Lord Jenkin of Roding
Main Page: Lord Jenkin of Roding (Conservative - Life peer)(13 years, 7 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I apologise to the Committee for my late arrival. The Chair will have saved me by indicating that sittings in the Chamber take precedence and, unfortunately, Questions went on beyond the scheduled start of this Committee. I hope that government business managers will look at that difficulty, which has been the source of a little embarrassment to me today and, more than that, a disadvantage to the Committee.
The amendment is concerned with giving consumers choice. It would enable consumers to have the benefit of a more comprehensive range of options, so that those who are motivated or who can afford a range of energy efficiency options can think about installing measures that go above and beyond the Green Deal. Providing a range of such options helps consumers to think more intensively about which measures they would like to install, as some measures will be better suited than others, according to the circumstances of the building that is due to be treated.
We have heard in Committee arguments in favour of thinking beyond what may strictly be provided through the Green Deal. We all appreciate the importance and significance of the Green Deal. I am not in any way, shape of form doing anything other than commending the objectives of the Green Deal, but there are possibilities beyond it. We all have a major job in educating the public and our fellow citizens about how they can respond. We all know what a challenge that will be because, in all circumstances, despite the fact that the arrangements for payment are so skilfully done through energy bills, costs are involved and we all know people’s natural response to additional costs, particularly when, in the immediate future, household budgets are likely to be constrained.
We want to make sure that as much information as possible is available and that we emphasise the necessity of both hitting the targets and ensuring that individual citizens and consumers sign up to the proposals in the Bill. This amendment builds on the momentum in this House for a more comprehensive energy perspective. I hope, therefore, that the Committee and the Minister will look on it as a constructive proposal to assist in the general objectives of the Bill. I beg to move.
I had hoped that the noble Lord would have given some indication of the range of improvements and benefits that might be available under the Green Deal. It seems to me that, if one were to list the entire range, including appliances and all the other things that now qualify under the Green Deal, that could in many cases be misleading to a householder, as it might be that only two or three of them could possibly be relevant to his or her house. I just wonder what the purpose is of listing the whole lot if inevitably the assessment will be that, within the price and given the nature of the building concerned, numbers 1, 2 and 3 are really the only ones that will be applicable. What is the purpose of listing, as the amendment suggests in the second subsection, all energy efficiency measures, if most of them might not apply to that house?
Following a slightly similar line of thought, but not exactly the same one, I think that, if you are going to have people in undertaking works to improve the energy efficiency of your building and you are able to do works outwith the scheme, why should that not all be done at the same time? I would hope that the Green Deal might set a minimum standard and a financial limit of the funding available and that, within that financial limit, as much work as the individual owner and improver wishes to undertake can be undertaken. After all, it is a financing arrangement that we are talking about; if the property owner or housing association or whatever wants to go the whole hog and really do the whole job, I do not see that the upper limit matters. What we want is the security of a scheme and it must have a minimum standard. We do not need the rest of it, so I think that the idea of listing it all is completely unnecessary. The only thing that needs to be totally determined is the minimum standard. After that, let it rip.
Another difficulty, which I referred to in our previous sitting, is that the householder faces a choice—whether to have a warmer home or lower bills. It will be difficult for anybody to estimate what the bills will be if the consumer decides that they have been cold and that they want the temperature to be a couple of degrees higher in their house. The problem is in quantifying. I totally support this whole proposal, but one has to make sure that it is realistic and workable. The noble Lord suggested an estimated range, making it clear that the estimate depends on whether the householder wants a warmer house. In many cases, one of the best things to do is to wear another layer of clothes. My granddaughter shares a flat. She is a sensible girl but one of her flatmates is not and their bills are higher because the flatmate chooses to wear pretty skimpy clothes. One has to take account of these human foibles.
Perhaps I could intervene as well at this point. This illustrates the classic difficulty of legislating in a way that is dependent on regulations, which we cannot possibly see at this stage. A critical issue is whether the Green Deal has a fixed rate of interest. Each individual deal must be based on a fixed interest. If the system fails to have a fixed rate of interest, a deal may show a clear saving when it is begun—particularly because interest rates are low and one could probably get financing for this sort of thing at 3 or 4 per cent—but, if interest rates rise to 5 per cent and the borrowing rate goes up to 8 per cent, that could completely take out the effect of the savings over a period of time. There is a real issue, which comes back to the fact that we are, as with all legislation of this sort, flying blind. We need to think seriously about interest rates. If the deals vary with interest rates, their attractiveness will be considerably eroded.
My Lords, we will come to the question of the energy company obligation later, but at this stage I must say that I was relieved to hear my noble friend Lord Teverson qualify the proposal in the third subsection of his Amendment 12 by saying that this is a bit of a cock-shy and may not necessarily be the right way ahead. At Second Reading, I remarked favourably on the energy company obligation because it was going to be more targeted on the fuel-poor than is the comparable measure under the CERT programme, which provided for a priority group covering about 11 million people, including every pensioner. It seemed to me that that was a very broad scattershot and made the cost to the energy companies that much greater. As I understand the Bill, the ECO is firmly linked with the question of fuel poverty; it is aimed at providing benefits for those who are classified as fuel-poor.
I am entirely with my noble friends in their assertion that local authorities have a major role to play in ensuring the success of the Green Deal. I recognise the value of incentives in the form of reduction of council tax or whatever. For instance, this is being offered by the Government in the case of communities that accept onshore wind farms; for a limited period they will be able to keep the additional rateable value coming to them, which will help the councils. On this occasion, however, it would be difficult to justify putting on to the energy companies the cost of any council tax rebates that may be awarded under subsection (3) of my noble friend’s Amendment 12. I was grateful to hear that he was not hooked on that as a solution to his problem.
I support the thrust of these amendments and I am grateful that we are discussing the role of the local authorities this early. Both as movers and shakers and as facilitators and providers of a framework or catalyst for movement, they will be extremely important.
In most parts of the country, opinion polls show that local authorities are relatively trusted. They are certainly trusted more than central government and energy supply companies. Whether the reasons for that are right or wrong, it is important that we mobilise that general good will. Local authorities have a role in a number of different respects and while it is true, as the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, has said, that the social housing stock has largely moved to housing associations, that is by no means totally the case. There will be many situations in which the local authority is still the landlord, although it may have a management company to run things, and it will have a responsibility for fairly substantial parts of the social housing stock and its maintenance and improvement.
It is regrettably true that the early stages of the last Government’s decent homes programme did not have a very strong energy efficiency dimension. That improved as time went on, but an opportunity was missed; a substantial amount of expenditure went on upgrading social housing stock, but improved energy efficiency was not one of the prime objectives. Local authorities as landlords can take that on.
Of course, there are also landlords of estates that are no longer a single form of tenure. Some of the occupants may well be tenants, but some of them may be owner-occupiers and some may be leaseholders or on a sublease, while some properties may be run by housing associations within the same estate. We have a complex and largely beneficial mix of types of housing on some of our larger estates, but the local authority is still the landlord and therefore in a strong position to try to persuade those on all forms of tenure to take advantage of the Green Deal, which probably individually they might not.
It is wrong that some improvements on estates have applied only to one form of tenure, because the economies of scale, to which the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, referred in a wider dimension, apply whatever the form of tenure. The totality of the provision and use of energy in those estates means that economies of scale will be achieved if the majority of the residents participate. The local authority is by far the best body to ensure that that happens.
Where housing associations are the landlord, of course they also have to have a role, but that is a slightly different role from what the amendment envisages for local authorities. Housing associations are no different from any other landlord that could effectively take advantage of this scheme and negotiate better terms, because they deal with substantial properties. It may be, however, that the Bill also needs to refer to housing associations in this regard.
Of course, local authorities can go beyond their role as the landlord or as a body that has an indirect interest in the property to a role in which they can help to persuade landlords of private tenanted property—that will include a significant number of the fuel-poor, but not necessarily only them—and owner-occupiers to operate this scheme on a street-by-street, similar-property-to-similar-property basis, again achieving economies of scale.
That role of local authorities is important. Some will be more prone to take up this cause and will be better at it than others, but that is the essence of devolution. Indeed, I assume that the essence of localism is that you will have different patterns in different areas. It is important that the Bill recognises that.
As for subsection (3) in the amendment, it is true that the new ECO commitment will be largely focused on the fuel-poor, but local authorities will be able to negotiate—not only with the householder but also with the energy supply companies—different ways of incentivising the adoption of the Green Deal. As I said early on in our proceedings, we have to recognise that this is a voluntary thing. It is not something that the Government, the energy company or your landlord can impose on you; take-up is voluntary. That may require some incentives. As the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, said, it is already the case in a number of areas that, by dealing with the energy supplier—British Gas, mostly—local authorities have already provided an incentive, so presumably they already have the power to do so. Subsection (3) suggests that we need to legislate for the link with the new energy company obligation, but I believe that local authorities already have the power to do this. If, by agreement with the energy supply companies, they can reach an accommodation that delivers the Green Deal on a wider scale, they certainly should not be inhibited from so doing. Amendment 12 is important in that it recognises these proactive and direct roles of local authorities, so I hope that the Government, if not agreeing with every word of it, will accept the general thrust.
The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, may be pleased to hear that when I read through the Bill I put a question mark against the reference to a fee in subsection (5). Like him, I would like to know what this is about. I would envisage, particularly if there is a change of ownership, that a new owner might prefer and be prepared to pay off the debt that is on the house so as to be shot of that. I would be very distressed if that were going to attract a fee. Like the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, I am not clear what this fee refers to and I look forward to hearing what my noble friend has to say about that.
Having said that, I think that if one is entering into an agreement that may well last 25 years, it is asking too much to expect any provider to offer a loan at a fixed rate of interest over the whole of the 25 years. The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, did realise that that might be difficult for the Government to accept. One inevitable consequence is that the interest rate on the loan would have to be higher than it might otherwise be. He knows much more about this than I do, but you can have tracker bonds that will follow the rate of interest, and obviously, if interest rates are low, you will start very low. However, you are actually recognising that if interest rates go up—and whether we will face this later this year remains to be seen—inevitably then the rate on the loan goes up. It will be for the provider to propose a rate of interest for the loan and for the improver to agree. Simply starting from the proposition that there would have to be a fixed rate over the whole period may, I think, be going, as the noble Lord indicated, a bit too far.
My Lords, I was wrestling with an amendment—it was going to be a probing amendment—to the effect that a landlord of private rented property should not be liable for the Green Deal if the property becomes vacant. I realise that this amendment might better be put in Chapter 2, when we are discussing the private rented sector, but it did not seem to fit there and seems to fit much better in Clause 5, which deals with the terms of the plan and in particular the persons liable to make any payment under the Green Deal.
When a private rented property becomes vacant between lettings, does liability for the Green Deal loan repayment fall to the landlord, bearing in mind that energy bills are likely to be minimal between lettings? It seems obvious that if the property is vacant, it would fall to the landlord to carry on paying any energy bills for the duration of the vacancy, even though they are minimal, but does he become liable for the Green Deal? And if so, does the repayment of the loan instalments get adjusted downwards, bearing in mind the very small energy bills while vacant and the golden rule? Secondly, what happens if the landlord cuts off the energy supply and reconnects when a new tenant arrives? The energy bill would be zero but there would still be interest to pay. Would this fall on the landlord and what about the golden rule here? Could this act as a disincentive to landlords to take up the Green Deal, or do the Government think it will act as an incentive to landlords to reoccupy the property more quickly, bearing in mind that the landlord may have to carry out repairs, maintenance and redecorations between lettings?
There is a provision in Clause 15(3)(d) of this Bill to suspend Green Deal payments. Does this suspension provision apply when a property becomes vacant, and, if so, what would this do to the repayments? Would it increase the term of the agreement and increase total liability due to interest accrued during the suspension? I ask all this because it does not seem to be at all clear as to how this would work and what the figures would be like for the landlord in the event of his property becoming vacant. I would be grateful for clarification.
Can my noble friend give some indication of what level of fee—I made the point about early repayment, perhaps a successor owner wishing to pay off the whole bill and not have it hang over them—he thinks is likely to be charged under the arrangements that my noble friend has outlined? There really is an argument for keeping that as low as possible.
I totally agree with my noble friend Lord Jenkin. There is always an argument for keeping everything as low as possible. However, we are not at the stage of the Bill where we should be able to predict or prescribe how additional fees are charged. I think I have spoken to that; I hope that my noble friend feels that I have. We have a lot of discussion, dialogue and consultation to have with the financial institutions who may well be providing that finance.
I note that the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, also looked on this clause and also saw that there was an issue with regard to the appropriate penalty. I appreciate that he is looking at it slightly differently from us, as we distinguish between the individual and the body corporate. We are concerned that we need an order of magnitude with regard to the nature of the offence. Here we are, involved in an exercise when we all know that we want, as far as possible, to see provisions go through on the basis of consent and mutual amity. We also know that things can go wrong. When they do so, we need to have some feeling of the order of magnitude which is attended on the wrongdoing, consistent with the overall objectives of the scheme. I look forward to the contribution that the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, will make to his amendment. I beg to move.
I was inspired to table my amendment by the proposal of the Delegated Powers Committee. In paragraph 11 of its report, it drew attention to the absence of a limit in the Bill and of the penalty that could be imposed. It took the view that as the affirmative procedure would be required, it would not regard the derogation of the power as inappropriate. However, it suggested that there should be a maximum penalty.
Looking at this provision, and applying my little skill and dubious judgment, I suggested a figure of £500. My amendment was tabled before that of the Official Opposition, and I am intrigued to see that they tabled the same figure for corporate bodies but a much lower figure for individuals. I would like to know what the Minister has in mind as an appropriate level of penalty. Mine is an entirely probing amendment.
I thank noble Lords for their suggested amendments to Clause 14 to limit the level of financial penalty on individuals and companies for failure to comply with the disclosure and acknowledgement provisions. This clause provides the powers of the Secretary of State to make regulations to ensure that sellers and licensors comply with their disclosure and acknowledgement obligations. The clause allows for the following specific provisions to be made: sanctions for non-compliance, including civil penalties; requiring the Green Deal provider to cancel the liability of a bill payer to pay Green Deal plan instalments; requiring the Green Deal provider to refund any payments already made; and requiring those at fault to pay compensation to the Green Deal providers.
I understand noble Lords’ desire to protect individuals and businesses from excessive penalties. However, the disclosure and acknowledgment requirements are vital to the effective operation of the Green Deal and indeed to protect the customer, so we need robust and transparent sanctions to ensure that they are all complied with. We will work with relevant industry stakeholders to develop options as to how these provisions will apply in practice to minimise instances of non-compliance. I wish to emphasise that we will consult before setting out these arrangements in regulations.
Our aim will be to use existing and well established systems of sanctions and redress where possible. Further consideration is necessary to determine what level of civil penalty would provide sufficient deterrence to ensure compliance, but I trust noble Lords understand that it would be premature to make a decision on an upper limit at this stage. In conclusion, I assure noble Lords that we will seek to ensure that penalties are proportionate. I hope that this assurance will enable the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.
I raise a point on this, because it is relevant to a question that I asked on Second Reading. If there is a default on the repayment of a Green Deal loan by a bill payer, which of the parties bears the cost of that default? Is it the energy supplier, whose job it is to collect the repayment as an addition to the energy bill, or is it the provider who put up the money in the first place? I am not sure that I have yet had an answer to that question. I know that it is one that worries suppliers. Many of them are energy companies, which are likely to face considerable strain on their balance sheets due to the huge investment which they will be making in generation and transmission equipment over the next few years. They are anxious that if they find themselves liable to bear the costs of default under the Green Deal scheme, that may affect their balance sheets and the perception of the financial markets.
I do not know whether this is an appropriate point to raise that question, but we are talking about defaults, and that is a question which really needs an answer. My noble friend may well not yet be in a position to answer. I think that I am right in saying that it was not answered on Second Reading, but it is a question which is causing concern and to which, at some stage, there will have to be a full answer.
We will develop this theme as the Bill goes through. Of course, in the first instance, it is the consumer to whom we would go in the event of default. Then, my noble friend rightly asks, will it be the Green Deal provider or the electricity provider? We are consulting on that issue at the moment. It is a very important thing to consult on, and when the consultation is over, we will bring it in to the Green Deal.
Was the noble Lord speaking to the amendment or to the clause?
I was speaking on the Question whether the clause should stand part.
Amendment 16E concerns prepayment meters. We wish to highlight the fact that there should be transparency to to help overcome any disinclination of poor households in fuel poverty to try to improve their heating. As we all know, a prepayment meter requires cash to be paid before energy can be consumed. Some meters take cards or tokens on which cash can be credited.
PPMs are used by energy suppliers as an alternative to disconnection and are routinely fitted to recover outstanding bills. As the financial crisis worsens, we are worried that more and more consumers with PPMs are going without electricity or gas under self-disconnection even in the coldest months of the year. This research sought to understand the extent of self-disconnection among PPM users and the effects that it can have. In research undertaken by Consumer Focus, the majority of households welcomed their prepayment meters for the control that they offer over budgeting and debt. This control comes at the price of inconvenience in managing and topping-up meters. Some consumers resort to going without heating, or without even the most basic of everyday essentials to ensure that they have enough money to keep their meters topped up. For some households this is an ongoing struggle. Around 16 per cent of PPM users self-disconnect at least once a year. That could affect as many as 1.4 million people, some of whom are highly vulnerable.
The tariffs charged for prepayment meters are more expensive than direct debits or online tariffs. Yet, despite the relative high costs, the majority of families on PPMs have an annual income of less than £17,500. Thirteen per cent of households pay for their gas and electricity using prepayment meters, with almost two-thirds of these households using them to pay for both gas and electricity. More than half of households on such meters receive a means-tested benefit or benefits for disability.
Ofgem’s own investigation found that prepayment meter customers were paying more for their energy than it costs energy companies to supply. To ensure that the tariff was cost-reflective, Ofgem introduced new licensing conditions for energy suppliers. Since September 2009, the new conditions have required energy suppliers to ensure that the price paid by prepayment meter customers reflects the cost of this form of supply when compared with direct debit or standard credit tariffs. Ofgem has concluded that the new conditions have led to the average premium for prepayment meters compared with direct debit falling to £69 from £111 since October 2007.
Nevertheless, an investigation by Consumer Focus has shown that the cost of poverty premium, based on a real-life example, reveals a differential of £250, which has caused us to raise the problem with the Minister in Amendment 16E. We are seeking clarity for people who wish to use prepayment meters and may wish to disconnect. There should be clarity that the extra charges which could be levied under this are separate from the extra charges that they could pay for Green Deal, such that the benefits that we would wish them to seek under a Green Deal application are not undermined. I beg to move.
I discussed the whole question of consumers with prepayment meters at some length with the body representing electricity producers. It was in the context of the CERT scheme, which we debated several times over the past two or three years. The point that they made very firmly was yes, of course, there are a number of consumers with prepayment meters who are fuel-poor. As the noble Lord properly said, it is one way in which the companies can make more certain of securing the cost of the energy they supply. But the companies also made clear to me that it is a very poor surrogate as a test for who are the fuel-poor. I found this surprising, but they were quite clear: a surprising number of consumers actually prefer to pay by prepayment meter so as not to be faced with bills at the end of a month or three months. One needs to bear that in mind: it is not an accurate indicator of who is likely to be fuel-poor.
My Lords, will the noble Lord bear in mind that these same electricity and gas companies have the postal codes of their consumers, and that it does not take a computer genius to link the postal districts with areas of great disadvantage and social vulnerability? It is quite clear that there are a number of people in second homes who find it very convenient for understandable reasons to have prepayment meters. However, the argument advanced by the energy companies that they do not really know who the poorest people are, is self-serving, because they make a lot of money out of charging a higher rate for these meters. It has been one of the great sources of antagonism for many of us against the power companies, that they have disadvantaged people who are already vulnerable. The ones who have second homes we can understand; but the correlation between the postal codes of poor neighbourhoods and the fact they are on prepayment meters is simple to establish, but they never want to do that because they hide behind so-called Freedom of Information provisions, which I do not think stand up to close scrutiny when they are set against the disadvantage of the people exploited by this form of charging, in many instances.
The noble Lord is perfectly entitled to make his point, but it does not refer to the point I was making. My point was that, yes, prepayment meters are used by many poor households and of course the gas and electricity companies have a very clear idea of who they are. Under the previous arrangements, they had to get 40 per cent of their carbon dioxide savings from people in that priority group, so they had to find out who they were, however difficult it was. That is not the point that I was making; my only point was that the presence of a prepayment meter in a dwelling is not of itself a good surrogate for who is fuel-poor. As the noble Lord himself has recognised, there may be many people with second homes; there may be people doing short-term lets who prefer to put in a prepayment meter, but whose tenants, the bill payer, may be miles from fuel-poor, but that is one of the ways that a landlord can make sure he is not landed with a bill at the end of the day. It is just not accurate to say that all prepayment meter households are inevitably fuel-poor or poor. They are not, and I think it is very important to recognise that fact and not take refuge in abusing the companies, which the noble Lord is so fond of doing.
My Lords, I am not sure of the relevance of this argument to the actual clause before us. The issue here is that prepayment meters have a history, whether you are fuel-poor or not, of having significant charges over and above the cost reflectivity and over and above the degree of security which the supplier can assume on other means of payments. In other words, if you are on direct debit, there is a reasonable degree of security, but it is slightly less than on a prepayment meter, which is an almost absolute security of payment, because you do not get any electricity unless the meter is turning.
Historically, the issue has been pretty appalling. Frankly, the regulator denied the problem for many years. I declare my previous interest as former chair of Consumer Focus. Consumer Focus and Energy Watch banged on for years about that before the point about cost reflectivity was finally accepted by Ofgem. It does not matter whether the reason that you have a prepayment meter is because you are fuel poor or because your landlord, in various tenancy situations, insists on you having a prepayment meter. It does not matter whether it is a second home. It does not matter whether you are in a mansion block in Kensington, where many are on prepayment meters—generally speaking, the income of that particular subgroup is somewhat higher than the fuel-poor. The point is that they were being ripped off.
As I understand it, the new clause is proposed by my noble friend because we do not want a similar nontransparent rip-off to occur by clobbering the structure of tariffs on prepayment to hide the fact that, as a result of having a prepayment meter, you have a differentially poor repayment profile under the Green Deal.
The new clause also touches on a substantial point that, had I been present on Second Reading, I would have made: the fact that, at the same time as we are introducing the Green Deal, we are mandating energy supply companies over the next 10 years to install smart meters in every household in the land. The energy companies will have to carry out that provision, over which the landlord, the tenant or the owner-occupier has no real control. Whereas the Green Deal will be a voluntary sign-up, smart meters will not. I happen to be in favour of smart meters for energy efficiency, carbon saving and behaviour change reasons, but we could get those three things muddled up. It may be that the same supplier who is offering you a Green Deal is at almost the same time proposing to put the smart meter in, as they will be required to do, and perhaps negotiating with you the terms of your operation of a prepayment meter.
The point of the new clause, as I understand it, is to separate those different elements so that there is no distortion for the consumer. The wider point is whether the rollout of the Green Deal can in a conscious, planned way relate to the rollout of smart meters. The reality is that, on the one hand, people are going to go into every home in the land under the smart meter installation programme; and, on the other, somebody will be offering a deal under the Green Deal.
A lot of householders will be seriously confused as to which bit they have to accept, and the repayment for that, and which bit they have some option and flexibility about, and they do not have to take the deal at all if they do not want to. I assume that paragraph (a) in the new clause relates to any meter being installed, including the new requirement that smart meters be installed. We have to separate those things in terms of repayment; but in terms of delivery, there may be some benefit in associating them. I would like the Minister to comment on that point, and particularly to endorse the point lying behind my noble friend's amendment: that those three separate issues must be disentangled.