Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism

Debate between Tom Tugendhat and Dan Jarvis

Wednesday 22nd May 2024 Commons Chamber

[Dan Jarvis]

Madam Deputy Speaker says it is fine to keep saying nice things about Scotland, but I am slightly conscious that the Minister may have somewhere to go in the not-too-distant future. I do not want to detain him for too much longer, given that there is apparently quite an important meeting taking place at 14.15—

[Tom Tugendhat]

At 16.15.

[Dan Jarvis]

At 16.15—the Minister has admitted it—but although I would like the opportunity to spend even longer talking about what a fantastic place Scotland is, I should probably begin to turn to the substance of these matters. I do so by saying that we on the Opposition Benches support the update to the Scottish Prevent duty guidance, although there are some questions about how it sits within broader efforts to counter extremism and terrorism, which I will come to in a moment.

Regardless of where in the UK extremism rears its ugly head, it is fuelled by fear and hate, and stoked by malign individuals whose motives are abhorrent to the vast majority of decent people in Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom. We have felt the devastation that extremism can cause through terrorist attacks around the world and in our country. With every act of terror, there was a path starting with radicalisation and ending with lives lost and lives changed forever.

At this point, I want to take the opportunity, and I am sure the Minister will join me in doing so, of paying tribute to Figen Murray. She is the mother of Manchester Arena bombing victim Martyn Hett, and she is a campaigner for Martyn’s law. Just today, she has completed her walk down from Manchester to London to meet the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition. The dignity and tenacity shown by Figen reminds us all of the painful legacies left by terrorism that are faced by too many people in our country.

That is why Prevent practitioners in Scotland and across the UK need confidence and clarity in Prevent duty guidance, as this guidance should ensure that the right interventions are taking place at the right time to detect, disrupt and defeat extremism wherever it presents itself. These interventions save lives, and we should not understate the crucial role played by Prevent practitioners. We therefore welcome changes in the guidance to improve the quality of Prevent referrals to multi-agency panels in Scotland by giving clearer advice on how to understand and manage risk, including through training and risk assessments and reducing permissive environments as a key theme to tackle the ideological causes of terrorism and broader radicalising influences. These are important steps, as there can never be any excuse for extremist violence anywhere on Britain’s streets or the glorification of any violence linked to any ideological cause. As the extremist threat landscape continues to shift across the UK, there must be full confidence in Prevent’s work in Scotland.

I would be grateful if the Minister could answer the following questions. First, since we debated the Prevent duty guidance regulations for England and Wales, the Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities has published the UK Government’s new definition of extremism—an update from their 2011 definition that the Scottish Government did not adopt. Can the Minister outline what discussions he has had with colleagues in the Scottish Government about adopting the new definition? To what extent can he say whether it was discussed as part of a wider discussion on community cohesion at the inter-ministerial standing committee meeting on 12 March?

Secondly, and still touching on the intergovernmental work, Sir William Shawcross stated in his review his concern about the lack of oversight and support for Prevent delivery in the Scottish education sector. He recommended that the Scottish Government restructure Prevent in line with the wider UK model. Although guidance for higher education institutions in Scotland was published alongside the updated Scottish Prevent duty guidance, it would be helpful if the Minister could explain what feedback was received from the Scottish education sector ahead of publication. What will the next steps be with the Scottish Government regarding Prevent and the Scottish education sector? Furthermore, Sir William said in February this year that Ministers had ignored some of his key recommendations. Has the Minister discussed those concerns with Sir William?

Thirdly, in his review, Sir William challenged the perceived extremist threat landscape in Scotland as identified by Scottish officials and recommended that more frequent assessments be made to enhance understanding among practitioners and officials alike. It was not clear in the UK Government’s response to this recommendation that they would work with the Scottish Government and Police Scotland on increasing the frequency. Can the Minister outline what is being done to improve this vital intelligence-gathering work in Scotland?

To conclude, the Opposition will work constructively with the Government as much as possible on these important matters, and I know that the Minister will take my points and questions in that spirit. All of us on the Opposition Benches want to ensure that the Scottish public and the wider UK are spared the terrors of extremism and shielded from the depravity of terrorist violence. We will work closely with the UK and Scottish Governments to ensure that they succeed in that vital task.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

Let me start with some of the points that the hon. Member for Glasgow Central (Alison Thewliss) made. I want to make it absolutely clear that incel violence is a form of extremism that draws on an ideology based on the hatred of women. It is completely unacceptable and, sadly, it has led to terrorism not just here but in other parts. It is utterly vile, and it is as serious and pernicious as any other form of terrorism or extremism. It is not quite as prevalent as some other forms—that is to be welcomed—but it can be kept down only if, as she said, we include people in our community and cut off the routes to hatred before they emerge and become passages.

The hon. Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis), as usual, has approached this in a calm and professional manner. It has been a pleasure to work with him on this, as it has been in many other areas. It has been an absolute joy to work with Figen Murray on another area. She has been a remarkable advocate for individuals across our country who have been victims of terror. Seven years ago, almost to the day, she lost her son Martyn. I know we all pay enormous tribute to her for the dignity and professionalism with which she has approached her campaign—one that has led to an awful lot of support, including from the Prime Minister and others. I am very grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his approach to this. Sadly, I cannot offer any updates at this stage. As he knows, we are going through the necessary consultation process. I will bring forward further updates as soon as I can, but that will be in due course, I am afraid.

The hon. Gentleman raised an interesting question about DLUHC’s conversation with the Scottish Government. Forgive me, but I will have to leave the DLUHC Secretary to speak for himself on that, as I am not aware of his conversations. I speak regularly to the Scottish Government on these areas, some of which are reserved matters. As he knows, national security is a reserved matter and therefore the responsibility of the UK Government. That said, there is an awful lot of co-operation not just with the Scottish Government but with other administrations in Scotland, including different councils in different counties.

While we are on this matter, the hon. Gentleman’s paean to Scotland would not have anything to do with his desire to get in campaigning mode, would it?

[Dan Jarvis]

So cynical!

[Tom Tugendhat]

I appreciate what he said, but for somebody who decided to throw himself out of aeroplanes in the south of England rather than join our great and glorious core training in Arbroath—that is just a very strange thing to have done, for who claims to have that unbelievable love for the north! It is a huge privilege to tease the hon. Gentleman—we have been friends for far too long for me to miss the opportunity.

It is always a pleasure to be in Scotland and to see the extraordinary achievements made by the Scottish people, not just in this area but in many others. This is one of those areas where I just want to pick up on something. The hon. Gentleman spoke about the way in which Scotland is dealing with these cases. I want to pay enormous tribute to those who are gathered together in Gartcosh: over 20 different agencies, including everybody from Police Scotland, MI5 to His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, and various environmental agencies. It is absolutely extraordinary to see what they have brought together. It is a real power centre not just for keeping Scotland safe, but for fighting crime and disorder all across the United Kingdom. It is a fantastic resource and really impressive.

If we are giving this paean to Scotland, I should also say that the head of MI5, whose Scottish tones have informed me of some of the worst abuses of humanity in this country, demonstrates the level of commitment that many have. I place on record my extreme gratitude to all MI5 officers, counter-terrorism police and the National Crime Agency, who do a huge amount to keep us safe, alongside the territorial forces, whose work is absolutely essential.

None of that would work unless there was the underpinning, and the underpinning is making sure that society does not breed more extremists. The way we avoid that is by making sure that people are part of our community. The Prevent programme is absolutely essential to making sure that when somebody strays, they are assisted to come back into the fold. This is the work, as was said, of the good shepherd. That is what is so important today: making sure that we keep people in our society and within the fold, able to contribute and able to feel part of a wider whole. That is absolutely essential.

Political Violence and Disruption: Walney Report

Debate between Tom Tugendhat and Dan Jarvis

Wednesday 22nd May 2024 Commons Chamber

[Dan Jarvis (Barnsley Central) (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for his statement and for providing advance sight of it. I join him in thanking Lord Walney for his work on this report.

It is important to say from the outset that the Opposition absolutely respect the fundamental freedom to make legitimate, peaceful protest but, when that freedom is abused to intimidate, harass and harm others, safeguards must be put in place to protect the public and our democratic system as a whole. We have seen in recent months that people have been intimidated and have felt threatened due to protest activity.

I therefore agree with the Minister that this is totally unacceptable, and there must be no no-go areas in our country. That is why we have been crystal clear that where there are public order offences, hate crime offences or terrorist offences on marches and demonstrations, they must face the full force of the law. The police have our full support in taking swift and robust action. Furthermore, we have been crystal clear that our police forces need the utmost clarity and support to carry out sometimes complex policing operations around protests.

The Walney report on political violence and disruption deals with some of the most fundamental and sensitive cornerstones of our democratic society. The Opposition will therefore go through and consider the report’s 41 recommendations very carefully, with an approach that our long and proud tradition of the right to peaceful protest must never be undermined by criminal or threatening activity on Britain’s streets.

In the first instance, I will touch on two points discussed in the report before asking the Minister a couple of questions.

The first point relates to whether the police should have more powers to ban protests that are intimidating or disruptive. It is important to note that the police already have powers under the Public Order Act 1986 to place conditions on protests, including amending routes and timings. They also have the power, in cases where there may be serious public disorder, to apply to the Home Secretary to prohibit a particular protest from taking place.

In addition, we have already had several new pieces of public order legislation in recent years that, in some cases, police forces are still getting to grips with. With this in mind, we believe the focus should be on making the existing framework work to make sure that the police can take robust action against those engaging in hateful or criminal behaviour on our streets. That said, we will look at this recommendation in more depth and see what the Government bring forward, because it is vital that everyone in our country feels safe on our streets.

The second point relates to protest organisers paying policing costs. The report’s recommendation raises a series of practical considerations about which organisations would be forced to pay and under what circumstances. Again, we think the focus at the moment should be on making existing legislation work but, as with the rest of the report, we will examine these recommendations in more depth and see what the Government bring forward.

Before asking the Minister a couple of questions, I welcome that the report raises serious concerns about the growing intimidation of Members of this House and local councillors. The Minister knows that, through the Defending Democracy Taskforce, we will continue to support the Government in their important work. He also knows that I stand ready to work closely with him to support his vital work in this area.

The report has been published amid activity across Government to counter extremism, bolster community cohesion and protect our democracy from malign forces, not least the work under way in the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities after the definition of extremism was published in March, and the work of the Defending Democracy Taskforce. I therefore ask the Minister to explain how other relevant Ministers in other relevant Government Departments will be involved in the preparation of the Government’s response to the Walney report.

Lord Walney’s work started in 2021 and, entirely understandably, had to be revised in the aftermath of the 7 October attacks. Although there had to be proper consultation and careful thought applied to such important matters, does the Minister think it would have been helpful if the report had been published sooner? I also point out to the Minister that the counter-extremism strategy is nine years out of date, while the hate crime strategy is now four years out of date. What plans does he have to update them?

To conclude, let me be clear that we on the Labour Benches will work to ensure that these threats are countered. We will work to defend the values of freedom and tolerance that are the cornerstones of our democracy, and we will work to defeat all those who seek to harm and undermine our way of life—in that, we will be unrelenting.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his comments and the way he has approached this matter. He has always been extremely pragmatic in areas of national security, and has certainly been a very capable partner with whom I have been able to work. I am grateful for his approach today.

I am particularly grateful that the hon. Gentleman is open to looking at certain areas of this report seriously, such as the question of where costs should lie. Football clubs have to contribute to the cost of policing matches, and Wimbledon has to contribute to the cost of policing tennis, and yet here are organisations costing tens of millions of pounds in policing costs each year, and doing so as though this was their own private fiefdom. It strikes me as a very odd way of behaving. I also welcome the hon. Gentleman’s approach to the Defending Democracy Taskforce and the support he has offered for it today.

Let me just answer the hon. Gentleman’s questions briefly. We will be discussing with DLUHC—as he knows, it is an important participant in this discussion—and other relevant departments, including the Ministry of Justice, how to take these recommendations forward and which to adopt. I am sure he understands that I will update the House in the usual way at the appropriate time. I am also grateful for his support on that.

Cyber-security

Debate between Tom Tugendhat and Dan Jarvis

Tuesday 7th May 2024 Westminster Hall

[Dan Jarvis (Barnsley Central) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Bardell. May I say how good it is to see the Minister in his place? I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Preston (Sir Mark Hendrick) on securing this important debate. He is a long-standing and dedicated servant to his constituents and Lancashire more widely; any compliment about Lancashire does not come particularly easily from my side of the Pennines, but that is certainly one that my hon. Friend deserves for his very long-standing service for his constituents.

I pay tribute to the men and women who serve in the National Cyber Force, soon to be based in Samlesbury, and to those who serve across the security and intelligence services and in the cyber-security sector. They fight on the digital frontline day in and day out to detect, disrupt and deter individual and state-sponsored adversaries that threaten our cyber-security.

The cyber threat is constantly mutating and spreading. The latest crime survey for England and Wales shows a staggering 29% increase in computer misuse between 2022 and 2023. Computer misuse disrupts services, obtains information illegally and extorts individuals, meaning that personal information can be published online without consent, entire life savings can be lost due to fraud, and individuals, including children, can be blackmailed. The Government need to be increasingly ruthless in their approach to countering those threats and legislate for the challenges of today, not those of yesterday. Doing so will give cyber-security professionals the means to retain the advantage over those who seek to harm us and protect more people and organisations from cyber-crime.

Therefore, as the right hon. Member for Midlothian (Owen Thompson) rightly said, the Computer Misuse Act needs updating to reflect the challenges of the cyber age, not those of the Ceefax age. Accelerating technological change means that outdated legislation is struggling to catch up with cyber-threats posed by the likes of artificial intelligence. That is why, on this side of the House, we have already proposed criminalising the programming of chatbots that radicalise and spread terrorist material. We also welcome the Government’s announcement last month of the criminalisation, through the Criminal Justice Bill, of the creation of sexually explicit deepfakes. Outdated legislation is at best restrictive and at worst punitive for cyber-security professionals in the UK who conduct ethical hacking to expose system vulnerabilities and protect us from harmful cyber-attacks.

The National Cyber Security Centre, which is home to exceptional men and women fighting cyber-crime, has said that ethical hacking reports by individual researchers provide valuable information that organisations can use to improve the security of their systems. That is why the Opposition tabled an amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill that would reform the CMA by introducing a statutory defence for cyber-security researchers and professionals involved in ethical hacking.

Our amendment comes after the Chancellor’s commitment to implement all of Sir Patrick Vallance’s recommendations on the regulation of emerging digital technologies published alongside last spring’s Budget, which included the introduction of a statutory defence. If this Government do not deliver, the next one should. Until that happens, the legislative lag will have consequences. Half of UK businesses and 32% of charities suffered a cyber-breach or attack in the last year alone. Breaches due to vulnerabilities in cyber-security drive some of the most pernicious types of criminality. According to the accounting firm BDO, fraud doubled in 2023.

Furthermore, the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy warned in December that the Government could face a catastrophic ransomware attack at any moment. The sobering reality is that such attacks are already happening on the UK’s critical national infrastructure. Just today, it was reported that in response to a ransom not being paid, personal information illegally obtained by a ransomware attack on NHS Dumfries and Galloway has been published on the dark web—a truly despicable act that accompanies another deeply concerning development today: a hack into the Ministry of Defence’s payroll records by a malign actor.

Those are only two of the most recent examples, and they show that the threat landscape has never been more dangerous. However, progress on reforming the CMA has been buffering for three years since the Government first announced their review of the legislation. Despite two public consultations, a Home Office industry working group and several public commitments, the Government have not yet made progress and, as the Minister will know, we are fast running out of parliamentary time. Though time is in short supply, there is consensus on acting in the national interest to update the CMA, and the Opposition are keen to play our part.

I would be grateful if the Minister would answer the following questions. He will know that they are meant in the constructive spirit in which we always seek to engage on these important matters. First, will he give an assurance that the proposed legislation, as outlined in the Government’s response to the CMA consultation, will be introduced in this Parliament?

Progress on legislation requires political leadership. However, the JCNSS report on ransomware said that the leadership by a former Home Secretary did not treat it as a priority. The Minister will remember that I wrote to him in January about this matter and others identified in the JCNSS report. Can he give a further assurance that his Department and other Departments are now prioritising ransomware by confirming that they will finally respond to the consultation on unauthorised access to online accounts and personal data, which was published in September 2022?

On public sector payments to ransomware, the Deputy Prime Minister responded to me at Cabinet Office questions on 25 April by saying that that “is not something” that he would “rule out totally”. However, the Security Minister’s written answer to me on the same question on the same day was much more resolute about the policy not to pay ransoms.

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

Listen to me.

[Dan Jarvis]

I am listening to the Minister. I do not know whether the Deputy Prime Minister is; that is possibly the problem.

It would be really helpful if the Minister would say whether a new approach to the public sector paying ransoms will be included in any update to the CMA. These assurances and clarifications matter, as the Home Office is part of a cross-Government response to countering cyber-threats, joining the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, the MOD, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Cabinet Office in driving policy to detect, disrupt and deter cyber-criminality.

As the Minister will know, the fulcrum of such activity is the National Security Council, but he will also know that, while it has a sub-committee for economic security, there is not a dedicated equivalent for cyber-security. Has consideration been given to the creation of a dedicated sub-committee of the NSC for policy responses to intermediate and long-term cyber challenges?

Another long-term challenge, which the Minister will be familiar with, is the retention of our best and brightest in fighting cyber-crime, both in the security and intelligence services and in the cyber-security sector. Do our modern-day Alan Turings, who play a vital role in keeping our country safe, feel that the most innovative and effective work can happen in the UK under current cyber-security legislation? The answer, sadly, is likely to be no: 60% of respondents to a recent cyber-ops survey said that the CMA is a barrier to their work in threat intelligence and vulnerability research, and 16,850 cyber-defenders—the equivalent of two GCHQs—are estimated to have been lost due to outdated cyber-security laws. The Minister knows that criminals profit the most from poor retention and recruitment, so has he considered how changes to the CMA could unlock the cyber-security sector’s huge potential to protect our country’s cyber-space better?

This debate has not just been about protecting our cyber-space through effective legislation; it has been about the principle of legislation retaining the advantage over malign actors intent on harming us. I said at the start of my speech that there are exceptional men and women working to defend our cyber-security, who are very much at the cutting edge of efforts to detect, disrupt and deter myriad threats. As legislators providing the legal framework for that crucial work, we must now all play our part.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Tom Tugendhat and Dan Jarvis

Monday 15th April 2024 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Minister.

[Dan Jarvis (Barnsley Central) (Lab)]

The Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner said last year that our policing and security services were technologically vulnerable because of their use of Chinese-made equipment, including CCTV, drones and body cameras. Can the Minister say whether the digital asbestos of Chinese-made technology is still used in our policing and security infrastructure—yes or no?

[Tom Tugendhat]

My friend the hon. Member will know well that the work of Fraser Sampson before he retired or ended his mandate last year has been fantastically important to many of us in making sure “digital asbestos” —I approve of the term—is got out of our institutions. This is something that is ongoing. It has got out of the most secure sites already, but there are other areas where there is work to do, because an awful lot of sites bought technology that would now be problematic. It is not just static sites; there is potential that some electric vehicles could be easily turned into mobile intelligence-gathering platforms by hostile states, so it is about looking not simply at the past, but at the future.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment)Bill [Lords]

Debate between Tom Tugendhat and Dan Jarvis

Report stage
Monday 25th March 2024 Commons Chamber

[Dan Jarvis]

I know that the hon. Member takes these matters incredibly seriously, and he has raised an important point. To be absolutely fair to the Minister and to his Department, I know that this is a matter that the Government have considered very carefully, and that there has been an extensive process of consultation with a range of tech companies—I have met a number of them myself—but I think it only fair to conclude that while of course there are important contributions to be made by tech companies to this debate, these are ultimately matters for the Government and the House to determine. Having said that, new clause 2 would provide a helpful and constructive mechanism for the Government, and we have tabled it in a genuine attempt to be helpful and to monitor very closely the significant challenges that our national security faces from serious and organised crime as a consequence of rapid developments in technology.

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for the spirit in which he has addressed this issue, and he deserves a proper response. There is a valid concern that this is a process of engagement with tech companies, and there needs to be a partnership. I will be frank with him: I do not support new clause 2, for the very simple reason that the way in which this interaction takes place has evolved a lot, even in the two years that I have been in post. I suspect that during the four or five years that this House will supervise the Bill, under the next Government and in the five years beyond that, the interaction will evolve again.

What concerns me is that we could write into law a system of oversight and regulation that does not properly address the way in which tech companies are involved in this area. Therefore, the best answer is to have a more iterative process, which I have no doubt the fantastic civil servants with whom I have the privilege to work will adapt. Whoever takes over from me in 20 or 30 years’ time will no doubt want to iterate that as well.

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to the Minister for clarification on the response to new clause 2. He understands that we have tabled it because we genuinely think that it is a mechanism that—let us be honest about it—would not be particularly onerous for the Government, and would be helpful in focusing minds across Government. I completely agree with the point he made about his civil servants, who have been excellent throughout the passage of the Bill. We just happen to differ on this issue, because the Opposition think that the new clause would provide a useful forum for the Government to consider the challenges. He is absolutely right about the rapid evolution of technology, and we think it would be no bad thing to condense Government thinking into a report that would be issued on an annual basis.

[Dan Jarvis]

That is a very important point, and I completely agree. These are complex and difficult matters of public policy, and I completely understand that none of this is easy from the Minister’s perspective. However, if the right hon. Gentleman does not mind my saying so, his point strengthens the case for new clause 2, because we think it would provide a useful mechanism for the Government to track the development of these important matters, but also provide a mechanism for Members of this House to hold the Government to account on them. I am very grateful for the points he has made.

Before turning to amendment 24 on BPDs, which stands in my name, I would be very grateful if the Minister could say whether any progress has been made on arrangements to notify the Investigatory Powers Commissioner when adding new BPDs to existing category authorisations. It might not be in the Bill, but we think that even a reference to it in the IPC’s annual inspection would be helpful progress on this matter. The Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham and I have discussed that, and I would be grateful if the Minister could said something about it.

I acknowledge the amendments on BPDs that were tabled by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald). Both of our parties have concerns about the definition of “low or no expectation of privacy” for BPDs, which we debated in a pretty constructive fashion on Second Reading and in Committee. However, Labour does not oppose the concept of “low or no expectation of privacy” for BPDs, which is why we will not support amendment 7, which was tabled by the SNP spokesman. Instead, amendment 24, which stands in my name, seeks further clarification on how “low or no expectation of privacy” will be applied to BPDs, with the aim that the parameters must be as clear as possible for the House to understand.

In Committee, the Minister used the Panama papers as an example of leaked and widely republished material being defined as a BPD with a low or no expectation of privacy. I understand why the Minister chose to use that example, but most other leaked documents containing personal information do not attract anywhere near the same level of media attention. Again, I would be grateful if the Minister took this opportunity to provide another example of information from a leak without widescale press coverage that would be suitable for the designation of a bulk personal data set with a low or no expectation of privacy.

[Tom Tugendhat]

As always, the hon. Gentleman is quite right to highlight the areas I touched on. The important thing about the Panama papers was that they changed. They would have enjoyed a high level of privacy, but with republication they became “low/no”. It would not be right to say that any leaked document enjoys “low/no”, but the law should reflect the reality of the data that is currently being held. When data goes from being secret to being effectively public, it would be absurd to hold the intelligence services to a different standard from that which would apply to any of us, who would be able to access it on a website.

[Dan Jarvis]

That is a very useful clarification, and I thank the Minister for it.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

Debate between Tom Tugendhat and Dan Jarvis

Committee stage & Report stage
Thursday 7th March 2024 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

It is a pleasure to be here under your chairship, Mrs Cummins. The exceptional growth in volume and types of data across society globally since 2016 has affected the intelligence services’ ability to work and collaborate at the necessary operational pace. The existing bulk personal dataset safeguards do not account for the way that data and its availability have evolved since the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 was passed. This creates a negative impact on operational agility, while making it increasingly difficult for the intelligence services to develop the necessary capabilities.

Clauses 1 and 2 introduce an alternative regime for bulk personal datasets where there is low or no reasonable expectation of privacy—the so-called low/no regime. Clause 1 specifically provides a mechanism for the intelligence agencies to determine whether bulk personal datasets should be authorised under part 7 of the 2016 Act for sensitive datasets, or proposed new part 7A for low/no datasets.

[Dan Jarvis (Barnsley Central) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Cummins. I rise to speak very briefly to clause 1, and to thank the Minister for his opening remarks.

At the outset of our consideration, we should all take the opportunity to pay tribute to the exceptional men and women who have served in our law enforcement and security services. We owe them a deep debt of gratitude. Let me say that the Opposition support the Bill, which updates aspects of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. It is imperative that legal frameworks are updated to ensure that our security and law enforcement services keep up with the challenges to communications technology in an increasingly challenging and complex landscape of threats to our safety and national security. None the less, the important provisions proposed in this Bill need to be scrutinised carefully. The shadow Home Secretary and I made it clear on Second Reading that we will work with the Government to improve it in places, following the example of the constructive cross-party work that was done in the other place.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

What can I say? We have got a little further on clause 1 than I anticipated. I am grateful to my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings, the right hon. Member for North Durham and other hon. Members who have spoken. Bulk personal dataset authorisation is clearly an important change, as my shadow, the hon. Member for Barnsley Central, has set out; I was interested to hear the suggestion from my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings that this was the shadow Minister’s first step on the path to greatness and to leading the Opposition. I am grateful for the points that hon. Members have made.

The type of data that may fall into part 7A is indeed covered—things like news articles, academic papers, public and official records, and the sort of bulk personal data that many people would have access to routinely. The changing nature of the need to hold data has meant that bulk personal data must be authorised in a different way than was previously thought. Paragraphs 4.14 and 4.20 of the draft code of practice set out further details of the datasets that would fall under the section 22A test, of which the hon. Member for Barnsley Central is no doubt aware.

The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East touched on various aspects of data that might fall within this approach. He will remember that Lord Anderson noted in his independent review that MI5 and MI6 estimate that roughly 20% of their bulk personal data holdings would fall into the category of “low and no”; for GCHQ, the figure would be nearer to 8%. Clearly, these things will evolve. To answer the point made by the right hon. Member for North Durham, the simple fact is that our world is producing incomparably greater volumes of data than ever before. The need to understand, handle and triage that data is therefore essential.

It is worth making the point, right at the beginning, that creating and storing huge volumes of data is to nobody’s advantage, and particularly not that of the intelligence services. The only purpose of having or examining data is to enable investigatory operations to get to targets of interest. It is not about anything other than ensuring that investigations can be properly targeted against those who threaten the interests of the British people, under various existing laws. This measure does not change those laws; it merely assists the targeting.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2

Low or no reasonable expectation of privacy

[Dan Jarvis]

I beg to move amendment 14, in clause 2, page 3, line 18, at end insert—

“(1A) This section does not apply to a bulk personal dataset unless it has been published in accordance with the Data Protection Act 2018.”

This amendment would ensure bulk personal datasets with low or no expectation of privacy have been published lawfully and in accordance with General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) set out in the Data Protection Act 2018.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The reality is that once papers are effectively public, the argument for privacy somewhat falls away. That is exactly where we are getting to in this area, which is why we have looked at how to oversee it and the different elements within it. Part 7A explains the oversight regime clearly and section 226A really gets to the nub of it.

It is important that we focus there, where the argument comes back to the essential element: when considering whether intelligence services have applied the test correctly, the judicial commissioner will apply the same principles that a court would apply on application for judicial review. We therefore have an internal legal process overseeing this before it would even get to any legal challenge. That is why it is more robust than some voices have gently suggested, and covers many of those internal challenges.

[Dan Jarvis]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

Well, the right hon. Gentleman could make a virtue of a necessity if he wishes. I certainly will. I shall enjoy meeting him to discuss this, and I hope that he will take that commitment in the spirit with which it is made.

[Dan Jarvis]

I think that this has been a useful debate. There have been a number of sensible and constructive contributions from both sides of the Committee. The Minister has made a commitment to sit down and discuss this further, and I am grateful for that undertaking. As I have said, we do not intend to push this amendment to a vote.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Bootle. I am happy to give way to the Minister if he wants to respond directly to that point.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The point about these powers is indeed to make better use of resources. One challenge is that many intelligence officers are tied up doing things that are no longer genuinely necessary for the protection of personal privacy, but they are following processes that, were they to be working for a private organisation —a company or whatever—would no longer be necessary because bulk personal data could simply be bought. Therefore, what we are actually looking at doing is using resources much more efficiently and therefore helping the protection of the British people, from a better financial position. However, the point made by the hon. Member for Bootle on resources is always one that I welcome.

[Dan Jarvis]

I have nothing further to add, other than to beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3

Duration of bulk personal dataset warrants

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 4 stand part.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank my right hon. Friend. Clause 3 amends the duration of bulk personal dataset warrants under section 213 of the IPA from six to 12 months. BPDs tend to be used to support long-term strategic intelligence activities, and a longer warrant duration will enable the value of the BPD to be better demonstrated, which will provide the relevant Secretary of State with a more accurate picture of the necessity and proportionality when an application for renewal is made. The existing part 7 safeguards will remain in place, including the double lock by the judicial commissioner.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5

Third party bulk personal datasets

[Dan Jarvis]

I beg to move amendment 16, in clause 5, page 14, line 34, at end insert—

“(4) A third party BPD warrant may not authorise the examination of a dataset consisting of the contents of the marked electoral register.”

This amendment would prevent a third-party bulk personal dataset consisting of the electoral register, which sets out whether people have voted, from being examined by the intelligence services.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank hon. Members for their points. The examination of third-party bulk personal datasets by the intelligence services is vital to their role of protecting the national security and economic wellbeing of the United Kingdom and preventing and detecting serious crime.

Clause 5 places an explicit statutory regime around the intelligence services’ examination, in situ, of bulk datasets held by third parties. The regime would apply only to the intelligence services, in line with the wider part 7 BPD powers in the IPA. The clause puts in place robust oversight and safeguards. For example, third-part dataset warrants are to be subject to a double lock, and the decision to authorise the warrant will need to be approved by both the Secretary of State and an independent judicial commissioner. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner and his office will oversee the regime to ensure the intelligence services’ examination of third-party datasets is both necessary and proportionate. That relates to the point made by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East about proportionality and need.

To answer the point made by the hon. Member for Barnsley Central, we do not consider it appropriate to exclude specific types of dataset from those for which a third-party dataset warrant can be sought. The reason is, as he knows, that we can begin to go down very tricky routes on this area, as the intelligence services have a requirement to keep safe not just our democracy but our wider nation. Therefore, limiting those different arguments can be problematic. What we are aiming to do is ensure the proportionality requirement is the test applied by both judicial commissioners and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.

The Secretary of State may issue a warrant authorising the examination of a third-party dataset only where it is necessary and proportionate—that is going to be quite a high bar in some of the areas asked about—for the intelligence service to examine the dataset to which the warrant relates. That decision will be double-locked by an independent judicial commissioner who, among other things, is required expressly to review the Secretary of State’s conclusions in respect of necessity and proportionality when deciding whether to approve the decision to issue a warrant. That is already in the Bill. Each decision will be made on a case-by-case basis and will be subject to prior judicial approval.

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful for the Minister’s response. I have to say, I am struggling to think of a scenario in which it might be necessary and proportionate to examine the marked electoral register. This is something we will reflect on.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

That is a helpful and useful suggestion. I am happy to proceed on that basis, if the Minister is.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I am happy to write to the hon. Member.

[Dan Jarvis]

On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

Minor and consequential amendments

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Clause 6 makes minor amendments to the 2016 Act to reflect the introduction of parts 7A and 7B, including making it clear that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner is responsible for oversight of the part 7B regime.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting)

Debate between Tom Tugendhat and Dan Jarvis

Committee stage & Report stage
Thursday 7th March 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Tom Tugendhat]

As always, I welcome my right hon. Friend’s contribution. That is covered in many areas in the letter I wrote to him.

[Dan Jarvis (Barnsley Central) (Lab)]

In an earlier response to comments by the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings, the Minister helpfully mentioned the letter that I think has been sent to the right hon. Member and possibly other members of the Committee. Can the Minister confirm that that letter will also be sent to the Opposition?

[Tom Tugendhat]

To be absolutely clear, the letter was in response to my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings, so it was sent to him, it was copied to the secretariat of the ISC and it is in the Bill pack. The hon. Member for Barnsley Central therefore has access to it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

The notice review mechanism is an important safeguard. If operators are dissatisfied with a notice that they are given, or with any part of it, they have a statutory right to refer it to the Secretary of State for a review. Clause 18 is essential to ensure that operators do not make any technical changes during the review period that would have a negative impact on existing lawful access capabilities.

Operators will not be required to make changes to specifically comply with the notice. However, they will be required to maintain the status quo. If there was lawful access at the point at which a notice was given, access to data must be maintained by the operator while the notice is being comprehensively reviewed. This will ensure that law enforcement and intelligence agencies continue to have access to vital data during that period in order to keep people safe.

To be clear, companies can continue to make technical changes or roll out new services during the review period, so long as lawful access remains unaffected. The status quo will apply only to services or systems specified within the notice; anything outside the scope of the notice will be unaffected. If, at the conclusion of a review, the Secretary of State confirms the effect or varies the notice, maintaining the status quo will be vital to ensure that law enforcement and intelligence communities do not lose access to data during the review period that they would otherwise have been able lawfully to obtain. In the Lords, the Government amended the Bill to introduce a timeline for the review of a notice.

[Dan Jarvis]

I will be very brief. I am grateful for the Minister’s remarks, but I want to raise the concerns of some telecommunications operators and of organisations representing the sector about clauses 18 and 19. These include a view that the role of the proposed new notices regime would hinder and even veto product development.

I know that the Minister and his Department have engaged with stakeholders about those concerns, as have Labour Members. I would be grateful if the Minister briefly set out whether recent engagement has taken place with stakeholders with regard to these matters, and whether he has any further plans to address the concerns that they have expressed about clauses 18 and 19.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I want to make a similar case. We are now getting into territory where I struggle to understand exactly what is going on, because I am not a tech geek. We are speeding past this measure almost as if it were inconsequential, but the language in some of the briefings that we have received about it is pretty dramatic.

The bundle that was emailed to Committee members this morning includes evidence from Apple that I think needs to be addressed:

“At present, the SoS must navigate important oversight mechanisms before they can block the offering of a new product or service they believe will impact…ability to access private user data.”

Apple summarises the suite of clauses that the Committee is considering, including the requirement in clause 18 to maintain the status quo during the review process, as allowing the Secretary of State

“to block, in secret, the release of a product or service even before the legality of a Technical Capability Notice can be reviewed by independent oversight bodies. The effect of this amendment will be to, extraordinarily, hand the SoS the power to block new products or services prior to their legality being ascertained. This result upends the balance of authority and independent oversight Parliament struck in the IPA.”

Given the new definition of “telecommunications operator” in clause 19, Apple has also warned that there will be serious implications for conflicts with other laws, including the EU GDPR and with US legislation.

As well as Apple, we have heard from various other organisations. TechUK has highlighted problems with broadening the definition of “telecommunications provider” before control of provision of a telecoms service, including to UK users, is established overseas. It also highlights the potential conflict of laws. What if the domestic law in the country in which a company is based does not allow for compliance with the notice that the Home Secretary has delivered? That company might not even be able to raise the issue of a conflict of laws, because it would be sworn to secrecy under the Bill.

According to TechUK, the proposed changes mark a departure in the way that the UK approaches the extraterritorial reach of the UK or UK laws and the consequential conflicts of laws. That was all recognised in the 2016 Act, in which a partial solution was found in the form of a UK-US agreement. Currently, however, the Government have not set out any plans to work towards equivalent solutions.

In relation to clause 21, I will raise similar concerns from other experts, but it is clear that some very serious companies and organisations have significant concerns about what the combination of these notices may end up delivering. Those concerns need addressed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

I have said what I am going to say on the matter.

Amendment 3 agreed to.

[Dan Jarvis]

I beg to move amendment 17, in clause 22, page 47, line 26, at end insert—

“(2G) If a warrant is issued by an individual designated by the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister must be informed of that decision as soon as it is reasonably practical to do so.”

This amendment would require the Prime Minister to be notified of a decision of a designated Secretary of State to authorise the interception of certain elected representatives’ communications as soon as is reasonably practicable.

[Dan Jarvis]

I am conscious of the debate that has just taken place, so I anticipate what the Minister may say in response. Let us give him another go anyway.

Amendments 17 and 18 relate to the decision of a designated Secretary of State to authorise the interception of elected representatives’ communications and interference with equipment relating to elected representatives. As the Minister will know, two similar amendments were proposed by Lord West in Committee in the other place. The reason for tabling the amendments in Committee in the Commons is that the Opposition believe that the Prime Minister’s overall involvement in the warrants must be retained, even if, in designated cases, it could be retrospective. As I said, I am mindful of the debate that has just taken place.

In the other place, Lord Sharpe rejected Lord West’s amendment on the basis that the oversight arrangements for warrant decisions taken by a designated Secretary of State, which include review by the judicial commissioner, are sufficient scrutiny. I understand that argument, but I wonder why it should not be the case that a Prime Minister is at least notified about decisions to issue warrants that they have had to delegate due to their being unable to do so. Furthermore, would a Prime Minister not being notified of a decision unnecessarily diminish their operational awareness in making future decisions to issue warrants?

My amendment would require the Prime Minister to be informed of a decision taken by a designated Secretary of State on their behalf as soon as the circumstances that have prevented the Prime Minister from approving a warrant in the first place have passed. I hope the Minister and the Committee will understand the emphasis on the important nuance in the difference between review and notification. Mindful of the earlier debate, I hope that the Minister will consider accepting the amendments.

[Tom Tugendhat]

For want of repeating myself, I will probably leave that to stand.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

Clauses 22 and 23 will increase the resilience and flexibility of the warrant system. They will ensure the effective processing of warrants that authorise the interception of, or the use of equipment interference to obtain, the communications of a Member of a relevant legislature when the Prime Minister cannot fulfil their duties due to medical incapacitation or a lack of access to secure communications. The changes will enable the authorisation process to function in an agile manner, thereby enabling the important work of the intelligence agencies to continue while maintaining a high bar for the authorisation of some of the most sensitive warrants.

[Dan Jarvis]

I rise to speak to new clause 1, which relates to oversight by the Intelligence and Security Committee of warrants to intersect and examine the communications of Members or the interference with equipment relating to Members. The context of the new clause will be clear to those who followed the debates in the other place about the role of the ISC. To be absolutely clear, I am not seeking to debate the Wilson doctrine—I know that Members will be relieved to hear that.

The purpose of the new clause is to probe and seek further safeguards for the ISC to provide essential oversight of this extremely sensitive matter, codified by the 2016 Act as part of a wider context of decisions made by the Prime Minister in the interests of national security. Members of this Bill Committee who also serve on the ISC will know that successive Prime Ministers have, unfortunately, not appeared in front of that Committee since, I believe, 2014. As a result, there has been no opportunity for direct accountability over prime ministerial decision making on warrants to intercept and examine Members’ communications, or on interference with equipment relating to Members.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

On the point about notification: forgive me, but it is inconceivable that it should be required in law to inform somebody that they have been subject to an investigation by the intelligence services in such a way. I would be delighted to discuss with the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East in a more secure environment why, for a whole series of reasons, that may not be such a good idea. On the question of the Prime Minister appearing before the ISC, my friend the hon. Member for Barnsley Central knows my views—I have expressed them on many occasions—but that is way above my pay grade.

[Dan Jarvis]

For now!

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 23

Equipment interference: Members of Parliament etc

Amendment made: 4, in clause 23, page 48, line 15, leave out from “and” to end of line 17 and insert—

“(b) has the necessary operational awareness to decide whether to give approvals under subsection (3) or (6).”—(Tom Tugendhat.)

This amendment replaces the reference to an individual being required in their routine duties to issue warrants under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 with a reference to an individual being required to have the necessary operational awareness to decide whether to give approvals under section 111 of that Act.

Clause 23, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 24

Issue of equipment interference warrants

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

The Bill makes minor changes to the equipment interference regime, specifically in relation to the warrantry processes associated with its authorisation. The purposes behind those changes are to correct minor drafting errors in the IPA to provide greater clarity, and to improve the efficiency of the warrantry process for equipment interference.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 24 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 25 and 26 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 27

Bulk equipment interference: safeguards for confidential journalistic material etc

[Dan Jarvis]

I beg to move amendment 19, in clause 27, page 50, line 9, at end insert—

“(2A) Where a senior official acts on behalf of the Secretary of State under subsection (2), they must inform the Investigatory Powers Commissioner of the selection for examination of BEI material as soon as reasonably practicable.”

This amendment would require a senior official acting on behalf of the Secretary of State who has selected BEI material for examination when there has been an urgent need to do so to inform the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as soon as reasonably practicable.

[Dan Jarvis]

Amendment 19 would require a senior official acting on behalf of the Secretary of State who has selected bulk equipment interference material for examination, when there has been an urgent need to do so, to inform the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as soon as is reasonably practical. It would ensure that every reasonable oversight arrangement was in place concerning the Bill’s investigatory powers provisions.

The amendment does not suggest that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner retrospectively reviews the approval, but instead proposes that they be informed to ensure that there are the most comprehensive and effective oversight arrangements on investigatory powers. We intend not to burden the police and the security services with additional duties, but to ensure that there is the maximum possible oversight with the minimum possible additional work. I hope that the Minister will at least agree with the intentions of the amendment and consider its merits in further strengthening the Bill’s oversight arrangements.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I welcome the amendment, and not only do I agree with it, but I feel that we have already done it. My understanding is that the provision duplicates what already occurs in practice under the current regime, as well as the changes made by clause 27. Currently, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner is already effectively notified when a senior official acting on behalf of the Secretary of State, in urgent circumstances, approves the selection for examination of journalistic material derived from bulk equipment interference. Clause 27 already inserts into the IPA new section 195A(2), which will ensure that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner is notified as soon as is reasonably practical by the Secretary of State when a senior official approves the use of criteria to select for examination journalistic material in reliance on an urgent approval. Effectively, the senior official is informing on behalf of the Secretary of State, or indeed the Secretary of State is informing on behalf of the senior official. We all very much hope it is the former of the two.

Clause 27 enhances the safeguards already afforded to journalistic material within the IPA, and the Government recognise the importance of journalistic freedom within free and democratic societies, which is why we are introducing this measure. Under the current regime, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner must be informed when a communication that contains confidential journalistic material or sources of journalistic material is retained following its examination for purposes other than its destruction. The clause introduces a requirement for prior independent approval by the IPC before any search criteria are used to select such material. Prior independent approval is also required before it is removed.

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to the Minister for that clarification. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 27 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 28

Exclusion of matters from legal proceedings etc: exceptions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Clause 28 will amend schedule 3 to the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 to provide exceptions for disclosures of intercepted materials to inquiries or inquests in Northern Ireland or Scotland into a person’s death. The clause will create parity with existing provisions for coroners in England and Wales. It also adds an exception to enable panel members of the Parole Board in England and Wales to access intercepted materials when considering parole applications and any subsequent appeals. It will also enable relevant coroners in Northern Ireland and sheriffs investigating deaths in Scotland to access intercepted material in connection with their inquiry or inquest.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 28 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 29

Freedom of information: bodies dealing with security matters

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

Clauses 30 to 33 are typical clauses that are included in the vast majority of legislation. Clause 30 allows the Secretary of State, by regulations made by statutory instrument, to make provision that is consequential on this Act. Clause 31 details the extent of the Bill. The Bill extends and applies to the whole of the United Kingdom, with the exception of measures contained in clause 28, in which subsection (2) applies to England and Wales only and subsection (3) applies to Northern Ireland and Scotland only.

As national security is a reserved matter, a legislative consent motion is required from Scotland only in relation to a small number of clauses in part 2—the oversight aspect—of the Bill. I am pleased that the Scottish Government have recommended that legislative consent be given.

Clause 32 details when the Bill commences. Part 6 comes into force on the day on which the Bill is passed; the other provisions come into force on such day as is appointed by regulations made by the Secretary of State.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 30 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 31 and 32 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 33

Short title

Amendment made: 5, in clause 33, page 56, line 1, leave out subsection (2).—(Tom Tugendhat.)

This amendment removes the privilege amendment inserted by the Lords.

Clause 33, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause 2

Report on the Prime Minister’s engagement with the Intelligence and Security Committee

“After section 240 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 insert—

“240A Report on the Prime Minister’s engagement with the Intelligence and Security Committee

(1) The Secretary of State must publish a report about the Prime Minister’s engagement with the Intelligence and Security Committee in relation to the investigatory powers regime and lay the report before Parliament.

(2) The report must be published within six months of the passage of the Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Act 2024, and annually thereafter.””—(Dan Jarvis.)

This new clause would ensure the Secretary of State publishes a report on the engagement, including any meeting held, between the Prime Minister and the Intelligence and Security Committee in relation to the investigatory powers regime.

Brought up.

[Dan Jarvis]

I recognise that we have already had an extensive debate on this matter. I do not intend to detain the Committee any longer, and there is therefore nothing further I wish to say about new clause 2, so I do not wish to move it.

New Clause 3

Impact of Act on EU data adequacy decisions

“Within six months of the passage of this Act, the Secretary of State must publish a report assessing the potential impact of this Act on EU data adequacy decisions relating to the United Kingdom.”—(Dan Jarvis.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish a report on potential impact of the provisions within this Bill on the requirements necessary to maintain a data adequacy decision by the EU.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Dan Jarvis]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 3 relates to the impact of the Act on EU data adequacy decisions. When a similar measure to this new clause was proposed by my noble Friend Lord Coaker during the Bill’s passage through the other place, the response from the Minister, Lord Sharpe, confirmed the UK Government’s regular contact with the European Commission about the Bill to ensure that any changes are understood. We welcome that but, as I hope the Minister will understand, such engagement is a continuous process, not a single event or even a series of events. As part of this continuous process, we believe that the Secretary of State should publish a report assessing the potential impact of the Act on EU adequacy decisions.

As Lord Coaker said in the other place:

“The adequacy agreement is dependent on the overall landscape of UK data protections”.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 23 January 2024; Vol. 835, c. 688.]

That is even though the UK protections require some further work. However, given the time pressures, Mrs Cummins, that is all I will say about new clause 3.

[Tom Tugendhat]

First, I welcome the interactions we have had on this point, as well as the work of Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe to ensure that this is widely understood. The work that has been done is important. We face the challenge that although we obviously commit to fulfilling our side of the TCA and the various agreements we have struck, this is really a matter for the European Commission to determine, so it is not one that we can pass into UK law. It is really a matter for them.

[Dan Jarvis]

I have nothing further to add. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

[Tom Tugendhat]

On a point of order, Mrs Cummins. I would like to express my extreme personal thanks to Tom Ball and the Bill team, Phoebe, the Lucys, and the many others who have contributed brilliantly to ensure that this Bill has proceeded with speed and professionalism. I thank not only the members of the Committee, but all Members of many parties, and particularly the ISC, which has contributed so much to this Bill, despite what the right hon. Member for North Durham claims. May I say a particular thanks to my very good friend and shadow, the hon. Member for Barnsley Central? It is an enormous pleasure to think that we have gone from fighting the Queen’s enemies to passing the King’s laws together.

[Dan Jarvis]

Further to that point of order, Mrs Cummins. I join the Minister in warmly extending my thanks on behalf of Labour to all members of the Public Bill Committee and all the officials, both in the Department and in the House, who have done a sterling job in getting us to this point. I am grateful to the Minister for his collegiate approach, which I very much hope we will be able to maintain during the further passage of the Bill. Thank you, Mrs Cummins.

Security of Elected Representatives

Debate between Tom Tugendhat and Dan Jarvis

Thursday 29th February 2024 Commons Chamber

[Dan Jarvis (Barnsley Central) (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for his statement and for advance sight of it. I join him in expressing our gratitude to all those who work to keep us safe. Our democracy is strong, but we can never stand for threats or attempts to intimidate. We cannot and will not allow a minority to pose security threats, or allow racial hatred to ever go unchallenged or to undermine our democracy.

Let me say to the Minister at the outset that we welcome the £31 million of additional funding. We recognise the extremely difficult situation faced by Members of this House, with all of us the target of intimidation and threats of violence, especially women. We must not forget that that targeting also extends to local councillors, Mayors, police and crime commissioners, Members of a devolved Parliament and an Assembly, and of course candidates. Nobody in this House needs any reminding of the terrible price we have paid in recent years and the loss of much-loved colleagues. We must ensure that this additional resource is focused in the right place and at the right time, and that long-term arrangements are in place to provide those who step forward to serve as elected representatives and their families with the reassurance they deserve to do their vital work without fear or favour.

Those arrangements must also ensure that others are not dissuaded from stepping forward to serve, because the threat is undermining the core principles of our representative democracy. Our country must return to a state of affairs where the only fear that politicians ever feel is from the ballot box. Although we absolutely respect the fundamental freedom to legitimate peaceful protest—it is a core democratic right—if that freedom is used to intimidate, harass or harm MPs and other representatives, including outside their home, safeguards must be put in place to protect them and our wider democratic system.

Such protective measures are now essential, but we also need to look at the underlying causes. What is it about our society that has changed that allows some to think that they can intimidate and threaten MPs and other elected representatives with impunity? What are the roots of this poison? It is hard not to see a connection between the increasingly polarised and acrimonious debate that has flourished online, particularly on social media, and the greater threat of physical harm in the real world. We also need to focus on the deeper roots of division that fuel this danger, not least by exercising good judgment in what we say. Words have consequences.

I would be grateful if the Minister answered a few questions. Is the £31 million a one-off uplift, or will it be made available on a recurring basis? How does that relate to Scotland and Northern Ireland? In this general election year, all Members standing for re-election will become candidates again for the short campaign. Can he give an assurance that all who need additional protection will continue to get it? Will he also give an assurance that work is under way to ensure that Operation Bridger is configured and resourced to provide appropriate support locally, not least to our councillors?

Recent protests, alongside threats to and intimidation of politicians, have also raised the issue of what is defined as hateful extremism. The Government have not yet brought forward a definition, but that would be helpful in countering threats and intimidation. Can the Minister say when the Government or the Levelling Up Secretary will bring forward a definition, and outline when the Government will bring forward an updated counter-extremism strategy?

The defending democracy taskforce set up by the Security Minister in November 2022 is an important operational mechanism for co-ordinating activity across Government to protect and bolster our democratic system and institutions. Given the proximity to the general election, perhaps now is the time to look at how we can bring this work together on a cross-party basis. We all have a shared interest in ensuring that elections can be contested in a way that not just defends but strengthens our democracy.

Protecting our democracy and those who serve as elected representatives is mission critical. We must ensure that all who step forward to serve as democratically elected politicians are properly protected, and that the sovereignty of our democratic processes are not undermined. We on this side of the House will work with the Minister and the Government to do everything we can to make sure that is the case.

[Tom Tugendhat]

May I say how pleased I am to be working with my very good friend the hon. Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis), who I have known for a lot longer than either of us has been in this place? The questions he asks are important, and the tone in which he approaches this subject is even more so, and I am hugely grateful for the spirit of co-operation with which he has approached not just today’s statement but the work he has put in before today, and indeed with which the hon. Member for Halifax (Holly Lynch) approached it before him.

Turning to the questions, the £31 million is this year’s allocation, but there are consequences that will flow into other years. I will not give the hon. Gentleman a figure because that is variable; as he will appreciate, we are almost through the current financial year, and the consequences will depend on what is drawn down and what is required.

The hon. Gentleman’s question about Scotland and Northern Ireland is of course entirely valid. Let me be clear: the security of the democratic process in the United Kingdom is not a devolved matter; it is down to this Government, and it is my responsibility and this Government’s responsibility to make sure that elections in the United Kingdom are free and fair. Of course, we must have a huge amount of co-operation with other Parliaments and Governments inside the United Kingdom; with, in some cases, returning officers and councils; and with Ministers in Holyrood—and Stormont, now that it has, thank God, returned to operating. This area is a sovereign responsibility, for the simple reason that it is about the national security of the United Kingdom.

The hon. Gentleman raised an important point about parliamentary candidates. He is right that when the election is called, there will be no more MPs, and any rights and privileges that we enjoy as Members of this House will immediately cease. The Government are looking at ways of maintaining the security requirements necessary to ensure that those who wish to stand as candidates again can do so, free from fear and from the threat of violence.

The hon. Gentleman’s question about counter-extremism is important, and I would like first to pay tribute to William Shawcross for his work on updating the Prevent review, and to Robin Simcox, whose work on the counter-extremism strategy has been so important. This is about countering extremism in many different forms. I mentioned that we must be clear that Islamist violence and threats are primarily a threat to the Muslim community in the United Kingdom. The number of friends of mine in the Muslim community whom some have tried to silence, because my friends’ version of Islam does not tie in with that of thugs and loudmouths who claim to speak on behalf of others, is remarkable. We must champion all voices in this country, and that includes all Muslim voices—there isn’t a single one; there are many. As for the definition, there is an existing definition, as the hon. Gentleman is aware, and work is ongoing to see how that could or should be updated. I am afraid that I do not have an update for him now, but I will certainly bring one forward as soon as I have it.

As for the cross-party nature of the defending democracy taskforce, the hon. Gentleman raises an important point, and I am looking at it now, although I think he will be the first to admit that the work has been very cross-party to date.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Tom Tugendhat and Dan Jarvis

Monday 26th February 2024 Commons Chamber

[Dan Jarvis (Barnsley Central) (Lab)]

Russia’s deadly poison attack in Salisbury, Iran’s intimidation of Iran International journalists and China’s secret police stations have long showed the need for a robust strategy to counter transnational repression on British soil. The Minister mentioned that a review is under way into the UK’s approach to transnational repression. When will it be published, and will it be part of a wider strategy to counter hostile state activity in this country?

[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question. The review is under way, and it includes many different elements from communities from around the world who are now settled happily in the United Kingdom. He will understand why I will not go into individual details. Certain communities have been targeted, such as the Hong Kong Chinese community, which is now very welcome in the United Kingdom under a policy that this Government introduced—I am very proud of the number who have claimed asylum and taken the opportunity as British nationals overseas to settle here—and we are looking at others. We are open to any reports of transnational repression, and we are listening.

Protest Measures

Debate between Tom Tugendhat and Dan Jarvis

Thursday 8th February 2024 Commons Chamber

[Dan Jarvis (Barnsley Central) (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for his statement, and for advance sight of it. The Labour party absolutely respects the fundamental freedom to make legitimate, peaceful protest, but when that freedom is abused to intimidate, harass and harm others, safeguards must be put in place to protect the public. It is essential that the police be able to maintain public order while safeguarding the right to legitimate, peaceful protest. We will therefore scrutinise the details of the proposals to ensure that any new measures are applied appropriately and proportionately.

I will respond to the measures that the Minister has outlined. First, there are the new powers for the police to arrest protesters using face coverings to conceal their identity. While we understand the genuine concern about protesters committing public order offences while wearing face coverings, we are also concerned that there might be, at times, legitimate reasons why some protesters would want to wear face coverings. Let me give an example. When dissidents protest outside foreign embassies—the Minister will know which ones I have in mind—they may well want to conceal their identity to protect their family back home. The UK is, and should always be, a safe haven for dissidents opposing oppressive regimes. Can the Minister provide more detail about how that new power will be applied appropriately?

Secondly, the Opposition welcome a ban on flares and fireworks, which have been used to fuel public disorder and intimidate police officers in recent months. However, the policing of large protests could pose a challenge to enforcing the ban effectively, so I would be grateful if the Minister outlined what guidance will be issued to police forces on enforcing that at large protests with thousands of people in attendance.

Thirdly, on measures to protect the sanctity of war memorials, I know that the Minister will agree—as will, I am sure, every right hon. and hon. Member in the House—that they are extremely important places. They are places to remember those who have made the ultimate sacrifice in the service of our country, and they must always be respected. During protest activity last year, a very small minority of protesters desecrated the sanctity of war memorials, which understandably sparked outrage right around the country.

Protest activity also raised the issue of what is defined as hateful extremism. Despite promises, the Government have not so far been forthcoming with their definition of hateful extremism, which would help the police forces to police protests better. Can the Minister say when that will be brought forward, and outline when the Government will bring forward an updated counter-extremism strategy? The current one is eight years out of date.

The right to peacefully protest is a fundamental freedom in our country. It must not be abused, but it must not be curbed unnecessarily, either. The Opposition will scrutinise these measures further to ensure that they strike the right balance between safeguarding the right to protest and the important duty to safeguard the public.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank my hon. Friend—and he is my hon. Friend—for his support and comments. He is quite right that protecting peaceful protest and the right of free citizens to express their views on our streets is essential to the Government’s mission, and it is one of our priorities. The points that he raises are fair; in some cases, I will have to write to him with more detail, but I will cover some of the areas that I think matter greatly.

On face coverings, my hon. Friend raises important questions about when there might be a legitimate reason for somebody to cover their face. The guidelines and the legislation that we are setting out will cover that, because police officers will have discretion to give an order requiring a face covering to be removed. Those commanding the policing of protests will therefore have discretion over when they ask for that instruction to be carried out.

Secondly, on pyrotechnics, the instruction is quite clear: the measure relates to those participating in the protest. If, particularly around Diwali or Guy Fawkes’s day—not a day that I think anybody in this House would ever celebrate—people who have bought fireworks happen to pass a protest, they will not be caught by the offence. It refers to participation in the protest.

On my hon. Friend’s point about war memorials, he and I know far too many names that have been etched on to those stones. We also know that protests on war memorials can tear open extremely painful wounds that have long been closed. That is why I think the British people, quite rightly, saw the protests on war memorials as so offensive. That is why it is right that the Government act against the small minority desecrating such an important place in our hearts.

On my hon. Friend’s question about counter-extremism, the work being done by Robin Simcox is hugely important, and we are doing an awful lot to tighten up various elements of our counter-extremism policy. Indeed, I hope very much that I will be leaving the Chamber very shortly to have a meeting on that subject. The reality is, however, that it is a very complex subject; the Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities is currently working on a definition of extremism alongside the Attorney General. There is an awful lot that we must do to ensure that groups that pose the danger of extremism are addressed in other ways. That is where cross-Government working has been so important in ensuring that groups are transparent in what they are doing, in who is funding them and in where they are targeting their attention.

Security Threat to UK-Based Journalists

Debate between Tom Tugendhat and Dan Jarvis

Monday 20th February 2023 Commons Chamber

[Tom Tugendhat]

My right hon. Friend will understand that I would rather answer that question before the Committee on which he sits than comment on the Floor of the House, but he will be aware that there are, very sadly, many different connections between criminal enterprises and terrorist groups and indeed hostile states. That is why countering state threats is about not just defending ourselves against hostile adversaries but ensuring that we are free from fraud and the abuse of crime in our communities.

[Dan Jarvis (Barnsley Central) (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for his statement and completely agree with the sentiments expressed by him and the shadow Minister with regard to the violation of our sovereignty: these are very serious matters indeed. I want to ask about a slightly wider but connected point: I understand that he will be limited in what he can say, but may I seek his assurance that his Department remains hypervigilant with respect to the activities of other states who may also seek to conduct operations against UK-based personnel?

[Tom Tugendhat]

Yes, is the answer. The reality is that state-based threats have increased in the last few years, and we know the obvious sources of such aggression—sadly, they have been written all too large on the global map. However, other states that are not so well-advertised have also been exploiting our freedoms and liberties to further their ends, and we will stop them.

National Security

Debate between Tom Tugendhat and Dan Jarvis

Tuesday 1st November 2022 Commons Chamber

[Tom Tugendhat]

I pay enormous tribute to my right hon. Friend, whose work in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office was incredibly important in championing democracy and freedom around the world. Indeed, some of her work that was not always celebrated was in championing journalism. One thing we should recognise fully is that democracy does not work without a free press: I know that I am going to regret these words, but what they write and how they write it are as much a part of our democratic institutions as the words that we use in this Chamber. Making sure that our press is free and without influence is as important to democracy as making sure that we are, too.

[Dan Jarvis (Barnsley Central) (Lab)]

I warmly welcome the Minister to his important new role. He and I have spent many years safeguarding the security of information; these are matters that I know he takes very seriously, and I wish him well in the role.

Because I know the Minister takes these matters so seriously, I want to return briefly to the shadow Home Secretary’s point about the importance of doing the right thing and the importance of personal conduct. In addition to the measures that the Minister has outlined to the House today, there is an absolute requirement for a vigilant mindset among all Members of this House, but most critically among Ministers, who need to show leadership in the area. Does he agree that when it comes to matters of national security, everyone—everyone—must adhere to the protective regime or be deprived of access and removed from their position if necessary? Those are the rules, and everyone should follow them at all times.

[Tom Tugendhat]

May I take a moment to pay enormous tribute to my friend? We met in Helmand about 16 years ago, when he was commanding a unit that I was sent to check up on. Well, he is checking up on me now—and he is quite right to hold me to account for my words, as I was sent to hold him to account for his actions back then. He is absolutely right. I know that his bedtime reading is the US army field manual: the first words are “Every day, do one thing to improve your defensive position.”