Wales Bill

Debate between Nia Griffith and Jonathan Edwards

Tuesday 5th July 2016 Commons Chamber

[Jonathan Edwards]

The powers as envisaged do not involve the complete block grant. The block grant—the total money available to Wales—will not change on day one. The only issue of contention is the fiscal framework; I have been making that point. The devolution of the fiscal power itself is not an issue in terms of making Wales poorer on day one.

There is also a technical reason why we should be fully devolving income tax powers. It is far more difficult to create a fair fiscal framework to accompany the partial devolution of income tax as opposed to full devolution. The result of this would be to enable future Welsh Governments to continue to avoid responsibility for their mistakes. In the interests of transparency, accountability and—critically—incentivisation, I hope even at this late stage that the UK Government will accept my new clause 3.

A key element of ensuring that the devolution of income tax is devolved successfully is the empowerment of the National Assembly to set income tax thresholds. New clause 2 aims to achieve this objective and I will press it to a vote on the second day of Committee, with the Chair’s permission. If we have time, I would also like to press new clause 3. We will discuss these new clauses on Monday.

New clause 2 is of vital importance as we embark on the journey of devolving income tax powers. The setting of thresholds is a key component of being able to use those powers based on domestic considerations. The Welsh economy in comparison to other parts of the UK is, regrettably, currently a lower-wage economy, a concern raised by Labour colleagues. New clause 2 would enable the National Assembly ultimately to determine the number of income tax thresholds and the levels at which they are set, including, critically, the basic rate. That freedom would enable the Finance Minister of the Welsh Government, whoever he or she may be, to set innovative income tax structures aimed at maximising revenues for the Welsh Exchequer to invest in Welsh public services, but also to encourage wealth creation and encourage investment.

It has been a consistent policy of the current Chancellor to increase personal allowances—in other words to increase the rate at which people begin paying income tax. Brexit may lead to a radical reversal of this policy in the coming months and years by the next Chancellor as revenues reduce. However, the key point is that as long as the ability to set personal allowances is reserved to London and Wales has a low-wage economy, decisions by Chancellors here could have a significant impact on the revenue available to invest in Welsh public services.

It really is all or nothing when it comes to the devolution of income tax and, as someone who supports making the Welsh Government fiscally responsible, I very much hope that the UK Government decide to support the former. Diolch yn fawr iawn.

[Nia Griffith]

I shall speak to several amendments, in particular amendment 11, which provides that income tax powers may not be devolved to the Welsh Assembly until a fiscal framework has been approved by both Houses of Parliament and the Welsh Assembly.

We have always said that a fiscal framework must ensure that Wales is not disadvantaged by taking on the devolution of some income tax powers. In the wake of the EU referendum result, it is all the more urgent that the Government develop a coherent and redistributory regional funding strategy not just for Wales, but for the whole of the UK.

The EU uses specific criteria for designating the areas that should receive structural funds by comparing the income of an area with the EU average. Areas in Wales such as the valleys and west Wales have benefited because they have a GDP that is less than 75% of the EU average, as has Cornwall, and many other areas have benefited because their GDP is between 75% and 90% of the EU average, including south Yorkshire and Merseyside. It is, broadly speaking, a needs-based system. As Members across the House will remember, Holtham recommended that funding for Wales should be based on a needs-based formula. However, a sophisticated formula would take time to develop.

It is simply unacceptable for Wales to accept the devolution of income tax without an order in both Houses and the consent of the Welsh Assembly, because those measures would give elected Members the chance to discuss the funding and the fiscal framework so that we do not see a cut to our funding and then get told to make up the rest by increasing income tax.

Wales Bill

Debate between Nia Griffith and Jonathan Edwards

Tuesday 14th June 2016 Commons Chamber

[Nia Griffith]

The Secretary of State has told us that he will clarify that, so we will know whether that will be possible. I understand from what he has said today that it is very unlikely, because he said it was about people who can vote, not the system itself, but we await clarification from him to know where we are going.

The Bill is designed to strengthen and streamline the current devolution settlement. For example, clause 18 allows the Assembly to implement European Union legislation directly where it relates to devolved matters. That is a sensible development, and one that I sincerely hope does not become redundant by the time the Bill goes into Committee after the referendum recess.

The biggest structural change in the Bill is the move to a reserved powers model, as recommended by the Silk commission. As Silk said, that should allow the Assembly to legislate

“with greater confidence and with greater regard to the purpose of the legislation, rather than being constrained by uncertainty”.

That change will bring greater clarity to our devolution settlement and, if the Government get the Bill right, it should result in fewer cases being taken to the Supreme Court. Too much public money has been spent on such manoeuvres.

I welcome the important statement on the permanence of the Assembly and of Welsh government in clause 1, and the inclusion of the Sewel convention that the UK Parliament will seek consent from the Assembly before legislating on devolved subjects. This recognises that just 17 years since the process of devolution began, the Assembly has become a fundamental part of our constitutional landscape. In 2011 the Welsh people voted for the Assembly to have full law-making powers, an important sign of confidence in the institution. Together with this Parliament, the Assembly should now be recognised as one of two significant legislatures that represent the people of Wales.

It was the Assembly’s ability to pass laws in devolved areas that the draft Bill put at risk in the most unnecessary and short-sighted way. It is a simple fact that as a law-making body, the Assembly must have the ability to change the law, but the draft Bill would have required it to pass a number of necessity tests before being able to amend the civil or criminal law. In the words of David Melding, the Conservative Chair of the Assembly’s Constitution Committee, these tests would have created

“an atmosphere of profound uncertainty”.

He went on to say:

“Taken to extremes, the very exercise of the legislative function could be compromised.”

I am pleased that the Government have seen sense and removed these tests so that the Assembly can amend the law when it needs to, but there are other tests that I will return to later.

The removal of the necessity tests means that a distinct body of Welsh law will continue to grow over time, a fact that poses a challenge to the single legal jurisdiction of England and Wales. We understand that the justice impact assessments outlined in clause 10 are intended to address this point, but a more long-term solution may need to be found at some point in the future. We trust that the working group consisting of the Ministry of Justice, the Lord Chief Justice and the Welsh Government will keep this issue under review.

On the areas of the Bill that require more work, I want to deal with the reservations, the necessity tests, and the devolution of income tax. It was a common theme in the response to the draft Bill that the list of reservations was far too long. Even the Secretary of State’s predecessor expressed surprise at the number of reservations—an unusual admission, given that it was his Bill. This rather suggested that there was a lack of a clear rationale for the compilation of that list. I note that the list of reservations in this Bill is very slightly shorter but it still runs to 34 pages, and the justification for reserving some subjects is far from clear.

The root of the problem with the reservations in the draft Bill was that the Wales Office allowed Whitehall to have free rein in deciding which areas it was willing to devolve, rather than adopting the principled process that the Silk commission recommended. In its report on the draft Bill, the Welsh Affairs Committee said that Whitehall Departments should be given

“clear guidance about the questions they should ask themselves before deciding whether or not to reserve a power”,

and that this guidance

“must be published prior to the publication of the Bill, so that the final list of reservations can be assessed against the criteria given.”

It is regrettable that no such fresh guidance has been published, which would allow us to decide whether the list of reservations has been drafted with clear criteria in mind.

In response to the Select Committee’s report, the Secretary of State said:

“The explanatory notes that accompany the Bill provide a clear rationale for each reservation included in the list.”

I am afraid that this is not the case. The justifications offered in the explanatory notes are patchy at best. Most just state what is reserved, without explaining why. We will consider the list in more detail as the Bill proceeds, but the Secretary of State must be ready to justify each of the reservations and to present a rational basis for the final list.

It is already clear that some of the reservations are unjustified. The decision to create a special category of reserved trust ports is one example. This means in practice that control of every Welsh port except Milford Haven will be devolved to the Assembly. The Government have presented no sensible justification for this, or for the turnover requirement in clause 31, based on the Ports Act 1991. As the Bill stands, ports that meet an annual turnover requirement of £14.3 million or more remain under the control of the UK Government, while powers over those with a smaller turnover would be transferred to Welsh Ministers. This seems to create a perverse incentive, because if the Welsh Government foster economic development in smaller ports, which significantly increase their turnover as a consequence, the Welsh Government could find that they lose control over those ports.

In the absence of an explanation, we can only assume that the Government want to keep control of the most profitable ports, with a view possibly to privatising them in future, as indeed the Government considered doing in 2011. Strange, is it not, that this annual turnover is the same threshold above which ports can be privatised under the 1991 Act? Previous privatisation proposals have raised serious concerns about asset-stripping by speculators and the fragmentation of ports, and these dangers would be just as real in the case of Milford Haven.

On the necessity tests, I am pleased that the most problematic of these, relating to civil and criminal law, have been removed from the Bill. This has made the Bill markedly clearer and more workable than its predecessor. However, two necessity tests remain in clause 3 and in paragraph 1 of new schedule 7B. As many witnesses noted during the Welsh Affairs Committee’s inquiry into the draft Bill, the problem with these tests is the uncertainty surrounding the word “necessity”. A representative from the Law Society described it as certainly not a term that is as well understood by lawyers as a concept, which raises the potential of legislation being challenged not just in the Supreme Court, but in the course of other civil and criminal proceedings. Given these very real concerns, would it not be preferable to ditch the necessity tests entirely and retain the wording in the Government of Wales Act 2006, which avoids invoking this legally difficult concept?

On the ministerial consents, we welcome the simplified system proposed in the Bill, but the Government could go further. The Welsh Affairs Committee has recommended introducing a 60-day time limit for consent to be given or refused. A change to this effect would give greater confidence and I urge the Government to consider adopting it in law.

Finally, on income tax, the current situation is that the Welsh people would have to support the devolution of income tax in a referendum before the powers could be transferred to the Assembly. This Bill removes that requirement, meaning that the Secretary of State could devolve income tax powers via an Order in Council, without the Assembly even having to agree to it. That cannot be right. Allowing the Assembly to levy taxes is a very significant constitutional development, and one which should not take place without a clear democratic decision, so we are asking the Secretary of State to consider amending the Bill to require the Assembly to agree to the devolution of tax powers before they are devolved.

[Jonathan Edwards]

The shadow Secretary of State for Wales will be aware of the comments of the shadow Secretary of State for Scotland, who said on the BBC on 9 November 2015, on the Scotland Bill, which gave full income tax powers to Scotland:

“When this Bill becomes law, it will present the Scottish Parliament with the opportunity to make Scotland the fairest nation on earth.”

I assume that that would be an objective for the hon. Lady and her party. Why, therefore, is she dithering about giving her colleagues in the Assembly the same powers as Scotland to achieve that objective?

[Nia Griffith]

It comes as no surprise that an intervention from the hon. Gentleman focuses on his party’s determination to see Wales become an independent state, regardless of the economic consequences. As I have just explained, it is crucial to give the Assembly the opportunity to negotiate a proper, fair fiscal framework with a “no detriment” principle before it accepts responsibility for income tax. That opportunity is extremely important.

Draft Wales Bill (Morning sitting)

Debate between Nia Griffith and Jonathan Edwards

Wednesday 3rd February 2016 General Committees

[Nia Griffith]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Owen.

The draft Wales Bill has understandably led to lively debate since it was published in October. I asked the Secretary of State to convene this Committee so that Members could be part of that debate, and to scrutinise the draft Bill before a new version is presented to the House. The draft Bill is the end product of some five years of work including the Silk Commission, the St David’s day process, and the Government’s White Paper. We expected a draft Bill that was worthy of the years of work that led up to it—a landmark constitutional moment giving more powers to Wales. Instead, we have a shambles of a draft Bill that has been criticised by academics, trade unions, lawyers, the Assembly’s Presiding Officer, the Church in Wales, the Equality and Human Rights Commission, the Welsh Language Society and every party in the Assembly, including the Welsh Conservatives. In fact, when the Assembly’s Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee launched its inquiry on the draft Bill, it was left in the unprecedented situation where practically no one supported it.

A new report by University College London and the Wales Governance Centre describes the draft Bill as

“constricting, clunky, inequitable and constitutionally short-sighted.”

In plain English, it is junk. The Secretary of State should be ashamed that he has presented such a weak and unworkable draft Bill because the people of Wales deserve better.

Labour Members support a move to a reserved powers model, which Silk recommended, and we support the new powers proposed in the Bill on energy, transport and the Assembly’s own affairs. Labour set up the Assembly and gave it greater powers through the Government of Wales Act 2006 and the 2011 referendum. We support the Assembly’s having more powers, and that is exactly why we will not support this Bill unless it is radically amended.

[Jonathan Edwards]

I congratulate the hon. Lady on her appointment as shadow Secretary of State. I am absolutely delighted by that appointment, but can she explain why, as the Secretary of State said, the biggest roadblock during the St David’s day process was the Labour party? I understand that she was not in those negotiations, but is she entirely happy with the position taken by her predecessor?

[Nia Griffith]

Today’s subject is the Bill before us, and we want a Bill that actually works, so that is what we need to scrutinise now; that is what we need to be looking at.

Just last year, the Secretary of State said:

“I want to establish a clear devolution settlement for Wales which stands the test of time.”—[Official Report, 27 February 2015; Vol. 593, c. 35WS.]

Elsewhere, he referred to

“a clear, robust and lasting devolution settlement”.

We have only to take one look at this Bill and it is plain that he has completely failed to do that. The Bill as drafted is not clear. It does not meet the Secretary of State’s stated aims. Those are not just my words; they are also those of the Assembly’s Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee, chaired, incidentally, by a Conservative Assembly Member. Its inquiry heard

“grave concerns about the complexity of the draft Bill”

from the

“overwhelming majority of…consultees and witnesses”.

It heard

“a clear, unanimous voice from legal experts and practitioners that the complexities of this Bill will lead to references to the Supreme Court.”

This Government have been particularly trigger happy in taking the Assembly to court ever since it has had primary law-making powers. Those cases cost the taxpayer tens of thousands of pounds and lead to long delays before the Assembly’s laws come into force.