(1 year, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will speak to Motion B1, an amendment to government Motion B. I am very pleased that the Government have finally proposed an alternative amendment, recognising that only the ISC can undertake effective scrutiny of intelligence and security work undertaken by the Government.
The ISC supports the government Motion on the basis that my Motion is also accepted. It removes the requirement for consideration of whether the ISC’s MoU needs to be updated to commence within six months. We are concerned that such a time restriction may have unintended consequences; it might inadvertently affect the ability of the ISC to oversee security or intelligence activity related to the Bill. For example, if the Government commence new security or intelligence activity as part of the Bill outside the ISC’s remit—beyond the six-month period—the Government could attempt to argue that they will not consider any commensurate update to the ISC’s MoU as considerations are required to start within six months of the Bill coming into force.
Because of the Government’s long-standing refusal to update the ISC’s MoU, and their continued arguments to justify their refusal to accept independent oversight of the committee, the committee is of the view that it will be much safer for us to remove this time limitation to avoid any possible confusion in the future. Although that sounds like a lawyer’s argument, this is a lawyer’s issue; it is something we have to be quite careful about.
While the government Motion will not remedy the significant gap in ISC oversight that already exists in relation to intelligence and security matters, it at least seeks to stop the oversight gap becoming even bigger. I hope that this reflects a turning point and the beginning of a shift in the Government’s position, including their acceptance of the need for robust, independent and democratic oversight of secret intelligence matters.
However, the House should not forget the wider problem, and we should continue to insist on a remedy. With my ISC colleagues in the other place, I have already explained repeatedly why the ISC’s MoU needs to be updated more broadly. I will not repeat those arguments now, other than to say that currently there is insufficient parliamentary oversight of the Government’s intelligence and security activities.
Intelligence and security matters are too important for there not to be comprehensive parliamentary oversight. There can be no activity by the Executive which escapes democratic oversight. The Motion is the first indication from the Government that they have begun to grasp this fundamental principle and the importance attached to it by those in this House. Despite the Motion’s significant limitations, I support it being added to the Bill, with my own Motion, to ensure that there are no unintended consequences which may negatively affect the ability of the ISC to oversee the entirety of this regime. I encourage the Government to use this as a foundation for constructive engagement on the rest of the ISC’s MoU, which, as I have explained, urgently needs updating.
My Lords, I will speak to this closing part of the Bill. I declare my interest as the senior treasurer of the Conservative Party. It is not on the register of interests, because the registrar does not accept it as a declarable interest; I do not know why, but I bring it to your Lordships’ attention now.
I wish to speak because, as this debate concludes, it would be unfortunate if the reader of this debate and previous debates was left with the conclusion that political parties are in any way seeking to obtain donations from foreign parties or do not take considerable steps to ensure that foreign parties or intermediaries do not make donations to political parties. In the previous debate, the noble Lord, Lord West, commented that
“it is perfectly possible for companies to make significant donations to political parties despite clearly not making operating profits and therefore with limited explanations of how they can afford such donations and where the money comes from”.—[Official Report, 21/6/23; col. 237.]
However, many companies can of course raise substantial sums of money and not make operating profits— I have personal experience of that. That is not the issue; the issue is that regulated donees have to be UK-registered companies incorporated in the UK which carry on business in the UK. I know from my experience that considerable lengths are taken to ensure that those companies are companies that carry on business, by any definition, in the UK. That is a requirement of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000.
The companies must also be registered with Companies House. Later this afternoon, we will finalise our debates on the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill, in which I have had a large involvement. From that, it is clear that Companies House will have substantially greater access to information on companies’ accounts digitally to assess who the persons of significant control are.
Accepting or funnelling unlawful donations is already illegal. Every donation over £7,500 is declared and you can take my word for it that any donation that one might think is, shall we say, unusual leads to lots of inquiries from the press, which is perfectly reasonable, and others such as political opponents. The Electoral Commission has 233 staff. It has resources this year of £25.5 million. It is responsible for looking after political parties, not much more than that.
It is not particularly obvious to me what more political parties could do. They are not banks; they are not HMRC. It would be inappropriate to create a very false impression. Donors do not control parties. They do not influence or determine policy. They typically give modest sums of money because they believe in supporting a party and wish it to succeed. We do not wish to slip into state funding, which would be a very dangerous route. In fact, donors to all political parties should be thanked and recognised for their contribution to civil society.