Lord Whitty
Main Page: Lord Whitty (Labour - Life peer)(13 years, 7 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, although I do not entirely agree with this amendment, or the way in which it is written, I think that it is important that the Green Deal plan is put within a broader context. In some ways, the Bill allows for that. In our last session in Grand Committee, we discussed the clauses that refer to the Green Deal plan and/or energy plan and I think that it is that broader energy plan that we could include in this.
As we will see in the next group of amendments, there will be occasions when there will be a much better deal available because more than one property is involved in the decision. This should also be pointed out in the Green Deal energy plan. I like what we are trying to achieve, because I believe that there is a broader issue.
There is another issue that has been left out. The biggest part of any energy plan is not the hardware or the physical changes that are made but how you use energy in your house. I would like to see an obligation in the code of practice—it is not appropriate for the primary legislation—that requires the assessor to ask whether it is possible to run a dishwasher or heating overnight off-peak rather than during the day. Your use of energy can be more effective in ways other than making physical changes to a building. I would like to see that included in recommendations in any energy plan.
This group of amendments includes Amendment 11, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Whitty. Although I do not agree with all of the amendment, I agree with the end of the sentence, which says the improver should have,
“no bias towards any one green deal provider”.
That comes back to the issue of ensuring that the improver gets a fair choice and option and that there is no bias within the system.
Prompted by the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, I rise to speak to the amendment in my name. Amendment 11 would require the assessor to inform the householder or landlord of the full range of possibilities and the flexibility within any recommendations. The assessment should be subject to clear, objective criteria. I know that some noble Lords dislike the reference to “standardised assessment”, but we need some objectivity and we need to give the householder some choice in how they take the assessor’s recommendations. We need to indicate some flexibility, even within the Green Deal, if we assume that there is a financial limit. This is before you consider the possibility of other arrangements to go beyond the provision of a new deal.
On the point made by the noble Lords, Lord Jenkin and Lord Moynihan, it is clear that there will have to be a detailed code of practice and it may be that some of these issues will be dealt with in that. However, those issues covered by the code of practice in Clause 3 do not include the listing or the objectivity in that listing of recommendations. While I accept that it may be more appropriate for this to go into the code of practice, the primary legislation has to make clear what the Secretary of State will have to bring forward when that code of practice eventually appears.
Finally, I underline the point that the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, made about the importance of there not being any bias towards any particular provider. This goes back to who is doing the assessing and what the qualifications for the assessing are, which we discussed at our last sitting. These things are quite ticklish. Obviously, we wish to encourage innovation in this area and we wish to encourage new entrants in the provision of energy-saving installations, ventilation equipment and so on, but these things get roguish at times. It is important to recognise that there is no point in going for the latest super-duper micro CHP system in an individual house if the roof is still not properly ventilated and the windows are not properly fitted. There is a hierarchy of things that you need to do, both in terms of cost and in terms of the most appropriate treatment of those premises. The code of practice and, in broad terms, the primary legislation need to make that clear. Otherwise, we will—I go back to the point that I made when I first spoke in Committee—get back to a situation where, in the very early days, there will be some bad publicity about what people have been lumbered with and the inappropriateness of the work that has been carried out. That would be very dangerous to the success, which we all want to see, of this Green Deal scheme.
My Lords, in view of the concern that some noble Lords have expressed over the difficulty of achieving a uniformly high level of competence in the assessors, it ought to be explicit in the Bill whether or not individual householders will have the opportunity to go to a different assessor if they feel that the job has not been done properly by the first.
My Lords, we will come to the question of the energy company obligation later, but at this stage I must say that I was relieved to hear my noble friend Lord Teverson qualify the proposal in the third subsection of his Amendment 12 by saying that this is a bit of a cock-shy and may not necessarily be the right way ahead. At Second Reading, I remarked favourably on the energy company obligation because it was going to be more targeted on the fuel-poor than is the comparable measure under the CERT programme, which provided for a priority group covering about 11 million people, including every pensioner. It seemed to me that that was a very broad scattershot and made the cost to the energy companies that much greater. As I understand the Bill, the ECO is firmly linked with the question of fuel poverty; it is aimed at providing benefits for those who are classified as fuel-poor.
I am entirely with my noble friends in their assertion that local authorities have a major role to play in ensuring the success of the Green Deal. I recognise the value of incentives in the form of reduction of council tax or whatever. For instance, this is being offered by the Government in the case of communities that accept onshore wind farms; for a limited period they will be able to keep the additional rateable value coming to them, which will help the councils. On this occasion, however, it would be difficult to justify putting on to the energy companies the cost of any council tax rebates that may be awarded under subsection (3) of my noble friend’s Amendment 12. I was grateful to hear that he was not hooked on that as a solution to his problem.
I support the thrust of these amendments and I am grateful that we are discussing the role of the local authorities this early. Both as movers and shakers and as facilitators and providers of a framework or catalyst for movement, they will be extremely important.
In most parts of the country, opinion polls show that local authorities are relatively trusted. They are certainly trusted more than central government and energy supply companies. Whether the reasons for that are right or wrong, it is important that we mobilise that general good will. Local authorities have a role in a number of different respects and while it is true, as the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, has said, that the social housing stock has largely moved to housing associations, that is by no means totally the case. There will be many situations in which the local authority is still the landlord, although it may have a management company to run things, and it will have a responsibility for fairly substantial parts of the social housing stock and its maintenance and improvement.
It is regrettably true that the early stages of the last Government’s decent homes programme did not have a very strong energy efficiency dimension. That improved as time went on, but an opportunity was missed; a substantial amount of expenditure went on upgrading social housing stock, but improved energy efficiency was not one of the prime objectives. Local authorities as landlords can take that on.
Of course, there are also landlords of estates that are no longer a single form of tenure. Some of the occupants may well be tenants, but some of them may be owner-occupiers and some may be leaseholders or on a sublease, while some properties may be run by housing associations within the same estate. We have a complex and largely beneficial mix of types of housing on some of our larger estates, but the local authority is still the landlord and therefore in a strong position to try to persuade those on all forms of tenure to take advantage of the Green Deal, which probably individually they might not.
It is wrong that some improvements on estates have applied only to one form of tenure, because the economies of scale, to which the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, referred in a wider dimension, apply whatever the form of tenure. The totality of the provision and use of energy in those estates means that economies of scale will be achieved if the majority of the residents participate. The local authority is by far the best body to ensure that that happens.
Where housing associations are the landlord, of course they also have to have a role, but that is a slightly different role from what the amendment envisages for local authorities. Housing associations are no different from any other landlord that could effectively take advantage of this scheme and negotiate better terms, because they deal with substantial properties. It may be, however, that the Bill also needs to refer to housing associations in this regard.
Of course, local authorities can go beyond their role as the landlord or as a body that has an indirect interest in the property to a role in which they can help to persuade landlords of private tenanted property—that will include a significant number of the fuel-poor, but not necessarily only them—and owner-occupiers to operate this scheme on a street-by-street, similar-property-to-similar-property basis, again achieving economies of scale.
That role of local authorities is important. Some will be more prone to take up this cause and will be better at it than others, but that is the essence of devolution. Indeed, I assume that the essence of localism is that you will have different patterns in different areas. It is important that the Bill recognises that.
As for subsection (3) in the amendment, it is true that the new ECO commitment will be largely focused on the fuel-poor, but local authorities will be able to negotiate—not only with the householder but also with the energy supply companies—different ways of incentivising the adoption of the Green Deal. As I said early on in our proceedings, we have to recognise that this is a voluntary thing. It is not something that the Government, the energy company or your landlord can impose on you; take-up is voluntary. That may require some incentives. As the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, said, it is already the case in a number of areas that, by dealing with the energy supplier—British Gas, mostly—local authorities have already provided an incentive, so presumably they already have the power to do so. Subsection (3) suggests that we need to legislate for the link with the new energy company obligation, but I believe that local authorities already have the power to do this. If, by agreement with the energy supply companies, they can reach an accommodation that delivers the Green Deal on a wider scale, they certainly should not be inhibited from so doing. Amendment 12 is important in that it recognises these proactive and direct roles of local authorities, so I hope that the Government, if not agreeing with every word of it, will accept the general thrust.
Just to clarify, the noble Lord is absolutely right. I have written this amendment so that the local authority would be the catalyst that makes things happen. Who the freeholder of the property or the land is is irrelevant to that—whether they are a private landlord, a public landlord or a registered social landlord, this would apply to them. This is not just about local authority estates. It is about any estate or group of houses geographically, not about tenure, exactly as the noble Lord has pointed out.
Yes, the role would be somewhat different in different cases, but I think that the new clause would provide for that. On the second new clause in the group, if we are to drop HECA—which many of us would regret; I acknowledge the noble Baroness as a prime mover of it—local authorities need to be aware that they can have a commitment in a broader framework to sustainability and energy efficiency in their area. Again, that is a facilitating provision, but it is broader than the Green Deal, and I would very much welcome some reference to it in the Bill. I hope that the Minister can say that that is also part of the Government’s thinking.
My Lords, we are very encouraged that the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, is looking more widely than the simplistic interpretation of the Green Deal to make the greatest benefits available. We share his reflections on how local authorities can utilise their wide influence in the housing market to achieve added benefits.
As my noble friend Lord Whitty said, we were anxious when we looked at the drafting of the new clause that we should not overcomplicate the situation, because local authorities are involved in so many different facets of the local market, either as landlords, with other landlords or, under the wording of the new clause, acting as an agent for the building improver. We are concerned that that role needs to be clearly thought through: how they are working and interfacing with the different participants in the plan. For example, they may, through a housing association or through their managing agents, take on side or even employ an assessor in their area. That would put them straight in as a participant in the whole complex matrix of these arrangements.
However, we largely go along with the thrust of the noble Lord, Lord Teverson. Yes, we see that an added impact may be needed to bring the greatest benefits. To be fair, local authorities will be thinking how they can help their residents along the Green Deal plan to bring the greatest benefits to their communities. Under subsection (3) of the new clause they may be able themselves as landlord to offer rebates or think about incentives, but we think that if they are achieving added benefits by economies of scale, that may well be sufficient to provide incentives that will encourage a greater take-up of the Green Deal. We support the thrust of the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, and we would like the Minister to take it away to think about it, or tell us today what role she envisages in the matrix of the participants in the Green Deal that local authorities could be encouraged to take up.
My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 13 and speak to the other amendments in this group. One could argue that the first three amendments could appear in the code of conduct or some form of secondary regulation, but the fact is that the primary legislation does not specify that such arrangements should do so. Therefore, one way or another, these amendments aim to ensure that these principles are followed in whatever regulations cover the delivery of the Green Deal.
Amendment 13 aims to protect those who effectively inherit a Green Deal arrangement. It is attempting to ensure that, because the Green Deal attaches to the property and not to the current occupant, subsequent occupiers are not unfairly prejudiced by the nature of the deal. In other areas of financial arrangements, we know that a significant number of deals start at a relatively low level of repayment and rise over time. Indeed, one could argue that the sub-prime mortgage market in the United States based on those principles almost brought the whole of world capitalism to its knees, but it is used in more respectable circumstances as well. However, in this case, it is important that subsequent occupiers are not disproportionately penalised. The golden rule should apply to the totality of the deal, but if the golden rule is delivered by low payments at the beginning, then subsequent occupiers, while they are required to pay a larger proportion of it back, may well not benefit from the golden rule.
I am grateful to my noble friend for asking me to explain again. A lot of this will be picked up in the group of amendments that relate to the rental sector. When we reach that point we will be able to clarify the situation.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for spelling out some of this, but I am still puzzled by bits of it. For example, there is the reference to the consumer credit regulations. He seems to be saying that they apply by default, but then referred us forward to Clause 23, which provides for some exemptions from it. It is not clear, as his words implied, that all such credit arrangements are covered by the Consumer Credit Act, except where specifically excluded. As he said himself, some of the organisations which will be Green Deal providers—with whom the householder actually has the deal, as distinct from the financial vehicle behind it—are not covered by the Consumer Credit Act. I am not necessarily asking for a detailed reply at this point but it would be useful for the Committee to have spelt out how and to whom the Consumer Credit Act applies and what, if any, are the exemptions referred to in Clause 23.
Perhaps I may clarify that question for the noble Lord. Our legal advice is that the protection is in place. I am happy to debate the subject with him afterwards, but that is our legal advice.
It would probably be helpful to us to have that legal advice—or the gist of it—in writing, otherwise we may return to this.
The issue in Clause 13, equity between the original occupier signing up for the Green Deal and a subsequent occupier, is still important. I agree that aspects can be covered by secondary legislation or the code of conduct, but it is obviously key that any potential payment needs to be spelt out—this is where it links to Amendment 16 with relation, for example, to an exit fee. If you sign up for an agreement, and there is an exit fee included, you are going in with your eyes open—or you should be if everything is transparent and spelt out. However, the agreement is not with the person who may subsequently pay the exit fee; other things being equal, on acquiring the property, a subsequent owner will have calculated that it is better to pay off the debt early. If there is a fee attached that is not included in the deal, it is important that contingency is covered. Transparency, caveat emptor and a search on acquiring the property or taking up the tenancy or lease must all be taken into consideration, but if a subsequent owner is to be liable for such fees down the line this must be spelt out.
To some extent, I accept the view that Amendment 15 is not appropriate in that it would prescribe a fixed rate of interest. On the other hand, it is difficult to calculate, even within the range of outcomes we discussed on the earlier amendment, whether the golden rule works unless you have some understanding of the interest implied in the total package. Some will be marginal, and a fixed rate will give you at least the minimum rate of return and benefit, whereas with a variable rate it will be difficult to assess whether the golden rule has been met. We will have to assume certain things about energy use. As the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, said, some people will use more energy because it is cheaper, for obvious reasons. However, on the basis of equal use and equal interest rates, you can make a reasonable stab at a calculation on the golden rule. If both of those are variable, it is more difficult to say how it applies.
I realise that we have to have flexibility, and therefore Amendment 15 in its absolutist sense is probably not appropriate. The previous amendment, with the clarification on compensation and Consumer Credit Act provisions, is needed. We need to protect consumers from the possibility that the whole structure of repayment is either to their detriment or unclear when they sign up.
Although I will withdraw the amendment at this stage—
My noble friend will have recognised from the contributions of Members of the Committee the anxiety about the concept of the fee. I wonder whether he will withdraw his amendment before we have made a great deal of progress, as I heard from the Minister’s reply, on how that issue is to be resolved. We have expressed anxieties on it.
I apologise to the Minister if, in the disturbance caused by the Divisions, I lost track of his replies. He may have covered the matter. I know that my noble friend was exercised about this, but so were other Members of the Committee and we all gave voice to it. We certainly have anxieties, and I wonder whether, before withdrawing the amendment, my noble friend will press the Minister on the matter.
I will press the Minister for communication with Members of the Committee who have taken an interest in the matter, on both the legal point and on any fee that applies.
Given that there has been disruption and that not everyone heard what I said, I am happy to communicate with other Members of the Committee to clarify these things and carry on with the dialogue. That is the spirit in which this Committee, including the contributions of all noble Lords, is operating.
It would be relatively easy to say what any fee does not cover, which would provide some clarity. I would also welcome any communication from the Minister between now and Report. I would hope that that clarification indicates that fees paid up-front are not included, even if there is need for flexibility about fees paid later. On the understanding that we will be hearing from the Minister, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
The noble Lord is perfectly entitled to make his point, but it does not refer to the point I was making. My point was that, yes, prepayment meters are used by many poor households and of course the gas and electricity companies have a very clear idea of who they are. Under the previous arrangements, they had to get 40 per cent of their carbon dioxide savings from people in that priority group, so they had to find out who they were, however difficult it was. That is not the point that I was making; my only point was that the presence of a prepayment meter in a dwelling is not of itself a good surrogate for who is fuel-poor. As the noble Lord himself has recognised, there may be many people with second homes; there may be people doing short-term lets who prefer to put in a prepayment meter, but whose tenants, the bill payer, may be miles from fuel-poor, but that is one of the ways that a landlord can make sure he is not landed with a bill at the end of the day. It is just not accurate to say that all prepayment meter households are inevitably fuel-poor or poor. They are not, and I think it is very important to recognise that fact and not take refuge in abusing the companies, which the noble Lord is so fond of doing.
My Lords, I am not sure of the relevance of this argument to the actual clause before us. The issue here is that prepayment meters have a history, whether you are fuel-poor or not, of having significant charges over and above the cost reflectivity and over and above the degree of security which the supplier can assume on other means of payments. In other words, if you are on direct debit, there is a reasonable degree of security, but it is slightly less than on a prepayment meter, which is an almost absolute security of payment, because you do not get any electricity unless the meter is turning.
Historically, the issue has been pretty appalling. Frankly, the regulator denied the problem for many years. I declare my previous interest as former chair of Consumer Focus. Consumer Focus and Energy Watch banged on for years about that before the point about cost reflectivity was finally accepted by Ofgem. It does not matter whether the reason that you have a prepayment meter is because you are fuel poor or because your landlord, in various tenancy situations, insists on you having a prepayment meter. It does not matter whether it is a second home. It does not matter whether you are in a mansion block in Kensington, where many are on prepayment meters—generally speaking, the income of that particular subgroup is somewhat higher than the fuel-poor. The point is that they were being ripped off.
As I understand it, the new clause is proposed by my noble friend because we do not want a similar nontransparent rip-off to occur by clobbering the structure of tariffs on prepayment to hide the fact that, as a result of having a prepayment meter, you have a differentially poor repayment profile under the Green Deal.
The new clause also touches on a substantial point that, had I been present on Second Reading, I would have made: the fact that, at the same time as we are introducing the Green Deal, we are mandating energy supply companies over the next 10 years to install smart meters in every household in the land. The energy companies will have to carry out that provision, over which the landlord, the tenant or the owner-occupier has no real control. Whereas the Green Deal will be a voluntary sign-up, smart meters will not. I happen to be in favour of smart meters for energy efficiency, carbon saving and behaviour change reasons, but we could get those three things muddled up. It may be that the same supplier who is offering you a Green Deal is at almost the same time proposing to put the smart meter in, as they will be required to do, and perhaps negotiating with you the terms of your operation of a prepayment meter.
The point of the new clause, as I understand it, is to separate those different elements so that there is no distortion for the consumer. The wider point is whether the rollout of the Green Deal can in a conscious, planned way relate to the rollout of smart meters. The reality is that, on the one hand, people are going to go into every home in the land under the smart meter installation programme; and, on the other, somebody will be offering a deal under the Green Deal.
A lot of householders will be seriously confused as to which bit they have to accept, and the repayment for that, and which bit they have some option and flexibility about, and they do not have to take the deal at all if they do not want to. I assume that paragraph (a) in the new clause relates to any meter being installed, including the new requirement that smart meters be installed. We have to separate those things in terms of repayment; but in terms of delivery, there may be some benefit in associating them. I would like the Minister to comment on that point, and particularly to endorse the point lying behind my noble friend's amendment: that those three separate issues must be disentangled.
There are two extremely valuable points here. If I may, I should like to defer the discussion on smart meters because there are a number of later amendments about them. As the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, said, it is important that we focus on this part of the Bill, Which is about the prepayment meter. It is fundamental that we get this bit right, and get smart meters right later. Of course, we need to have in our mind on joined-up thinking, and the two interrelate.
Through the Green Deal, people who pay bills through smart meters first receive information about extra payments that they incur as a result of meters being installed or existing Green Deal plans. We intend that the Green Deal charge can be collected by energy suppliers through all existing payment routes, which include prepayment meters as well as quarterly credit cards, which were mentioned earlier.
A number of licensing conditions are in place to protect customers who receive their energy supply through prepayment meters, including changes to prevent unfair price differentials between payment methods. We will ensure that all relevant protections extend to the Green Deal charge and we are working with Ofgem to make sure that that happens. I hope that that gives enough information for the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.
I return now to the issue of fees and how they are referred to in a rather different context. Both this amendment and my next group of amendments relate to references to fees. Clause 30 covers powers to deal with special circumstances. The first of the special circumstances is the suspension or cancellation of the Green Deal. Subsection (2) refers to the provision setting out the procedure,
“for securing a suspension or cancellation (including the payment of an administration fee calculated in accordance with the regulations)”.
It is the bit in brackets that I am seeking to change. If a Green Deal arrangement is to be cancelled, it is presumably for one of two reasons: either because the provision under the Green Deal has not met the specifications—in other words, the provider has defaulted—or because the repayer, whether or not they were the original repayer, is now in circumstances where they cannot repay. In either of those circumstances, it seems inappropriate, in addition to cancelling the deal, to charge a payment. It is therefore odd that there is reference at that point to the payment of an additional fee. Even though it is referred to as an administration fee, in the circumstances it is an additional payment. It is conceivable that there are other circumstances than the two that I have suggested, but I cannot think of them. If the Minister’s imagination is better than mine, no doubt she will tell us.
The second such provision relates to subsection (2)(d), which goes back to the argument about early repayment. If the original agreement was clear, the terms of early repayment would be clear. As it stands, this runs into the same difficulty that I referred to an hour or so ago, which is that a new occupier or a new landlord might have to meet a repayment fee—to which they had not previously been committed, as they were not the original signer of the agreement—for deciding that on all other grounds they wished to repay early. It is not clear, as it is not clear in many other respects, why a fee should be paid for early repayment or exit. Because we have seen exit fees abused in other areas of energy provision, I would be deeply suspicious of the primary legislation referring to an exit fee in this form. No doubt we will return to this issue when we come to the details of defining the situations to which this applies, but in the primary legislation the apparent presumption that a fee is involved should be deleted. I beg to move.
I support my noble friend in his Amendment 18 and his proposal regarding early repayment penalties under Amendment 19. My noble friend and other noble Lords spoke strongly about this issue when it was discussed earlier. The Minister replied that, if this provision was taken out, it could lead to an awkward situation in which it would be open for different people to charge different levels of fees. Perhaps the Minister could take this away. If she could propose that no penalty fees would be levied in this situation under the Bill, that would sort the problem out and not leave it to the providers to decide. If it is not covered, there would be a disparity in the fees and penalties that could be levied.
My Lords, Clause 30 allows regulations to be made that set out when and how a bill payer’s liability to make Green Deal repayments can be cancelled or suspended. Amendment 18 would prevent the regulations from making provision for a procedure to be followed for securing such suspension or cancellation of the repayments. Noble Lords have made the point about this being proportionate and not abused.
An example of when the bill payer’s liability might be cancelled is where the bill payer had chosen to make full early repayment of the Green Deal finance arrangement. In such an eventuality, there may be a need to include an administration fee. I will turn to why that might be in a minute. As discussed earlier, such a fee would be calculated in line with the rules of the Consumer Credit Act for the domestic Green Deal and in line with the regulations that we propose to set out in secondary legislation for the business Green Deal. This clause also gives us the flexibility to introduce a payment suspension mechanism for the bill payer in appropriate circumstances.
The legislation permits an administration fee to be requested for the arrangement of payment suspension. This is essential to balance the needs of the property owner to have flexibility while minimising the loss that the provider of finance might incur. The details of this—for example, when such a fee might be requested and the level of such a fee—will be subject to consultation later this year.
Amendment 19 would remove the ability to set out in regulations what should be payable in the event of early repayment of the Green Deal being required, including how any fee should be calculated. The effect of this amendment would be to prevent the regulations setting out the rules on early repayment from being set out in Green Deal plans.
The domestic Green Deal is subject to the early repayment rules set out in the Consumer Credit Act, which prevents consumers from being charged unreasonable fees when they repay early. However, business Green Deal providers are not subject to any existing regulations on early repayment fees. This amendment would remove the ability for the Government to set out regulations limiting the fees that can be charged when a business is required to repay the Green Deal early.
Early repayment fees are an important protection for the investor providing the finance. They have invested their money expecting a particular rate of return over a particular period. Being able to claim some compensation when an early repayment is made is an important element to keep the cost of finance low. This practice is not uncommon in the mortgage market.
However, we do not want Green Deal providers to charge disproportionate fees when early repayment is required, so the ability to set out some rules around this in secondary legislation is important. There is a danger that these amendments could remove that protection, which I think is far from the intention of the mover of the amendment. I hope that noble Lords will be reassured by my explanation and, on that basis, that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I understand and accept part of that argument. These regulations are going to be subject to consultation. It may be appropriate that in some circumstances an administration fee is charged. A reference was made to the mortgage market, but in that context this is not just an administration fee but effectively—the noble Baroness used the term “compensation”—a major disincentive to people repaying their mortgage early. There is a certain amount of consumer dissatisfaction about this from people who, under all other calculations, would repay their mortgage early but who have been put off so doing by the size of the early repayment charge. I do not know that the analogy with the mortgage market is particularly helpful; I would hope that, at a maximum, any fee would reflect the real cost of the administration of cancelling early rather than the potential loss. After all, the finance provider would get the money back and could then reinvest it in as good a deal as they could. I do not think that the compensation issue should arise in these circumstances.
My main point is that this is primary legislation. The noble Baroness referred to the fact that this is subject to consultation. I suspect that the issue of fees will arise during that consultation among potential providers and finance companies as well as among consumer groups. The fact that the Bill is written in this way suggests that the procedure must include provision of a fee. Clause 30(2)(a) refers to,
“the procedure to be followed for securing a suspension … including the payment”,
as if the payment is an obvious matter. Similarly, paragraph (d) says, “including a fee”, not “a possible fee” or “there may be a fee involved”. It is worded as if the regulations are going to have to provide for a fee.
I would prefer to keep that open until we come to the consultation on the regulations. I think that in this case the primary legislation—I am using the opposite argument to the one to which the ministerial Bench usually resorts, which is that we do not have to prescribe so much in primary legislation because we can leave it to the consultation on regulations—is too prescriptive or could be seen to be too prescriptive.
Perhaps I may reassure the noble Lord that what is being sought here is a balance between bringing providers in and the very important aim of encouraging people to take up these schemes and for them not to think that their fingers are going to be burned if they pay off what they owe early. What underlines these provisions is the attempt to find a proportionate way to deal with that and to protect people through this legislation. However, as my noble friend Lord Marland has indicated, we will be discussing the subject of fees further.
I may need to come back to noble Lords on that but, as I understand it, if people choose to repay early the expectation is that they would pay a fee. However, I do not think that I have fully answered what the noble Lord has asked, so I will need to come back to him to clarify that.
In view of the hour and the fact that we will be returning to this, I beg to withdraw.
My Lords, since I packed my bag before we gave up, I will be brief. This group of amendments relates to fees, on which I have expanded at some length already. Some of these simply follow through from those that we have already discussed. Some relate to appeals, and I think that a disincentive to appeals is an area of significant concern. Some relate to other details of the way in which the Green Deal will be delivered. However, they all raise the issue of fees. I think that it would be helpful to the Committee—it would certainly be helpful to me—if, before we come to the next stage, the Minister could arrange for someone to set out why the issue of fees has to apply in these various situations. That can probably be done more logically than going through clause by clause, because some of them obviously hang together. There are only three or four subjects, but there are a lot of points where fees arise. If the Minister would commit to doing that, I would be prepared to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, at this point in the proceedings the noble Lord’s views on fees are well known, and he has our assurance that we will look at the issue very carefully. As we have already said, the level of any fee will be set out in secondary legislation. I think that the noble Lord is making the point that he would like us to develop a thinking process before we get to that and that, between us, we can develop it further before we get to that point. I look forward to discussing the matter with him in the near future.