Illegal Migration Bill

Debate between Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th May 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

With great respect, the noble Baroness is wrong. The Human Rights Act did not incorporate the convention. Can I just finish what I was saying? It took certain articles of the convention and reproduced them in a schedule to the Act of Parliament. That is not incorporating the convention; it is reproducing certain articles of it in the Human Rights Act. The point is not relevant to today but, if I am going to be interrupted on a point of law, at least let it be right. One has only to look at Schedule 1 to the Human Rights Act to see what that Act did.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

Before the noble Lord sits down, I hesitate to butt into this very exciting conversation between some great legal minds. I will of course pore over it in Hansard tomorrow. The point about courts saying “Did the Government mean this or that?” is that we are passing very bad laws that are not explicit—that is the fault of the Government—and this will be one of them.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I entirely agree with the noble Baroness that we should pass clear legislation. I think she used the word “exciting” to describe lawyers.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

It was a joke.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

That is the first time I have heard the word used. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, used the word “interesting”, which is at least better than “expensive”, which is the usual word used. On that, perhaps I should sit down.

Public Order Bill

Debate between Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb

Consideration of Commons amendments
Tuesday 14th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I hope I do not cause offence here, but I disagree strongly with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. I shall give the House a few words that would be more than minor but less than significant: it could be “reasonable”, “measured, “limited” or “tolerable”. There are all sorts of stages between “more than minor” and “significant”. As a veteran protester, I have probably passed quite a few red lines in the past, although I have never committed violence—so far.

I turn to Motion A1. Obviously I am upset, along with other noble Lords, I hope, at the fact that the other place immediately whips out all our good work and indeed our hard work. We spend time reading the Bill and thinking about it, which obviously the majority of people in the other place do not; they simply do whatever the Government tell them. I feel that the Government are trying to stop protest of virtually every kind—almost any protest imaginable—and that is so deeply oppressive that I could not possibly support it, so I wholeheartedly support Motion A1.

If the House will indulge me, I will mention the other two Motions as well so that I speak only once. I am horrified by Motion B2. I regret that Labour feels it cannot support Motion B1 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. Sitting here, I have been thinking that I would vote against Motion B2, but that is probably too difficult. I do not even think I can abstain, so I think I am going to vote for it—but it will be through gritted teeth as it goes against all my libertarian views, and I am really annoyed with Labour for putting it in.

To finish on an upbeat note, there is Motion C. The Government make endless bad decisions. We are wallowing in an ocean of bad decisions nationally because of this Government, and some extremely unpleasant scenarios, with poverty and deprivation, are playing out because of them. But here they have done the right thing. It is incredible that the Government have come back with not just something that we generally asked for but with a slightly improved version of the Lords amendment, which I have to thank them for and say “Well done”—if that does not sound too patronising, or matronising. It is a win for civil liberties and the right of the public to be informed about protest and dissent.

On a final note, I have been saying that I am the mother of a journalist. That is a slight twist of the truth, because actually I am the mother of an editor, and I just know that she will be absolutely delighted with what the Government have done today.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I declare an interest: I generally pay my mortgage by debating the difference between “significant” and “more than minor”, so I am on very familiar territory.

The problem with the word “significant” is this: what is the opposite of significant? It is insignificant. There is therefore a constant debate in the courts when something, generally a contract, is said to be significant. Does it mean substantial—that is, quite a lot—or does it mean not insignificant, in other words more than de minimis? That is the problem with a word such as “significant”. For those reasons, I respectfully endorse the approach of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead. We need a test here that is easy to apply.

Elsewhere in the law, we have the concept of significant risk. Of course, that is even more difficult, because there you are talking about risk—something that might happen—whereas here, in Motion 1A, we are talking about something that has happened or is happening. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, asked what the difference was between “more than minor” and “significant”. In the Court of Appeal case of R v Lang, Lady Justice Rose, who is now in the Supreme Court, said in her judgment:

“The risk identified must be significant. This is a higher threshold than mere possibility of occurrence”—


that is, a risk case—

“and in our view can be taken to mean … ‘noteworthy, of considerable amount or importance’”.

Even in that definition, there is a difference, I would suggest, between “noteworthy” and “of considerable amount”—and that is in the context of a risk, not something that is actually happening.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb

Report stage
Thursday 31st March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I rise not to add any contribution on the legal side of things but just to add a little moral outrage, because this is an injustice. We all understand, I think, that the lack of public funding for bereaved families at inquests and inquiries just compounds their suffering. It is also very inefficient, because the point of having competent lawyers in court is that they can assist the court in the administration of justice. They can navigate complex issues of fact and law, which means that a just decision can be reached. It also provides the public with a huge service, because we all have to have confidence in the state to keep us safe in its custody and control.

I admit that it is hard when we have a Government such as this, but even so, I think we all understand that every death in police custody, prisons, mental health institutions or any other setting must be fully exposed through the inquest system, and this cannot be done without legal representation for bereaved parties. Without public funding it is actually a tax on bereaved families. It is time for your Lordships’ House to end this injustice by convincing the Government that they have to allow this amendment through.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for their contributions to this short debate. I am conscious that the fact that the debate has been relatively short is not a reflection of the importance of the issue. On the contrary, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, said, this is a long-running issue. It is not quite as long- running as the coronial office, but it has been before the House before and doubtless it will be again.

I start by assuring the House that the Government believe that bereaved families should be at the heart of any inquest process, but we consider that, although there are some exceptions, which I will come to, legal representation and legal aid are not required for the vast majority of inquests. As I said on the previous group, the coroner’s investigation is a relatively narrow-scope inquiry to determine who the deceased was and how, when and where they died. In my meeting with Inquest last week, we obviously discussed the availability of legal aid for inquests. Again, I should put on record that although there are undoubtedly areas where Inquest would like the Government to go further, we had a productive and useful conversation.

Amendments 25, 26 and 27 all seek to expand access to legal aid at inquests. However, the amendments would also make that access to legal aid entirely non-means-tested. That would lead to significant and potentially open-ended cost to the taxpayer. It would also go against the principle of targeting legal aid at those who need it most, because these amendments would provide public funding for those who could, in fact, afford the cost themselves. Over and above that, I am not persuaded, with respect to my former and current colleagues, that having more lawyers at an inquest will provide an improved experience for the bereaved. Indeed, it could have the unintended consequence of turning an inquisitorial event into a complex defensive case, which would likely prolong the distress of bereaved families.

We do, of course, recognise that bereaved families need support and guidance. We have been working on several measures to make inquests more sympathetic to the needs of bereaved people. That includes publishing new guidance on the coroner service for bereaved families, engaging with the chief coroner on training for coroners and developing a protocol. I think this goes to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, that, where the state is represented, the protocol now is that the state will consider the number of lawyers instructed, so as to support the underlying inquisitorial approach to inquests.

I turn to the availability of legal aid. First, legal help is available under the legal aid scheme, subject to a means and merits test, which bereaved families can access if they require advice and assistance. Further, where certain criteria are met, legal aid for legal representation may be available under the exceptional case funding scheme. Where these criteria are met, we are of the view that that process should be as straightforward as possible. Therefore, as of January this year, there is no means test for an exceptional case funding application in relation to representation at an inquest or for legal help at an inquest where representation is granted.

Thirdly, we considered our approach to initial access to legal help at inquests in our recently published Legal Aid Means Test Review. This is something of an intimidating document, but I invite interested noble Lords to have a look at it. There, we have proposed to remove the means test for legal help in relation to inquests which relate to a possible breach of rights under the ECHR—it is generally Article 2, but not exclusively—or where there is likely to be significant wider public interest in the individual being represented at the inquest. We published that review on 15 March; a full consultation is currently open and will close on 7 June.

For those reasons, which go both to the nature of the inquest and what the Government are currently doing in this area, I invite the noble Lord who is proposing the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, to withdraw them.

Prisoners: Imprisonment for Public Protection Sentences

Debate between Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb

Tuesday 8th March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I think the link between humanity and effectiveness might lie beyond a short answer to a question. What I can say is that quick fixes—such as retrospectively abolishing the IPP sentence or resentencing IPP offenders—would expose the public to unacceptable risk. We have to recognise that people were given IPP sentences because they were considered dangerous. Having said that, we are working towards making sure that all prisoners subject to an IPP sentence are properly reviewed and their sentences are progressed.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

One cannot exactly call this a quick fix. The review was announced by the then Prime Minister in July 2011 and has taken until now—nearly 11 years. Why has it taken so long to even start to get to the point where we are righting this egregious injustice?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, “egregious injustice” is probably the right phrase. What came out in the debates on the police Bill was a recognition by those who proposed the IPP sentence in the first place that it was a mistake. I do not want to look back. We have made the first moves towards a proper automatic referral system. We will be publishing the action plan once we get the response of the Justice Committee. I hope that across the House we can work together to resolve this issue.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Debate between Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Report stage
Monday 28th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

The Greens support the amendment too.

[The Paliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for proposing the new clause. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said that it was a short one; I respectfully agree, and hope that I can be brief in response without any discourtesy to the noble and learned Lord or, indeed, the other proposers of the clause. One point in his speech on which I think the whole House agreed was when he reminded us that, whatever the question, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will always be able to think of an answer.

Turning to the subject matter of the amendment and the proposed new clause, I first underline what was said by my noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford as to the Government’s commitment to their international legal obligations flowing from the refugee convention. Not only is it our intention to continue to comply with all of the legal obligations under that convention but we consider that this legislation does precisely that.

Our starting point is that the provisions of the Bill are compliant with the refugee convention but, none the less, the new clause is not something that I can support. Let me set out why.

The refugee convention, as I have said before, and effectively by design, leaves certain terms and concepts open to a degree of interpretation. That is an important feature of international instruments such as the refugee convention, allowing it not only to stand the test of time—some might say that it could now usefully be reviewed, but that is a separate point—but, more importantly, to be applied in and across many jurisdictions with differing legal systems. Necessarily, therefore, there is then a need to ascribe meaning to the terms of the convention at a domestic level. That meaning is determined by each signatory to the refugee convention in accordance with the principles of the Vienna convention, taking a good faith interpretation in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the language used in the convention.

Against that background, I suggest that it is absolutely right that Parliament may pass legislation setting out how the UK interprets the refugee convention and the UK’s obligations under it. Having a clear framework of definitions, and setting out unambiguously the key principles, promotes clarity and consistency in how decisions are made; as I have said in previous debates, that is a desirable approach. The mischief that I see in this amendment is that it would risk undermining the clarity and certainty that we are trying to create by effectively giving the courts a chance to look behind the interpretation agreed by Parliament in primary legislation when that interpretation is then applied through policy and subsequent decisions.

On the one hand, we want to give the pen to Parliament, so to speak, to set out a clear understanding and interpretation of the convention; Part 2 of the Bill is very clear as to our intentions in this respect. However, I suggest that this amendment would afford the courts an opportunity to come to a different understanding when looking at the policies and practices which put that system into effect. Of course, I accept that it will be for the courts to interpret the legislation once enacted, and I do not disagree that the courts have a role in overseeing whether policies or decisions comply with the interpretation of the convention as set out in the Bill; that is a given. But it is Parliament’s interpretation that is key here. It is not for the court to set out its own, potentially conflicting interpretation of the refugee convention and the obligations under it.

Therefore, far from creating a certain and consistent approach, this promotes uncertainty with policies and decisions being potentially judged against differing interpretations. If we are content, as I suggest we should be, that Parliament is legislating in compliance with the approach open to all state parties under the Vienna convention—that is, affording a good faith interpretation to the refugee convention—then this clause is not only unnecessary but promotes confusion and uncertainty for all those seeking to apply to, and comply with, the asylum system.

It would also be unusual to put in primary legislation the statement that Parliament, when legislating, is complying with its international obligations. International conventions cover a wide area of legislation, and if we did so here it could create questions as to why we did not do so in other statutes and why other statutes do not provide the same assurances.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, as alerted by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, mentioned Section 2 of the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993. That already sets out the primacy of the refugee convention in domestic law. I will repeat what it says:

“Nothing in the immigration rules (within the meaning of the 1971 Act) shall lay down any practice which would be contrary to the Convention.”


Accordingly, if the aim of this proposed new clause is that the policies implemented under Part 2 of this Bill through the rules or connected guidance are meant to be compatible, and not incompatible, with the refugee convention, as interpreted by Parliament in this Bill, that can already be challenged by way of Section 2 of the 1993 Act. Our policies and decision-making will continue to be made in accordance with the Immigration Rules or published guidance.

What, therefore, would this proposed new clause add? My concern is that it adds a means for the court to question the interpretation given by Parliament to the refugee convention. I suggest respectfully that this would be contrary to a fundamental purpose of this Bill: for Parliament to define the nature of our obligations under the refugee convention while remaining compliant with those obligations. The proposed new clause potentially leaves the nature of obligations and terms under the convention open to the interpretation of the courts, removing the certainty that we are trying to achieve.

To put it in two sentences, if the aim is to make sure that the Immigration Rules and guidance are compliant with the refugee convention, that is already done under the 1993 Act. If the aim is any more than that, I respectfully suggest that it trespasses on a fundamental purpose of this Bill: that Parliament, and not the courts, should interpret how the UK implements the refugee convention. For those reasons, I respectfully invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw the amendment.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Debate between Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Thursday 10th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

Of course we have considered the statutory guidance, not least because it comes from the Home Department and was issued this month. With great respect, we do think they are compatible. We do not see any contradiction between the aims of the statutory guidance under the 2015 Act and what we are proposing here. As to who will be served with a notice, individuals who will be served with a slavery and trafficking information notice are those who have previously made a human rights or protection claim in respect of removal or refusal of entry. They are therefore potentially subject to removal action.

The noble Lords, Lord Coaker and Lord Alton, asked: why are we doing this? I think that was then refined to: why are we doing this now? That is pretty simple to state. As I have said, we want to identify genuine victims of modern slavery or trafficking within this group as quickly as possible so that they receive both protection from removal and access to the support given during the recovery period.

This may not be the best form of providing statistics, but the number of those detained in the UK following immigration offences in 2020 was obviously affected by the pandemic. However, even prior to this there was a clear rise in the number of referrals to the national referral mechanism, from 3%—501—in 2017 to 16%—1,767—in 2019. In 2019, only a small proportion, about 1%, of individuals detained in the UK following an immigration offence who made a national referral mechanism referral were returned. We published a report last year providing data on some of the concerns we are seeking to address through the Bill and outlining pressures in the system and where referrals of modern slavery are coming from. The reports are available on the government website but, to make it simpler, I will write to the noble Lords, Lord Coaker and Lord Alton, with a copy available, with the URL so they can find the relevant material.

I suggest it is right that we reduce the opportunities to misuse the system for immigration purposes and improve the efficiency of the processes, targeting resources where they are most needed to help victims recover from exploitation and rebuild their lives. We want to address concerns that some referrals are being made intentionally late in the process, to frustrate immigration action and divert resources away from legitimate claimants. It is not right that foreign criminals subject to deportation and those who have absolutely no right to remain in the UK can seek to delay their removal by waiting until the very last minute before raising new claims or putting in endless evidence or information relating to their status in the UK. So what Clauses 57 and 58 seek to do is on the one hand ensure that vulnerable victims receive appropriate and timely support, and on the other hand enable investigative and enforcement activities to take place with reasonable dispatch.

I should point out—this did not feature too much in the debate—that Clauses 57 and 58 are underpinned by access to legal advice, under Clauses 65 and 66, to help individuals understand whether they are a potential victim of modern slavery or human trafficking, and to support a referral into the national referral mechanism if that is the case. As I have said before, a constant theme, particularly in modern slavery measures within the Bill, is that decisions are made on a case-by-case basis, taking a needs-based approach. Therefore, turning to Amendments 151D, 152 and 155, it would be wrong in principle to create a carve-out for any one group of individuals, and to create a two-tiered system based either on age or the type of exploitation claimed. I am sure that this is not the intention of those moving the amendments, but, in the real world, which at some point we must think about, it could incentivise individuals to provide falsified information regarding their age or to put forward falsified referrals regarding timings or type of exploitation to delay removal action.

It was interesting, in the course of what was, with respect, a very forceful speech supporting his amendment, that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, referred to 12 or 13 year-olds and not, for example, to a 17 and a half year-old. When it comes to children, if we define children as all under-18s, the approach that we want to take is to ensure that decision-makers have the flexibility to approach the claims of all children of different ages and maturities appropriately, and therefore I suggest that a blanket approach is inappropriate.

By introducing a statutory requirement to provide information before a specified date—we are not talking about neat files here—we hope to identify those victims at the earliest opportunity. Clauses 57 and 58 have safeguards built in, and I assure in particular the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, that, when considering the “reasonable grounds” decision, the decision-makers in the SCA are already well experienced in taking into account the specific vulnerabilities of children. I also point out to the Committee something that the noble and learned Baroness will know but other noble Lords may have forgotten: namely, that at the “reasonable grounds” stage the threshold is lower for children due to there being no requirement to show means of exploitation. That position will not change.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I have been biting my tongue, but the Minister talked about the real world, and I do not think that this Government have any concept of what exists in the real world. The Minister has heard examples from the real world, given by noble Lords who understand what is going on. It is not appropriate for the Minister to talk about the real world when he is denying the stories that he has heard today.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am not denying any stories. I set out statistics earlier on which were absolutely from the real world, and that is the issue that we are dealing with.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I hope the noble Lord will forgive me if I reply to his points in reverse order. On the second, of course I appreciate that it is a non-exhaustive list. The point I was making is that even a non-exhaustive list is more prescriptive, when it comes to court, than absolute discretion. When you are arguing a case, even if the statute says A, B, C, D, E on a non-exhaustive basis, you are in greater trouble coming along with F, than if the discretion is free-standing. That is the point I was seeking to make.

Of course, my colleagues in the Home Office engage carefully with the commissioner and other entities in the voluntary sector. Ultimately, it is for the Government to decide what legislation to bring before the House.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I want to deal with Urgent Questions again, because the Minister answered a different question from mine. I asked why it was advertised so late. He may not know this, but the Greens are excluded from the usual channels, so we would have no way of knowing.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

At this point, all I can do is pass that on, and I will.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Debate between Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate.

The starting point is that we are no longer members of the European Union and, by extension, the Common European Asylum System. In response to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, these provisions are not a direct response to the case of AH (Algeria). They are about having an opportunity to define clearly and unscramble refugee convention terms following our exit from the EU. It is right that, at this time of legal change, we take the opportunity to reassess the operation of our asylum system and reconsider our approach not only to fundamental policies but to processes, so that we can create a clearer and more accessible system.

The fact is that the development of the asylum system through international conventions, European law, domestic legislation, Immigration Rules and case law has created a complex legal web that can be difficult to understand and apply; that goes for claimants, decision-makers and the courts. I do not propose to use props—I understand that that is not permitted—but, for my own assistance on a later group, I brought a book called, rather laughingly, The Immigration Law Handbook. We consider it a desirable law reform to define clearly key elements of the refugee convention in UK domestic law. In response to my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, that is exactly what we are doing. We want to make the position clearer for everyone, including decision-makers and the courts.

A lot has been said that touches on the same point but, with great respect, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, perhaps put it most forcefully. She used a number of metaphors. Let me respond to them. This is not about tripping anybody up. It is not a sleight of hand; it is difficult to do one of those on the Floor of your Lordships’ House. This is about bringing clear definitions before Parliament and having them all in one place. The central point is this: there is nothing wrong—indeed, I suggest that there is everything right—with the UK, through this Parliament, interpreting its obligations under the refugee convention. That is entirely lawful. I use “lawful” in both its narrow and wide senses. It is lawful in the sense that it is in accordance with the law; it is also lawful in the broader sense of being in accordance with the political or constitutional principle that we call the rule of law. Further, it is in accordance with the Vienna convention. Everything we are doing complies fully with all our international obligations, including the refugee convention and the European Convention on Human Rights. I will come back to the question that the noble Baroness asked me in that regard a little later.

With respect to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, it is not perverse to use domestic legislation to give effect to and interpret international treaties. I assure the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, that I am not in the business of appeasing the far right; nor am I in the business of deleting obligations under international law. Many of the definitions, which repay careful reading, are very similar to those already used in the UK—for example, those contained in the 2004 qualification directive, which was transposed into UK law via the 2006 regulations.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for his kind words. I assure him that I of course give proper consideration to international reputational impacts, but surely there can be no adverse impact by complying with international law and interpreting treaties in accordance with the Vienna convention.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I am sorry, I missed my moment; I should have spoken as soon as the Minister spoke to me. I did not accuse him of trying to appease the far right. I hope I did not say that—I certainly did not mean to—but I do accuse the Government of it. I know that the Minister did not write this Bill, but that is something I see the Government as guilty of.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I did not take it personally. I agree that I did not write the Bill. It would be a far worse Bill, and the noble Baroness would like it even less, if I had written it. But I replied in that way because I take the view that if I am standing here defending government policy, then I will stand here and defend government policy. I certainly would not defend a government policy which was simply appeasing the far right. So, that is why I replied in those terms. I know that the noble Baroness was not making a personal attack; I did not take it that way.

To finish my point to the noble Lord, Lord Alton—

Social Welfare Law Cases: Legal Aid

Debate between Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb

Tuesday 1st February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, the pilot that I was referring to is a general pilot in relation to social and welfare entitlements. Regarding housing possession cases, as the noble Lord knows, there is a housing possession court duty scheme. We are running a specific focus on that, because there are areas where people are not getting the advice that they need. That was paused during the pandemic because we put a complete halt on repossessions, but we are now looking at the best way to make sure that we get focused housing advice to people who need it, when they need it.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, what was the Government’s original motivation back in 2012? Presumably, it was to save money, which this probably has not done overall. What the Government have done is to throw thousands of the poorest people in the UK into a situation where they cannot find justice.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I am afraid that I cannot assist the House with what the Government’s motivation was in 2012. My motivation is very simple: the rule of law and access to justice. It is as simple as that.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Lords Hansard - part one & Report stage
Wednesday 15th December 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, these amendments follow a discussion in Committee and an undertaking given on Report in the other place in response to amendments tabled by Tom Tugendhat MP, with cross party-support, which sought to raise the maximum penalties for child cruelty offences. We said at that time that we would bring forward proposals for reform as soon as possible.

I pay tribute to Tom Tugendhat and the family of his young constituent, Tony Hudgell, who have campaigned tirelessly for these changes to the law in his name. As a baby, Tony was abused to such an extent by his birth parents that he is now severely disabled. No child should suffer such appalling abuse, especially from those who should love and care for them most. Therefore, it is right to ensure that, in such cases, the punishment fits the crime. I should add that today saw the sentencing of those involved in the tragic death of Star Hobson. I offer my and the Government’s sincere condolences to Star’s friends and family. The violent death of a child as young as Star really is heart-breaking.

Government Amendments 69 and 70 amend Section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 and Section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 respectively to increase the maximum penalties in three circumstances. Those for cruelty to a person under 16 rise from 10 years’ imprisonment to 14 years’ imprisonment; those for causing or allowing the death of a child or vulnerable adult rise from 14 years’ imprisonment to life imprisonment; and, finally, those for causing or allowing a child or vulnerable adult to suffer serious physical harm rise from 10 years’ imprisonment to 14 years’ imprisonment.

Government Amendment 70 also adds the offence of causing or allowing the death of a child or vulnerable adult to Schedule 19 to the Sentencing Act 2020. This is a consequential amendment of Schedule 19 which lists offences where the penalty may be life imprisonment. It means that, if the judge determines that the offender is dangerous and the circumstances of the offence are sufficiently serious, the offender must receive a life sentence. Furthermore, a consequence of increasing the maximum penalty for causing or allowing the death of a child or vulnerable adult to life imprisonment is that offenders sentenced to seven years or more for that offence will now spend two-thirds, rather than half, of the sentence in custody.

I am confident that the House will agree, especially in light of the recent appalling cases, that the courts should, where necessary, have the fullest range of sentencing powers available—I underline that these are new maximum sentences—to deal appropriately with those who abuse children and vulnerable persons. I therefore beg to move Amendment 69.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to rise to support government amendments. There are cases of child abuse and neglect that cannot be adequately punished under the current maximum sentences. It is rare for me to urge more punishment; I always try to focus on rehabilitation, deterrence and restitution, but here I see more punishment as appropriate, simply because protecting a child is our natural human response.

A few years ago, a grave was found in Italy containing a 10,000 year-old skeleton of a tiny baby girl, just a few weeks old. She was buried with what would have been quite precious things: an eagle owl talon, shell pendants and some precious stones. This showed us that, first, 10,000 years ago people cared about their children even when they were of a very young age, and we did not necessarily know that—burials from the Mesolithic period are quite rare—and, secondly, the fact that she was a girl showed that it was an egalitarian society and they did not have our western attitude of women being rather less than men.

There is, however, no deterrent effect required from criminal law because if the only thing stopping someone hurting a child is that it is illegal then there is something deeply wrong with that person. We have an innate reaction to child abusers—a natural hatred towards anyone who would do something so vile. However, that is not to say that every single case of child abuse or neglect is the same, so I am pleased that this is an increase in the maximum sentences and that the Government are not messing around with mandatory minimum sentences.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Report stage
Wednesday 8th December 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, we have considered this. We restricted the new sentence to 16 and 17 year-olds to ensure that only older children who are convicted of this serious offence are given a mandatory life sentence, unless there are exceptional circumstances that mean it is not justified. Of course, exceptional circumstances are not just those relating to the offence but those relating to the offender. There is a precedent for this age distinction. The Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 also uses the age of 16 as a threshold to begin applying minimum sentences for knife-crime offences. So we have considered the point made by the noble and learned Baroness.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I am so sorry, but I do not understand why we are arguing about this. We are all dissatisfied with what the Government are doing, yet none of us can stop it. It is all angels dancing on the head of a pin, as far as I can see. I am really distressed at this and wish that I had spoken to more people and perhaps got some others onside. The Government are making a mistake and that is what the Minister should hear from this debate.

Offenders: Pregnant Women

Debate between Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb

Wednesday 17th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, all new prison officers working within the women’s estate will complete a new module on pregnancy, which is starting in January. We are also developing a two-day course for all staff working directly with pregnant women and mothers separated from young children, and that is part of our implementation strategy for our new policy for pregnant women in prison.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I was going to ask about training, but I was glad to hear that answer. On a different topic—and forgive my ignorance here—within the sentencing guidelines, how much weight is given to the cost to society when a woman who is kept on remand for a short sentence then loses her home and her children, and the children have to go into care? She would have no home when she comes out, so she could not take them back. That is a cost to society. How much weight is given within the sentencing guidelines to that sort of issue?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

It is very important that the implementation of sentencing guidelines is a matter for independent judges and not government Ministers. What I can say is that judges and sentencers of all sorts have to consider the effect of the sentence not only on the person being sentenced but on people for whom they care. That will particularly apply to young children, and in the case of pregnant women it will also apply to the unborn child.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Monday 15th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the various speeches which have been given on these amendments, which, as we have heard, seek in different ways to avoid the release of prisoners on a Friday. Obviously, I understand the distinction between the two, although it is fair to say that they are both aimed at substantially the same point.

The current position is this. Section 23 of the Criminal Justice Act 1961 provides that prisoners whose release dates fall on a weekend or bank holiday should be released on the working day which immediately precedes that weekend or bank holiday. In most cases, that is a Friday, which is why, to make the obvious point, we have “bunching” on Fridays. If one would expect release dates generally to fall over the week, given the law of large numbers, you have Saturday and Sunday pushed back to Friday, plus the occasional bank holiday. We are very aware of and alive to the challenges that this can create in accessing support and services in the community. We are taking steps to mitigate those difficulties; I will turn to those in a moment.

First, however, the amendments seek to reduce releases on a Friday or non-working weekday by either preventing the court setting a sentence length that is likely to lead to release on those days, or by providing greater flexibility for prison governors to avoid Friday releases by giving the discretion to release earlier in the week. I heard what the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, said about the responses given in the other place: that the Minister there was clutching at straws. I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, has set me the challenge to be better than “completely hopeless”. That is a bar I hope to surmount.

I assure the Committee that I am open-minded and have listened very carefully to the debate. While I am sympathetic to the need to tackle this issue, I do not agree that it is necessary to legislate in the way proposed by the amendments, and I will explain why. To do so would either undermine existing sentencing principles by preventing the court passing a sentence which is likely to result in release on a Friday, or it would allow prisoners to be released even earlier from their sentence. Legislation provides that prisoners are released on the working day closest to their statutory release date and we do not believe it is necessary to go further than that.

I will deal with sentencing first. It is not realistic or achievable to require a sentencing court to try to work out on which day of the week an offender would fall to be released and adjust the sentence accordingly to avoid that being a Friday, weekend or bank holiday. I would have thought that that is self-evident. It is obvious because a prisoner’s release date is something of a complex calculation. It is carried out by prison staff and depends on a number of different factors that a sentencing court would not necessarily be able to take into account. These could include: any other concurrent or consecutive sentences the offender might already be serving; the correct amount of remand time to apply on all relevant sentences being served; and any added days imposed for bad behaviour while serving the sentence.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I thank the Minister for giving way; that is very kind. Is he aware of how daft that sounds? We have just explained that the punishing of ex-prisoners is not acceptable. The bunching should not occur; find a way around it.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 8th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

Before the noble Lord sits down, I point out that he is arguing for the status quo when we have already said that there is no rationale behind it. There is no rationale behind two years or three years. The fact that he thinks it sounds reasonable is really not good enough. It is urgent to get this review together. Which organisations have the Government taken advice from on this, before bringing in these new penalties? Who did they take advice from? It sounds as if they did not take it from people who understand the situation as it is on the roads.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I am afraid that, with respect, the noble Baroness is wrong on both points. There are provisions in the Bill which change the law considerably; there are quite a few in this area. I am certainly not arguing for the status quo but rather for the provisions we have put in the Bill. I have sought to explain why, if we are going to change other parts of our road traffic offences, we need to do so carefully and make sure that there are no unintended consequences. I hoped my explanation of the new test for dangerous driving based on breaches of the Highway Code and the consequences that brings with it was a good example of that.

As to who we have consulted, I assure the noble Baroness that my department and the Department for Transport speak frequently to a range of stakeholders. Perhaps I can write to her with a list, exhaustive or possibly non-exhaustive, of the people we have spoken to.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I also point out that when the Minister demonstrated the Dutch reach, he did so from the point of view of a Dutch car rather than an English one. Perhaps he would like to practise that at home.

Criminal Justice System: Equal Treatment of Deaths and Injuries

Debate between Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb

Thursday 24th June 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking to ensure that the criminal justice system treats deaths and injuries caused by motorists equally to those not caused by motorists.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)]

My Lords, where there is evidence of an intention to kill or cause serious injury, offences committed by motorists will be prosecuted in the same way as other homicides or assaults. However, in the context of driving it is often difficult to ascertain the driver’s state of mind or intentions. That is why the law contains additional road traffic offences that consider an objective test of the standard of driving, rather than the driver’s subjective intent.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

In 2014, a man travelling at 80 to 88 miles per hour in his car drove straight at the traffic officer who tried to flag him down to stop him. The killer made no attempt to swerve or to slow and he threw PC Duncan into the air like a ragdoll, leaving him with fatal injuries. The starting point for murdering a police officer with a knife or an iron bar is 30 years; this driver got an eight and a half year sentence. Is that justice?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, first, I acknowledge the gravity of that incident and we should pay our respects to the police officer’s family, remembering the work that police officers do, day in and day out. However, one has to distinguish the road traffic offence from the consequences. In that case, if there were sufficient evidence to prosecute for murder or manslaughter, that prosecution should have been brought. I know that the CPS does bring those charges when there is evidence to support them and sufficient likelihood of a guilty verdict.

Independent Office for Police Conduct

Debate between Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb

Tuesday 16th March 2021 Lords Chamber

[The Lord Speaker (Lord Fowler)]

I call the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater. No? I call the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, in my activist world I hear a lot of complaints against the IOPC and its previous incarnation. I am curious about the fact that a lot of former police officers work there as investigators. It has been suggested that the IOPC does not investigate as thoroughly as it might because it has too many former police officers. Has the Home Office paid any attention to that?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, one must have a balance. If you are going to investigate the police, you need some people in your organisation who have the skill set to know how the police operate. The figures are these. Overall, 23% of IOPC staff are former police officers—that is 28% in operations. However, first, they do not investigate their former force; and secondly, most senior decision-makers are not former police officers. By law, the director-general cannot be a former police officer, and the current director-general has put in place a practice that the two deputies are also not former police officers.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Debate between Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb

Committee stage & Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 8th February 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I hope I can be relatively brief in my reply—not because the point is not important, nor indeed out of a lack of respect for any of the contributions we have just heard, but because there is a single and critical point, fundamental to the administration of justice, which lies at the heart of this debate.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, explained, this probing amendment is designed to protect the identity of complainants in domestic abuse cases by the automatic application of reporting restrictions from the point when the allegation is made. Although the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, referred us to Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, I dare say that the principle of open justice goes back much further than that. We are all familiar with the adage that justice must not only be done, it must be seen to be done. That statement, with which we are all familiar, I am sure, recognises that automatic reporting restrictions of this kind are an exceptional interference with open justice. Therefore, we make those reporting restrictions available only when there is a real need to do so.

The most familiar precedent is in relation to complainants who allege that a sexual offence has been committed against them. In those circumstances, there is a clear justification for preventing the reporting of the complainant’s identity, because there is an overriding need for anonymity to be guaranteed from the outset so that victims of a type of offence that still carries considerable stigma are emboldened to come forward and tell the police. As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, says, there are a couple of other such other examples in the law, but each of those is an exception to the general rule. We must be very careful, I would suggest, to limit those exceptions to cases where it is demonstrably required. Therefore, while I listened with care to the speech by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and his personal and, if I may say, moving testimony, we do not consider that, as a matter of generality, domestic abuse cases in which no sexual offence has been committed fall into the same category such that they require automatic protection in the same way.

However, as a number of noble Lords identified, that does not mean that victims of domestic abuse should be denied anonymity where they both request and need it. The courts have discretionary powers to impose, on application, reporting restrictions prohibiting the naming of a witness, where the court is satisfied that being identified would diminish the quality of that witness’s evidence. I suggest that there is sufficient discretion before the courts to meet cases where reporting restrictions are required. To go further would be an unjustifiable interference with the extremely important principle of open justice.

I hope, therefore, given that this is a probing amendment —and while of course I am always willing to discuss anything with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones—that she will feel able to withdraw her amendment at this stage.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I realise this is a tricky subject to legislate on, but I think there is a problem and we need to fix it in some way. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser, for their largely sympathetic comments. I heard the Minister say that justice must not only be done, it must be seen to be done. In that case, I would like him to go, perhaps, one of these days, to the High Court and see what is happening in the spy cops inquiry, where Judge Mitting—or rather the Met—is giving anonymity to many police officers who have committed crimes. Therefore, it does seem to me that somehow there is justice for some and not for others. I will, of course, withdraw the amendment now, but I still think this is a problem and that there has to be some way of sorting it out.