Infrastructure Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Whitty and Lord Jenkin of Roding

Monday 10th November 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jenkin of Roding]

My Lords, I added my name to my noble friend’s amendment and I congratulate him on the way in which he moved it. I want to make two points. First, I was the Minister for Energy in the very early stages of our North Sea oil and gas. I was the Minister for only seven weeks when we lost the election at the end of February 1974. At that stage, no one had the remotest idea of setting up a sovereign fund. I do not remember the thought crossing my mind or my desk. As my noble friend Lord Forsyth has indicated, we did not have the slightest idea of how much it was going to be.

In a sense, I take issue with my noble friend Lord Hodgson for saying that it was a massive mistake. I find it difficult to accept that. There may have come a time when one should have seen that the prospects were going to be as bright as they have been and one might have done something to meet my noble friend’s wish. But to have expected that to happen in the very early stages when the oil and gas had scarcely begun to flow is a little unfair. At the time, when BP was investing in the Brent oilfield, which became the most important oilfield, its financial director said that he had established a law; namely, that, however much is spent in developing a North Sea oilfield, the amount still to be spent would be constant. It stands constant. It does not go down. That was the climate in which the oil industry was operating then. The Government, I think, gave it every opportunity to develop and we have enjoyed the success.

Secondly, I hesitated to put my name to my noble friend’s new clause because of the figures. My noble friend Lord Forsyth has already raised this. Nevertheless, I think the principle is sound, particularly what was said about intergenerational equity. Where you have the prospect of major wealth, is it right that it should all be spent on the present generation? It seems to me that there is a principle here that it is desirable to support. My noble friend referred at the end of his speech to what my right honourable friend the Chancellor said over the weekend about,

“making sure money is not squandered on day-to-day spending”.

When you have the indebtedness we have it is unrealistic to say that when you are spending money to keep the economy going to meet the needs of social services and so on that somehow if we spend the revenues from something such as shale gas we are squandering it. However, there may come a time, as happened in Norway, when it would be right to set up a fund. My noble friend’s new clause says that the Government “may”—it does not say “must”. I have already indicated that I have some doubts about the figures he has put in at the end but the principle seems to be very sound and I hope that the opportunity may come when we shall do something about it. Like him I look forward to the reply from my noble friend on the Front Bench.

[Lord Whitty]

My Lords, I have also added my name to this amendment. This is for two reasons—partly, I was swept away by the rhetoric from the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, in Committee; it is such an obvious strategic decision that I thought I must support it. The second reason is purely historic. Somewhere in the archives of the TUC, from about 1973, there is a paper with the initials “LW” on it. In that paper I argued that we should set up a fund to invest in upgrading into the new technologies of the manufacturing industry and acquire assets at home and abroad to meet the interests of the state and of the British economy out of the tax revenues which we anticipated would come from the North Sea. We had no idea how much revenue would be coming in from North Sea oil at that time but it would clearly be substantial. I do not think anybody thought at that point it would be as substantial as it turned out, altering the terms of trade of the UK, with the level of sterling rising to the detriment of the competitiveness of the British manufacturing sector which was, of course, already a bit deadbeat and uncompetitive.

If only they had listened to me then. I am afraid that I never got my paper to the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, while he was still in office but the next Government took no notice of it nor, indeed, the one after that. It stayed through all that period of North Sea oil revenue the Government received—I would not use “squandered”. I disagree with a lot of the priorities of the Government of the 1980s as noble Lords know, but that revenue was not used for the long-term benefit of the British economy when at least a fraction of it should have been. I thought the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, had an important point here. If this industry develops to the extent that many of its proponents are saying, although none of us knows that yet, there will be a serious tax revenue that is in a strict sense a windfall for future Governments and a windfall for the British economy. We should not make the same mistake and we should take a lesson from our Norwegian cousins by investing in a fund that can provide some degree of security and improvement of the British economic situation for future generations. I am very happy to support in principle the noble Lord’s amendment.

Infrastructure Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Whitty and Lord Jenkin of Roding

Monday 3rd November 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Whitty]

My Lords, I shall not reply on the wider issues of the role of the monitor, in which debate on this group has become engaged. I will concentrate simply on the issue of road safety. The Minister, who I thought in her response to the previous group was moving in my direction, has greatly disappointed me in her reply to this one. That belies the good work that her department is doing and has done for many years on road safety and the opportunity that the new company would have to improve it.

I am also sorry that I am falling out with the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, on the issue of liability. The point I am making is that in certain aspects of road safety—design of roads, traffic management, use of telemetrics and speed controls, information and signing—there is a vital role to be played by the highways authorities, in particular one with the resources, level of responsibility and intensity of traffic which the strategic highways company will have.

[Lord Jenkin of Roding]

I do not disagree with a single word of what the noble Lord has just said about what should be the responsibilities of the strategic highways company. My fear earlier was that he was extending it to matters which are really the responsibility of other bodies.

[Lord Whitty]

My Lords, in all areas of safety and liability, there may be contributions by many factors. Frequently there is contribution to negligence by people in other areas. That may apply to drivers as well, but there are some firm responsibilities on those who are responsible for the design, management and control of the roads. That area of improvement in road safety has been the least developed until relatively recently. The improvements which have been made have been made largely as a result of general improvements to the roads rather than by a focus on road safety improvements, except on a few issues.

As I said, the creation of the company gives us the opportunity of a step change in delivery of road safety on our strategic network. That means giving as clear a signal as possible that this is indeed, to use the Minister’s words earlier, a high duty on the new company. That needs to be expressed unambiguously in the Bill. The words “have due regard to” safety are neither belt nor braces. It is not an objective of the company; nor is it embedding and inculcating that through everything that the company does. If we want to do that, we need to write safety large in the responsibility of the company. If the Minister goes back to her previous remarks about looking at higher duties to be written into the Bill, leaving aside all the other amendments in the group, her adoption of my Amendment 15 would achieve just that. As she has made it clear that she is not prepared to accept it, to try to ensure that road safety is a major function of the new organisation, I need to test the opinion of the House.

Infrastructure Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Whitty and Lord Jenkin of Roding

Tuesday 22nd July 2014 Grand Committee

[Lord Whitty (Lab)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 94 I will speak also to Amendment 94A. The first amendment is in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Judd while the second is solely in my name. Both deal, essentially, with the same issue. The first is a general statement of principle—that energy efficiency should be considered alongside other options for the delivery of infrastructure improvements and dealt with on the same basis. The second goes into rather more detail and sets various conditions, in that any proposals would have to meet carbon targets, contribute to the reduction of fuel poverty and be compatible with and considered alongside other investments in energy infrastructure. I do not mind which of these two amendments the noble Baroness accepts. I would be quite happy with either or both, or perhaps even a better one from her, but the essential point here is that energy efficiency is underregarded when we look at the programme for national infrastructure.

The Government have produced a lot of papers on infrastructure. The one in June 2013, which was not the first, has effectively nothing about energy efficiency. There is a brief obtuse reference at one point to the Green Investment Bank but nothing else. The National Infrastructure Plan itself, which came in December 2013, had a whole chunk on energy going through all the different aspects of energy, from the heat programme through to all the different bits of generation. It mentioned the strategy for fuel poverty; the noble Baroness answered a Question from the noble Lord, Lord Ezra, a few days ago, saying it was going to be published in spring 2014, so we are slipping on that. It waits until right to the very end of the provisions on energy before it mentions smart meter rollout, the only aspect of energy efficiency which is mentioned therein. There was then another document, a finance update for the infrastructure plan, which was delivered in March this year. Again, that did not mention energy efficiency.

It is important that investment in energy efficiency is seen alongside “big bucks” investment in generation and improvements in the energy system itself. Delivering energy efficiency improvements has the best return, pound for pound, of any investment in energy in terms of carbon saving, of cost saving to the consumer and of energy saved. A relatively recent Cambridge Econometrics study showed that very clearly. It also is more labour-intensive and therefore creates more skilled and semi-skilled jobs. It benefits the whole of the country rather than part of the country, as some of the infrastructure projects do on the transport side and some of the energy ones on the employment side. Hinkley Point will be great for west Somerset, and I very much approve of it being there, but it does not benefit employment much anywhere else in the country.

I mean a range of things by energy efficiency investment. My principal concern, as noble Lords will recall, has largely been on investment in the housing stock, both in terms of retrofit and of future build. However, that is only one part of it. There are other parts of investment in infrastructure and retrofitting investment that the Government have not touched at all, which relate to commercial buildings and to the use of energy more generally in our economy and on the industrial side.

The very latest document, which the Minister was kind enough to send us last Friday, Delivering UK Energy Investment, is a superb publication. It is possibly a bit glossy, given the history of DECC in this regard, but it has obviously decided that it has to present itself effectively. The last section of the document contains a lot of information on energy efficiency, although some of it is subject to some rather specious claims. In fact, it starts out by saying that, in terms of energy intensiveness, the UK is the “least energy intensive” of all G7 economies. That, however, reflects the structure of the economy and is not a like-for-like comparison, certainly as regards our housing stock, which is universally recognised as being one of the least efficient in Europe.

The energy system itself is subject to some outmoded forms of transmission and distribution which will require attention. That is, indeed, mentioned in the document, but only in the context of the electricity demand reduction dimension of the capacity mechanism, on which we had a lot of discussion during the passage of the Energy Bill. I think Members on this side of the Committee, and many other noble Lords, find this somewhat lacking in precision as yet, but we should be grateful that it is there. However, the broader concept of energy efficiency is referred to in relation to smart meters, investment under the Green Deal and money spent under the ECO. In my opinion it gives a slightly exaggerated view of how effective that is going to be. I am in favour of the ECO. However, the provisions introduced by the Government in the last few months in response to the Prime Minister’s attack on “green crap”, which was presumably an organic predecessor of the “green blob”, means that we now have the ECO spread out over a much longer time period. It is therefore less rapid and less of an investment than was the case as it was originally conceived. Meanwhile, of course, a lot of the predecessor schemes have disappeared. Although the Government are putting some money into that provision, it is relatively low level.

Although these things are going on, they are not considered in the same light as the investment in large-scale generation, the whole of ERM or, indeed, the capacity mechanism, and they are not assessed on the same basis. As I said at the beginning of my remarks, the return on energy efficiency measures, as analysed by countless economists, is much greater than the return on generation investment, whatever the form of generation we are talking about—offshore wind, nuclear, or, indeed, gas or coal—and in carbon- saving terms it is also greater. It seems to me therefore that there is a gap in our approach to national infrastructure on the energy side, although some of this applies also to the transport side because improvements in transport energy efficiency ought to be considered in the same light. If we are looking at how public and private money is spent and directed on infrastructure, investment in energy efficiency should be considered on the same basis, at the same time, with the same degree of urgency and with the same degree of government backing. That is not the case at the moment. These amendments are directed at ensuring that the widest aspects of energy efficiency are reflected in that strategy—a strategy to which the Government rightly give priority in terms of public spending on a public policy, but also one which will directly benefit the consumer and businesses operating within the UK. It will also benefit them early whereas many other investments will take five or 10 years to pay off in terms of energy supply. Therefore it will improve the economics of British industry and business in general.

So the arguments for energy efficiency in all its forms being up there as part of the infrastructure programme are pretty irrefutable. I am not saying that the Government have done nothing on this front but the failure to consider energy efficiency in the same light has meant that such programmes are regarded as lower priority and less exciting, and they are not given the same degree of importance. My amendments attempt to begin to change that. The next version of the National Infrastructure Plan, due at the end of this year or the beginning or next, should reflect this very explicitly with a whole section on energy efficiency rather that it being regulated and only partially covered in the documents. I believe that DECC recognises this but it needs wider recognition across government as a whole so that we are not dependent solely on a glossy DECC publication—welcome though that is. Right in the heart of Treasury thinking on industrial policy, energy efficiency should be up there and treated in the same way as the other infrastructure priorities. I beg to move.

[Lord Jenkin of Roding (Con)]

My Lords, this is an important amendment. I was glad that the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, gave the Government credit for what has been done. A good deal has been done. I am sure that the noble Lord will have studied, as I have, the paper produced last month on the Energy Savings Opportunities Scheme. It now has its own acronym—ESOS. One can read quite a lot about ESOS.

I was very encouraged the other day by reading of a meeting attended by my noble friend Lord Deighton, the Commercial Secretary to the Treasury. To quote from a press release, my noble friend,

“today said he is ‘extremely attracted’ to the idea of reframing home energy efficiency as one of the UK’s top 40 infrastructure priorities”.

The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, may well be pushing at an open door. My noble friend has very considerable influence on these matters and comes to this House and his job with a very great reputation for what he succeeded in doing in the case of the Olympic Games. As most noble Lords will recognise, he is a figure to be regarded with considerable respect not only in this House but outside it, too.

My noble friend was asked by the Green Building Council chief executive, Paul King,

“whether the Government needed to change the mindset on home retrofit from thinking about 26 million small problems to one major infrastructure opportunity. Lord Deighton said he was ‘seduced’ by the idea of reframing the debate on energy efficiency and that ‘Government should lead’ on the agenda”.

Coming from that source, I hope my noble friend on the Front Bench will sing from the same hymn sheet. It is perfectly clear—as the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, eloquently put it—that this policy has no down side and very considerable upside attractions if one can reach the point where one needs to invest less in production because one is saving more and using energy a great deal more efficiently. That seems to be highly desirable.

It is very interesting that an organisation called the Energy Bill Revolution, which sent me a brief on this recently, quotes research from Cambridge Econometrics showing that energy efficiency schemes,

“outstripped all other investments and tax breaks by creating over 70,000 jobs by 2015, and the boosting of GDP by 0.2%”.

It goes on to say that the key reason for those figures is that the high level of job creation is because it is much more labour-intensive than many other forms of energy investment and much less material-intensive than most construction projects.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Whitty]

My Lords, I want to make just a few remarks on this. I do not quite share my noble friend’s rosy picture of the effect of the oil and gas industry on the British economy. Although benefits were derived from the period during which Britain was an oil producer, it distorted the rest of the economy. That need not necessarily have been the case, had we had a plan to use the proceeds from North Sea gas and oil in a way which developed the rest of the economy. Instead, large sections of the manufacturing sector disappeared. We did not have a clear strategic plan for the totality of the economy although there was a fairly clear strategic plan as regards the exploitation of North Sea gas and oil itself.

I do not wish to prolong that situation during the decline of North Sea gas and oil. We now need to plan for the transition. That is, in a sense, what the Wood report is saying. The mechanism for doing that is in part reflected in these government amendments. They are, however, slightly odd amendments because they effectively propose the basis for a new regulator. As that regulator is not yet in being, reference is made to the Secretary of State. Presumably, the Minister will be able to confirm that at some point down the line we will have new primary legislation which sets up the structure, governance, powers and responsibilities of the new regulator, in which case some of these measures will have to be rewritten not very far down the line. I am not necessarily against that but it means that how the measure is written in relation to the Secretary of State will be different when we have a fully fledged regulator. There will be different parliamentary oversight apart from anything else.

My next point follows that made by my noble friend on carbon capture and storage. It is important to recognise that the continuing use of fossil-based fuels will not be compatible with our carbon targets unless there is some form of carbon capture and storage. Moreover, the North Sea has bequeathed us a significant natural facility for storing that carbon. The whole issue of enhanced oil recovery and the use of that storage for carbon dioxide storage in the future is vital. Indeed, in the whole of Europe, and possibly the world, there is no more obvious place where we could store the carbon produced through the continuing use of fossil fuels, with, I suspect, relatively little local opposition.

When the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, and I were involved in the Select Committee report on European energy, we found that Germany and other central European countries were very opposed to carbon capture and storage taking place among their population and on their territory. However, in Britain we have a real opportunity to offer the totality of the European energy and industrial network the use of those North Sea facilities, which would last a long time. I once asked someone to put a timescale on that but it will certainly see us out and will probably be longer than the period during which we have extracted North Sea oil and gas. It is therefore important that the carbon capture and storage element is written into the strategy and the legislation paving the way to set up a new regulator, as my noble friend’s amendment would do. Therefore, I hope that the Government will accept it.

My last point is tangential and requires the Minister to talk to her colleague, the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. Amendment 94B and the subsequent amendments seek to establish the provisions of a licence. Some noble Lords may remember that when we started to discuss this Bill a few weeks ago, we talked about a licence for a new highways company. The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, said that that would all be dealt with in the licence. However, in relation to energy, primary legislation is required to set down what the licence will cover. I think that we need a reply from the Department for Transport at some point as to why we do not need the equivalent in relation to the corporatisation of the Highways Agency into a body that will itself require a licence. The questions that I and others have raised on the nature of this new body have been brushed off by it being said that it will all be in the licence. When we come back to the front end of this Bill, I may start asking those questions again. I do not expect the Minister to answer that now, but perhaps she or her officials could convey that to their opposite numbers in the Department for Transport.

[Lord Jenkin of Roding]

I shall make a few observations on the speeches that we have heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Worthington, and the noble Lord, Lord Whitty. The Government are pursuing carbon capture and storage. They have put up £1 billion, which will probably not be necessary, and have identified projects that will be supported, one of which is the project at Peterhead, which will use the storage available in the offshore oil field. That is exactly right. I have asked questions in the past about the perfectly good saline caps onshore and why they could not similarly be used; they have exactly the same provision to be able to keep material indefinitely over millennia. Some of them are now being used for gas storage. I was pleased to hear today that there has been quite a significant increase in gas storage in recent years—something for which I and others have been arguing. It is entirely right, as the Secretary of State said in his Written Statement that,

“the principles will apply to offshore activity, however Government intend that the OGA’s remit should extend to onshore—as well as to the licensing activity for natural gas storage and unloading and carbon dioxide storage—and so, working with the respective industry stakeholders and trade groups, we will look to extend the principles accordingly”.—[Official Report, Commons, 16/7/14; col. 74WS.]

I am sure that that is right, but it prompts the question of whether these principles apply to the extraction of natural gas from shale. Different conditions may need to apply. Noble Lords have already referred to the idea of progressively replacing inevitably declining oil and gas resources with the apparently huge availability of shale gas in this country. I do not want to anticipate the debates that we will have in the autumn after the consultation on access to shale gas. However, the fact of the matter is that there are very large quantities indeed. It is interesting that the Bowland shale basin, which has been surveyed quite substantially by the British Geological Survey, is many hundreds of feet in thickness, quite apart from being two kilometres down, or whatever it is. Much of what was being extracted in America has been from comparatively slender deposits of shale. In that respect, we are sitting on a huge potential resource, which will need to be very carefully managed from all sorts of angles—environmental, and everything else. What we hope that OGA will do for the offshore oil and gas industry is to gain knowledge that will be applicable to these onshore developments, to which the Secretary of State referred in column 68 of his Written Statement. Of course he also said:

“Government will work closely with industry and other interested parties in the months ahead to undertake this work and ensure we are ready to put legislation on the additional powers before the House in the first Session of the new Parliament”.—[Official Report, Commons 16/7/14; col. 75WS.]

That is keeping up with the tradition of having a new Energy Bill every Session.

This is so important, and one has to get this right. Perhaps with the addition of the amendments that the Government have tabled, this is a very important step forward. One has to recognise that this is not inevitable; it has to be very carefully managed, and with the co-operation of the industry, government and eventually the OGA, which is a key player in this, there is no reason why it should not be achieved. I look forward to this with considerable optimism. It is a very good and attractive part of the Bill, and I hope that we accept the Government’s amendments.

Infrastructure Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Whitty and Lord Jenkin of Roding

Thursday 10th July 2014 Grand Committee

[Lord Jenkin of Roding]

When I read this clause and, in particular, studied the Explanatory Notes my instinct was that there seemed to be some sense in this. Where these things are held up for a long period, it frustrates development. Anxieties have been expressed. They have been expressed to me by the Local Government Association. The only point I wish to make to my noble friend is about whether we could have some idea of what an order under this clause would look like when we come back to this on Report. I made this point to my noble friend Lady Kramer about some of the roads legislation we considered earlier in the Bill, and I make it now to my noble friend Lady Stowell. It would be really helpful to the House, as it will be on Report, to have before it the sort of order that would be made under this Bill. This Bill gives a power to make orders. I am not at all sure what those orders would look like.

[Lord Whitty (Lab)]

My name is attached to the clause stand part provision. While I think some of the amendments in the name of my noble friends would improve the situation, I think the Government need to think again on this. The Minister should take advice from the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, and look more closely at what circumstances and processes the problem that the Government are trying to address needs. As it stands, this is a pretty draconian and open-ended provision. Clearly, for all sorts of reasons there can be delays in the local authority being able to assess whether a condition has been met. The conditions can be quite complex because they are not only in the area of heritage, as my noble friend Lady Andrews has said, but can relate to the natural environment, social implications, traffic implications and so forth. These things are not necessarily easily dealt with, particularly by hard-pressed planning departments. As it stands, the clause would allow the Secretary of State to come to this Parliament the day after the period of the condition lapsed with an order to override the non-decision of the local authority. That seems too harsh. It is important that there is some reserve power for the Secretary of State. I understand why the Government are looking for it, but it should be exercised with discretion. Frankly, this clause gives far too much power to the Secretary of State to interfere in what essentially must be a local decision which understands the complexity of local circumstances. This clause gives no indication of what should trigger the Secretary of State’s intervention and the suspicion must be—I put it at its most extreme, but nevertheless—that a developer who happens to be close to the Minister and is frustrated by the delay tips the Secretary of State off and we have a complete override of our planning process as a result, subject only to the negative procedure of this House and another place. That is too open-ended and I hope that the Government will think again between now and when we come back on this.

I should have declared an interest as a vice-president of the LGA. The LGA has great disquiet about this, and that is shared by a large number of other organisations which are engaged in the planning process. I hope that the Minister will be able to give us something on this and that she will have another look at it before we return.

Infrastructure Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Whitty and Lord Jenkin of Roding

Tuesday 8th July 2014 Grand Committee

[Lord Jenkin of Roding (Con)]

My Lords, I take this opportunity to thank my noble friend and her private office for the help that we were given after last week’s sitting with the supply of the documents to which she had referred and to which the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, has also just referred. I am very grateful. I, too, have read them, and the draft licence in particular, with all the caveats surrounding it, which I totally understand, is a very helpful indication. It might have been helpful if I had known about it when we were discussing the purposes of setting up this body and what its objectives would be.

I would have expected a remuneration committee to be the sort of thing to be covered by the articles of association. Indeed, the paper that the Minister has circulated, entitled Strategic Highways Company: Approach to the Articles of Association, makes reference to the,

“Model Articles for a company limited by shares”.

Of course, this company cannot be the same as that because, in a sense, it is rather different with all the shares owned by the Secretary of State. However, I would have expected the whole question of a remuneration committee to be covered by the articles when they are finally drawn up and issued.

It is absolutely within the powers of a board of directors to decide how that is going to operate, but I think that it is not unreasonable that the Secretary of State should keep a very close eye on this issue. Some of the remuneration that has been paid—not only in the private sector, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, implied, but sometimes also in the public sector—has been a bit absurd and given rise to a good deal of criticism and uneasiness. I should have expected the Secretary of State to want to keep a close eye on what the company is doing. As I understand it, it will primarily be for the articles of association to spell out this sort of thing, and I would be most grateful if my noble friend would be willing to confirm that.

[Lord Whitty (Lab)]

My Lords, I support the amendment because it raises wider issues. Although I do not want to go over much of what was said in our previous sitting, the Minister gave some unsatisfactory answers. Since then, like my noble friend Lord Berkeley, I have read the draft licence agreement, which does not answer most of my points or, indeed, the points regarding this amendment. Before we get to Report, we need to be clear—either through draft articles of association or through some greater management guidance for the proposed, hived-off company—about what the company can and cannot do.

On reading the impact assessment, it appears that the alleged benefits of this hiving-off arise almost entirely from the certainty of funding. They do not seem to arise significantly—the £3.8 billion over 10 years arises almost entirely from the certainty of funding on maintenance and schemes within that timescale. Very little of it seems to arise from better management, novel forms of contracts or technological improvements. If that is the case, all that the Treasury and Secretary of State need to do is ensure that there is firm funding from Parliament. Admittedly, a Parliament lasts only five years, and the aggregate period we are talking about is 10 years; but, nevertheless, the institutional change of itself does not seem to deliver a significant contribution to that alleged net benefit.

The questions on how the company runs its staffing, and how it recruits and pays the management, could have a bearing on that, but it is never explicit. It is certainly not explicit in the documents to which we have referred. The anxiety of the rest of the staff and the PCS union is that, although moving away from the Civil Service may mean that the Government can pay the senior management significantly more—if they are going to go the way of HS2 and pay the 23 senior managers, the chief executive or anyone else, more than the Prime Minister, that will be difficult for anyone to accept politically—the rest of the staff will face greater insecurity, as my noble friend has said, as well as the possibility of changes to all their terms and conditions.

Therefore, for the morale of the existing Highways Agency staff, unless we are explicit about what the advantages of better management and a better situation for the workforce will be, it will be difficult to envisage a wholehearted endorsement of this proposition from the staff. Unless there is a reflection of some improved management in terms of the benefits of the hiving-off, as distinct from the substantial assumptions about what the certainty of funding delivers, the case for going through all this change begins to look a bit thin.

Infrastructure Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Whitty and Lord Jenkin of Roding

Thursday 3rd July 2014 Grand Committee

[Lord Whitty]

We now come on to the strategy and, by implication, the money. The Government have commendably said that they want a steady strategy that is going to last some time, with an allocation of resources against it. That in itself is highly desirable, but it is not so dramatically different from the various road programmes that have existed in the past and have been subject to sudden change, as the Minister said, mainly because of changes to financial arrangements but also because of planning delays and technical problems with the projects when they go beyond the initial feasibility study.

The national infrastructure plan, which has a lot of roads in it, broken down on a regional basis, is presumably going to be built on and represented as the strategic highways plan, and there will be a five-year programme of money attached to it. My Amendment 14 attempts to ensure that that five-year view is reflected in the Bill. The Government have made quite a lot of the five-year thing, but although I have not read every word of Schedule 3, I do not see it in the Bill. There are arguments as to whether five years is enough, given that it takes that long even to get anywhere near starting, but the five-year funding has been an important plank of the Government’s selling of this project, and I think that it should appear somewhere in the Bill.

My wording may not be quite right, but I think that it should be a rolling five-year programme, so that in year 3 you are still looking five years ahead. You would add to it, and you would add the financial commitment related to it at that point. My wording does not exactly say that, but that is what I am after. If the department can find better wording, that is so much the better. However, we should at least write into the Bill the embedding of a minimum five-year view and that it should be on a rolling basis and have money attached. Otherwise, a lot of the rationale for this whole exercise disappears. That is what Amendment 14 is about. The Government have made a start with the designation of projects within the national infrastructure programme and can turn that into a highways strategy, and the Chancellor has made the commitment for these five years.

The Government seem slightly naive in their confidence that the Treasury will never revisit this because it is now an arm’s-length company. The past 50 years have seen cuts to the money that has gone to private companies, to nationalised corporations and to local authorities. The fact that they are arm’s length from government has not stopped the Treasury deciding at particular points to change what it had previously—in effect—promised. So far nobody has managed to sue the Chancellor for that; I doubt whether it will be any different under this new arrangement. That may be a bit cynical. As the Minister said, it would be more embarrassing to do that, but my experience of Treasury Ministers and Treasury officials over the past few decades does not indicate that they are easily embarrassed. Indeed, interfering with other departments’ clear priorities is the way that the Treasury works, rightly or wrongly. Therefore, the benefits of having an allocation for five years can be exaggerated. Nevertheless, it is a desirable aim, and it is desirable that we know for those five years what projects are there and what stage they are at. Since it is a rolling programme, moving from feasibility study to planning, to precise engineering design, to the start of digging and through to actual completion of the road, it is desirable that it should appear in a five-year perspective. Before we finish the Bill, I hope that a form of words can be adopted that makes sure that that is reflected in the Act. If it provides a bit of embarrassment to future Treasury Ministers, so much the better, and so much easier will future Transport Ministers find their relations with the Treasury.

My Amendment 16 raises the broader issue of strategy. We have an infrastructure strategy but not a specific transport strategy. It needs to be made clear how the roads strategy, or highways strategy, fits in with the broader transport strategy—rail, ports and airports in particular. The whole logistical structure and the balance within it in terms of our economy, what pressure is put on the transport system and what the regional balance and stress points are, need to be reflected in all modes and, indeed, different corridors need to be judged on a multimodal basis. If they are not, simply having a sacrosanct—or near-sacrosanct—roads strategy will deal only with part of the problem. My Amendment 16 relates to putting the roads strategy into that broader context. I beg to move.

[Lord Jenkin of Roding (Con)]

My Lords, it is my impression that this road investment strategy, and the commitments made to it by the Government, is perhaps the aspect of this Bill that has been most welcomed by industry, commerce and, indeed, all those who depend on transport for their operation. I have just been rereading what the CBI said about this, and it attaches enormous importance to the stability that the roads investment strategy is intended to bring.

It will be a long time before those of us who lived through it forget what happened in 1997 when the Deputy Prime Minister at the time, the noble Lord, Lord Prescott, decided that roads were much less important than a lot of other things and there was a massive stop to almost the entire road investment at the time. That is the memory that I have and the impression that the noble Lord gave at the time, and that memory will take a long time to disperse. The Bill, particularly this clause and the policy that lies behind it, has been greeted with huge enthusiasm.

The Treasury has ultimate responsibility for managing the economy as a whole. I can speak as perhaps the only former Treasury Minister in the Room, having spent four years as Financial Secretary and then Chief Secretary to the Treasury in the 1970s. One is always aware that at the back of any policy there has to be Treasury approval. In the interests of the economy as a whole the Treasury has to be able to say to a department, “I’m very sorry, we can’t afford that”. Here, though, the combination of the strategic highways company, the roads investment strategy and the commitments that the coalition Government have given on this must to some extent make a Treasury Minister think extremely carefully about how far it would be right to interfere with this—that would be a major decision.

Of course, these things often happen when there is a change of Government. What industry is looking for here, as we heard in the debate in the Chamber today from a number of speakers, is common ground between the major parties so that there are not massive changes of policy on matters of this sort, which have such a devastating effect on manufacturing industry—which is what we were discussing then.

Whether one needs to have what the amendment suggests at least every five years I would regard as questionable; it seems to add an element of uncertainty that the Bill does not have. There is a five-year review but I am not quite sure why this particular condition would need to be put in. I listened carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, and I have enormous respect for his expertise in this field because he was a Minister in the Department for Transport, or whatever it was called at the time, but the advantage that has been gained by publishing this policy in this clause of the Bill is that it assures the commercial side of this country that there is now going to be far greater stability in the long term. I am delighted that there is such emphasis on the long-term strategy for infrastructure building so that we can get away from these five-year single-Parliament policy decisions, which might put it risk.

I want to see this aspect of the Bill going through as effectively and swiftly as possible because it is what the country, particularly its commercial elements, have been looking for for a long time. I am going to look at not just this amendment but a number of the others that have been tabled—I was going through them earlier today—to see whether they would interfere with that aspect by raising doubts or putting additional bureaucracy or obstacles in the way of getting the strategy fulfilled. That is what one will need to look at very carefully. At the moment, as far as I can see, most of the Bill achieves what is wanted. I express my doubt about whether Amendment 14 from the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, would improve that; I suspect that it would add an additional obstacle and raise doubts that ought not to be there.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Kramer]

I do not want this point to go unchallenged. I say to the noble Lord that I think the industry has heard absolutely correctly, but nobody I know in the industry believes that a Parliament can bind every future Parliament from thereon out and totally remove its democratic right. It would be inappropriate to attempt to do that and, frankly, I do not think it could be done, so it is absolutely crucial that we recognise that the Secretary of State can make a variance. It is not the intention of this Government that they will vary the RIS that they put forward, but I do not see that they can completely bind a future Parliament 100%. That is why the mechanism in place is to set a very transparent course—one could say an obstacle course—for any change or variance, so that it in no way would be done lightly. Perhaps no Government would do it lightly but it would be done with consultation and engagement, and with various steps in place. Industry has widely recognised that that provides it with a very substantial degree of certainty—enough to have the kind of positive responses to which the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, referred.

[Lord Jenkin of Roding]

Perhaps I might add to that before the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, resumes. I have in front of me the British Chambers of Commerce brief. I want to read only one sentence from it. It says that,

“the transformation of the Highways Agency into a more flexible body, with five-year investment programmes”,

should offer,

“more certainty to business on key road projects”.

It is not expecting to have complete certainty and for this to be totally fixed over a period because it recognises the reality, as my noble friend has just said, that to some extent it has to reflect what is happening in the rest of the economy. What it welcomes is what it sees as the opportunity of much more certainty than we have had in the past.

[Lord Whitty]

My Lords, that is very realistic; nevertheless, the way that it has described the situation is more than is actually in the Bill. Some other form of words would give more certainty than the Bill does currently, as past changes show that there is a need for some protection. It may be that the obstacles—if that is how the Minister wants to describe the consultation—are one way of ensuring that it does not get easily changed. The other way is to put the strategy to Parliament and have to report to Parliament if you are going to change it. In some industries or sectors, that is done in certain respects. You have to provide a strategy and, if you change it, there is at least an argument in Parliament. These things change from time to time.

I am sorry to take up the Committee’s time, but I shook my head at the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, earlier and I need to explain. I became the Roads Minister in 1998. In 1997, the Government inherited a roads programme from quite a good 1996 White Paper of the previous Government, which listed projects but did not list money attached to them. Projects got added in as we approached the 1997 election, by both parties, for reasons I will not go into. We therefore had a programme with far too much in it at the tail-end, and which did not have the right amount of money attached to it. The noble Lord, Lord Prescott, announced that he thought his aim as Transport Secretary was to reduce the number of cars on the road, and he was therefore not going to build roads which simply increased traffic. I know this well because we announced the roads programme in 1998, about four days after I became the Minister, so I take no responsibility for the decisions but I do take responsibility for the presentation. The majority of things which had been in the previous paper were back in, and then there were one or two more and one or two fewer—but they were all costed. A lot of those costings proved to be utterly inaccurate, most of the timings proved to be most inaccurate and one of the projects was indeed the A303 past Stonehenge, and we know what happened to that. Certainty is not easy in this area. We need a bit more certainty than we have here.

Energy Bill

Debate between Lord Whitty and Lord Jenkin of Roding

Wednesday 6th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Whitty]

My Lords, these amendments relate to the strategy which will be required under Clause 136. As I indicated earlier, the clause itself should be beefed up. At the moment the Government clearly think it can all be done by secondary legislation. But whatever the substantive content of the strategy, and whatever definition of fuel poverty is adopted, careful and regular reporting and monitoring of progress on improving the energy efficiency of the houses in which low-income households live, and on reducing the total numbers of the fuel poor in our economy, are important to hold the Government and the supply companies to account. This reporting would also ensure that the policies the Government intend are pursued, whether they are the current ones via the ECO or, to some extent, the Green Deal, or whether they are new policies that the Government come up with at a later stage.

Noble Lords earlier argued for it to be a taxpayer-resourced intervention in improving energy efficiency. As my noble friend Lord O’Neill said earlier, we need to measure the success of that policy in terms of the energy efficiency of buildings, and to look year by year—and in particular to set target years—at how the energy efficiency of our dwellings is improving, as other noble Lords have acknowledged. Even now, after nearly 20 years of activity in trying to improve the quality of our buildings, we fall far short of the northern European standard in terms of insulation and warmth retention. We are therefore far more afflicted by the resultant fuel poverty than other equivalent countries.

One problem is consistency of reporting. We need to report on the achievement of the objectives: on energy efficiency, and on reductions of the number of the fuel poor; but we also need to report on the effects of fuel poverty, and how we are managing to reduce those. Some of those are set out in the amendment. There are references to mortality rates due to fuel poverty; to the cost of fuel poverty-related diseases to the NHS; to debt; and to emissions of carbon dioxide, because this is an energy efficiency and carbon reduction policy as well as a fuel poverty and social policy. These should all be monitored and reported on, and checked against the milestone targets which I hope the Minister will eventually come up with in the strategy.

The other point is consistency with past data. There is a problem here because there is some cynicism that a change of definition of fuel poverty has statistically got rid of nearly 2 million homes without anybody actually being any better off. Some people should have been excluded from the total, but most people would regard that the majority of those are still fuel poor, and the run of statistics we have had from the year 2000 or even earlier onwards would be discontinued if the change of definition also led to an end of those historic statistics. We also have the complication that in Scotland, Northern Ireland and, I think, Wales, the old definition is to be retained. Therefore, when we look at UK numbers for the fuel poor, there will be an inconsistency between the adoption of Professor Hills’s definition and the government monitoring and tracking that, and what is happening in the devolved Administrations, which would mean that we could not have an overall UK figure.

That may change over time, but all I am suggesting is that for a few years we mandate that the old series should continue so that the old definition—as I say, we already have a 15-year run with it—should be extended at least to 2018 and be reviewed at that point. For the first few years of the strategy, the two criteria could be judged. There would be the new definition, which will have a starting point in, say, 2014 or 2015 and is the Government’s preferred definition—for the moment I accept that—and a comparison with the old, historic trend. We would then be able to see whether the change in definition led to a change in outcome statistically and whether that change actually meant something real on the ground. In some ways, the two might diverge significantly, because while the criticism of the old definition was that it was too price sensitive, the criticism against the new definition is that it is not quite sensitive enough. In the end, the judgment of poverty is that someone cannot afford something because the price is too high. I fear that the Government will find that even if they have a relatively successful policy on energy efficiency, if prices continue to go up, that will not show in the figures. It is my subjective judgment that that will be a problem.

All I am saying tonight is that the Government should accept, for a limited period, that we should run the two series together to see if they diverge and whether there are any policy or future monitoring conclusions to be drawn from that. I hope that the Government can accept that, and that there should be systematic reporting of the level of fuel poverty, the success of energy efficiency activity, and of its outcomes and impacts in the terms of these provisions. I beg to move.

[Lord Jenkin of Roding (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, has made a sophisticated case for his amendment. When I read it, my first reaction was to say, “We have all agreed that the Hills proposed definition is likely to be more effective in dealing with real fuel poverty than the existing one that was suggested under the Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act”. Indeed, as I said earlier today, having reread the debate on this subject that we had in Committee, I had the impression that there was very little disagreement that the new would be a good deal more effective than the old.

The noble Lord has now given two reasons for running on. One is to be able to have a continuous process whereby the old one goes on while the new one is being introduced so that there is no gap, and with that I have some sympathy. But if he is saying that the second reason for running the two in parallel is so that you can compare one with the other, I would find that more difficult. I am not sure how the officials would manage to do that. If the old definition has been established by Professor Hills’s report as really not being an effective measurement of fuel poverty and therefore providing the basis for annual reports, it would seem that the less one relies on it the better, and the quicker one can go on to the new one the better. However, it may be that I have misunderstood the noble Lord. I do not think it can be used to compare; the only possible reason should be for continuity, which I am sure could be achieved in other ways.

Energy Bill

Debate between Lord Whitty and Lord Jenkin of Roding

Monday 4th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Whitty (Lab)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 76A, I shall speak also to Amendment 76B which is grouped with it.

We now come to the central part of this Bill which takes up 60 pages of the main Bill; it comes to something like 60 clauses and a large chunk—two-thirds—of the schedules. It has received relatively little attention in the course of the Bill’s proceedings, and virtually none in another place. We gave it reasonable consideration in Committee and we reached a degree of consensus. There are some things I still have queries about, but I am grateful to the Minister for explaining aspects of that and also to her officials who explained some of the aspects even further.

It still remains, however, that this is part of the Bill which has received very little public and wider attention. Yet it is one of the most important parts of the Bill because it regulates the nuclear industry. The policy of the Government, and to a large extent the policy of all parties now, is that of a significant shift towards nuclear power within our energy mix. We know the history of nuclear power is controversial, not only in the past here, but also worldwide. It is therefore essential that we get the system of regulation in this area right and the balance right. The Government have, to a large extent, done that. It has been quite a long gestation period taking what will be the ONR out of the Health and Safety Executive, giving it certain additional powers and clarifying in one piece of statute what its role is. I commend that. While it makes for a rather lopsided Bill, it is an important achievement. My amendments, therefore, are not attempting to upset the main thrust of the provisions within these sections, but they are trying to clarify some aspects of it. I hope that the Minister can give me some satisfaction on that.

One of the main roles of the ONR, and one of the most important public roles, will be the approval of designs for new reactors and the construction process that goes with it. Yet in all those pages there is very little mention of that role. It is mentioned here in Clause 60 and it is mentioned specifically under nuclear safety. The reason that it is so important is that both those who argue strongly in favour of nuclear power and those who argue strongly against it are concerned about the nature of the design of the reactor. It has been an issue in relation to the Hinkley Point approval that this reactor may not be the most appropriate reactor for the future—it may not be the most cost-effective and it may not be the best in terms of the contribution to the environment. Whether those criticisms are true or not, the Government rightly had a very heavy assessment, verification and approval process before they gave the go-ahead to the Hinkley Point project. The ONR in its shadow form and the Environment Agency both had a role in looking at that design. They looked at the design itself, its engineering, its safety requirements, its operational requirements, its effect on the ecology and the environment and of course they looked at its economics. They gave approval following a pretty long process and managed to rationalise the number of planning and other approvals that were needed.

I declare an interest in that until the end of last year I was a member of the board of the Environment Agency and I took a particular interest in the nuclear dimension of its activities. Both on the ONR/HSE side and on the Environment Agency side that was a very effective process. It was, however, an ad hoc process. It was a process that the Government invented when we were talking about several different designs that were possible and several different sites a couple of years earlier. It is still true that there has been some criticism of the choice of design being what some people refer to as an old design for what is a 35-year project. I do not want to enter into an argument about the merits of those criticisms myself, but it is important that the Government and the regulatory system have a robust system of ensuring that the design has been through the most rigorous appraisal system.

There are of course other designs that will be coming along. We have other sites that are capable and have been already designated by the Government as potential nuclear sites. There are other designs out there which are already operational or nearly operational: the CANDU system, a boiling water system, a PRISM system and there are companies and consortia that are promoting those here and elsewhere in the world. It is therefore highly possible that a different consortium from the one that is operating at Hinkley Point will come up with a different design which will need to be subject to an equally rigorous process. In that process it is vital that part of the responsibility of the ONR is to be at the cutting edge of nuclear technology and all the sub-technologies that go to make up the design. It is also important that it is cost-efficient.

The other criticism of the Hinkley Point deal is that we are paying too much for it. I again make no point on that at this stage. It is clearly right, however, that it is done on the most cost-effective basis, both for public acceptability and for the importance to the economy of moving to a greater share of nuclear power through the 2020s. It is also important that maximum safety is built in and, more generally, the protection of the environment.

Reading these sections of the Bill, one would not immediately deduce that this is, in a sense, the central role of the ONR. The approval of new systems, the new reactor designs and the appropriateness in the timescale is an important part of our ability to meet our carbon targets and to ensure that there is no detrimental effect either to the economy or to the environment. It deserves at least underlining—which is all my amendment does—that the role of the ONR in this respect is crucial and comprehensive, and that it is not only to do with safety but all these other matters as well.

Amendment 76A makes it clear that it is not only the safety of persons that is relevant but the safety of, and impact on, the environment. For that reason it is also important that there is specific reference in the Bill to the role of the Environment Agency. That agency played an equal role in the Hinkley Point case. The Environment Agency clearly has powers under the environment Acts but what we discussing is a joint responsibility. The ONR is not taking over that responsibility from the Environment Agency, which presumably could have been an option when the ONR concept was delivered.

Amendment 78B underlines what I have been talking about and makes it clear that in approving a design, and the construction plans that go with it, there is an absolute obligation on the ONR to ensure that they are of the very highest quality. The amendment also covers issues of cost-effectiveness, safety and security. This is central to the task of the ONR, as I have argued. The safety dimension is central to the safety of the population and of the environment. It is also important in a political sense. The public’s acceptance of the shift to nuclear power is fragile. It is significant but fragile, as we saw in Germany and other countries following the events at Fukushima. Therefore, it is important that the regulator we put in control of this system is seen as having a comprehensive and robust responsibility to deliver on all those elements when approving a major new reactor design. On every occasion we need to go through a very detailed process. It is important that it is written in large letters that this is one of the ONR’s central functions.

The Minister may say that this amendment is superfluous but in terms of reassuring the public it is important. The Government’s policy on this issue may be sufficient but the issue of the certification and approval of design must be an important part of the Bill. I hope that my few words on these two amendments will take it some way in that direction. I beg to move.

[Lord Jenkin of Roding]

My Lords, the House is very much indebted to the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, for the amount of time and the expertise that he has brought to bear on this important part of the Bill, as he rightly said. It has been a very long time in gestation. It was recognised two, even three, years ago that the difficulties which the ONR—it was then the nuclear inspectorate—faced in recruiting people to do the very specific task that is required when approving nuclear designs meant that they had to be sui generis so far as the terms of the employment were concerned. They could not be subject to the normal standard Civil Service rules. That is the primary aim of this part of the Bill: namely, to take the ONR out of the standard Civil Service terms of contract for the people it employs. It takes anything up to 20 years before an inspector becomes fully qualified to carry out the extremely expert work that is necessary to approve the designs of nuclear power stations and they are difficult people to come by. One needs to be competitive in this regard. The Select Committee on Science and Technology heard evidence from the former chief inspector, Dr Mike Weightman, who was very clear about this and, indeed, was glad that the issue was at last coming forward in this Bill. He made it clear that he had had to wait rather a long time for this to be done. The Government are very much to be congratulated on including the issue in the Bill.

Amendment 76A, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, and others, seeks to add the words “and the environment”. As a former board member of the Environment Agency, the noble Lord has had much more experience of this issue than I have. As he rightly said, the regulation of this area is done by both bodies—the inspectorate, now the Office for Nuclear Regulation, and the Environment Agency. Their roles may overlap but they are most emphatically not the same. Nuclear science and technology is essentially the area of expertise of the ONR whereas the Environment Agency has the broader role of looking at the impact of a nuclear plant on the surrounding environment and at atmospheric pollution and so on. These roles are not the same. I will be interested to hear what my noble friend has to say on this. However, if I may say so, to add “and the environment” would confuse the issue. This part of the Bill does not deal with the Environment Agency, which continues to do exactly what it did when the noble Lord was a member of its board. I would be interested to know the reaction of the Environment Agency to the amendment. I think it would say, “It is not for them, it is for us”, meaning the agency. As I say, I shall be interested to hear what my noble friend has to say but it raises a question.

As regards Amendment 78B, we need to pay greater attention to cost-effectiveness. I do not know how many noble Lords have read the very interesting article by my noble friend Lord Ridley published a few weeks ago in which he talked about the cost pressures of the nuclear inspectorate on the price of a nuclear power station. I do not have the article in front of me but I remember he said that the inspectorate is taking a very, very safe system and insisting that it will be a very, very, very safe system. The question is: what will that cost? I would be interested to know to what extent it is the inspectorate’s role to consider the cost of the additional requirements that it may impose on the design of a plant.

I am absolutely satisfied that the public will expect the inspectorate to have very high standards. Indeed, I spent some years as the honorary president of the Energy Industries Council, which represents some 650 companies in the supply chain for all the energy industries. One of the things I find myself saying over and over again is that if firms are going to sell to the nuclear industry they must get used to nuclear standards which, for the most part, are considerably higher than general engineering standards, and rightly so. However, is it the role of the ONR to look to the question of cost? It has to consider the design of the plant that is put before it. As the noble Lord rightly said, there will be several. It is already looking at the advanced boiling water reactor put forward by Horizon Nuclear Power, which is now owned by Hitachi. It is not yet looking at either CANDU or PRISM—the other two items the noble Lord mentioned—which are still being examined by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority and the department. However, if a design is put forward for either of those two items, the inspectorate will have to look at those as well. Should it be concerned about the cost? The only cost with which it ought to be concerned is whether we are expecting too high a standard at too great a cost, and whether this is absolutely essential. I suspect there is a temptation to say that anything which makes an installation safe—even if it has to be very, very, very safe—should be done even if it costs a lot. I do not agree with that. There must be a role here for looking at the particular cost for the particular requirement that the inspectorate is asked to look at.

As I say, I shall be interested to hear what my noble friend says about that but I think there may be greater merit in this amendment than in Amendment 76A.

Energy Bill

Debate between Lord Whitty and Lord Jenkin of Roding

Thursday 4th July 2013 Grand Committee

[Lord Jenkin of Roding]

My amendment has of course not been moved so I cannot withdraw it, as I am sure that my noble friend realises. I may study her remarks quite carefully, together with the advice that I have been taking on these matters. I hope that I will not need to return to this on Report, but the advice I had was that people felt pretty strongly that there had to be one non-executive director with experience in the area of the ONR. I am not quite sure whether the Bill gives them the power to do that. We hope that it should be firmly written into the Bill that they must, but I have not moved the amendment so I cannot withdraw it.

[Lord Whitty]

My Lords, I am somewhat disappointed by the Minister’s reply, but I should first apologise to the Committee that I did not refer in my opening remarks to the last three amendments in this group, which deal with cross-appointments. They would not be compulsory, but the Secretary of State should have the option of appointing people from other bodies with a role within the nuclear industry. It would be helpful to have something like that in the Bill, as co-ordination between agencies is aided by having non-executive directors who cross-represent. We do too little of it and, as a result, we have turf wars and misunderstandings between agencies. I could bore the Committee with some of those from my experience as a non-executive director of two such agencies and as a Minister. I agree that the Secretary of State should not be bound to do this, but the Bill should at least point him in that direction and I am disappointed that the Minister does not accept that.

On the point about pensions, this was a probing amendment. Very few regulators pay pensions to their board members. It is all part of the market rate for nuclear-trained and qualified people. I will not say any more about that in that case, as it is fine, but it is slightly odd to have that in legislation.

On the central question about the make-up of the board, it seems to me that the board, including the non-executives, must represent the best traditions in health and safety governance. That means that they have to have a high level of expertise and knowledge of the law, and of the technical and scientific areas, in which they operate. I am therefore a bit surprised that the Minister is not prepared to accept something like the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin. It also means that the success of the Health and Safety Executive over 40 years—it has been a great success, since it has brought down the level of injuries, deaths and dangerous practices across the board in industry—has in part depended on it being seen as a collaborative effort.

The symbolism, and usually the reality, of that was that at the top level there were people representing the unions as well as the Government. Clearly, the Government still accept that view of the make-up of the HSE board even though they do not want to consult the TUC about it. Their advertisement for the board of the HSE, which I briefly considered, makes that clear.

It seems wrong that we should depart from that culture for the creation of something which is taking on responsibilities such as those of the ONR in a sector where collaboration and understanding between management and unions—and their ability to have a coherent approach to the management of risk on a daily basis—is so important, because the results of not so doing could be utterly catastrophic. The Government will regret not putting that structure in. Depending on the judgment of future Secretaries of State, they may regret not explicitly saying that they want one of the non-executive members to,

“have experience of … nuclear safety”.

It is not sufficient to say that that will be provided by the executive directors. The whole point of non-executive directors is that they can, on equal terms, discuss these issues with the executive directors. In terms of representation, it may not have the structured or corporate state kind of formal representation that was there in the origins of the HSE, although I regret the passage of that. In reality, they ought to have been able to reproduce the culture of the Health and Safety Executive at top level, and they ought to have on the board people who have experience of the main areas which are the responsibility of the ONR.

I think that it is unfortunate that the Government do not reflect that in the legislation. It is one of the things we may return to. If the Bill goes through in this form, I hope that the judgments of future Secretaries of State, whichever department is responsible, will take these things into account anyway. It would be better, frankly, if it were in legislation. That would set the tone and nature of the organisation. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment at this stage.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Whitty]

My Lords, the Committee will be relieved to know that Amendment 40C is the lead amendment in the final group for today. This group deals with aspects of the financial structure of the ONR. I am not sure that even the totality of 60 pages of regulations and another 60-odd pages of schedules makes this subject clear to me.

Amendment 40C is pretty straightforward. I cannot see in the reporting mechanism, although I am sure that this would be the fact in practice, that the report that the ONR has to give to the Secretary of State, and that the Secretary of State gives to Parliament, must include a fully audited set of accounts. That seems fairly straightforward. If it is there somewhere else in the Bill, I will withdraw, but it seems helpful to put it in the formal reporting structures.

Amendment 40D deals with borrowing. It is a probing amendment. I do not, in principle, object to the ONR being able to borrow, but it is not a provision that we find very frequently in the powers of regulators. We know that there has been some indication that the amount of public funding that the Government will give to the ONR—directly out of the taxpayers’ pocket, as it were—will be £35 million a year, I think, potentially rising to £80 million. It is a fairly hefty whack and a very important contribution.

The ability to borrow over and above that, and the ability to charge fees, is pretty unusual in a regulator. Can the Minister give us some indication of what she expects the total expenditure to be, not just the taxpayers’ and the fee income, but the total expenditure, roughly, of the ONR in its early years of operation? How much of that does she expect will need to be raised through borrowing? This is quite a delicate area. I am sure there are some public bodies that can borrow but, generally speaking, not regulators.

In the nuclear sector, speakers on previous amendments have emphasised the absolute necessity of the ONR being independent. There is a wider issue of conflict of interest over whom it would borrow from and what obligations that borrowing would provide. It is presumably not helpful if the ONR borrows from the industry it intends to regulate or anybody with connections to it. If we go ahead with an ability to borrow, there should be some pretty explicit restrictions on it. If the provision simply means that the ONR can borrow from the public works system of loans from the Government, we probably should say so. If it goes outside that, issues do arise.

This is not only an industry issue; security and safeguard issues are also involved. Would we want it to borrow from overseas sources? Probably not in most cases. In a subsequent clause we allow the ONR to operate overseas, but should it be able to borrow money to do so? Again, who will it borrow the money from to regulate or help regulate someone else’s nuclear sector? I am suspicious about this. My amendments would delete the lot but I am willing to listen to something short of that. Before we finish with the Bill, the Government need to be cautious about this and make explicit what powers we are giving it, what the limitations are and what the money is for.

On Amendment 40G, Clause 34 allows the ONR to charge fees. However, it is not clear on what basis those fees will be charged. In general, the Treasury would require regulators to charge fees based on full-cost recovery. Is that the principle on which the ONR is to operate? It is not quite the principle on which the HSE operates, but it is moving towards it. It is, broadly speaking, the principle on which the Environment Agency operates and it would be useful to know on what basis it is to charge fees to the industry and to whom in the industry it is to charge fees. Is it simply the operators of the nuclear sites and installations, or is the whole of the supply chain feeding into that operation to be charged fees as well?

Clause 79 allows the ONR to provide services to anyone, more or less, provided it has the consent of the Secretary of State. Presumably that includes overseas. In principle, it may be okay to provide the expertise of ONR staff in areas for which the ONR is not responsible—which, as I read it, Clause 79(2) to (5) allows—but that seems a bit odd. If the expertise and services it is providing are not in the areas for which the ONR was set up, you could have all sorts of odd operations. A top nuclear inspector in his spare time may also be an expert in karate or in almost any area. On the basis of this clause, the ONR could hire out its services under the label of ONR. More likely, you could get the ONR running an engineering consultancy service, a scientific and technical service or a metric measuring service using its expertise, but not in the areas for which it is responsible.

If we are going to do that, we will be creating a somewhat different beast—a beast that can diversify. As we find with quasi-public bodies that diversify, if that side concern turns into a seriously commercial money-making concern, it can distort the priorities and the nature of the organisation as well as create areas for conflicts of interest.

I hope these wide and bland powers to provide services to almost anyone will be looked at again by the Government, and that clarification will be given, if not in legislation then at least in the guidance, on how the ONR board and management will eventually operate. I beg to move.

[Lord Jenkin of Roding]

My Lords, I have doubts about two amendments in this group. On Amendment 40G, I am told that full cost recovery always takes place. However, you have a potential position whereby a licensee who needs to be properly regulated may be in financial difficulties and unable to pay the charges that he would otherwise have to. It may be a rare occurrence but, given that they attempt a full cost recovery at the moment, there needs to be a possibility that some essential services may not be paid for on the spot by the licensee because they do not have the money. I would be very interested to hear any other arguments.

I am unhappier about Amendment 40K. This point has been raised with me by the Nuclear Industry Association, which feels that it would be greatly to the advantage of the UK generally and the ONR in particular to be able to develop and make the best use of its expertise in markets not just in this country. The effect of eliminating subsections (4) to (9) of Clause 79 would be to reduce the ONR to its absolutely core activities. There is quite a strong feeling that that would not be to everybody’s advantage.

My noble friend referred to the effect of the Fukushima disaster and the great tsunami there, and I said earlier that it greatly enhanced the reputation of regulation in this country because of the work of Dr Weightman—but it goes wider than that. The supply chain for the nuclear industry is very much concerned with spreading its activities abroad to increase overseas earnings, and here, too, the ONR could provide valuable services and should not be prevented by the Bill from doing so. Of course, it will always be concerned primarily with its regulatory duties in this country, but it has the expertise, and will develop increasing expertise, to provide wider services and perhaps earn some money for itself and for this country. So I would be unhappy to see the elimination of those four subsections.

On the question of the account of what the total money might be, I await with interest the answer from my noble friend.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Jenkin of Roding]

Before my noble friend sits down I hope I may be allowed to say how much we owe to the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, for enabling us to have debated a large number of matters during the course of the afternoon. As I said earlier, I had my doubts about whether we would take the time. We will stop just half an hour short and are most grateful to him.

[Lord Whitty]

Flabbergasted as I am, I thank the noble Lord and others who are saying, “Hear, hear!” I wondered if we could get through a full day when I started on this process, because, in principle, we agree with the Government’s broad strategy and we certainly want an ONR which is effective, independent, vibrant and innovative. Anything I have said is not intended to restrict that. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for pointing me to paragraph 21 of Schedule 7 about the annual accounts. It would be helpful to have them all in one place, but nevertheless this seems to cover the point.

On full recovery of costs, there will be situations in which regulators cannot do that. They usually have to explain why to the Treasury, certainly if it is done on any systematic basis. There will be exceptions, but I think that the Government have said they will be pursuing the principle of full recovery of costs. I am not therefore pursuing the argument that this needs to be in legislation. At least we have a clear answer that that is the principle and that fees and costs will be covered plus the Secretary of State’s allocation of grant in aid—or whatever we call it these days.

That might still leave a gap which presumably is intended by the borrowing provisions here. As my noble friend Lord O’Neill says, I have proposed deletion, not to say that I am utterly opposed to borrowing powers, but to see to what degree the Government are likely to use them. The Minister has pretty much indicated that they would not use them that often, but they are there. Given that they are there, I think that in some capacity or another, the Government—it could be the Secretary of State in guidance, or whatever—need to be pretty careful of what kind of borrowing the ONR engage in, because this gets into the area of conflict of interest.

This also applies to my amendments in relation to what services the ONR can sell. Because my deletions would still leave subsections (1) and (2) of the clause, which allow the ONR to sell services anywhere in the world which relate to its areas of purpose—that is, nuclear safety in the widest sense—all the objectives of selling services to other states that are interested in developing nuclear power would be allowable, even if my full deletion was accepted. I am worried about a provision that says we can also sell services to anyone anywhere that are not related to our purpose. That seems to allow for a money-making venture which is not really related to the role of the ONR.

At the end of the day, through all of this, we have to remember that the ONR is a regulator. As a regulator it has to be cleaner than clean. It has to have clear sources of operation; clear standards to which it operates; clear standards for the qualification of its staff; and—yes—some limitations on what those staff and the organisation can do. To retain a genuinely world-class regulator in a very difficult and delicate field, we need to be careful not to allow any loopholes which allow a conflict of interest to be claimed, even if it is not for real. I am a bit suspicious about the issue of selling services. I think the Government should reflect on it. For now, I am happy to complete this stage—only 20 minutes in advance, regrettably—and beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Energy Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Whitty and Lord Jenkin of Roding

Tuesday 4th October 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jenkin of Roding]

My Lords, I will make two brief points. The first is that, yes, there are landlords who fall well short of the standards that we might like them to adhere to. I am especially concerned with one category of letting, and that is letting to students. I say this with some feeling, as my grandchildren are in exactly this position now. A group of four students at Imperial rented accommodation in the north-east of London, and it was so draughty that my dear granddaughter came and said, “Please may we have a rug to lay against the front door to keep the snow out?”. They were not going to be there for more than a year, and indeed they were already looking for something else. However, these will be the really difficult cases, and I think one has to recognise that.

My second point is quite different. I have been consulting local authorities, because they now have quite specific rules to enforce the new provisions that are made for the private rented sector. I am gratified to find that they are in fact quite ready to take that up. They welcome this, provided that the full cost will be met, and that this will be treated under a full burdens assessment so that they will not have to thrust the cost upon their council tax payers. I think that they have been given some assurances, but if those assurances could be repeated this evening by my noble friend that would be very welcome.

[Lord Whitty]

My Lords, I also thank the Minister for bringing forward the substantive amendments here. However, I would also like to support the noble Lord, Lord Best, particularly on Amendment 35E, on the date. We have arrived at a slightly illogical position. There was some concern when the date was 2016, but there was a certain logic to that date. People were worried about it taking five years, but in the original proposition there was a review to be completed by 2014. The Government have accepted the logic of removing that review, which might delay progress and clarity about what we were requesting. However, that should make 2016 easier to attain, rather than less easy. I am therefore somewhat bemused as to why we are now talking about 2018 for meeting these standards.

I will accept that there could be two logical reasons for it. The noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, has touched on one: the argument that local authorities need time to prepare and to set up their enforcement. However, that is not what local authorities are saying. They are concerned about the cost, but they are also quite keen to get involved in this, at least at the RDA level. No doubt one or two local authorities will not quite make it but we know that most of them are trying to. Frankly, it would be slightly easier for them to do so had an amendment to another Bill proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Best, which would have allowed the local authorities to set up registers been accepted by the noble Lord’s colleagues in the DCLG. However, it is not really the case—

[Lord Jenkin of Roding]

I have specifically asked the local authority associations where they stand on the issue of 2016 or 2018. While they see the attraction of 2016, they have actually made it quite clear that they are not taking a position on this. No doubt different local authorities will have different views. However, the associations have specifically told me firmly that they are not taking sides in this argument.

Energy Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Whitty and Lord Jenkin of Roding

Monday 31st January 2011 Grand Committee

[Lord Whitty]

My Lords, we are now moving on to Chapter 5 of the Bill and the issue of smart meters. We have touched on it from time to time at earlier stages, and I have said that some of the issues that arise in relation to the Green Deal also arise in relation to smart meters. The Government will need to consider the implications of the two programmes. I should probably make it clear at the outset that I am in favour of a roll-out of smart meters, but there are a significant number of consumer issues which arise in relation to the installation of such meters which, if wrongly handled, will lead to some resistance and backlash against them.

Smart meter installation is different from the Green Deal because the Green Deal is ultimately a voluntary scheme that the householder or landlord can take on board, and then he can decide whether it had been a good deal for his premises. With smart meters, the obligation is on the supply companies to install them. They are already beginning that installation, and some of them, particularly British Gas, already have a substantial programme under way. However, we should look at the implication for consumers. As colleagues will know, one of the problems in the energy market has been the ease with which people can switch and the potential cost of switching in terms of both the supply company and the method of payment.

If we have a wholesale introduction of smart meters—which make it more difficult, more costly or more of a hassle for the consumer to be able to say, “I’m fed up with the way this company is dealing with me; I want to switch to the next company”, or “I’m fed up with paying by pre-payment meter; I want to go on to direct debit” or whatever the choice is—and if the meter itself, the system under which the meter operates or the terms on which it is supplied make that more difficult, then we have significant consumer detriment. We must remember that the energy market is not one that is characterised by deep trust of consumers in their suppliers. Nor is it the case that the regulator has substantial powers over the peripherals: it has substantial powers over the supplier, but there is no real protection in relation to energy products or services in the same way. Installation of smart meters could lock people in to their current system unless we provide that the meters are reasonably interchangeable, compatible and available in a way that allows people to switch both method of payment and supply.

We have to bear in mind that the introduction of smart meters is not so universally supported as it probably is in this Room. Research by Consumer Focus a couple of years ago, as well as evidence from Which?, showed fairly deep resistance to it, and some misunderstanding. So there is some mistrust at the consumer end, to put it at it mildest. We also know that in other countries where similar programmes have been adopted there has been some resistance—for example in some states of America and, on broader human rights grounds, in the Netherlands. So it is a delicate area. If we are to achieve introduction with minimum consumer resistance and minimum delay and challenge, we need to be able to reassure the householder that the meter that they are installing will not stop them switching should they wish to change tariff, company or the method by which they pay.

So, Amendment 32C deals with the degree of compatibility. This is not just an issue of standards, because we have been talking about standards for smart meters for at least 10 years before we have introduced a single one, and we are still at a position where we do not have a common standard. It would obviously help if at this point we already had a standard, but the issue here is compatibility, which need not necessarily mean a single standard or specification. It is important that we can reassure consumers that installing a meter will not inhibit their choice.

Amendment 32B deals with a slightly more ticklish issue. When the supply company or their agent is required to go into households and install a smart meter, how will it deal with trying at the same time to sell other products that are related to the smart meter, or that could be made to be related to it? Protecting consumers during the installation process is essential if we are not to meet with some resistance. On the one hand, there is the possibility of mis-selling in these circumstances; on the other, some devices are coming on to the market that would make it much easier for consumers, on the basis of the smart meter, to know what was causing their energy consumption to increase and how they could control it. The basic smart meter primarily gives the supply company that information, although it also tells the consumer at any given time what their level of consumption is and the cost of it.

The amendment would allow information to be given to householders about other products that could help them to make sense of and use smart meters, but in a way which does not amount to hassle or to a situation where their mandatory presence inside the consumer’s house can be misused to sell particular products. The amendment effectively requires the marketing material to be in a written form so as to protect the householder from being misled or mis-sold a related product.

I have no doubt that the Minister and his officials will have comments to make on the exact wording, as will the supply companies; but unless we recognise this as a potential problem, we could find ourselves in some difficulty. In one sense we are ahead of the game in that some installation programmes are going on and we know that there will be no standard design or specification before 2014 at the earliest. We could therefore already be locking people in. We need to ensure that, as the programme rolls out, we minimise the degree to which that can happen in future.

I hope the Government can at least take on board these concerns and look at the best way of dealing with them in terms of the legislation and reassuring householders that smart meters will not inhibit their choice or lead to their being ripped off in some other way when the installation takes place. I beg to move.

[Lord Jenkin of Roding]

My Lords, like the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, with many of whose remarks I entirely agree, I, too, have been trying to keep in touch with what has been going on—indeed, ever since I was offered the chance of installing a smart meter by one of my suppliers, only to be told that I could not possibly have it because it was in a porch and, therefore, accessible to anyone passing the house. It seems to me that these are the kind of things that must be dealt with.

I think that the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, has not fully taken account of the extent of the discussions, which have been going on now for some time, between the Government, the industry, Ofgem and consumer groups. These discussions have been extremely positive and seem to me to have been exactly the right way forward. We now have the Government’s prospectus—issued in July, I think—and a draft code put out by the Energy Retailers Association, which works with Energy UK, that sets out how a code might deal with precisely the points to which the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, drew our attention.

I am told that this has attracted comments from the consumer organisations, which are clearly interested in seeing how it will develop. In terms of securing a system that is both clear and at the same time offers flexibility—and flexibility is something that the industry has tried to build into the system; there must be some flexibility in how this will be done—a code which can be more easily amended in the light of experience may be better than trying to establish firm statutory rules, such as those in the amendments which the noble Lord has moved.

One of the points right at the heart of these discussions is that the right of changing your supplier has to be built into the system. I have had a letter from my noble friend’s department only this morning in response to a representation that I made to him a couple of weeks ago. It states:

“Common specifications will also be the means for achieving ‘inter-operability’, which means that suppliers can use smart meters installed by other suppliers, allowing easy switching.”

It seems to me that that is the kind of standard which the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, was looking for, and I think it is now firmly taken on board by both the industry and the department. Indeed, I have been told that the question of maintaining the right to switch suppliers has been regarded as a sine qua non. It has to happen with the installation of smart meters, and nothing in the system should prevent it, given that it is the way in which competition can be made to produce benefits for the consumer. A voluntary code that balances flexibility to provide the customer with information, while at the same time guaranteeing their rights, would be a very desirable way forward. I do not know what my noble friend will say but, against that background, the amendments might be regarded as being overprescriptive.

Energy Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Whitty and Lord Jenkin of Roding

Wednesday 26th January 2011 Grand Committee

[Lord Whitty]

My Lords, I am not against relying on statutory instruments to clarify the policy as we go down the line. All Ministers find that it takes time to work out the details, but at this stage we need to put down some markers and to have an idea of the general direction in which the Government are going.

I agree with a lot of what my noble friend Lord O’Neill said on the ECO and fuel poverty. If the Government are effectively putting all their eggs in the fuel poverty basket through the ECO replacing all other forms of intervention, as my noble friend Lady Smith said, however good the scheme which emerges under the ECO is, it will be undermined if the payment for it is on a quasi-poll tax basis. You will take away with one hand what you have given with the other. I urge the Government to think clearly about what they are doing on both sides of that equation.

However, my main point is on Ofgem. I understand that a review of its role is still ongoing. As the Minister will know, there are widely different views, not necessarily on a party basis, on what Ofgem should and should not be doing. Ofgem itself tends to change its mind on what it should be doing. Clause 67 implies that we are taking something away from Ofgem. I should like to know from the Minister whether this is part of the review of Ofgem, which I understand will end in March, when there will be a report. Ofgem is also covered by the Public Bodies Bill, as my noble friend said, and there are uncertainties relating to what will emerge as a regulator in that regard. It is important that the totality of what Ofgem is responsible for is defined before we provide measures which could, piecemeal, carve off bits of Ofgem’s role or add bits to it. Before we finish the Bill, we need to hear the result of that review and what the Government propose in total.

[Lord Jenkin of Roding]

My Lords, I have much sympathy with what has been said about the need to know more about what will be in the orders and regulations made under the Bill. Like others, as my noble friend Lady Maddock has said, I understand the pressures that the Minister is under. He wants to get ahead with this and in the mean time he is consulting on the details of what will go into the regulations. At the same time, he must appreciate that it is quite difficult to debate the Bill—these clauses, including Clause 61, are particularly detailed—without knowing what is in the Government’s mind. I shall pick out only one subsection, subsection (3), which inserts new subsection (5A) in Section 33BC of the Gas Act 1986. The new subsection states:

“If the order makes provision … enabling the Authority to direct a transporter or supplier to meet part of a carbon emissions reduction target by action relating to an individual named in the direction the order may also make provision”.

I do not imagine for one moment that Ofgem will make an order directing the supplier to deal with Mrs Buggins by name. This must mean categories or classes of consumer. Indeed, the purpose of the Bill— which I very much welcomed at Second Reading—is to concentrate this help on the people who are fuel poor or in a similar category. That is what we are trying to do. However, that is left vague in the subsequent new paragraphs. In new paragraph (a), it is stated,

“authorising the Authority to require specified persons to provide it with information for the purpose of enabling it to identify and select individuals who are to be the subject of a direction”.

New paragraph (b) refers to,

“specifying criteria in accordance with which the Authority is to select individuals who are to be the subject of a direction”.

One can see that one is moving into a very complex and obviously very necessary part of the whole procedure.

I compare this with the CERT programme, which, after a short delay, this ECO is intended to replace. The CERT programme dealt with very large categories and applied to 11 million people. There was the ridiculous situation that companies that were supposed to concentrate their efforts on the priority group were not allowed to be told who they were. After a tremendous effort, and through the Pensions Bill, we got a power to make a regulation that allowed the Department for Work and Pensions to specify the names of a very small class of pension credit beneficiaries. I was reminded of that marvellous line from Lucretius—I will not quote the Latin as that is out of order—that the mountains heaved in childbirth and what came out was a little mouse. It was a very small group, a very small part of the 11 million.

What seems to be intended is that Ofgem will be given the criteria and will be able to select the groups to which it may then direct companies to give help and support. I hope I have understood this intention correctly. I am sure my noble friends on the Front Bench will recognise that it is very difficult to debate this if one does not have any idea of how that power is going to be used.

Over the several editions of CERT I made the point about not being allowed to identify these groups and having to search the streets to find the people who qualified for the priority group under that legislation. I get the impression that that message has been taken on board and that we are therefore going to have a more specific effort to try to define the group categories. When the Bill refers to,

“an individual named in the direction”,

presumably that means they are going to actually have names and therefore addresses so they will know where to go to give their help.

I suspect the noble Lord, Lord O’Neill, is right and that it may be a while before we get to Report. We have to do that on the Floor of the House when it is not occupied with other legislation, but there may be an opportunity for Ministers to give an indication of how the order is to be implemented. This is at the heart of what the energy companies’ obligation is about. They are going to help designated groups of people much more specifically than form part of the priority group under the CERT legislation. It is quite difficult to debate this, however, if we do not know who they will be. I take as an example subsection (3) and it is the same in the following subsection; if we could have had some indication as to who they are that would make the debate more meaningful.

However, going back to my first point, I do understand my noble friend’s problem of having to move ahead with this legislation so as to bring forward the day in which it can become operative, while at the same time negotiating in detail with all the various groups and bodies about how it is going to be implemented. We must lean over a little more to help Members of the House to carry out our duty of scrutiny so that we know what we are talking about.

Energy Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Whitty and Lord Jenkin of Roding

Wednesday 19th January 2011 Grand Committee

[Lord Jenkin of Roding]

My Lords, we will come to the question of the energy company obligation later, but at this stage I must say that I was relieved to hear my noble friend Lord Teverson qualify the proposal in the third subsection of his Amendment 12 by saying that this is a bit of a cock-shy and may not necessarily be the right way ahead. At Second Reading, I remarked favourably on the energy company obligation because it was going to be more targeted on the fuel-poor than is the comparable measure under the CERT programme, which provided for a priority group covering about 11 million people, including every pensioner. It seemed to me that that was a very broad scattershot and made the cost to the energy companies that much greater. As I understand the Bill, the ECO is firmly linked with the question of fuel poverty; it is aimed at providing benefits for those who are classified as fuel-poor.

I am entirely with my noble friends in their assertion that local authorities have a major role to play in ensuring the success of the Green Deal. I recognise the value of incentives in the form of reduction of council tax or whatever. For instance, this is being offered by the Government in the case of communities that accept onshore wind farms; for a limited period they will be able to keep the additional rateable value coming to them, which will help the councils. On this occasion, however, it would be difficult to justify putting on to the energy companies the cost of any council tax rebates that may be awarded under subsection (3) of my noble friend’s Amendment 12. I was grateful to hear that he was not hooked on that as a solution to his problem.

[Lord Whitty]

I support the thrust of these amendments and I am grateful that we are discussing the role of the local authorities this early. Both as movers and shakers and as facilitators and providers of a framework or catalyst for movement, they will be extremely important.

In most parts of the country, opinion polls show that local authorities are relatively trusted. They are certainly trusted more than central government and energy supply companies. Whether the reasons for that are right or wrong, it is important that we mobilise that general good will. Local authorities have a role in a number of different respects and while it is true, as the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, has said, that the social housing stock has largely moved to housing associations, that is by no means totally the case. There will be many situations in which the local authority is still the landlord, although it may have a management company to run things, and it will have a responsibility for fairly substantial parts of the social housing stock and its maintenance and improvement.

It is regrettably true that the early stages of the last Government’s decent homes programme did not have a very strong energy efficiency dimension. That improved as time went on, but an opportunity was missed; a substantial amount of expenditure went on upgrading social housing stock, but improved energy efficiency was not one of the prime objectives. Local authorities as landlords can take that on.

Of course, there are also landlords of estates that are no longer a single form of tenure. Some of the occupants may well be tenants, but some of them may be owner-occupiers and some may be leaseholders or on a sublease, while some properties may be run by housing associations within the same estate. We have a complex and largely beneficial mix of types of housing on some of our larger estates, but the local authority is still the landlord and therefore in a strong position to try to persuade those on all forms of tenure to take advantage of the Green Deal, which probably individually they might not.

It is wrong that some improvements on estates have applied only to one form of tenure, because the economies of scale, to which the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, referred in a wider dimension, apply whatever the form of tenure. The totality of the provision and use of energy in those estates means that economies of scale will be achieved if the majority of the residents participate. The local authority is by far the best body to ensure that that happens.

Where housing associations are the landlord, of course they also have to have a role, but that is a slightly different role from what the amendment envisages for local authorities. Housing associations are no different from any other landlord that could effectively take advantage of this scheme and negotiate better terms, because they deal with substantial properties. It may be, however, that the Bill also needs to refer to housing associations in this regard.

Of course, local authorities can go beyond their role as the landlord or as a body that has an indirect interest in the property to a role in which they can help to persuade landlords of private tenanted property—that will include a significant number of the fuel-poor, but not necessarily only them—and owner-occupiers to operate this scheme on a street-by-street, similar-property-to-similar-property basis, again achieving economies of scale.

That role of local authorities is important. Some will be more prone to take up this cause and will be better at it than others, but that is the essence of devolution. Indeed, I assume that the essence of localism is that you will have different patterns in different areas. It is important that the Bill recognises that.

As for subsection (3) in the amendment, it is true that the new ECO commitment will be largely focused on the fuel-poor, but local authorities will be able to negotiate—not only with the householder but also with the energy supply companies—different ways of incentivising the adoption of the Green Deal. As I said early on in our proceedings, we have to recognise that this is a voluntary thing. It is not something that the Government, the energy company or your landlord can impose on you; take-up is voluntary. That may require some incentives. As the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, said, it is already the case in a number of areas that, by dealing with the energy supplier—British Gas, mostly—local authorities have already provided an incentive, so presumably they already have the power to do so. Subsection (3) suggests that we need to legislate for the link with the new energy company obligation, but I believe that local authorities already have the power to do this. If, by agreement with the energy supply companies, they can reach an accommodation that delivers the Green Deal on a wider scale, they certainly should not be inhibited from so doing. Amendment 12 is important in that it recognises these proactive and direct roles of local authorities, so I hope that the Government, if not agreeing with every word of it, will accept the general thrust.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Jenkin of Roding]

The noble Lord is perfectly entitled to make his point, but it does not refer to the point I was making. My point was that, yes, prepayment meters are used by many poor households and of course the gas and electricity companies have a very clear idea of who they are. Under the previous arrangements, they had to get 40 per cent of their carbon dioxide savings from people in that priority group, so they had to find out who they were, however difficult it was. That is not the point that I was making; my only point was that the presence of a prepayment meter in a dwelling is not of itself a good surrogate for who is fuel-poor. As the noble Lord himself has recognised, there may be many people with second homes; there may be people doing short-term lets who prefer to put in a prepayment meter, but whose tenants, the bill payer, may be miles from fuel-poor, but that is one of the ways that a landlord can make sure he is not landed with a bill at the end of the day. It is just not accurate to say that all prepayment meter households are inevitably fuel-poor or poor. They are not, and I think it is very important to recognise that fact and not take refuge in abusing the companies, which the noble Lord is so fond of doing.

[Lord Whitty]

My Lords, I am not sure of the relevance of this argument to the actual clause before us. The issue here is that prepayment meters have a history, whether you are fuel-poor or not, of having significant charges over and above the cost reflectivity and over and above the degree of security which the supplier can assume on other means of payments. In other words, if you are on direct debit, there is a reasonable degree of security, but it is slightly less than on a prepayment meter, which is an almost absolute security of payment, because you do not get any electricity unless the meter is turning.

Historically, the issue has been pretty appalling. Frankly, the regulator denied the problem for many years. I declare my previous interest as former chair of Consumer Focus. Consumer Focus and Energy Watch banged on for years about that before the point about cost reflectivity was finally accepted by Ofgem. It does not matter whether the reason that you have a prepayment meter is because you are fuel poor or because your landlord, in various tenancy situations, insists on you having a prepayment meter. It does not matter whether it is a second home. It does not matter whether you are in a mansion block in Kensington, where many are on prepayment meters—generally speaking, the income of that particular subgroup is somewhat higher than the fuel-poor. The point is that they were being ripped off.

As I understand it, the new clause is proposed by my noble friend because we do not want a similar nontransparent rip-off to occur by clobbering the structure of tariffs on prepayment to hide the fact that, as a result of having a prepayment meter, you have a differentially poor repayment profile under the Green Deal.

The new clause also touches on a substantial point that, had I been present on Second Reading, I would have made: the fact that, at the same time as we are introducing the Green Deal, we are mandating energy supply companies over the next 10 years to install smart meters in every household in the land. The energy companies will have to carry out that provision, over which the landlord, the tenant or the owner-occupier has no real control. Whereas the Green Deal will be a voluntary sign-up, smart meters will not. I happen to be in favour of smart meters for energy efficiency, carbon saving and behaviour change reasons, but we could get those three things muddled up. It may be that the same supplier who is offering you a Green Deal is at almost the same time proposing to put the smart meter in, as they will be required to do, and perhaps negotiating with you the terms of your operation of a prepayment meter.

The point of the new clause, as I understand it, is to separate those different elements so that there is no distortion for the consumer. The wider point is whether the rollout of the Green Deal can in a conscious, planned way relate to the rollout of smart meters. The reality is that, on the one hand, people are going to go into every home in the land under the smart meter installation programme; and, on the other, somebody will be offering a deal under the Green Deal.

A lot of householders will be seriously confused as to which bit they have to accept, and the repayment for that, and which bit they have some option and flexibility about, and they do not have to take the deal at all if they do not want to. I assume that paragraph (a) in the new clause relates to any meter being installed, including the new requirement that smart meters be installed. We have to separate those things in terms of repayment; but in terms of delivery, there may be some benefit in associating them. I would like the Minister to comment on that point, and particularly to endorse the point lying behind my noble friend's amendment: that those three separate issues must be disentangled.

Energy Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Whitty and Lord Jenkin of Roding

Monday 17th January 2011 Grand Committee

[Lord Jenkin of Roding]

My Lords, we are considering, among other things, what is to go into the code of practice. We are not at this stage legislating that these are going to be duties placed by the Bill immediately on the various participants, but it is what the code of practice needs to cover. This raises the point that has already been mentioned; I will mention it very shortly again. There will have to be a balance. If you are going to attract providers to initiate the process by setting up a scheme which involves assessors, installers, the energy companies and so on, there must not be too many obstacles or disincentives placed in their way. Equally, there needs to be fairness for the consumer whose house is going to be made more energy efficient. Throughout this process we must make it clear that we have that balance right.

I have read some of the briefs, one or two of which are reflected in the amendments that have been tabled by my noble friends. I rang one and said if you get all these amendments accepted, you will kill the scheme stone dead. There will be so many obstacles and barriers that the objective of the scheme to get the largest possible number of homes and small business offices properly treated and properly energy efficient will in fact not happen. The response was, “We still think that these are necessary to protect the consumer”. A balance has to be struck.

The one thing that I am attracted to is a proper system for making complaints and having them dealt with. That seems something that the code of practice could very well deal with quite effectively. Nothing is worse than if something goes wrong and you do not know where or how to try to get it put right or you waste hours on the telephone trying to find people who will deal with your complaint. That could be a very important element in ensuring the confidence of the people whose premises are due to be made more efficient. If one adds all the other things together, one is creating barriers. We must be very careful not to raise too many barriers otherwise the scheme simply will not achieve its objectives.

[Lord Whitty]

I support the bulk of these amendments. They may eventually appear in a somewhat different form but they are important for the success of the scheme. I apologise that I was not here at the beginning of the discussion of the consumer protection amendments and that I was in somewhat sunnier climes on Second Reading. This is the first time that I have intervened in this debate and I hope that colleagues will not mind me reiterating my general position.

I am strongly in favour of the Green Deal approach for its effect on carbon cuts, fuel poverty and the bills of consumers of all kinds. However, it is a complicated thing to put together. There are several things that would kill it stone dead, as the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, said, one of which is that the industry is not mobilised because it is disincentivised. However, an equally possible reason for the thing falling stone dead would be if consumers do not have confidence that the work that they are being asked by choice to undertake in their own homes is done in an effective way and that, were there to be any flaws in it, they would have suitable protection and redress.

We are talking about 14 million householders and landlords and 250,000 potential workers in this area. There are bound to be things that go wrong and people understand that. However, they also need to be assured that the general quality of the people that they are asking into their homes and, ultimately, they or their successors are paying for, do a proper job and that there is some protection if they do not. The confidence of the householder and the landlord is essential in this area, otherwise there will not be a sufficient take-up of the scheme.

We have talked a little about certification and accreditation. This group of amendments addresses checking on quality in a reasonably random way. There is the issue of warranty and of having standardised —or at least the offer of standardised—insurance. If we are undertaking building work in our homes, we would expect all of those to exist. If we ignore the need for that, we consumers deserve to be ripped off by cowboy builders or whatever—as many are.

There is an added complication because the people that the householder will be dealing with—the people who, effectively, they will be repaying for this work through their lower energy bills—will not in general be the same as the people who are doing the work, nor the same as the people that will be in their homes, nor the same as they would expect the quality of work from. We do not quite yet know what the range of new Green Deal providers will be. However, there will be finance companies, maybe retailers, banks, energy service companies and energy supply companies. Relatively few of these will be the same as the people making the installation. They will in one sense be subcontractors and, hopefully, the subcontractors will be accredited and certified in some form. There will be standards which they will all meet or which the majority will meet most of the time. However, the householder will need to be assured that there is that standard; that there is the protection of an effective warranty and insurance system; and that there is an appeals and redress process built into the totality of the system.