Domestic Infrastructure: Chinese Ownership

Debate between Lord Young of Cookham and Baroness Anelay of St Johns

Wednesday 23rd January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the risks arising from Chinese ownership of technologies and platforms critical to the domestic infrastructure of the United Kingdom.

[Lord Young of Cookham (Con)]

My Lords, the Government take seriously any national security risks arising from the ownership of infrastructure assets and systems, and assess those risks on a case-by-case basis, irrespective of their origin. On 24 July 2018, the Government published the National Security and Investment White Paper, which consulted on reforms to powers to scrutinise investment for the purposes of protecting national security. The Government are now considering carefully the response to that consultation and will respond in due course.

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns (Con)]

My Lords, while thanking my noble friend for his considered Answer, I point out that superfast 5G has great potential for our economy. It could be worth £200 billion over the next decade. The world leader in 5G is Huawei, but our closest security allies—Australia, New Zealand and the US—have already taken steps to restrict access to Huawei technology on the grounds of national security. Will we follow suit speedily? If not, why not?

[Lord Young of Cookham]

I am grateful to my noble friend, who has drawn attention to the need to get the balance right. America has banned Huawei from federal networks. We do not plan to go as far as that. I think America has a different approach from this country to international trade and inward investment, particularly under its “America first” policy. Of course, it has particular difficulties with China at the moment. We want to get the balance right and to have the best digital infrastructure we can, with up-to-date equipment to promote growth and inward investment, but we do not want to compromise national security. Huawei is precluded from taking part in certain sensitive parts of our infrastructure—lawful intercept, for example—and in other cases its equipment is interposed between equipment from other firms to mitigate risks. We keep the balance under review, but I think we have it about right.