Holding the Line Against Tyranny and Anarchy (Constitution Committee Report) Debate
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(3 weeks ago)
Lords Chamber
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
My Lords, I declare my interest as the director of the Free Speech Union.
One of the key findings of this excellent report is summarised as follows:
“Public confidence in the judiciary is vital for trust in the fair administration of justice. This requires that judges make decisions independently of bias and external influence, and that they are perceived to do so. However, the committee stated confidence was being increasingly challenged by political rhetoric that criticised the judiciary, and this was being amplified on social media”.
This is the aspect of the report I would like to talk about today: what is legitimate and illegitimate criticism of the judiciary, particularly the senior judiciary?
In chapter 4 of the report, in the section headed “Attacks on judges and the judiciary”, it rightly says that:
“The judiciary, as with any other state institution, should not be immune from scrutiny or criticism”.
The report goes on to say that, while attacks on judgments are fair game, attacks on judges are not. It particularly condemns attacks that claim a decision is based on a judge’s political views or bias. The Lady Chief Justice is quoted in the report as singling out
“newspaper articles about ‘outrageous judicial overreach’”,
and those which used the words “lefty” and “liberal”, and described decisions as “crazy”. The implication is that such attacks, which attribute political bias to judges, originate for the most part with the populist right, not the left. Frances Gibb is quoted in the report, as saying that, every so often,
“‘you get an eruption—often in the tabloid press—against judges’”.
However, it scarcely needs pointing that such attacks come from both sides of the political divide. I am thinking in particular of the attacks on the Supreme Court for the decision it made in the For Women Scotland case. Maggie Chapman, a Green MSP, who was the deputy convenor of Holyrood’s equalities committee at the time, accused the Supreme Court justices of “bigotry, prejudice and hatred”. We heard similar criticisms, if not quite so extreme, from Stonewall, Consortium LGBT and the Good Law Project. More recently, following this week’s judgment in the case against Associated Newspapers, the Duke of Sussex and the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, issued a joint statement attacking Justice Nicklin and accusing him of a “complete and obvious whitewash”, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, pointed out.
I share the report’s view that, if the public are to maintain confidence in judges and the judiciary, there should be no perception of political bias. However, are such accusations always based, in the words of the report, on
“inappropriate, and often inaccurate, public criticism by politicians and journalists”
based on misinformation? Last year, Robert Jenrick MP, then the shadow Justice Minister, pointed out that over 30 immigration judges have links to open borders charities. He pointed out that one serving judge openly celebrated on social media the defeat of the last Government’s Rwanda plan. Surely this activity has played a part—perhaps a small one, but a part none the less—in the perception of bias in the decisions of the Upper Tribunal.
More pernicious are the requirements, as part of the process for selecting members of the senior judiciary, that applicants affirm their support for diversity and inclusion. In the Judicial Skills and Abilities Framework, against which the Judicial Appointments Commission assesses applicants, one of the effective working criteria is:
“Takes an inclusive approach to those with differences from themselves … Is able and willing to challenge inappropriate behaviour by others”.
Under leadership skills, it says applicants are expected to:
“Ensure an inclusive culture for all, irrespective of background”.
I am sure most noble Lords do not regard such requirements as political, but I remind them that Reform UK, for all its recent setbacks, is still leading in the polls. I suspect that many supporters of that party would regard these criteria as political. Do we not want supporters of right-wing parties to have confidence in judges and the judiciary?
The commitment that applicants for Silk are required to make is stronger still. The KC Competency Framework has five competencies. Competency D—
“Diversity action and understanding”—
requires that an applicant:
“Demonstrates an understanding of diversity and cultural issues, respects the needs and cultural wishes of others and is proactive in addressing the needs of people from all backgrounds”.
The indicators include:
“Takes positive action to promote diversity and equality of opportunity … Confronts discrimination and prejudice when observed in others; does not let it pass unchecked … Acts as a role model for others in handling diversity and cultural issues.
Is there not a risk that these requirements will contribute to the perception of bias, whether accurate or not? Take the requirement that applicants for Silk must take positive action to promote diversity. To some, that will sound like code for “take positive action to promote people who are not white men”.
The requirement to respect
“the needs and cultural wishes of others”
is, I submit, something of an ideological litmus test, requiring those wishing to take Silk to affirm their alignment with the principles of equity, diversity and inclusion. Note: it asks applicants not simply to tolerate the cultural wishes of others—which may be a wish that women should cover their heads—but to respect them.
It is worth bearing in mind that the latest batch of High Court appointments all took Silk before they were appointed. They all passed this ideological litmus test. Is it not wanting to have your cake and eat it to, on the one hand, insist that members of the senior judiciary should affirm their commitment to EDI at various points as they clamber the judicial pyramid—a contested ideology, I think it is fair to say—and, on the other, condemn journalists and politicians for launching political attacks on senior judges?
In 2024 the Bar Standards Board consulted about introducing a new duty to promote EDI in its code of conduct. That was rightly condemned by a broad coalition within the legal profession, including the Law Society. Surely the same requirement has no more place in the KC Competency Framework than it does in the BSB’s code of conduct. I was, I am afraid, disappointed that the report did not recommend its removal from the KC framework as well as its removal from the Judicial Skills and Abilities Framework.
I share the concerns of the report that critics of judges, and the senior judiciary in particular, should play the ball and not the man, but if we want to achieve that ambition, we have to stop insisting that the man affirm his commitment to a politically contested ideology.