Data Protection and Digital Information Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateViscount Camrose
Main Page: Viscount Camrose (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)Department Debates - View all Viscount Camrose's debates with the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology
(4 months, 1 week ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I listened carefully to the explanation given by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for his stand part notice on Clause 44. I will have to read Hansard, as I may have missed something, but I am not sure I am convinced by his arguments against Clause 44 standing part. He described his stand part notice as “innocuous”, but I am concerned that if the clause were removed it would have a slightly wider implication than that.
We feel that there are some advantages to how Clause 44 is currently worded. As it stands, it simply makes it clear that data subjects have to use the internal processes to make complaints to controllers first, and then the controller has the obligation to respond without undue delay. Although this could place an extra burden on businesses to manage and reply to complaints in a timely manner, I would have thought that this was a positive step to be welcomed. It would require controllers to have clear processes in place for handling complaints; I hope that that in itself would be an incentive against their conducting the kind of unlawful processing that prompts complaints in the first place. This seems the best practice, which would apply anyway in most organisations and complaint and arbitration systems, including, perhaps, ombudsmen, which I know the noble Lord knows more about than I do these days. There should be a requirement to use the internal processes first.
The clause makes it clear that the data subject has a right to complain directly to the controller and it makes clear that the controller has an obligation to respond. Clause 45 then goes on to make a different point, which is that the commissioner has a right to refuse to act on certain complaints. We touched on this in an earlier debate. Clearly, to be in line with Clause 44, the controller would have to have finished handling the case within the allotted time. We agree with that process. However, an alternative reason for the commissioner to refuse is when the complaint is “vexatious or excessive”. We have rehearsed our arguments about the interpretation of those words in previous debates on the application of subject access requests. I do not intend to repeat them here, but our concern about that wording rightly remains. What is important here is that the ICO should not be able to reject complaints simply because the complainant is distressed or angry. It is helpful that the clause states that in these circumstances,
“the Commissioner must inform the complainant”
of the reasons it is considered vexatious or excessive. It is also helpful that the clause states that this
“does not prevent the complainant from making it a complaint again”,
presumably in a way more compliant with the rules. Unlike the noble Lord, Lord Clement Jones—as I said, I will look at what he said in more detail—on balance, we are content with the wording as it stands.
On a slightly different tack, we have added our name to Amendment 154, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and we support Amendment 287 on a similar subject. This touches on a similar principle to our previous debate on the right of data communities to raise data-breach complaints on behalf of individuals. In these amendments, we are proposing that there should be a collective right for organisations to raise data-breach complaints for individuals or groups of individuals who do not necessarily feel sufficiently empowered or confident to raise the complaints on their own behalf. There are many reasons why this reticence might occur, not least that the individuals may feel that making a complaint would put their employment on the line or that they would suffer discrimination at work in the future. We therefore believe that these amendments are important to widen people’s access to work with others to raise these complaints.
Since these amendments were tabled, we have received the letter from the Minister that addresses our earlier debate on data communities. I am pleased to see the general support for data intermediaries that he set out in his letter. We argue that a data community is a separate distinct collective body, which is different from the wider concept of data intermediaries. This seems to be an area in which the ICO could take a lead in clarifying rights and set standards. Our Amendment 154 would therefore set a deadline for the ICO to do that work and for those rights to be enacted.
The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, made a good case for broadening these rights in the Bill and, on that basis, I hope the Minister will agree to follow this up, and follow up his letter so that we can make further progress on this issue.
The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has tabled a number of amendments that modify the courts and tribunals functions. I was hoping that when I stood here and listened to him, I would understand a bit more about the issues. I hope he will forgive me for not responding in detail to these arguments. I do not feel that I know enough about the legal background to the concerns but he seems to have made a clear case in clarifying whether the courts or tribunals should have jurisdiction in data protection issues.
On that basis, I hope that the Minister will also provide some clarification on these issues and I look forward to his response.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for tabling these amendments to Clauses 44 and 45, which would reform the framework for data protection complaints to the Information Commissioner.
The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has given notice of his intention to oppose Clause 44 standing part of the Bill. That would remove new provisions from the Bill that have been carefully designed to provide a more direct route to resolution for data subjects’ complaints. I should stress that these measures do not limit rights for data subjects to bring complaints forward, but instead provide a more direct route to resolution with the relevant data controller. The measures formalise current best practice, requiring the complainant to approach the relevant data controller, where appropriate, to attempt to resolve the issue prior to regulatory involvement.
The Bill creates a requirement for data controllers to facilitate the making of complaints and look into what may have gone wrong. This should, in most cases, result in a much quicker resolution of data protection-related complaints. The provisions will also have the impact of enabling the Information Commissioner to redeploy resources away from handling premature complaints where such complaints may be dealt with more effectively, in the first instance, by controllers and towards value-added regulatory activity, supporting businesses to use data lawfully and in innovative ways.
The noble Lord’s Amendment 153 seeks, in effect, to expand the scope of the Information Commissioner’s duty to investigate complaints under Section 165 of the Data Protection Act. However, that Section of the Act already provides robust redress routes, requiring the commissioner to take appropriate steps to respond to complaints and offer an outcome or conclude an investigation within a specified period.
The noble Lord raised the enforcement of the UK’s data protection framework. I can provide more context on the ICO’s approach, although noble Lords will be aware that it is enforced independently of government by the ICO; it would of course be inappropriate for me to comment on how the ICO exercises its enforcement powers. The ICO aims to be fair, proportionate and effective, focusing on areas with the highest risk and most harm, but this does not mean that it will enforce every case that crosses its books.
The Government have introduced a new requirement on the ICO—Clause 43—to publish an annual report on how it has exercised its enforcement powers, the number and nature of investigations, the enforcement powers used, how long investigations took and the outcome of the investigations that ended in that period. This will provide greater transparency and accountability in the ICO’s exercise of its enforcement powers. For these reasons, I am not able to accept these amendments.
I also thank the noble Baroness and the noble Lord for their Amendments 154 and 287 concerning Section 190 of the Data Protection Act. These amendments would require the Secretary of State to legislate to give effect to Article 80(2) of the UK GDPR to enable relevant non-profit organisations to make claims against data controllers for alleged data breaches on behalf of data subjects, without those data subjects having requested or agreeing to the claim being brought. Currently, such non-profit organisations can already pursue such actions on behalf of individuals who have granted them specific authorisation, as outlined in Article 80(1).
In 2021, following consultation, the Government concluded that there was insufficient evidence to justify implementing Article 80(2) to allow non-profit organisations to bring data protection claims without the authorisation of the people affected. The Government’s response to the consultation noted that the regulator can and does investigate complaints raised by civil society groups, even when they are not made on behalf of named individuals. The ICO’s investigations into the use of live facial recognition technology at King’s Cross station and in some supermarkets in southern England are examples of this.
I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for raising her concerns about the protection of children throughout the debate—indeed, throughout all the days in Committee. The existing regime already allows civil society groups to make complaints to the ICO about data-processing activities that affect children and vulnerable people. The ICO has a range of powers to investigate systemic data breaches under the current framework and is already capable of forcing data controllers to take decisive action to address non-compliance. We are strengthening its powers in this Bill. I note that only a few member states of the EU have allowed non-governmental organisations to launch actions without a mandate, in line with the possibility provided by the GDPR.
I turn now to Amendments 154A, 154B—
Before the noble Lord gets there and we move too far from Amendment 154, where does the Government’s thinking leave us regarding a group of class actions? Trade unions take up causes on behalf of their membership at large. I guess, in the issue of the Post Office and Mr Bates, not every sub-postmaster or sub-postmistress would have signed up to that class action, even though they may have ended up being beneficiaries of its effects. So where does it leave people with regard to data protection and the way that the data protection scheme operates where there might be a class action?
If the action is raised on behalf of named individuals, those named individuals have to have given consent for that. If the action is for a general class of people, those people would not have to give their explicit consent, because they are not named in the action. Article 80(2) of the GDPR said that going that further step was optional for all member states. I do not know which member states have taken it up, but a great many have not, just because of the complexities to which it gives rise.
My Lords, just so that the Minister might get a little note, I will ask a question. He has explained what is possible—what can be done—but not why the Government still resist putting Article 80(2) into effect. What is the reason for not adopting that article?
The reason was that an extensive consultation was undertaken in 2021 by the Government, and the Government concluded at that time that there was insufficient evidence to take what would necessarily be a complex step. That was largely on the grounds that class actions of this type can go forward either as long as they have the consent of any named individuals in the class action or on behalf of a group of individuals who are unnamed and not specifically raised by name within the investigation itself.
Perhaps the Minister could in due course say what evidence would help to persuade the Government to adopt the article.
I want to help the Minister. Perhaps he could give us some more detail on the nature of that consultation and the number of responses and what people said in it. It strikes me as rather important.
Fair enough. Maybe for the time being, it will satisfy the Committee if I share a copy of that consultation and what evidence was considered, if that would work.
I will turn now to Amendments 154A to 155 and Amendment 175, which propose sweeping modifications to the jurisdiction of the court and tribunal for proceedings under the Data Protection Act 2018. These amendments would have the effect of making the First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal responsible for all data protection cases, transferring both ongoing and future cases out of the court system and to the relevant tribunals.
The Government of course want to ensure that proceedings for enforcement of data protection rules, including redress routes available to data subjects, are appropriate for the nature of the complaint. As the Committee will be well aware, at present there is a mixture of jurisdiction for tribunals and courts under data protection legislation, depending on the precise nature of the proceedings in question. Tribunals are indeed the appropriate venue for some data protection proceedings, and the legislation already recognises that—for example, for application by data subjects for an order requiring the ICO to progress their complaint. However, courts are generally the more appropriate venue for cases involving claims for compensation and successful parties can usually recover their costs. Courts also apply stricter rules of procedure and evidence than tribunals. That is because some cases are appropriate to fall under the jurisdiction of the tribunal, while others are more appropriate for court jurisdiction. For example, claims by individuals against organisations for breaches of legal requirements can result in awards of compensatory damages for the individuals and financial and reputational damage for the organisations. It is appropriate that such cases are handled by a court in accordance with its strict procedural and evidential rules, where the data subject may recover their costs if successful.
As such, the Government are confident that the current system is balanced and proportionate and provides clear and effective administrative and judicial redress routes for data subjects seeking to exercise their rights.
My Lords, is the Minister saying that there is absolutely no confusion between the jurisdiction of the tribunals and the courts? That is, no court has come to a different conclusion about jurisdiction—for example, as to whether procedural matters are for tribunals and merits are for courts or vice versa. Is he saying that everything is hunky-dory and clear and that we do not need to concern ourselves with this crossover of jurisdiction?
No, as I was about to say, we need to take these issues seriously. The noble Lord raised a number of specific cases. I was unfamiliar with them at the start of the debate—
I will go away and look at those; I look forward to learning more about them. There are obvious implications in what the noble Lord said as to the most effective ways of distributing cases between courts and other channels.
For these reasons, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
I am intrigued by the balance between what goes to a tribunal and what goes to the courts. I took the spirit behind the stand-part notice in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, as being about finding the right place for the right case and ensuring that the wheels of justice are much more accessible. I am not entirely persuaded by what the Minister has said. It would probably help the Committee if we had a better understanding of where the cases go, how they are distributed and on what basis.
I thank the noble Lord; that is an important point. The question is: how does the Sorting Hat operate to distribute cases between the various tribunals and the court system? We believe that the courts have an important role to play in this but it is about how, in the early stages of a complaint, the case is allocated to a tribunal or a court. I can see that more detail is needed there; I would be happy to write to noble Lords.
Before we come to the end of this debate, I just want to raise something. I am grateful to the Minister for offering to bring forward the 2021 consultation on Article 80(2)—that will be interesting—but I wonder whether, as we look at the consultation and seek to understand the objections, the Government would be willing to listen to our experiences over the past two or three years. I know I said this on our previous day in Committee but there is, I hope, some point in ironing out some of the problems of the data regime that we are experiencing in action. I could bring forward a number of colleagues on that issue and on why it is a blind spot for both the ICO and the specialist organisations that are trying to bring systemic issues to its attention. It is very resource-heavy. I want a bit of goose and gander here: if we are trying to sort out some of the resourcing and administrative nightmares in dealing with the data regime, from a user perspective, perhaps a bit of kindness could be shown to that problem as well as to the problem of business.
I would be very happy to participate in that discussion, absolutely.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. I have surprised myself: I have taken something positive away from the Bill.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, was quite right to be more positive about Clause 44 than I was. The Minister unpacked its relationship with Clause 45 well and satisfactorily. Obviously, we will read Hansard before we jump to too positive a conclusion.
On Article 80(2), I am grateful to the Minister for agreeing both to go back to the consultation and to look at the kinds of evidence that were brought forward, because this is a really important aspect for many civil society organisations. He underestimates the difficulties faced when bringing complaints of this nature. I would very much like this conversation to go forward because this issue has been quite a bone of contention; the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, remembers that only too well. We may even have had ping-pong on the matter back in 2017. There is an appetite to keep on the case so, the more we can discuss this matter—between Committee and Report in particular—the better, because there is quite a head of steam behind it.
As far as the jurisdiction point is concerned, I think this may be the first time I have heard a Minister talk about the Sorting Hat. I was impressed: I have often compared this place to Hogwarts but the concept of using the Sorting Hat to decide whether a case goes to a tribunal or a court is a wonderful one. You would probably need artificial intelligence to do that kind of thing nowadays; that in itself is a bit of an issue because, after all, these may be elaborate amendments but, as the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, said, the case being made here is about the possibility of there being confusion and things not being clear in terms of where jurisdiction lies. It is really important that we determine whether the courts and tribunals themselves understand this and, perhaps more appropriately, whether they have differing views about it.
We need to get to grips with this; the more the Minister can dig into it, and into Delo, Killock and so on, the better. We are all in the foothills here but I am certainly not going to try to unpack those two judgments and the differences between Mrs Justice Farbey and Mr Justice Mostyn, which are well beyond my competency. I thank the Minister.
My Lords, the UK has rightly moved away from the EU concept of supremacy, under which retained EU law would always take precedence over domestic law when they were in conflict. That is clearly unacceptable now that we have left the EU. However, we understand that the effective functioning of our data protection legislation is of critical importance and it is appropriate for us to specify the appropriate relationship between UK and EU-derived pieces of legislation following implementation of the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act, or REUL. That is why I am introducing a number of specific government amendments to ensure that the hierarchy of legislation works in the data protection context. These are Amendments 156 to 164 and 297.
Noble Lords may be aware that Clause 49 originally sought to clarify the relationship between the UK’s data protection legislation, specifically the UK GDPR and EU-derived aspects of the Data Protection Act 2018, and future data processing provisions in other legislation, such as powers to share or duties to disclose personal data, as a result of some legal uncertainty created by the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. To resolve this uncertainty, Clause 49 makes it clear that all new data processing provisions in legislation should be read consistently with the key requirements of the UK data protection legislation unless it is expressly indicated otherwise. Since its introduction, the interpretation of pre-EU exit legislation has been altered and there is a risk that this would produce the wrong effect in respect of the interpretation of existing data processing provisions that are silent about their relationship with the data protection legislation.
Amendment 159 will make it clear that the full removal of the principle of EU law supremacy and the creation of a reverse hierarchy in relation to assimilated direct legislation, as provided for in the REUL Act, do not change the relationship between the UK data protection legislation and existing legislation that is in force prior to commencement of Clause 49(2). Amendment 163 makes a technical amendment to the EU withdrawal Act, as amended, to support this amendment.
Amendment 162 is similar to the previous amendment but it concerns the relationship between provisions relating to certain obligations and rights under data protection legislation and on restrictions and prohibitions on the disclosure of information under other existing legislation. Existing Section 186 of the Data Protection Act 2018 governs this relationship. Amendment 162 makes it clear that the relationship between these two types of provision is not affected by the changes to the interpretation of legislation that I have already referred to made by the REUL Act. Additionally, it clarifies that, in relation to pre-commencement legislation, Section 186(1) may be disapplied expressly or impliedly.
Amendment 164 relates to the changes brought about by the REUL Act and sets out that the provisions detailed in earlier Amendments 159, 162 and 163 are to be treated as having come into force on 1 January 2024—in other words, at the same time as commencement of the relevant provisions of the REUL Act.
Amendment 297 provides a limited power to remove provisions that achieve the same effect as new Section 183A from legislation made or passed after this Bill receives Royal Assent, as their presence could cause confusion.
Finally, Amendments 156 and 157 are consequential. Amendments 158, 160 and 161 are minor drafting changes made for consistency, updating and consequential purposes.
Turning to the amendments introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, I hope that he can see from the government amendments to Clause 49 that we have given a good deal of thought to the impact of the REUL Act 2023 on the UK’s data protection framework and have been prepared to take action on this where necessary. We have also considered whether some of the changes made by the REUL Act could cause confusion about how the UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018 interrelate. Following careful analysis, we have concluded that they would largely continue to be read alongside each other in the intended way, with the rules of the REUL Act unlikely to interfere with this. Any new general rule such as that suggested by the noble Lord could create confusion and uncertainty.
Amendments 168 to 170, 174, 174A and 174B seek to reverse changes introduced by the REUL Act at the end of 2023, specifically the removal of EU general principles from the statute book. EU general principles and certain EU-derived rights had originally been retained by the European Union (Withdrawal) Act to ensure legal continuity at the end of the transition period, but this was constitutionally novel and inappropriate for the long term.
The Government’s position is that EU law concepts should not be used to interpret domestic legislation in perpetuity. The REUL Act provided a solution to this by repealing EU general principles from UK law and clarifying the approach to be taken domestically. The amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would undo this important work by reintroducing to the statute book references to rights and principles which have not been clearly defined and are inappropriate now that we have left the EU.
The protection of personal data already forms part of the protection offered by the European Convention on Human Rights, under the Article 8 right to respect for private and family life, and is further protected by our data protection legislation. The UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018 provide a comprehensive set of rules for organisations to follow and rights for people in relation to the use of their data. Seeking to apply an additional EU right to data protection in UK law would not significantly affect the way the data protection framework functions or enhance the protections it affords to individuals. Indeed, doing so may well add unnecessary uncertainty and complexity.
Amendments 171 to 173 pertain to exemptions to specified data subject rights and obligations on data controllers set out in Schedules 2 to 4 to the DPA 2018. The 36 exemptions apply only in specified circumstances and are subject to various safeguards. Before addressing the amendments the noble Lord has tabled, it is perhaps helpful to set out how these exemptions are used. Personal data must be processed according to the requirements set out in the UK GDPR and the DPA 2018. This includes the key principles of lawfulness, fairness and transparency, data minimisation and purpose limitation, among others. The decision to restrict data subjects’ rights, such as the right to be notified that their personal data is being processed, or limit obligations on the data controller, comes into effect only if and when the decision to apply an exemption is taken. In all cases, the use of the exemption must be both necessary and proportionate.
One of these exemptions, the immigration exemption, was recently amended in line with a court ruling that found it was incompatible with the requirements set out in Article 23. This exemption is used by the Home Office. The purpose of Amendments 171 to 173 is to extend the protections applied to the immigration exemption across the other exemptions subject to Article 23, apart from in Schedule 4, where the requirement to consider whether its application prejudices the relevant purposes is not considered relevant.
The other exemptions are each used in very different circumstances, by different data controllers—from government departments to SMEs—and work by applying different tests that function in a wholly different manner from the immigration exemption. This is important to bear in mind when considering these broad-brush amendments. A one-size-fits-all approach would not work across the exemption regime.
It is the Government’s position that any changes to these important exemptions should be made only after due consideration of the circumstances of that particular exemption. In many cases, these amendments seek to make changes that run counter to how the exemption functions. Making changes across the exemptions via this Bill, as the noble Lord’s amendments propose, has the potential to have significant negative impacts on the functioning of the exemptions regime. Any potential amendments to the other exemptions would require careful consideration. The Government note that there is a power to make changes to the exemptions in the DPA 2018, if deemed necessary.
For the reasons I have given, I look forward to hearing more from the noble Lord on his amendments, but I hope that he will not press them. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that very careful exposition. I feel that we are heavily into wet towel, if not painkiller, territory here, because this is a tricky area. As the Minister might imagine, I will not respond to his exposition in detail, at this point; I need to run away and get some external advice on the impact of what he said. He is really suggesting that the Government prefer a pick ‘n’ mix approach to what he regards as a one size fits all. I can boil it down to that. He is saying that you cannot just apply the rules, in the sense that we are trying to reverse some of the impacts of the previous legislation. I will set out my stall; no doubt the Minister and I, the Box and others, will read Hansard and draw our own conclusions at the end, because this is a complicated area.
Until the end of 2023, the Data Protection Act 2018 had to be read compatibly with the UK GDPR. In a conflict between the two instruments, the provisions of the UK GDPR would prevail. The reversing of the relationship between the 2018 Act and the UK GDPR, through the operation of the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act—REUL, as the Minister described it—has had the effect of lowering data protection rights in the UK. The case of the Open Rights Group and the3million v the Secretary of State for the Home Office and the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport was decided after the UK had left the EU, but before the end of 2023. The Court of Appeal held that exemptions from data subject rights in an immigration context, as set out in the Data Protection Act, were overly broad, contained insufficient safeguards and were incompatible with the UK GDPR. The court disapplied the exemptions and ordered the Home Office to redraft them to include the required safeguards. We debated the regulations the other day, and many noble Lords welcomed them on the basis that they had been revised for the second time.
This sort of challenge is now not possible, because the relationship between the DPA and the UK GDPR has been turned on its head. If the case were brought now, the overly broad exemptions in the DPA would take precedence over the requirement for safeguards set out in the UK GDPR. These points were raised by me in the debate of 12 December, when the Data Protection (Fundamental Rights and Freedoms) (Amendment) Regulations 2023 were under consideration. In that debate, the noble Baroness, Lady Swinburne, stated that
“we acknowledge the importance of making sure that data processing provisions in wider legislation continue to be read consistently with the data protection principles in the UK GDPR … Replication of the effect of UK GDPR supremacy is a significant decision, and we consider that the use of primary legislation is the more appropriate way to achieve these effects, such as under Clause 49 where the Government consider it appropriate”.—[Official Report, 12/12/23; col. GC 203.]
This debate on Clause 49 therefore offers an opportunity to reinstate the previous relationship between the UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act. The amendment restores the hierarchy, so that it guarantees the same rights to individuals as existed before the end of 2023, and avoids unforeseen consequences by resetting the relationship between the UK GDPR and the DPA 2018 to what the parliamentary draftsmen intended when the Act was written. The provisions in Clause 49, as currently drafted, address the relationship between domestic law and data protection legislation as a whole, but the relationship between the UK GDPR and the DPA is left in its “reversed” state. This is confirmed in the Explanatory Notes to the Bill at paragraph 503.
The purpose of these amendments is to restore data protection rights in the UK to what they were before the end of 2023, prior to the coming into force of REUL. The amendments would restore the fundamental right to the protection of personal data in UK law; ensure that the UK GDPR and the DPA continue to be interpreted in accordance with the fundamental right to the protection of personal data; ensure that there is certainty that assimilated case law that references the fundamental right to the protection of personal data still applies; and apply the protections required in Article 23 of the UK GDPR to all the relevant exemptions in Schedule 2 to the Data Protection Act. This is crucial in avoiding diminishing trust in our data protection frameworks. If people do not trust that their data is protected, they will refuse to share it. Without this data, new technologies cannot be developed, because these technologies rely on personal data. By creating uncertainty and diminishing standards, the Government are undermining the very growth in new technologies that they want.
My Lords, I have looked at the government amendments in this group and have listened very carefully to what the Minister has said—that it is largely about interpretation. There are no amendments that I wish to comment on, save to say that they seem to be about consistency of language and bringing in part EU positions into UK law. They seem also to be about consistency of meaning, and for the most part the intention seems to be to ensure that nothing in EU retained law undoes the pre-existing legal framework.
However, I would appreciate the Minister giving us a bit more detail on the operation of Amendment 164. Amendment 297 seems to deal with a duplication issue, so perhaps he can confirm for the Committee that this is the case. We have had swathes of government amendments of a minor and technical nature, largely about chasing out gremlins from the drafting process. Can he confirm that this is the case and assure the Committee that we will not be left with any nasty surprises in the drafting that need correction at a later date?
The amendments tabled in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, are of course of a different order altogether. The first two—Amendments 165 and 166—would restore the relationship between the UK GDPR and the 2018 Act and the relevant provisions of the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023. Amendment 168 would ensure that assimilated case law referring to the European Charter of Fundamental Rights would still be relevant in interpreting the UK GDPR. It would give greater certainty in how the UK’s data protection framework is interpreted. Amendment 169 would ensure that the interpretation is carried over from the UK GDPR and 2018 legislation in accordance with the general principle of the protection of personal data.
The noble Lord’s Amendments 170 to 174B would bring back into law protections that existed previously when UK law was more closely aligned with EU law and regulation. There is also an extension of the EU data protection of personal data to the assimilated standard that existed by virtue of Section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. I can well understand the noble Lord’s desire to take the UK back to a position where we are broadly in the same place in terms of protections as our former EU partners. First, having—broadly speaking—protections that are common across multiple jurisdictions makes it easier and simpler for companies operating in those markets. Secondly, from the perspective of data subjects, it is much easier to comprehend common standards of data protection and to seek redress when required. The Government, for their part, will no doubt argue that there is some sort of big Brexit benefit in this, although I think that advisers and experts are divided on the degree of that benefit, and indeed who benefits.
Later, we will get to discuss data adequacy standards. Concern exists in some quarters as to whether we have this right and what this legislative opportunity might be missing to ensure that the UK meets those international standards that the EU requires. That is a debate for later, but we are broadly sympathetic to the desire of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, to find the highest level of protection for UK citizens. That is the primary motivation for many of the amendments and debates that we have had today. We do not want to weaken what were previously carefully crafted and aligned protections. I do not entirely buy the argument that the Minister made earlier about this group of amendments causing legal uncertainty. I believe it is the reverse of that: the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, is trying to provide greater certainty and a degree of jurisdictional uniformity.
I hope that I have understood what the noble Lord is trying to achieve here. For those reasons, we will listen to the Minister’s concluding comments—and read Hansard—very carefully.
I thank the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Bassam, for their comments. As the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, points out, it is a pretty complex and demanding area, but that in no way diminishes the importance of getting it right. I hope that in my remarks I can continue that work, but of course I am happy to discuss this: it is a very technical area and, as all speakers have pointed out, it is crucial for our purposes that it be executed correctly.
While the UK remains committed to strong protections for personal data through the UK GDPR and Data Protection Act, it is important that it is able to diverge from the EU legislation where this is appropriate for the UK. We have carefully assessed the effects of EU withdrawal legislation and the REUL Act and are making adjustments to ensure that the right effect is achieved. The government amendments are designed to ensure legal certainty and protect the coherence of the data protection framework following commencement of the REUL Act—for example, by maintaining the pre-REUL Act relationship in certain ways between key elements of the UK data protection legislation and other existing legislation.
The purpose of the REUL Act is to ensure that the UK has control over its laws. Resurrecting the principle of EU law supremacy in its entirety or continuing to apply case law principles is not consistent with the UK’s departure from the EU and taking back control over our own laws. These amendments make it clear that changes made to the application of the principle of EU law supremacy and new rules relating to the interpretation of direct assimilated legislation under the REUL Act do not have any impact on existing provisions that involve the processing of personal data.
The noble Lord, Lord Bassam, asked for more detail about Amendment 164. It relates to changes brought about by the REUL Act and sets out that the provisions detailed in Amendments 159, 162 and 163 are to be treated as having come into force on 1 January 2024—in other words, at the same time as commencement of the relevant provisions of the REUL Act. The retrospective effect of this provision addresses the gap between the commencement of the REUL Act 2023 and the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill.
On the immigration exemption case, I note that it was confined to the immigration exemption and did not rule on the other exemptions. The Government will continue to keep the exemptions under review and, should it be required, the Government have the power to amend the other exemptions using an existing power in the DPA 2018. Before doing so, of course the Government would want to ensure that due consideration is given to how the particular exemptions are used. Meanwhile, I thank noble Lords for what has been a fascinating, if demanding, debate.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and my noble friend Lord Kamall for their amendments. To address the elephant in the room first, I can reassure noble Lords that the use of digital identity will not be mandatory, and privacy will remain one of the guiding principles of the Government’s approach to digital identity. There are no plans to introduce a centralised, compulsory digital ID system for public services, and the Government’s position on physical ID cards remains unchanged. The Government are committed to realising the benefits of digital identity technologies without creating ID cards.
I shall speak now to Amendment 177, which would require the rules of the DVS trust framework to be set out in regulations subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. I recognise that this amendment, and others in this group, reflect recommendations from the DPRRC. Obviously, we take that committee very seriously, and we will respond to that report in due course, but ahead of Report.
Part 2 of the Bill will underpin the DVS trust framework, a document of auditable rules, which include technical standards. The trust framework refers to data protection legislation and ICO guidance. It has undergone four years of development, consultation and testing within the digital identity market. Organisations can choose to have their services certified against the trust framework to prove that they provide secure and trustworthy digital verification services. Certification is provided by independent conformity assessment bodies that have been accredited by the UK Accreditation Service. Annual reviews of the trust framework are subject to consultation with the ICO and other appropriate persons.
Requiring the trust framework to be set out in regulations would make it hard to introduce reactive changes. For example, if a new cybersecurity threat emerged which required the rapid deployment of a fix across the industry, the trust framework would need to be updated very quickly. Developments in this fast-growing industry require an agile approach to standards and rule-making. We cannot risk the document becoming outdated and losing credibility with industry. For these reasons, the Government feel that it is more appropriate for the Secretary of State to have the power to set the rules of the trust framework with appropriate consultation, rather than for the power to be exercised by regulations.
I turn to Amendments 178 to 195, which would require the fees that may be charged under this part of the Bill to be set out in regulations subject to the negative resolution procedure. The Government have committed to growing a market of secure and inclusive digital identities as an alternative to physical proofs of identity, for those that choose to use them. Fees will be introduced only once we are confident that doing so will not restrict the growth of this market, but the fee structure, when introduced, is likely to be complex and will need to flex to support growth in an evolving market.
There are built-in safeguards to this fee-charging power. First, there is a strong incentive for the Secretary of State to set fees that are competitive, fair and reasonable, because failing to do so would prevent the Government realising their commitment to grow this market. Secondly, these fee-raising powers have a well-defined purpose and limited scope. Thirdly, the Secretary of State will explain in advance what fees she intends to charge and when she intends to charge them, which will ensure the appropriate level of transparency.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, asked about the arrangements for the office for digital identities and attributes. It will not initially be independent, as it will be located within the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. As we announced in the government response to our 2021 consultation, we intend for this to be an interim arrangement until a suitable long-term home for the governing body can be identified. Delegating the role of Ofdia—as I suppose we will call it—to a third party in the future, is subject to parliamentary scrutiny, as provided for by the clauses in the Bill. Initially placing Ofdia inside government will ensure that its oversight role could mature in the most effective way and that it supports the digital identity market in meeting the needs of individual users, relying parties and industry.
Digital verification services are independently certified against the trust framework rules by conformity assessment bodies. Conformity assessment bodies are themselves independently accredited by the UK Accreditation Service to ensure that they have the competence and impartiality to perform certification. The trust framework certification scheme will be accredited by the UK Accreditation Service to give confidence that the scheme can be efficiently and competently used to certify products, processes and services. All schemes will need to meet internationally agreed standards set out by the UK Accreditation Service. Ofdia, as the owner of the main code, will work with UKAS to ensure that schemes are robust, capable of certification and operated in line with the trust framework.
Amendment 184A proposes to exclude certified public bodies from registering to provide digital verification services. The term “public bodies” could include a wide range of public sector entities, including institutions such as universities, that receive any public funding. The Government take the view that this exclusion would be unnecessarily restrictive in the UK’s nascent digital identity market.
Amendment 195ZA seeks to mandate organisations to implement a non-digital form of verification in every instance where a digital method is required. The Bill enables the use of secure and inclusive digital identities across the economy. It does not force businesses or individuals to use them, nor does it insist that businesses which currently accept non-digital methods of verification must transition to digital methods. As Clause 52 makes clear, digital verification services are services that are provided at the request of the individual. The purpose of the Bill is to ensure that, when people want to use a digital verification service, they know which of the available products and services they can trust.
Some organisations operate only in the digital sphere, such as online-only banks and energy companies. To oblige such organisations to offer manual document checking would place obligations on them that would go beyond the Government’s commitment to do only what is necessary to enable the digital identity market to grow. In so far as this amendment would apply to public authorities, the Equality Act requires those organisations to consider how their services will affect people with protected characteristics, including those who, for various reasons, might not be able or might choose not to use a digital identity product.
Is the Minister saying that, as a result of the Equality Act, there is an absolute right to that analogue—if you like—form of identification if, for instance, someone does not have access to digital services?
On this point, the argument that the Government are making is that, where consumers want to use a digital verification service, all the Bill does is to provide a mechanism for those DVSs to be certified and assured to be safe. It does not seek to require anything beyond that, other than creating a list of safe DVSs.
The Equality Act applies to the public sector space, where it needs to be followed to ensure that there is an absolute right to inclusive access to digital technologies.
My Lords, in essence, the Minister is admitting that there is a gap when somebody who does not have access to digital services needs an identity to deal with the private sector. Is that right?
In the example I gave, I was not willing to use a digital system to provide a guarantee for my son’s accommodation in the private sector. I understand that that would not be protected and that, therefore, someone might not be able to rent a flat, for example, because they cannot provide physical ID.
The Bill does not change the requirements in this sense. If any organisation chooses to provide its services on a digital basis only, that is up to that organisation, and it is up to consumers whether they choose to use it. It makes no changes to the requirements in that space.
I will now speak to the amendment that seeks to remove Clause 80. Clause 80 enables the Secretary of State to ask accredited conformity assessment bodies and registered DVS providers to provide information which is reasonably required to carry out her functions under Part 2 of the Bill. The Bill sets out a clear process that the Secretary of State must follow when requesting this information, as well as explicit safeguards for her use of the power. These safeguards will ensure that DVS providers and conformity assessment bodies have to provide only information necessary for the functioning of this part of the Bill.
My Lords, the clause stand part amendment was clearly probing. Does the Minister have anything to say about the relationship with OneLogin? Is he saying that it is only information about systems, not individuals, which does not feed into the OneLogin identity system that the Government are setting up?
It is very important that the OneLogin system is entirely separate and not considered a DVS. We considered whether it should be, but the view was that that comes close to mandating a digital identity system, which we absolutely want to avoid. Hence the two are treated entirely differently.
That is a good reassurance, but if the Minister wants to unpack that further by correspondence, I would be very happy to have that.
I am very happy to do so.
I turn finally to Amendments 289 and 300, which aim to introduce a criminal offence of digital identity theft. The Government are committed to tackling fraud and are confident that criminal offences already exist to cover the behaviour targeted by these amendments. Under the Fraud Act 2006, it is a criminal offence to make a gain from the use of another person’s identity or to cause or risk a loss by such use. Where accounts or databases are hacked into, the Computer Misuse Act 1990 criminalises the unauthorised access to a computer programme or data held on a computer.
Furthermore, the trust framework contains rules, standards and good practice requirements for fraud monitoring and responding to fraud. These rules will further defend systems and reduce opportunities for digital identity theft.
My Lords, I am sorry, but this is a broad-ranging set of amendments, so I need to intervene on this one as well. When the Minister does his will write letter in response to today’s proceedings, could he tell us what guidance there is to the police on this? Because when the individual, Mr Arron, approached the police, they said, “Oh, sorry, there’s nothing we can do; identity theft is not a criminal offence”. The Minister seems to be saying, “No, it is fine; it is all encompassed within these provisions”. While he may be saying that, and I am sure he will be shouting it from the rooftops in the future, the question is whether the police have guidance; does the College of Policing have guidance and does the Home Office have guidance? The ordinary individual needs to know that it is exactly as the Minister says, and identity theft is covered by these other criminal offences. There is no point in having those offences if nobody knows about them.
That is absolutely fair enough: I will of course write. Sadly, we are not joined today by ministerial colleagues from the Home Office, who have some other Bill going on.
I have no doubt that its contribution to the letter will be equally enjoyable. However, for all the reasons I set out above, I am not able to accept these amendments and respectfully encourage the noble Baroness and noble Lords not to press them.
My Lords, I suppose I am meant to say that I thank the Minister for his response, but I cannot say that it was particularly optimistic or satisfying. On my amendments, the Minister said he would be responding to the DPRRC in due course, and obviously I am interested to see that response, but as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, said, the committee could not have been clearer and I thought made a very compelling case for why there should be some parliamentary oversight of this main code and, indeed, the fees arrangements.
I understand that it is a fast-moving sector, but the sort of things that the Delegated Powers Committee was talking about was that the main code should have some fundamental principles, some user rights and so on. We are not trying to spell out every sort of service that is going to be provided—as the Minister said, it is a fast-moving sector—but people need to have some trust in it and they need to know what this verification service is going to be about. Just saying that there is going to be a code, on such an important area, and that the Secretary of State will write it, is simply not acceptable in terms of basic parliamentary democracy. If it cannot be done through an affirmative procedure, the Government need to come up with another way to make sure that there is appropriate parliamentary input into what is being proposed here.
On the subject of the fees, the Delegated Powers Committee and our amendment was saying only that there should be a negative SI. I thought that was perfectly reasonable on its part and I am sorry that the Minister is not even prepared to accept that perfectly suggestion. All in all, I thought that the response on that element was very disappointing.
The response was equally disappointing on the whole issue that the noble Lords, Lord Kamall and Lord Vaux, raised about the right not to have to use the digital verification schemes but to do things on a non-digital basis. The arguments are well made about the numbers of people who are digitally excluded. I was in the debate that the noble Lord referred to, and I cannot remember the statistics now, but something like 17% of the population do not have proper digital access, so we are excluding a large number of people from a whole range of services. It could be applying for jobs, accessing bank accounts or applying to pay the rent for your son’s flat or whatever. We are creating a two-tier system here, for those who are involved and those who are on the margins who cannot use a lot of the services. I would have hoped that the Government would have been much more engaged in trying to find ways through that and providing some guarantees to people.
We know that we are taking a big leap, with so many different services going online. There is a lot of suspicion about how these services are going to work and people do not trust that computers are always as accurate as we would like them to be, so they would like to feel that there is another way of doing it if it all goes wrong. It worries me that the Minister is not able to give that commitment.
I have to say that I am rather concerned by what the Minister said about the private sector—in effect, that it can already have a requirement to have digital only. Surely, in this brave new world we are going towards, we do not want a digital-only service; this goes back to the point about a whole range of people being excluded. What is wrong with saying, even to people who collect people’s bank account details to pay their son’s rent, “There is an alternative way of doing this as well as you providing all the information digitally”? I am very worried about where all this is going, including who will be part of it and who will not. If the noble Lords, Lord Kamall and Lord Vaux, wish to pursue this at a later point, I would be sympathetic to their arguments.
On identity theft, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, made a compelling case. The briefing that he read out from the Metropolitan Police said that your data is one of your most valuable assets, which is absolutely right. He also rightly made the point that this is linked to organised crime. It does not happen by accident; some major people are farming our details and using them for all sorts of nefarious activities. There is a need to tighten up the regulation and laws on this. The Minister read out where he thinks this is already dealt with under existing legislation but we will all want to scrutinise that and see whether that really is the case. There are lots of examples of where the police have not been able to help people and do not know what their rights are, so we just need to know exactly what advice has been given to the police.
I feel that the Minister could have done more on this whole group to assure us that we are not moving towards a two-tier world. I will withdraw my amendment, obviously, but I have a feeling that we will come back to this issue; it may be something that we can talk to the Minister about before we get to Report.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Bennett, Lady Young of Old Scone and Lady Jones, for their proposed amendments on extending the definition of business data in smart data schemes, the disclosure of climate and nature information to improve public service delivery and the publication of an EU adequacy risk assessment.
On Amendment 195A, we consider that information about the carbon and energy intensity of goods, services or digital content already falls within the scope of “business data” as information about goods, services and digital content supplied or provided by a trader. Development of smart data schemes will, where relevant, be informed by—among other things—the Government’s Environmental Principles Policy Statement, under the Environment Act 2021.
With regard to Amendment 218, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Young of Old Scone, for her sympathies; they are gratefully received. I will do my best in what she correctly pointed out is quite a new area for me. The powers to share information under Part 5 of the Digital Economy Act 2017—the DEA—are supplemented by statutory codes of practice. These require impact assessments to be carried out, particularly for significant changes or proposals that could have wide-ranging effects on various sectors or stakeholders. These impact assessments are crucial for understanding the implications of the Digital Economy Act and ensuring that it achieves its intended objectives, while minimising any negative consequences for individuals, businesses and society as a whole. As these assessments already cover economic, social and environmental impact, significant changes in approach are already likely to be accounted for. This is in addition to the duty placed on Ministers by the Environment Act 2021 to have due regard to the Environmental Principles Policy Statement.
Lastly, turning to Amendment 296, the Government are committed to maintaining their data adequacy decisions from the EU, which we absolutely recognise play a pivotal role in enabling trade and fighting crime. As noble Lords alluded to, we maintain regular engagement with the European Commission on the Bill to ensure that our reforms are understood.
The EU adequacy assessment of the UK is, of course, a unilateral, autonomous process for the EU to undertake. However, we remain confident that our reforms deliver against UK interests and are compatible with maintaining EU adequacy. As the European Commission itself has made clear, a third country—the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, alluded to this point—is not required to have the same rules as the EU to be considered adequate. Indeed, 15 countries have EU adequacy, including Japan, Israel and the Republic of Korea. All these nations pursue independent and, often, more divergent approaches to data protection.
The Government will provide both written and oral evidence to the House of Lords European Affairs Committee inquiry on UK-EU data adequacy and respond to its final report, which is expected to be published in the summer. Many expert witnesses already provided evidence to the committee and have stated that they believe that the Bill is compatible with maintaining adequacy.
As noble Lords have noted, the Government have published a full impact assessment alongside the Bill, which sets out in more detail what both the costs and financial benefits of the Bill would be—including in the unlikely scenario of the EU revoking the UK’s adequacy decision. I also note that UK adequacy is good for the EU too: every EU company, from multinationals to start-ups, with customers, suppliers or operations in the UK relies on EU-UK data transfers. Leading European businesses and organisations have consistently emphasised the importance of maintaining these free flows of data to the UK.
For these reasons, I hope that the noble Baronesses will agree to withdraw or not move these amendments.
The Minister made the point at the end there that it is in the EU’s interest to agree to our data adequacy. That is an important point but is that what the Government are relying on—the fact that it is in the EU’s interest as much as ours to continue to agree to our data adequacy provisions? If so, what the Minister has said does not make me feel more reassured. If the Government are relying on just that, it is not a particularly strong argument.
My Lords, can I point out, on the interests of the EU, that it does not go just one way? There is a question around investment as well. For example, any large bank that is currently running a data-processing facility in this country that covers the whole of Europe may decide, if we lose data adequacy, to move it to Europe. Anyone considering setting up such a thing would probably go for Europe rather than here. There is therefore an investment draw for the EU here.
I do not know what I could possibly have said to create the impression that the Government are flying blind on this matter. We continue to engage extensively with the EU at junior official, senior official and ministerial level in order to ensure that our proposed reforms are fully understood and that there are no surprises. We engage with multiple expert stakeholders from both the EU side and the UK side. Indeed, as I mentioned earlier, a number of experts have submitted evidence to the House’s inquiry on EU-UK data adequacy and have made clear their views that the DPDI reforms set out in this Bill are compatible with EU adequacy. We continue to engage with the EU throughout. I do not want to be glib or blithe about the risks; we recognise the risks but it is vital—
Could we have a list of the people the noble Lord is talking about?
Yes. I would be happy to provide a list of the people we have spoken to about adequacy; it may be a long one. That concludes the remarks I wanted to make, I think.
Perhaps the Minister could just tweak that a bit by listing not just the people who have made positive noises but those who have their doubts.
I thank my noble friend Lord Holmes, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, as well as other co-signatories for detailed examination of the Bill through these amendments.
I begin by addressing Amendments 197A, 197B and 197C tabled by my noble friend Lord Holmes, which seek to establish a biometrics office responsible for overseeing biometric data use, and place new obligations on organisations processing such data. The Information Commissioner already has responsibility for monitoring and enforcing the processing of biometric data, and these functions will continue to sit with the new information commission, once established. For example, in March 2023 it investigated the use of live facial recognition in a retail security setting by Facewatch. In February 2024, it took action against Serco Leisure in relation to its use of biometric data to monitor attendance of leisure centre employees.
Schedule 15 to this Bill will also enable the information commission to establish committees of external experts with skills in any number of specialist areas, including biometrics, to provide specialist advice to the commission. Given that the Information Commissioner already has responsibility for monitoring and enforcing the processing of biometric data, the Government are therefore of the firm view that the information commission is best placed to continue to oversee the processing of biometric data. The Bill also allows the new information commission to establish specialist committees and require them to provide the commission with specialist advice. The committees may include specialists from outside the organisation, with key skills and expertise in specific areas, including biometrics.
The processing of biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying an individual is also subject to heightened safeguards, and organisations can process such data only if they meet one of the conditions of Article 9 of UK GDPR—for example, where processing is necessary to comply with employment law provisions, or for reasons of substantial public interest. Without a lawful basis and compliance with relevant conditions, such processing of biometric data is prohibited.
Amendments 197B and 197C in the name of my noble friend Lord Holmes would also impose new, prescriptive requirements on organisations processing, and intending to process, biometric data and setting unlimited fines for non-compliance. We consider that such amendments would have significant unintended consequences. There are many everyday uses of biometrics data, such as using your thumbprint to access your phone. If every organisation that launched a new product had to comply with the proposed requirements, it would introduce significant and unnecessary new burdens and would discourage innovation, undermining the aims of this Bill. For these reasons, I respectfully ask my noble friend not to move these amendments.
The Government deem Amendment 238 unnecessary, as using biometric data—
I am sorry, but I am wondering whether the Minister is going to say any more on the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes. Can I be clear? The Minister said that the ICO is the best place to oversee these issues, but the noble Lord’s amendment recognises that; it just says that there should be a dedicated biometrics unit with specialists, et cetera, underneath it. I am looking towards the noble Lord—yes, he is nodding in agreement. I do not know that the Minister dismissed that idea, but I think that this would be a good compromise in terms of assuaging our concerns on this issue.
I apologise if I have misunderstood. It sounds like it would be a unit within the ICO responsible for that matter. Let me take that away if I have misunderstood—I understood it to be a separate organisation altogether.
The Government deem Amendment 238 unnecessary, as using biometric data to categorise or make inferences about people, whether using algorithms or otherwise, is already subject to the general data protection principles and the high data protection standards of the UK’s data protection framework as personal data. In line with ICO guidance, where the processing of biometric data is intended to make an inference linked to one of the special categories of data—for example, race or ethnic origin—or the biometric data is processed for the intention of treating someone differently on the basis of inferred information linked to one of the special categories of data, organisations should treat this as special category data. These protections ensure that this data, which is not used for identification purposes, is sufficiently protected.
Similarly, Amendment 286 intends to widen the scope of the Forensic Information Databases Service—FINDS—strategy board beyond oversight of biometrics databases for the purpose of identification to include “classification” purposes as well. The FINDS strategy board currently provides oversight of the national DNA database and the national fingerprint database. The Bill puts oversight of the fingerprint database on the same statutory footing as that of the DNA database and provides the flexibility to add oversight of new biometric databases, where appropriate, to provide more consistent oversight in future. The delegated power could be used in the medium term to expand the scope of the board to include a national custody image database, but no decisions have yet been taken. Of course, this will be kept under review, and other biometric databases could be added to the board’s remit in future should these be created and should this be appropriate. For the reasons I have set out, I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, will therefore agree not to move Amendments 238 and 286.
Responses to the data reform public consultation in 2021 supported the simplification of the complex oversight framework for police use of biometrics and surveillance cameras. Clauses 147 and 148 of the Bill reflect that by abolishing the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s roles while transferring the commissioner’s casework functions to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office.
Noble Lords referred to the CRISP report, which was commissioned by Fraser Sampson—the previous commissioner—and directly contradicts the outcome of the public consultation on data reform in 2021, including on the simplification of the oversight of biometrics and surveillance cameras. The Government took account of all the responses, including from the former commissioner, in developing the policies set out in the DPDI Bill.
There will not be a gap in the oversight of surveillance as it will remain within the statutory regulatory remit of other organisations, such as the Information Commissioner’s Office, the Equality and Human Rights Commission, the Forensic Science Regulator and the Forensic Information Databases Service strategy board.
One of the crucial aspects has been the reporting of the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner. Where is there going to be and who is going to have a comprehensive report relating to the use of surveillance cameras and the biometric data contained within them? Why have the Government decided that they are going to separate out the oversight of biometrics from, in essence, the surveillance aspects? Are not the two irretrievably brought together by things such as live facial recognition?
Yes. There are indeed a number of different elements of surveillance camera oversight; those are reflected in the range of different bodies doing that it. As to the mechanics of the production of the report, I am afraid that I do not know the answer.
Does the Minister accept that the police are one of the key agencies that will be using surveillance cameras? He now seems to be saying, “No, it’s fine. We don’t have one single oversight body; we had four at the last count”. He probably has more to say on this subject but is that not highly confusing for the police when they have so many different bodies that they need to look at in terms of oversight? Is it any wonder that people think the Bill is watering down the oversight of surveillance camera use?
No. I was saying that there was extensive consultation, including with the police, and that that has resulted in these new arrangements. As to the actual mechanics of the production of an overall report, I am afraid that I do not know but I will find out and advise noble Lords.
His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services also inspects, monitors and reports on the efficiency and effectiveness of the police, including their use of surveillance cameras. All of these bodies have statutory powers to take the necessary action when required. The ICO will continue to regulate all organisations’ use of these technologies, including being able to take action against those not complying with data protection law, and a wide range of other bodies will continue to operate in this space.
On the first point made by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, where any of the privacy concerns he raises concern information that relates to an identified or identifiable living individual, I can assure him that this information is covered by the UK’s data protection regime. This also includes another issue raised by the noble Lord—where the ANPR captures a number-plate that can be linked to an identifiable living individual—as this would be the processing of personal data and thus governed by the UK’s data protection regime and regulated by the ICO.
For the reasons I have set out, I maintain that these clauses should stand part of the Bill. I therefore hope that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will withdraw his stand part notices on Clauses 147 and 148.
Clause 149 does not affect the office of the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner, which the noble Lord seeks to maintain through his amendment. The clause’s purpose is to update the name of the national DNA database board and update its scope to include the national fingerprint database within its remit. It will allow the board to produce codes of practice and introduce a new delegated power to add or remove biometric databases from its remit in future via the affirmative procedure. I therefore maintain that this clause should stand part of the Bill and hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his stand part notice.
Clauses 147 and 148 will improve consistency in the guidance and oversight of biometrics and surveillance cameras by simplifying the framework. This follows public consultation, makes the most of the available expertise, improves organisational resilience, and ends confusing and inefficient duplication. The Government feel that a review, as proposed, so quickly after the Bill is enacted is unnecessary. It is for these reasons that I cannot accept Amendment 292 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones.
I turn now to the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, which seek to remove Clauses 130 to 132. These clauses make changes to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, which provides the retention regime for biometric data held on national security grounds. The changes have been made only following a formal request from Counter Terrorism Policing to the Home Office. The exploitation of biometric material, including from international partners, is a valuable tool in maintaining the UK’s national security, particularly for ensuring that there is effective tripwire coverage at the UK border. For example, where a foreign national applies for a visa to enter the UK, or enters the UK via a small boat, their biometrics can be checked against Counter Terrorism Policing’s holdings and appropriate action to mitigate risk can be taken, if needed.
My Lords, to go back to some of the surveillance points, one of the issues is the speed at which technology is changing, with artificial intelligence and all the other things we are seeing. One of the roles of the commissioner has been to keep an eye on how technology is changing and to make recommendations as to what we do about the impacts of that. I cannot hear, in anything the noble Viscount is saying, how that role is replicated in what is being proposed. Can he enlighten me?
Yes, indeed. In many ways, this is advantageous. The Information Commissioner obviously has a focus on data privacy, whereas the various other organisations, particularly BSCC, EHRC and the FINDS Board, have subject-specific areas of expertise on which they will be better placed to horizon-scan and identify new emerging risks from technologies most relevant to their area.
Is the noble Viscount saying that splitting it all up into multiple different places is more effective than having a single dedicated office to consider these things? I must say, I find that very hard to understand.
I do not think we are moving from a simple position. We are moving from a very complex position to a less complex position.
Can the Minister reassure the Committee that, under the Government’s proposals, there will be sufficient reporting to Parliament, every year, from all the various bodies to which he has already referred, so that Parliament can have ample opportunity to review the operation of this legislation as the Bill stands at the moment?
Yes, indeed. The information commission will be accountable to Parliament. It is required to produce transparency and other reports annually. For the other groups, I am afraid that many of them are quite new to me, as this is normally a Home Office area, but I will establish what their accountability is specifically to Parliament, for BSSC and the—
Will the Minister write to the Committee, having taken advice from his Home Office colleagues?
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who participated in the excellent debate on this set of amendments. I also thank my noble friend the Minister for part of his response; he furiously agreed with at least a substantial part of my amendments, even though he may not have appreciated it at the time. I look forward to some fruitful and positive discussions on some of those elements between Committee and Report.
When a Bill passes into statute, a Minister and the Government may wish for a number of things in terms of how it is seen and described. One thing that I do not imagine is on the list is for it to be said that this statute generates significant gaps—those words were put perfectly by the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate. That it generates significant gaps is certainly the current position. I hope that we have conversations between Committee and Report to address at least some of those gaps and restate some of the positions that exist, before the Bill passes. That would be positive for individuals, citizens and the whole of the country. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment and look forward to those subsequent conversations.