Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement

Debate between Lord West of Spithead and Baroness Watkins of Tavistock

Monday 17th January 2022 Grand Committee

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Watkins of Tavistock) (CB)]

My Lords, the debate can now continue. I have agreed that if we have further votes, we will try not to take the full 10 minutes, if everyone has managed to vote electronically, so that we can proceed.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, the United States has also established a US submarine advisory committee, which is advising the Australians on options. Can the Minister say whether we have anyone on that committee? What relationship does that advisory committee have with the US nuclear-powered submarine task force currently working with the UK to identify the best way for Australia to acquire a nuclear submarine fleet? I hope this is not a separate group doing separate work. We need to make sure this is all properly co-ordinated, otherwise we will find that we miss out on things. I am surprised that we have not established a post similar to Jim Miller’s post. Rather our national security adviser is pulling together all the strands from various departments such as the MoD, the FCDO, BEIS and others and is a very busy man. Surely we need to have someone who can focus full-time on this programme, or something will fall between the cracks and we will be outmanoeuvred by our great American friends, who are very good at doing business, and we will be caught out.

Picking the right design for the Royal Australian Navy’s nuclear-powered submarines is extraordinarily complex, and difficult choices will need to be made. There are two prime contenders: the Royal Navy’s Astute class and the US Navy’s Virginia-class Block V submarine or possibly the Astute successor or the Block VI Virginia-class which is going to replace the Block V. None of them will require refuelling. In answer to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, they will be provided straightaway with a core and a reactor that runs through their entire life.

Numerous issues will need to be considered, including fleet size, submarine service life, Australian defence self-reliance, Australian industry, content, design risks, size, crewing, payload delivery, sustainment of operations, training regimes, export controls and nuclear controls within Australia. It has been assessed that a critical mass of 10 Australian SSNs would be required to sustain sufficient certified personnel at sea and ashore and that it will be at least 15 years from now before there are enough qualified Australians to run even one nuclear submarine in a self-reliant manner. Provision of the boats will take even longer than that. This is highly complex and difficult to organise.

I believe that the Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement should be welcomed with acclaim. It will help global stability because it will make the Chinese think and it will, I hope, give great opportunities to UK defence firms and science.