided. This situation could have been avoided if the Government had acted in good faith and sought compromise.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions. I repeat again our absolute commitment to the creative sector and our intention to work with it to help it flourish and grow. This is London Tech Week. All Ministers, including me and my colleagues, have been involved in that, showcasing the UK’s rising tech talent to the world. I do not feel I should apologise for our involvement with the tech sector in that regard.

Data (Use and Access) Bill [HL]

Viscount Camrose Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments and / or reasons
Wednesday 4th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I once again declare an interest as chair of the Authors’ Licensing and Collecting Society, and once again give the staunch support of these Benches to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, on her Motion A1. She made an incontestable case once again with her clarion call.

I follow the noble Lord, Lord Russell, and others in saying that we are not in new territory. I have a treasured cartoon on my wall at home that relates to the passage of the Health and Social Care Bill as long ago as 2001, showing Secretary of State Alan Milburn recoiling from ping-pong balls. Guess who was hurling the ping-pong balls? The noble Earl, Lord Howe, that notable revolutionary, and I were engaging in rounds of parliamentary ping-pong—three, I think. Eventually, compromises were reached and the Bill received Royal Assent in April 2001.

What we have done today and what we are going to do today as a House is not unprecedented. There is strong precedent for all Benches to work together on ping-pong to rather good effect. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, says, what we are proposing today will not, in the words of the Minister, “collapse” the Bill: it will be the Government’s choice what to do when the Bill goes back to the Commons. I hugely respect the noble Lord, Lord Knight, but I am afraid that he is wrong. It was not a manifesto commitment; there is no Salisbury convention that can be invoked on this occasion. It has nothing at all to do with data adequacy except that the Government feel that they have to get the Bill through in order to get the EU Commission to start its work. If anything, the Bill makes data adequacy more difficult. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, that I agree with almost everything he said: everything he said was an argument for the noble Baroness’s amendment. Once again, as ever, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, as I so often do on these occasions. I regard him as the voice of reason, and I very much hope that the Government will listen to what he has to say.

Compromise is entirely within the gift of the Government. The Secretary of State should take a leaf out of Alan Milburn’s book. He did compromise on an important Bill in key areas and saw his Bill go through. I am afraid to say that the letter that Peers have received from the Minister is simply a repeat of her speech on Monday, which was echoed by Minister Bryant in the Commons yesterday. The Government have tabled these new amendments, which reflect the contents of that letter. Despite those amendments, however, the Government have not offered a concession to legislate for mandated transparency provisions within the Bill, which has been the core demand of the Lords amendments championed by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for the reasons set out in the speeches we have heard today.

In the view of these Benches, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, other Members of this House, and countless creatives have made the absolutely convincing case for a transparency duty which would not prejudge the outcome of the AI and copyright consultation. We have heard the chilling points made by the noble Lords, Lord Russell and Lord Pannick, about US policy in this area and about the attitude of the big tech companies towards copyright. We are at a vital crossroads in how we ensure the future of our creative industries. In the face of the development of AI and how it is being trained, we must take the right road, and I urge the Government to settle now.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My Lords, given where we are, I will speak very briefly, but I will make just two points. First, I think it is worth saying that the uncertainty surrounding where we are with AI and copyright is itself damaging, not just to the creative sector, not just to AI labs and big tech in general, but to all those who will themselves be impacted by the Bill’s many other provisions. Overall, I think it is worth reminding ourselves that this is an important Bill whose original conception did not even address AI and copyright. It carried very important and valuable provisions—as the Minister pointed out in her opening remarks—on digital verification services, smart data schemes, the national underground asset register and others. These can genuinely drive national productivity. Indeed, that is why my party proposed them when we were in government. It is, therefore, deeply frustrating that the Government have not yet found a way forward on this, and I am afraid that I very much agree with the noble Lord, Lord Knight. The way the Government have gone about this has been reprehensible: I think that is the word I would use.

Data (Use and Access) Bill [HL]

Viscount Camrose Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments and / or reasons
Monday 2nd June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as chair of the Authors’ Licensing and Collecting Society. I offer the unequivocal and steadfast support from the Liberal Democrat Benches for Motion A1 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, which introduces Amendment 49F in lieu of Amendment 49D.

It is absolutely clear that the noble Baroness’s speeches become better and more convincing the more we go on. Indeed, the arguments being made today for these amendments become better and more convincing as time goes on. I believe we should stand firm, as the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, said.

Time and time again, we all have had to address the narrative stated in the consultation paper and repeated by Ministers suggesting there is uncertainty or a lack of clarity in existing UK copyright law regarding AI training. We have heard that the Secretary of State has just recently acknowledged that the existing copyright law is “very certain”, but as I said to the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, he has also stated that

“it is not fit for purpose”.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/5/25; col. 1234.]

That makes the narrative even worse than saying that copyright law is uncertain.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has rightly asserted, we do not need to change copyright law. It is the view of many that existing law is clear and applies to the commercial use of copyrighted works for AI training. The issue is not a deficient law but rather the ability to enforce it in the current AI landscape. As the noble Baroness has also profoundly put it—I have got a number of speeches to draw on, as you can see—what you cannot see, you cannot enforce. The core problem is a lack of transparency from AI developers: without knowing what copyrighted material has been used to train models and how it was accessed, creators and rights holders are unable to identify potential infringements and pursue appropriate licensing or legal action.

In striking down previous Lords amendments, the Government have suggested that this House was at fault for using the wrong Bill. They have repeatedly claimed that it is too soon for transparency and too late to prevent stealing, and they have asserted that accepting the Lords transparency amendment would prioritise one sector over another. But that is exactly what the Government are doing. They have suggested an expert working group, an economic impact assessment, a report on the use of copyright, and then, I think, a report on progress in what the noble Baroness the Minister had to say. But, as many noble Lords have said today, none of that gives us the legislative assurance —the certainty, as the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, put it—that we need in these circumstances.

The Government have objected to being asked to introduce regulations because of financial privilege, and now, it seems—I can anticipate what the noble Baroness the Minister is going to say—are objecting to the requirement to bring forward a draft Bill with this amendment. But the Government are perfectly at liberty to bring forward their own amendment allowing for transparency via regulations, a much more expeditious and effective route that the House has already overwhelmingly supported. Transparency is the necessary foundation for a functioning licensing market, promotes trust between the AI sector and the creative industries, and allows creators to be fairly compensated when their work contributes value to AI models.

The Government have asked for a degree of trust for their plans. This amendment, while perhaps less than creators deserve—I think the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, described it as the bare minimum—is a step that would help earn that trust. It is this Government who can do that, and I urge them to heed the words of their own Back-Benchers: the noble Lords, Lord Cashman, Lord Rooker and Lord Brennan, all asked the Government to find a compromise.

I urge all noble Lords, in the face of a lack of compromise by the Government, to support Motion A1.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My Lords, as this is the third round of ping-pong, as many noble Lords have observed, I will speak very briefly. If the noble Baroness the Minister has not by now understood how strongly noble Lords on all sides of the House feel about this issue, it may be too late anyway.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has made an increasingly powerful case for the Government to act in defence of the rights of copyright owners, and we continue to call on the Government to listen. We have of course discussed this at great length. The noble Baroness has tabled a new Motion which would require Ministers to make a Statement and bring forward a draft Bill. Given that the Minister has expressed her sympathy for the concerns of your Lordships’ House previously, surely this new Motion would be acceptable to the Government as a pathway toward resolving the problem, and we again urge the Government to accept it.

However, whatever choice the Government make—I do not think anyone could claim that any part of this is an easy problem, as my noble friend Lord Vaizey pointed out—many of us are frustrated by the absence of agility, boldness and imagination in their approach. That said, speaking at least from the Front Bench of a responsible Opposition, we take the view that we cannot engage further in protracted ping-pong. We are a revising Chamber, and, although it is right to ask the Government to think again when we believe they have got it wrong, we feel we must ultimately respect the will of the elected Chamber.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I must once again thank all noble Lords who have spoken during this debate, and of course I continue to recognise the passion and the depth of feeling on this issue.

I did not think I needed to reiterate this, but we absolutely believe in the importance of the creative sector, and of course we want it to have a flourishing future. In previous debates, I have spelled out all the work that we are doing with the creative sector and how fundamental it is to our economic planning going forward. I do not intend to go over that, but I have said it time and again from this Dispatch Box. Our intention is to find a substantial and workable solution to this challenge that we are all facing.

I also reassure the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, and others that we have had numerous discussions with the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and others and have of course taken those discussions seriously. As a result, we have come today with an honest and committed plan to work together to resolve the contentious issue of AI and copyright both quickly and effectively.

Online Harms: Young People

Viscount Camrose Excerpts

Wednesday 21st May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

The noble Viscount will know that schools already have a policy, or are expected by the Department for Education to have one, to ensure that children do not have access to phones in schools. That is a clear policy that the Government are keen to reiterate. What we are talking about here is what children do outside the school environment. From July, the children’s code of practice will provide much greater reassurance and protection for children. Services will be expected to provide age-appropriate experiences online by protecting children from bullying, violent content, abuse and misogynistic content. In other words, there will be much more forceful regulation to specifically protect children. Obviously, we will continue to monitor the codes of practice, but there are specific new powers under the code that come into effect in July and we want to see their impact.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My Lords, I very much hope the Government are actively tracking and measuring the effects of schools’ own policies on mobile phone use during the school day. If so, what conclusions can be drawn about the wisdom of an outright ban? If they are not tracking that information, why not?

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, as I said, the Department for Education’s mobile phones in schools guidance is clear that schools should prohibit the use of devices with smart technology throughout the school day, including during lessons, transitions and breaks. The Government expect all schools to take steps in line with that. Beyond that, my own department, DSIT, has commissioned a piece of research to look at young people’s use of social media and their access to it throughout the day. The outcome of the research is due very soon and we will learn the lessons from that. Up until now, the evidence has not been as clear-cut as we would like. We hope to learn on an international basis how to protect young people throughout the day, and will apply those lessons once the evidence has been assessed.

Data (Use and Access) Bill [HL]

Viscount Camrose Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments and / or reasons
Monday 19th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her introduction. In view of the remarks made a week ago by the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Vallance, who referred to government datasets from the past 15 years which mixed up sex and gender as “accurate”—or perhaps “sort of accurate”, because the exchange in the report varied slightly—do the Government defend the accuracy of those datasets, even though they were, and continue to be, muddled because no one knew what “sex” meant? Are we expected to rely on the accuracy of data which mixed up sex and gender—that is, male and female—or do the Government mean that we cannot defend those data because they were only sort of accurate? I am not entirely clear what the Government are telling us about relying on historic data.

I am also concerned about what insight this gives into what the Government intend to regard as accurate from now on. I continue to think that the Government are on quite a sticky wicket in regard to data accuracy on sex and gender and their refusal to enshrine true sex accuracy in this Bill. We continue to have a bit of a fudge, which shakes confidence in their intentions. This is a huge missed opportunity, but I realise we are not having a further vote.

I shall ask just one question. Clause 29 allows for the Secretary of State to publish supplementary codes for DVS providers. Will the Government commit to publishing a supplementary code to ensure that DVS providers understand how to verify sex accurately and avoid what has been described by the Government Benches as the “muddle” of the last 15 years?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this important debate. I will first speak to the issues around accurate recording of sex data before coming on to talk about scientific research.

Throughout the passage of the Bill, we have been clear that digital verification services will be a significant driver of data reliability and productivity. They are absolutely dependent on accurate recording and rigorous management of data. We supported my noble friend Lord Lucas in his original amendments on Report, and we tabled our own amendments from the Front Bench for Lords consideration of Commons amendments last week.

I am grateful to the Minister for her engagement on this issue, and I know she has taken our concerns seriously. That said, we remain concerned about the accurate recording and management of sex data, especially in light of the recent judgment of the Supreme Court. The Government must continue to remain vigilant and to take steps to ensure datasets held by the Government and arm’s-length bodies are, and continue to be, accurate.

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[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as chair of the Authors’ Licensing and Collecting Society.

I express the extremely strong support of all on these Benches for Motion C1, proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. I agree with every speech that we have heard so far in today’s debate—I did not hear a single dissenting voice to the noble Baroness’s Motion. Once again, I pay tribute to her; she has fought a tireless campaign for the cause of creators and the creative industries throughout the passage of the Bill.

I will be extremely brief, given that we want to move to a vote as soon as possible. The House has already sent a clear message by supporting previous amendments put forward by the noble Baroness, and I hope that the House will be as decisive today. As we have heard this afternoon, transparency is crucial. This would enable the dynamic licensing market that is needed, as we have also heard. How AI is developed and who it benefits are two of the most important questions of our time—and the Government must get the answer right. As so many noble Lords have said, the Government must listen and must think again.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My Lords, it is probably redundant to pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for her tenacity and determination to get to a workable solution on this, because it speaks for itself. It has been equally compelling to hear such strong arguments from all sides of the House and all Benches—including the Government Benches—that we need to find a solution to this complex but critical issue.

Noble Lords will recall that, on these Benches, we have consistently argued for a pragmatic, technology-based solution to this complex problem, having made the case for digital watermarking both in Committee and on Report. When we considered the Commons amendments last week, we worked closely with the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, to find a wording for her amendment which we could support, and were pleased to be able to do so and to vote with her.

It is important that the Government listen and take action to protect the rights of creatives in the UK. We will not stop making the case for our flourishing and important creative sector. We have put that case to Ministers, both in your Lordships’ House and at meetings throughout the passage of the Bill. As a responsible Opposition, though, it is our view that we must be careful about our approach to amendments made by the elected House. We have, I hope, made a clear case to the Government here in your Lordships’ House and the Government have, I deeply regret to say, intransigently refused to act. I am afraid that they will regret their failure to take this opportunity to protect our creative industries. Sadly, there comes a point where we have to accept that His Majesty’s Government must be carried on and the Government will get their Bill.

Before concluding, I make two final pleas to the Minister. First, as others have asked, can she listen with great care to the many artists, musicians, news organisations, publishers and performers who have called on the Government to help them more to protect their intellectual property?

Secondly, can she find ways to create regulatory clarity faster? The process that the Government envisage to resolve this issue is long—too long. Actors on all sides of the debate will be challenged by such a long period of uncertainty. I understand that the Minister is working at pace to find a solution, but not necessarily with agility. I echo the brilliant point made by my noble friend Lady Harding that agility and delivering parts of the solution are so important to pick up the pace of this, because perfect is the enemy of good in this instance. When she gets up to speak, I hope that the Minister will tell us more about the timeline that she envisages, particularly for the collaboration of DSIT and DCMS.

This is a serious problem. It continues to grow and is not going away. Ministers must grip it with urgency and agility.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, once again, I acknowledge the passion and depth of feeling from those noble Lords who have spoken and, again, I emphasise that we are all on the same side here. We all want to see a way forward that protects our creative industries, while supporting everyone in the UK to develop and benefit from AI.

Of course, we have listened, and are continuing to listen, to the views that have been expressed. We are still going through the 11,500 responses to our consultation, and I have to tell noble Lords that people have proposed some incredibly creative solutions to this debate which also have a right to be heard.

This is not about Silicon Valley; it is about finding a solution for the UK creative and AI tech sectors that protects both. I am pleased that the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, now endorses the Government’s reports as the right way to identify the right solutions; however, I will address some of her other points directly.

First, she talked about her amendment providing certainty to the creative industries. I can provide that certainty now, as Minister Bryant did in the other place last week. Copyright law in the UK is unchanged by this Bill. Works are protected unless one of the exemptions, which have existed for some time, such as those for teaching and research, applies, or the rights holders have guaranteed permission for their work to be used. That is the law now and it will be the law tomorrow.

I also want to reassure my noble friend Lord Cashman and the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, who talked about us stripping away rights today. I want to be clear that the Government have proposed no legislation on this issue; the Bill does no such thing. The amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, would provide no certainty other than that of more uncertainty—of continuous regulations, stacked one upon another in a pile of instruments. This cannot be what anyone desires, and it is why the Government do not agree to it.

The noble Baronesses, Lady Kidron and Lady Harding, suggested that her amendment, requiring regulations on only one issue ahead of all others and via a different process, would somehow leave Parliament free to consider all the other issues independently. I am afraid that this is not the case; this is a policy decision with many moving parts. Jumping the gun on one issue will hamstring us in reaching the best outcome on all the others, especially because, as I said earlier, this is a global issue, and we cannot ring-fence the UK from the rest of the world.

We refute the suggestion that we are being complacent on this. I say to my noble friend Lord Brennan that I of course agree that the UK should be a global leader, but we need to make sure that we have the right approach before we plant our flag on that. There is a reason that no other territory has cracked this either. The EU, for example, is still struggling to find a workable solution. It is not easy, but we are working quickly.

The noble Baroness once again raised enforcement, and she has left the mechanism to the discretion of the Government in her new amendment. While we are pleased that the noble Baroness has changed her approach on enforcement in light of the Commons reasons, we all agree that for new transparency requirements to work, enforcement mechanisms will be needed and must be effective.

The noble Baroness said she has tried everything to persuade the Government, and I would have welcomed a further meeting with her to discuss this and other aspects of her revised proposals. Unfortunately, however, that invitation was not accepted. To reiterate, in spite of all our different positions on this Bill, we are all working towards the same goal.

Following proper consideration of consultation responses and publication of our technical reports, we will bring forward comprehensive and workable proposals that will give certainty to all sides. If the House has strong views when the proposals come forward, there will of course be the opportunity for us to debate them. We have made it clear that our reports will be delivered within 12 months and earlier if we can. I remind noble Lords that the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, will not take effect for 18 months. There is not an instant solution, as many noble Lords want to hear today. Neither the noble Baroness’s nor our amendment is an instant solution; it will take time, and we have to recognise that.

We do not believe, in the meantime, that protracted ping-pong on this one remaining issue in the Bill is in anyone’s interest. The elected House has spoken twice and through legislative and non-legislative commitments, the Government have shown they are committed to regulating quickly and effectively. Therefore, I hope the noble Baroness and your Lordships’ House will accept these assurances and continue working with the Government to make progress on this important issue.

A lot has been said in this debate about the importance of transparency. To my noble friend Lord Brennan, I say that the Government have said from the very beginning that we will prioritise the issue of transparency in all the work we do. Transparency is essential to licensing; licensing is essential to the question of remuneration; and remuneration is essential to AI being high quality, effective and able to be deployed in the UK. These are the challenges we are facing, but all these things have to be addressed in the round and together, not in a piecemeal fashion. However, noble Lords are absolutely right to say that, without transparency, it is, of course, worth nothing.

On enforcement, the Government are sympathetic to the argument that it is a different matter for individuals to enforce their rights via the courts as opposed to large creative agencies. This is the kind of the thing that the working groups I have mentioned will explore. As Minister Bryant said last week, we want to make the new regime effective for everybody, large and small.

I will finish with some things I am sure we can all agree on: the urgency of the problem; the need to be evidence-based; that solutions will require collaboration between the creative and the AI sectors; and the solutions must work for everyone. I assure the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, that everybody will have a seat at the table in the discussions. I hope noble Lords will agree with me and truly support the innovators and creators in the UK by voting with the Government on this Motion, which will deliver a full, comprehensive package that will make a difference to the creative sector for years to come in this country.

Data (Use and Access) Bill [HL]

Viscount Camrose Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments and / or reasons
Monday 12th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (Lord Vallance of Balham) (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to some of the amendments made in the other place, starting with Amendments 1 to 31. These will ensure that smart data schemes can function optimally and that Part 1 is as clear as possible. Similarly, Amendments 35 to 42 from the other place reflect discussions on the national underground asset register with the devolved Governments. Finally, Amendments 70 to 79 make necessary consequential updates to the final provisions of the Bill and some updates to Schedules 11 and 15.

I will now speak to the amendments tabled by noble Lords, starting with those relating to sex data. Motion 32A disagrees with the amendment to remove Clause 28(3) and (4), and instead proposes changes to the initial drafting of those subsections. These would require the Secretary of State, when preparing the trust framework, to assess whether the 15 specified public authorities can reliably ascertain the data they collect, record and share. Amendment 32B limits this assessment to sex data, as defined through Amendment 32C; that definition limits sex to biological sex only and provides a definition of acquired gender.

It is also relevant to speak now to Motion 52A, which disagrees with the amendment to remove Clause 140 and, instead, suggests changes to the drafting. Clause 140, as amended by Amendment 52B, seeks to, through a regulation-making power, give the Secretary of State the ability to define sex as being only biological sex in certain areas or across public sector data processing more widely. Let me be clear that this Government accept the recent Supreme Court judgment on the definition of sex for the purposes of equality legislation. We need to work through the effects of this ruling holistically and with care, sensitivity and—dare I say it—kindness. In line with the law, we need to take care not to inappropriately extend its reach. This is not best done by giving the Secretary of State the power to define sex as biological in all cases through secondary legislation without appropriate scrutiny, given the potential impact on people’s human rights, privacy and dignity, and the potential to create legal uncertainty. Likewise, giving the Secretary of State a role in reviewing how other public authorities process sex data in all circumstances based on that definition would be inappropriate and disproportionate, and I note that the Supreme Court’s ruling relates specifically to the meaning of sex in equalities legislation.

The driver behind these amendments has been the importance of sex data being accurate when processed by public authorities. I strongly agree with that aim: accurate data is essential. This Government take data accuracy—including the existing legislation that requires personal data to be accurate—and data standards seriously. That is why we are addressing the question of sex information in public sector data. First, the EHRC is updating its statutory code of practice to support service providers in light of the Supreme Court judgment. Secondly, the Data Standards Authority is developing data standards on the monitoring of diversity information, including sex and gender data, and the effect of the Supreme Court judgment will be considered as part of that work.

Thirdly, the Office for Statistics Regulation published updated guidance on collecting and reporting data and statistics about sex and gender identity data last year. Fourthly, the Office for National Statistics published a work plan in December 2024 for developing harmonised standards on data more generally. Finally, the department is currently considering the implementation of the Sullivan review, published this year, which I welcome.

On digital verification services, I reassure noble Lords that these measures do not change the evidence that individuals rely on to prove things about themselves. The measures simply enable that to be done digitally. This Government are clear that data must be accurate for the purpose for which it is being used and must not be misleading. It should be clear to digital verification services what the information public authorities are sharing with them means. I will give an important example. If an organisation needs to know a person’s biological sex, this Government are clear that a check cannot be made against passport data, as it does not capture biological sex. DVS could only verify biological sex using data that records that attribute specifically, not data that records sex or gender more widely.

I know this is a concern of the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, and I hope this provides some reassurance. The data accuracy principle of GDPR is part of existing law. That includes where data is misleading—this is a point I will return to. I hope that noble Lords find this commitment reassuring and, as such, will agree with Commons Amendment 32.

Motion 34A on Amendments 34B and 34C address the security of the national underground asset register. Security has always been at the heart of the national underground asset register. We have therefore listened to the well-thought-through concerns that prompted the amendment previously tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, regarding cybersecurity. Following consideration, the Government are instead proposing an amendment we have drafted with support of colleagues in the security services. We believe this addresses the intention of ensuring the security of the national underground asset register data, with three key improvements.

First, it broadens the scope from cybersecurity only to the general security of information kept in or obtained from the national underground asset register. This will ensure that front-end users have guidance on a range of measures for security good practice—for example, personnel vetting, which should be considered for implementation—while avoiding the need to publish NUAR-specific cybersecurity features that should not be in the public domain. Secondly, it specifies the audience for this guidance; namely, users accessing NUAR. Finally, it broadens the scope of the amendment to include Northern Ireland alongside England and Wales, consistent with the NUAR measures overall. Clearly, it remains the case that access to NUAR data can be approved for purposes only by eligible users, with all access controlled and auditable. As such, I hope that noble Lords will be content to support government Motion 34A and Amendments 34B and 34C.

Commons Amendment 43, made in the other place, on scientific research removes the public interest test inserted in the definition of scientific research by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville. While recognising the concern the noble Lord raises, I want to be clear that anything that does not count as scientific research now would not do so under the Bill. Indeed, we have tightened the requirement and added a reasonableness test. The Bill contains strong safeguards. Adding precise definitions in the Bill would not strengthen these protections but impose a significant, new legal obligation on our research community at a time when, in line with the good work of the previous Government, we are trying to reduce bureaucracy for researchers, not increase it with new processes. The test proposed will lead to burgeoning bureaucracy and damage our world-leading research. This disproportionate step would chill basic and curiosity-driven research, and is not one we can support.

I beg to move that the House agree with the Commons in their Amendment 1. I have spoken to the other amendments.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My Lords, I first thank the Minister for his—as ever—clear and compelling remarks. I thank all noble Lords who have been working in a collegiate, collaborative fashion to find a way forward on the few but important remaining points of disagreement with the Government.

Before I come to the issue of accurate recording of personal data, I also thank the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for tabling the government amendments on the national underground asset register and her constructive engagement throughout the progress of the Bill.

As noble Lords will recall, I set out our case for stronger statutory measures to require the Secretary of State to provide guidance to relevant stakeholders on the cybersecurity measures that should be in place before they receive information from the national underground asset register. I am of course delighted that the Government have responded to the arguments that we and others made and have now tabled their own version of my amendment which would require the Secretary of State to provide guidance on the security of this data. We are happy to support them in that.

I turn to Motions 32A and 52A standing in my name, which seek to ensure that data is recorded accurately. They amend the original amendment, which my noble friends Lord Lucas and Lord Arbuthnot took through your Lordships’ House. My noble friend Lord Lucas is sadly unable to attend the House today, but I am delighted to bring these Motions forward from the Opposition Front Bench. In the other place, the Conservative Front Bench tabled new Clause 21, which would, we feel, have delivered a conclusive resolution to the problem. Sadly, the Government resisted that amendment, and we are now limited by the scope of the amendments of my noble friend Lord Lucas, so we were unable to retable the, in my view, excellent amendment in your Lordships’ House.

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Motion 32A (Amendment to the Motion on Amendment 32)

[Viscount Camrose]

Moved by

32A: Leave out from “House” to end and insert “do disagree with the Commons in their Amendment 32, and do propose Amendments 32B and 32C to the words so restored to the Bill—

32B: Clause 28, page 30, line 34, leave out “personal data attributes” and insert “sex data”

32C: Clause 28, page 30, line 34, at end insert—“(3A) For the purposes of subsection (3), sex data is reliably ascertained if it is collected in accordance with the following category terms and definitions—(a) “sex” meaning male or female only based on “sex at birth”, “natal sex” or “biological sex” (these terms carrying the same meaning and capable of being used interchangeably); and(b) in addition, where it is lawful to do so in accordance with data protection legislation and the Gender Recognition Act 2004, “acquired gender” meaning male or female only, as recorded on a gender recognition certificate issued in accordance with the Gender Recognition Act 2004.””

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I thank the Minister for his very able summing up of his position, but I am afraid I cannot get past the question in my mind of how existing legacy data, even if it is managed by a DVS system going forward, will suddenly be of high quality when it is currently, as we know from the Sullivan report, in a muddle. As a result, for all his eloquence, I beg leave to test the opinion of the House.

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This is not an easy problem to solve. This is why we must use the best economic data and evidence that we can gather and follow a proper policy process to determine the best way forward. We will get to the right outcomes, and we will get those outcomes as quickly as we can. We want to work with noble Lords across the Chamber to get there. However, despite the good intentions on display in these amendments, the Government cannot support them. I beg to move.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for setting out the Government’s case so clearly. I will speak to my Amendment 46A, which seeks to improve the report that the Government brought forward in the other place. This issue is causing real concern for copyright owners and so many others in the creative industries. Let us remind ourselves that the creative industries contributed £124 billion in gross value added to the UK economy in 2023 and outperformed the UK economy between 2010 and 2023 in terms of growth. The Government are, wisely and rightly, prioritising growth over other concerns, and the creative industries will have to be an essential part of this—but only to the extent that they have a trusted and efficient marketplace for intellectual property.

Our amendment would improve the Government’s proposed report by adding consideration of extra territorial use of creators’ copyright works by operators of web crawlers and AI systems, as well as consideration of establishing a digital watermark for the purposes of identifying licensed content. I very much take on board the Minister’s point that this must be international to work, but few countries, if any, would have better or greater convening power to initiate the process of creating such digital standards. I urge the Government to pursue that avenue.

I pay tribute to all noble Lords who have raised the issue of copyright during the passage of this Bill. I am sure that I will be joining many others in thanking the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, who has led such a powerful and successful campaign on this issue. Throughout the passage of the Bill, we have recognised the serious concerns raised by the creative sector and, on Report, we tabled an amendment seeking to create a digital watermark to identify this content and to protect copyright owners. I am very pleased that the Government have taken the first step by amending the Bill in the other place to put a report in it. That being said, the report needs to go further. If the Government are unwilling to accept our changes, I will test the opinion of the House when my amendment is called.

I turn briefly to Motion 49A, I the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. I once again pay tribute to the work that she has done to make progress on this. While we had concerns about the drafting of her amendment on Report, I am very pleased that she has tabled her Amendment 49B today. With the additional parts of it targeted at supporting small businesses and micro-entities, we are delighted to support it. It is increasingly clear that the Government must do the right thing for our creative industries, and we are delighted to offer our support to Motoin 49A. I intend to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 46A when it is called.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Motion 49A and offer my support to Amendment 46A in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose. It is a sensible amendment and I hope that the Government find a way to accept it without challenge.

I start by rebutting three assertions that have been circling over the past few weeks. First, I reject the notion that those of us who have raised our voices against government plans are against technology. I quote the Secretary of State, Peter Kyle, who I am delighted to see is below Bar this afternoon. He said to the FT that:

“Just as in every other time there is change in society, there will be some people who will either resist change or try to make change too difficult to deliver”.


Well, creative people are early adopters of technology. Their minds are curious and their practices innovative. In my former career as a film director, I watched the UK film industry transform from working on celluloid to being a world-leading centre of digital production. For the past five years at Oxford’s Institute for Ethics in AI, where I am an advisor, I have been delighted to watch the leaps and bounds of AI development. Those at the frontier of AI development are creative thinkers, and creative people are natural innovators. The Government’s attempt to divide us is wrong.

The transformational impact of technology is something that all the signatories of this weekend’s letter to the Prime Minister understand. Creators do not deny the creative and economic value of AI, but we do deny the assertion that we should have to build AI for free with our work and then rent it back from those who stole it. Ours is not an argument about progress but about value. The AI companies fiercely defend their own IP but deny the value of our work. Not everything new is progress, not everything that already exists is without value, but we, the creative industries, embody both change and tradition, and we reject the assertion that we are standing in the way of change. We are merely asserting our right to continue to exist and play our part in the UK’s future growth.

Secondly, there is no confusion about copyright law in relation to AI, nor does the phenomenal number of submissions to the consultation prove anything other than the widespread outrage of the creative industries that the Government sought to redefine theft rather than uphold their property rights. In our last debate, my noble and learned friend Lady Butler-Sloss made an unequivocal statement to that effect which has been widely supported by other legal opinion. The Government’s spokesman, who has greeted every press inquiry of the last few weeks by saying that the Government are consulting to sort out the confusion in copyright in relation to AI is, at best, misinformed. Let me be clear: the amendment would not change copyright. We do not need to change copyright law. We need transparency so that we can enforce copyright law, because what you cannot see you cannot enforce.

Thirdly, I rebut the idea that this is the wrong Bill and the wrong time. AI did not exist in the public realm until the early 2020s. The speed and scale at which copyright works are being stolen is eye-watering. Property that people have invested in, have created, have traded and that they rely on for their livelihood is being stolen at all parts of the value chain. It is an assault on the British economy, happening at scale to a sector worth £120 billion to the UK, an industry that is central to the industrial strategy and of enormous cultural import. It is happening now, and we have not even begun to catch up with the devastating consequences. The Government have taken our amendments out of the Bill and replaced them with a couple of toothless reports. Whatever these reports bring forward and whatever the consultation offers, we need the amendment in front of us today now. If this Bill does not protect copyright then, by the time that the Government work out their policy, there will be little to save.

The language of AI—scraping, training, data modules, LLMs—does not evoke the full picture of what is being done. AI corporations, many of which are seeking to entrench their existing information monopolies, are not stealing nameless data. They are stealing some of the UK’s most valuable cultural and economic assets—Harry Potter, the entire back catalogue of every music publisher in the UK, the voice of Hugh Grant, the design of an iconic handbag and the IP of our universities, great museums and library collections. Even the news is stolen in real time, all without payment, with economic benefits being taken offshore. It costs UK corporations and individuals their hard-earned wealth and the Treasury much needed revenue. It also denudes the opportunities of the next generation because, whether you are a corporation or an individual, if work is stolen at every turn, you cannot survive. The time is now, and this Bill is the vehicle.

Motion 49A replaces the previous package of Lords amendments. I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, who wishes he could be with us; the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and his colleagues, who have been uncompromising in their support; and my noble friend Lord Freyberg, who were all co-sponsors of the original amendment.

Amendment 49B would simply provide that a copyright holder be able to see who took their work, what was taken, when and why, allowing them a reasonable route to assert their moral right to determine whether they wish to have their work used, and if so, on what terms. It is a slimmer version of the previous package of amendments, but it covers the same ground and, importantly, it puts a timeline of 12 months on bringing forward these provisions and makes specific provision for SMEs and micro-entities and for UK-headquartered AI companies.

--- Later in debate ---

Tabled by

[Viscount Camrose]

46A: In inserted subsection (3)(b), at the end insert “, and a plan to reduce related barriers to market entry for those developers;”

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I thank the Minister for her full and detailed answer. Having heard the tone of the debate, I think it is clear that the focus and energy of the House are more on the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, but I am happy to take up the Minister’s offer of a further meeting.

Amendment 46A (to Amendment 46) not moved.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Viscount Camrose]

52A: Leave out from “House” to end and insert “do disagree with the Commons in their Amendment 52, and do propose Amendments 52B and 52C to the words so restored to the Bill—

52B: Clause 140, page 173, line 15, leave out “core personal data attributes” and insert “sex data”

52C: Clause 140, page 173, line 21, at end insert—
“(3) For the purposes of this section, sex data must be collected in accordance with the following category terms and definitions—
(a) “sex” meaning male or female only based on “sex at birth”, “natal sex” or “biological sex” (these terms carrying the same meaning and capable of being used interchangeably), and
(b) in addition, where it is lawful to do so in accordance with data protection legislation and the Gender Recognition Act 2004, “acquired gender” meaning male or female only, as recorded on a gender recognition certificate issued in accordance with the Gender Recognition Act 2004.””

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

A little time has elapsed since the original debate, but I beg leave to test the opinion of the House.

Electronic Communications (Networks and Services) (Designated Vendor Directions) (Penalties) Order 2025

Viscount Camrose Excerpts

Tuesday 25th March 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her introduction to this draft statutory instrument; it was brief and to the point. These penalties will be able to reach 10% of turnover or £100,000 per day for continuing breaches, so getting the calculations right is crucial. However, I have some concerns about the SI, the first of which is about timing.

I do not understand why we are looking at a three-year gap between the enabling powers and the calculation rules. The Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021, which I worked on, was presented to this House as urgent legislation to protect critical national infrastructure, yet here we are, in 2025, only now establishing how to calculate penalties for breaches in the way set out in this SI. During this period, we have had enforcement powers without the ability to properly determine penalties. As I understand it, tier 1 providers had to comply by March 2024, yet the penalty calculation mechanism will not be in place until this year—no doubt in a few weeks’ time.

Secondly, there is the absence of consultation. The Explanatory Memorandum cites the reason as the SI’s “technical nature”, but these penalties—I mentioned their size—could have major financial implications for providers. The telecoms industry has complex business structures and revenue streams. Technical expertise from the industry could have helped to ensure that these calculations are practical and comprehensive. The technical justification seems remarkably weak, given the impact these rules could have. For example, the current definition of “relevant business” for these calculations focuses on traditional network and service provision, but modern telecoms companies often have diverse revenue streams. There is no clear provision for new business models or technologies. How will we handle integrated service providers? What about international revenues? The treatment of associated services needs clarification.

Thirdly, the implementation sequence is an issue. We are being asked to approve penalty calculations before seeing the enforcement guidelines. There is no impact assessment, so we cannot evaluate potential consequences. I understand that the post-implementation review is not scheduled until 2026, and there is no clear mechanism for adjusting the framework if problems emerge. The interaction with the existing penalty regime needs clarification.

There are also technical concerns that need some attention. The switch from “notified provider” to “person” in the 2003 order, as a result of this SI, needs rather more explanation. The calculation method for continuing breaches is not fully detailed, there is no specific provision for group companies or complex corporate structures and the treatment of joint ventures and partnerships remains unclear.

Finally, I hope that, in broad terms, the Minister can give us an update on progress on the removal of equipment covered by the Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021. That was mandated by the Act; I know it is under way but it is not yet complete.

This is about not merely technical calculations but creating an effective deterrent to the telecoms industry, while ensuring fair and practical enforcement of important security measures. Getting these rules right is essential for both national security and our telecoms sector. I look forward to the Minister’s response on these points.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for bringing this important SI forward today and for setting it out so clearly and briefly. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. He made a range of interesting points: in particular, the point on timing was well made, and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s answers on that. This instrument seeks to implement provisions relating to the enforcement of designated vendor directions—DVDs—which form part of the broader framework established under the Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021. That Act, introduced under the previous Government, was designed to strengthen the security and resilience of the UK’s telecommunications networks, particularly in response to emerging national security risks.

We all know only too well that one of the most prominent issues at the forefront of this framework has been the removal of high-risk vendors, such as Huawei, from UK telecommunications infrastructure. Huawei’s involvement in the UK’s 5G rollout has long been a point of debate, with growing concerns about national security risks tied to its equipment. This SI therefore provides a mechanism for enforcing the penalties that may be applied to public communications providers —PCPs—that fail to comply with the DVDs to ensure that the UK’s telecommunications infrastructure remains secure from undue foreign influence.

The primary change introduced by this SI is the formalisation of the penalties regime for public communications providers that fail to comply with the conditions outlined in DVDs. It establishes a framework for calculating and enforcing penalties that may be imposed by the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State retains discretion in imposing penalties, but they must be applied in a proportionate manner. In considering penalties, the severity of the breach, the culpability of the provider and the broader implications for the sector must all be taken into account. The aim is to ensure compliance with DVDs while protecting the integrity of the UK’s national infrastructure.

However, while the objectives of this instrument are understood, this debate offers a good opportunity to scrutinise some of the specifics a little, particularly with regard to the proportionality of penalties and the potential economic consequences for the sector. It is with that in mind that I shall raise questions in just three areas regarding the provisions set out in this instrument.

First, the SI grants the Secretary of State significant discretion in the imposition of penalties. Of course, we recognise the value of flexibility here, but there is legitimate concern that this discretion may result in inconsistent enforcement across different public communications providers. Can the Minister assure us that transparency and accountability will be maintained throughout this process? How will the Government ensure that the application of penalties is fair and consistent, particularly when considering the varying size and scope of telecoms providers?

Further to this, can the Minister clarify how the penalties will be calculated? I echo the questions asked by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, particularly in cases where a breach does not pose an immediate or severe national security threat. Do the Government anticipate that penalties will be tiered with lesser fines for breaches that do not substantially compromise national security? Can the Minister further explain how such decisions will be communicated to the public and to industry to ensure transparency?

Secondly, providers are required to remove Huawei equipment from the UK’s 5G networks by 2027. This is, of course, a significant and costly task for telecom providers. Given these financial challenges, will the penalties for non-compliance take into account the costs already incurred by providers in replacing Huawei’s technology? Will the penalties be adjusted to reflect the substantial financial burden that these providers are already facing in removing Huawei equipment from their networks? Thirdly, where PCPs have been issued with a DVD, this can be a long and demanding process. How are the Government going to keep track of progress? What progress reports can be shared with Parliament and the public?

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[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

Is the Minister confident that the 2027 deadline will be met; that no vendor, purchaser or telecoms company will be caught by the Act; that no fines will be levied; and that what we are talking about today is, therefore, entirely theoretical?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

While the Minister is working on her answer, perhaps she could include in that something about how progress against the delivery of these objectives will be reported to Parliament, potentially —and, indeed, to the public.

Copyright and Artificial Intelligence

Viscount Camrose Excerpts

Thursday 27th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

The noble Earl is right, and we are trying to find a way to ensure that those rights are upheld. However, all these sectors need to grow in our economy. As I was just explaining, the creative sector uses AI, so it is not as simple “us and them” situation. AI is increasingly being used by all sectors across our economy. We need to find a way through this that rewards creators in the way that the noble Earl has outlined, which I think we all understand.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My Lords, I recognise of course that the task of analysing the results of the consultation still needs to go ahead. That said, does the Minister agree with us that digital watermarking is going to be a key component of the solution to the AI and copyright issue? If so, what does she make of the number of digital watermarking solutions that are now coming to market? In her view, is this to be welcomed or should we be pursuing a single standard for digital watermarks?

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

The noble Viscount has made an important point about watermarks, and that is certainly one solution that we are considering. The issue of transparency is crucial to the outcome of this issue, and watermarks would certainly help with that. I do not have a view as yet on whether we should have one or many, but I am hoping that the consultation will give us some guidance on that.

Data (Use and Access) Bill [HL]

Viscount Camrose Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th December 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Lucas (Con)]

My Lords, I very much support the thrust of these amendments and what the noble Lord, Lord Knight, said in support of and in addition to them. I declare an interest as a current user of the national pupil database.

The proper codification of safeguards would be a huge help. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, said, it would give us a foundation on which to build. I hope that, if they are going to go in this direction, the Government will take an immediate opportunity to do so because what we have here, albeit much more disorganised, is a data resource equivalent to what we have for the National Health Service. If we used all the data on children that these systems generate, we would find it much easier to know what works and in what circumstances, as well as how to keep improving our education system.

The fact that this data is tucked away in little silos—it is not shared and is not something that can be used on a national basis—is a great pity. If we have a national code as to how this data is handled, we enable something like the use of educational data in the way that the NHS proposes to use health data. Safeguards are needed on that level but the Government have a huge opportunity; I very much hope that it is one they will take.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I start by thanking all noble Lords who spoke; I enjoyed the vivid examples that were shared by so many of them. I particularly enjoyed the comment from the noble Lord, Lord Russell, about the huge gulf in difference between guidance, of which there is far too much, and a code that actually drives matters forward.

I will speak much more briefly because this ground has been well covered already. Both the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, seek to introduce codes of practice to protect the data of children in education services. Amendment 138 in the name of the noble Lord seeks to introduce a code on processing personal data in education. This includes consultation for the creation of such a code—a highly important element because the safety of this data, as well as its eventual usage, is of course paramount. Amendment 141 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, also seeks to set out a code of practice to provide heightened protections for children in education.

Those amendments are absolutely right to include consultation. It is a particularly important area of legislation. It is important that it does not restrict what schools can do with their data in order to improve the quality and productivity of their work. I was very appreciative of the words of the noble Lord, Lord Knight, when he sketched out some of the possibilities of what becomes educationally possible when these techs are wisely and safely used. With individual schools often responsible for the selection of technologies and their procurement, the landscape is—at the risk of understatement —often more complex than we would wish.

Alongside that, the importance of the AI Safety Institute’s role in consultation cannot be overstated. The way in which tech and AI have developed in recent years means that its expertise on how safely to provide AI to this particularly vulnerable group is invaluable.

I very much welcome the emphasis that these amendments place on protecting children’s data, particularly in the realm of education services. Schools are a safe place. That safety being jeopardised by the rapid evolution of technology that the law cannot keep pace with would, I think we can all agree, be unthinkable. As such, I hope that the Government will give careful consideration to the points raised as we move on to Report.

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[Lord Bethell (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to make a brief but emphatic comment from the health constituency. We in the NHS have been victims of appalling cyber- hacking. The pathology labs in south London were hacked and that cost many lives. It is an example of where the world is going in the future unless we act promptly. The emphatic call for quick action so that government keeps up with world changes is really well made. I ask the Minister to reflect on that.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My Lords, I, too, shall speak very briefly, which will save valuable minutes in which I can order my CyberUp Christmas mug.

Amendments 156A and 156B add to the definition of unauthorised access, so that it includes instances where a person who accesses data in the reasonable knowledge that the controller would not consent if they knew about the access or the reason for the access, and this person is not empowered to access by an enactment. Amendment 156B introduces defences to this new charge. Given the amount of valuable personal data held by controllers, as our lives have moved increasingly online—as many speakers in this debate have vividly brought out—there is absolutely clear merit not just in this idea but in the pace implied, which many noble Lords have called for. There is a need for real urgency here, and I look forward to hearing more detail from the Minister.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I turn to Amendments 156A and 156B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes. I understand the strength of feeling and the need to provide legal protections for legitimate cybersecurity activities. I agree with the noble Lord that the UK should have the right legislative framework to allow us to tackle the harms posed by cybercriminals. We have heard examples of some of those threats this afternoon.

I reassure the noble Lord that this Government are committed to ensuring that the Computer Misuse Act remains up to date and effective in tackling criminality. We will continue to work with the cybersecurity industry, the National Cyber Security Centre and law enforcement agencies to consider whether there are workable proposals on this. The noble Lord will know that this is a complex and ongoing issue being considered as part of the review of the Computer Misuse Act being carried out by the Home Office. We are considering improved defences by engaging extensively with the cybersecurity industry, law enforcement agencies, prosecutors and system owners. However, engagement to date has not produced a consensus on the issue, even within the industry, and that is holding us back at this moment—but we are absolutely determined to move forward with this and to reach a consensus on the way forward.

I think the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, said in the previous debate that the amendments were premature, and here that is certainly the case. The specific amendments that the noble Lord has tabled are premature, because we need a stronger consensus on the way forward, notwithstanding all the good reasons that noble Lords have given for why it is important that we have updated legislation. With these concerns and reasons in mind, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

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[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, the trouble with this House is that some have long memories. The noble Earl, Lord Erroll, reminded us all to look back, with real regret, at the Digital Economy Act and the failure to implement Part 3. I think that that was a misstep by the previous Government.

Like all of us, I warmly welcome the inclusion of data access provisions for researchers studying online safety matters in Clause 123 of the Bill. As we heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and the noble Lord, Lord Knight, this was very much unfinished business from the Online Safety Act. However, I believe that, in order for the Bill to be effective and have the desired effect, the Government need to accept the amendments in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and the noble Lord, Lord Bethell. In terms of timeframe, the width of research possible, enforceability, contractual elements and location, they cover the bases extremely effectively.

The point was made extremely well by the noble Lords, Lord Bethell and Lord Russell, that we should not have to rely on brave whistleblowers such as Frances Haugen. We should be able to benefit from quality researchers, whether from academia or elsewhere, in order to carry out this important work.

My Amendment 198B is intended as a probing amendment about the definition of researchers under Clause 123, which has to be carefully drawn to allow for legitimate non-governmental organisations, academics and so on, but not so widely that it can be exploited by bad actors. For example, we do not want those who seek to identify potential exploits in a platform to use this by calling themselves “independent researchers” if they simply describe themselves as such. For instance, could Tommy Robinson seek to protect himself from liabilities in this way? After all, he called himself an “independent journalist” in another context when he clearly was not. I hope that when the Government come to draw up the regulations they will be mindful of the need to be very clear about what constitutes an independent or accredited researcher, or whatever phrase will be used in the context.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My Lords, although I have no amendments in this group, I will comment on some of them. I might jump around the order, so please forgive me for that.

Amendment 197 would change Clause 123 so that the Secretary of State must, as soon as reasonably practicable and no later than 12 months after the Act is passed, make regulations requiring regulated services to provide information for the purposes of research into online safety. This is clearly sensible. It would ensure that valuable research into online safety may commence as soon as possible, which would benefit us all, as speakers have made abundantly clear. To that end, Amendment 198D, which would ensure that researcher access is enforceable in the same way as other requirements under the Online Safety Act, would ensure that researchers can access valuable information and carry out their beneficial research.

I am still left with some curiosity on some of these amendments, so I will indicate where I have specific questions to those who have tabled them and hope they will forgive me if I ask to have a word with them between now and Report, which would be very helpful. In that spirit, I turn to Amendment 198B, which would allow the Secretary of State to define the term “independent researcher”. I ask the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, who tabled the amendment, whether he envisages the Secretary of State taking advice before making such regulations and, if so, from whom and in what mechanism. I recognise that it is a probing amendment, but I would be keen to understand more.

I am also keen to understand further from my noble friend Lord Bethell and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, why, under Amendment 198A, the Secretary of State would not be able to make regulations providing for independent research into the “enforcement of requirements” under these regulations. Again, I look forward to discussing that with them.

I have some concerns about Amendment 198, which would require service providers to give information pertaining to age, stage of development, gender, race, ethnicity, disability and sexuality to researchers. I understand the importance of this but my concern is that it would require the disclosure of special category data to those researchers. I express reservations, especially if the data pertains to children. Do we have the right safeguards in place to address the obviously heightened risks here?

Additionally, I have some concerns about the provisions suggested in Amendment 198E. Should we allow researchers from outside the United Kingdom to require access to information from regulated service providers? Could this result in data being transferred into jurisdictions where there are less stringent data protection laws?

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have welcomed the provisions in the Bill. I very much appreciate that we have taken on board the concerns that were raised in the debates on the previous legislation. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and the noble Lords, Lord Bethell and Lord Clement-Jones, for their amendments.

I will speak first to Amendment 197, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, which would compel the Secretary of State to create a framework and to do so within 12 months of passage. I understand and share her desire to ensure that a framework allowing researchers access is installed and done promptly. This is precisely why we brought forward this provision. I reassure her that the department will consult on the framework as soon as possible after the publication of Ofcom’s report.

Turning to Amendments 198 and 198B, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, respectively, Clause 123 provides the Secretary of State with the power to make regulations relating to researchers’ access to data. I can reassure noble Lords that it does not limit the regulations to the non-exhaustive list of examples provided. I agree that fair and proportionate criteria for who is considered a researcher are critical to the success of the future framework. I reassure noble Lords that in the provision as currently written the Secretary of State can include in the design of the framework the specific requirements that a person must meet to be considered a researcher.

Turning to Amendments 198A and 198D, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, while I am sympathetic to his desire to provide a future framework with the robust enforcement powers of the OSA, I assure him that as the provision is written, the Secretary of State can already use the existing enforcement powers of the OSA to support a future framework. Furthermore, should the evidence suggest that additional or different measures would be more effective and appropriate, this provision allows the Secretary of State the flexibility to introduce them.

Turning next to Amendments 198C and 198E, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, I understand the spirit of these amendments and note the importance of this issue, given the global nature of the online world. It is entirely reasonable to allow researchers who are not based in the UK to utilise our researcher access framework, as long as the subject of their research is the experience of UK users online. I reassure him that the provisions as drafted already allow the Secretary of State to make regulations permitting non-UK-based researchers to use the framework where appropriate. We plan to use the evidence gathered through our own means and through Ofcom’s report to set out who will be eligible to use the framework in the secondary legislation.

Finally, turning to Amendment 198F, I am aware of the concern that researchers have encountered blockages to conducting research and I am sympathetic to the intentions behind the amendment. We must ensure that researchers can use the future framework without fear of legal action or other consequences. I am conscious that the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, asked me a specific question about legal exemptions and I will write to her to make that answer much clearer. I reassure noble Lords that the Government are considering the specific issues that the noble Lord raises. For these reasons, I ask that the amendments not be pressed while the Government consider these issues further and I am of course happy to engage with noble Lords in the meantime.

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Moved by

[Viscount Camrose]

199: After Clause 126, insert the following new Clause—
“Data risks from systemic competitors and hostile actors
Data risks from systemic competitors and hostile actors(1) The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Information Commissioner, must conduct a risk assessment on the data privacy risks associated with genomics and DNA companies that are headquartered in countries the government determines to be systemic competitors and hostile actors.(2) Within 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must present a report on the risk assessment in subsection (1) to Parliament and consult the intelligence and security agencies on the findings, taking into account the need to not make public information critical to national defence or ongoing operations.(3) This risk assessment must evaluate—(a) the degree of access granted to foreign entities, particularly those linked to systemic competitors and hostile actors, to genomic and DNA data collected within the United Kingdom,(b) the potential for genomic and DNA data to be exfiltrated outside of the United Kingdom,(c) the potential misuse of United Kingdom genomic and DNA data for dual-use or nefarious purposes,(d) the potential for such data to be used in a manner that could compromise the privacy or security of United Kingdom citizens or undermine national security and strategic advantage.(4) The risk assessment must consider and include, but is not limited to—(a) an analysis of the data handling and storage practices of genomics companies that are based in countries designated as systemic competitors and hostile actors, (b) an independent audit, including digital and physical forensic examination, at any company site that could have access to United Kingdom genomics data, and(c) evidence of clear disclosure statements to consumers of products and services from genomics companies subject to data sharing requirements in the countries where they are headquartered.(5) This risk assessment must be conducted as frequently as deemed necessary by the Secretary of State or the Information Commissioner to address evolving threats and ensure continued protection of the genomics sector from entities controlled, directly or indirectly, by countries designated as systemic competitors and hostile actors.(6) The Secretary of State may issue directives or guidelines based on the findings of the risk assessment to ensure compliance by companies or personnel operating within the genomics sector in the United Kingdom, safeguarding against identified risks and vulnerabilities to data privacy.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure sufficient scrutiny of emerging national security and data privacy risks related to advanced technology and areas of strategic interest for systemic competitors and hostile actors. It aims to inform the development of regulations or guidelines necessary to mitigate risks and protect the data privacy of UK citizens’ genomics data and the national interest. It seeks to ensure security experts can scrutinise malign entities and guide researchers, consumers, businesses, and public bodies.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My Lords, the UK is a world leader in genomics research. This research will no doubt result in many benefits, particularly in the healthcare space. However, genomics data can be, and increasingly is, exploited for deeply concerning purposes, including geostrategic ones.

Western intelligence agencies are reportedly becoming increasingly concerned about China using genomic data and biotechnology for military purposes. The Chinese Government have made it clear that genomics plays a key part in the civilian-military doctrine. The 13th five-year plan for military-civil fusion calls for the cross-pollination of military and civilian technology such as biotechnology. This statement, taken in conjunction with reports that the Beijing Genomics Institute—the BGI—in collaboration with the People’s Liberation Army, is looking to make ethnically Han Chinese soldiers less susceptible to altitude sickness, makes for worrying reading. Genetically engineered soldiers appear to be moving out of fiction and towards reality.

The global genomics industry has grown substantially as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic and gene giant BGI Group and its affiliated MGI Tech have acquired large databases of DNA. Further, I note that BGI has widespread links to the Chinese state. It operates the Government’s key laboratories and national gene bank, itself a vast repository of DNA data drawn from all over the world. A Reuters investigation found that a prenatal test, NIFTY, sold by BGI to expectant mothers, gathered millions of women’s DNA data. This prenatal test was developed in collaboration with the Chinese military.

For these reasons, I think we must become far more protective of genomic data gathered from our population. While many researchers use genomic data to find cures for terrible diseases, many others, I am afraid, would use it to do us harm. To this end, I have tabled Amendment 199 to require the Secretary of State and the Information Commissioner to conduct frequent risk assessments on data privacy associated with genomics and DNA companies headquartered in countries that are systemic competitors or hostile actors. I believe this will go some way to preventing genomic data transfer out of the UK and to countries such as China that may use it for military purposes. I beg to move.

[Lord Bethell (Con)]

My Lords, I strongly support this amendment. As a former Minister, I was at the front line of genomic data and know how powerful it currently is and can be in the future. Having discussed this with the UK Biobank, I know that the issue of who stores and processes genomic data in the UK is a subject of huge and grave concern. I emphasise that the American Government have moved on this issue already and emphatically. There is the possibility that we will be left behind in global standards and will one day be an outlier if we do not close this important and strategically delicate loophole. For that reason, I strongly support this amendment.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, for moving this amendment, which raises this important question about our genomics databases, and for the disturbing examples that he has drawn to our attention. He is right that the opportunities from harnessing genomic data come with very real risks. This is why the Government have continued the important work of the UK Biological Security Strategy of 2023, including by conducting a full risk assessment and providing updated guidance to reduce the risks from the misuse of sensitive data. We plan to brief the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy on the findings of the risk assessment in the new year. Following that, I look forward to engaging with the noble Viscount on its outcome and on how we intend to take these issues forward. As he says, this is a vital issue, but in the meantime I hope he is prepared to withdraw his amendment.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I thank the Minister for her answer, and I very much accept her offer of engagement. I will make a few further brief comments about the importance of this amendment, as we go forward. I hope that other noble Lords will consider it carefully before Report.

I will set out a few reasons why I believe this amendment can benefit both the Bill and this country. The first is its scope. The amendment will allow the Secretary of State and the Information Commissioner to assess data security risks across the entirety of the genomic sector, covering consumers, businesses, citizens and researchers who may be partnering with state-linked genomics companies.

The second reason is urgency. DNA is regularly described as the “new gold” and it represents our most permanent identifier, revealing physical and mental characteristics, family medical history and susceptibility to diseases. Once it has been accessed, the damage from potential misuse cannot be researched, and this places a premium on proactively scrutinising the potential risks to this data.

Thirdly, there are opportunities for global leadership. This amendment offers the UK an opportunity to take a world-leading role and become the first European country to take authoritative action to scrutinise data vulnerabilities in this area of critical technology. Scrutinising risks to UK genomic data security also provides a foundation to foster domestic genomics companies and solutions.

Fourthly, this amendment would align the UK with key security partners, particularly, as my noble friend Lord Bethell mentioned, the United States, which has already blacklisted certain genomics companies linked to China and taken steps to protect American citizens’ DNA from potential misuse.

The fifth and final reason is protection of citizens and consumers. This amendment would provide greater guidance and transparency to citizens and consumers whose DNA data is exposed to entities linked to systemic competitors. With all of that said, I thank noble Lords for their consideration and beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 199 withdrawn.

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[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, we have had some powerful speeches in this group, not least from the noble Baronesses, Lady Kidron and Lady Owen, who drafted important amendments that respond to the escalating harms caused by AI-generated sexual abuse material relating to children and adults. The amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, would make it an offence to use personal data or digital information to create digital models or files that facilitate the creation of AI or computer-generated child sexual abuse material. As she outlined and the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, confirmed, it specifically would become an offence to create, train or distribute generative AI models that enable the creation of computer-generated CSAM or priority legal content; to train AI models on CSAM or priority illegal content; or to possess AI models that produce CSAM or priority legal content.

This amendment responds to a growing problem, as we have heard, around computer-generated sexual abuse material and a gap in the law. There is a total lack of safeguards preventing bad actors creating sexual abuse imagery, and it is causing real harm. Sites enabling this abuse are offering tools to harm, humiliate, harass, coerce and cause reputational damage. Without robust legal frameworks, victims are left vulnerable while perpetrators operate with impunity.

The noble Lord, Lord Bethell, mentioned the Internet Watch Foundation. In its report of July, One Step Ahead, it reported on the alarming rise of AI-generated CSAM. In October 2023, in How AI is Being Abused to Create Child Sexual Abuse Imagery, it made recommendations to the Government regarding legislation to strengthen legal frameworks to better address the evolving landscape of AI-generated CSAM and enhance preventive measures against its creation and distribution. It specifically recommended:

“That the Government legislates to make it an offence to use personal data or digital information to create digital models or files that facilitate the creation of AI or computer-generated child sexual abuse material”.


The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, tabled such an amendment to the previous Bill. As she said, she was successful in persuading the then Government to accept it; I very much hope that she will be as successful in persuading this Government to accept her amendment.

Amendments 211G and 211H in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, are a response to the extraordinary fact that one in 14 adults has experienced threats to share intimate images in England and Wales; that rises to one in seven among young women. Research from Internet Matters shows that 49% of young teenagers in the UK aged between 13 and 16—around 750,000 children—said that they were aware of a form of image-based abuse being perpetrated against another young person known to them.

We debated the first of the noble Baroness’s amendments, which is incorporated in her Bill, last Friday. I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Knight; I did not find the Government’s response at all satisfactory. I hope that, in the short passage of time between then and now, they have had time to be at least a little agile, as he requested. UK law clearly does not effectively address non-consensual intimate images. It is currently illegal to share or threaten to share non-consensual intimate images, including deepfakes, but creating them is not yet illegal; this means that someone could create a deepfake image of another person without their consent and not face legal consequences as long as they do not share, or threaten to share, it.

This amendment is extremely welcome. It addresses the gap in the law by criminalising the creation of non-consensual intimate images, including deepfakes. It rightly targets deepfakes due to their rising prevalence and potential for harm, particularly towards women. Research shows that 98% of deepfake videos online are pornographic, with 99% featuring women and girls. This makes it an inherently sexist problem that is a new frontier of violence against women—words that I know the noble Baroness has used.

I also very much welcome the new amendment not contained in her Bill, responding to what the noble Baroness, Lady Gohir, said at its Second Reading last Friday about including audio deepfakes. The words “shut down every avenue”, which I think were used by the noble Baroness, Lady Gohir, are entirely apposite in these circumstances. Despite what the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, said on Friday, I hope that the Government will accept both these amendments and redeem their manifesto pledge to ban the creation of sexually explicit deepfakes, whether audio or video.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My Lords, the current law does not sufficiently protect children from AI-driven CSAM because it is simply such a fast-moving issue. It is a sobering thought that, of all the many wonderful developments of AI that many of us have been predicting and speculating on for so long, CSAM is really driving the technology forward. What a depressing reflection that is.

Overall, AI is developing at an extraordinarily rapid pace and has come with a number of concerning consequences that are not all yet fully understood. However, it is understood that child sexual abuse is completely unacceptable in any and all contexts, and it is right that our law should be updated to reflect the dangers that have increased alongside AI development.

Amendment 203 seeks to create a specific offence for using personal data or digital information to create or facilitate the creation of computer-generated child sexual abuse material. Although legislation is in place to address possessing or distributing such horrendous material, we must prioritise the safety of children in this country and take the law a step further to prevent its creation. Our children must be kept safe and, subject to one reservation, which I will come to in a second, I support the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, to further protect them.

That reservation comes in proposed new subsection 1(c), which includes in the offence the act of collating files that, when combined, enable the creation of sexual abuse material. This is too broad. A great deal of the collation of such material can be conducted by innocent people using innocent materials that are then corrupted or given more poisonous aspects by further training, fine-tuning or combination with other materials by more malign actors. I hope there is a way we can refine this proposed new paragraph on that basis.

Unfortunately, adults can also be the targets of individuals who use AI to digitally generate non-consensual explicit images or audio files of an individual, using their likeness and personal data. I am really pleased that my noble friend Lady Owen tabled Amendments 211G and 211H to create offences for these unacceptable, cruel acts. I support these amendments unambiguously.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for her Amendment 203. It goes without saying that the Government treat all child sexual abuse material with the utmost seriousness. I can therefore confirm to her and the Committee that the Government will bring forward legislative measures to address the issue in this Session and that the Home Office will make an announcement on this early in the new year.

On Amendments 211G and 211H, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, the Government share concerns that more needs to be done to protect women from deepfake image abuse. This is why the Government committed in their manifesto to criminalise the creation of sexually explicit deepfake images of adults. I reassure the noble Baroness and the whole Committee that we will deliver on our manifesto commitment in this Session. The Government are fully committed to protecting the victims of tech-enabled sexual abuse. Tackling intimate audio would be a new area of law, but we continue to keep that legislation under review.

I also say to the noble Baroness that there is already a process under Section 153 of the Sentencing Act 2020 for the court to deprive a convicted offender of property, including images that have been used for the purpose of committing or facilitating any criminal offence. As well as images, that includes computers and mobile phones that the offender either used to commit intimate image offences or intended to use for that purpose in future. For those reasons and the reassurances I have given today, I hope that noble Lords will feel able to withdraw or not press their amendments.