Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill

Debate between Lord Wei and Lord Storey

Thursday 18th September 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wei (Con)]

My Lords, my Amendment 502YQ is mainly to probe the Government’s intention in relation to their own use of data regarding this Bill. This amendment addresses an issue that has surfaced repeatedly in our many debates: the scope of data collection about children in education. We have heard a lot today about the role of technology providers, but I want to turn the focus to how we are collecting data within the education system in government.

My amendment would ensure that personal data may be collected, retained or processed only where it is strictly necessary to protect a child from significant harm, as defined in Section 31 of the Children Act 1989. Why is this needed? The Bill as drafted gives wide latitude to local authorities and the Secretary of State to demand data on children not in school—an area that I really care about—as well as potentially on others. In particular, the data demanded of children not in school—we have already heard about the amount of data that is already collected on children in school—is off the scale. We are told that this is for safeguarding, but safeguarding has a very specific meaning in law. It is not a licence for limitless information gathering; it is a duty to act when a child is suffering or likely to suffer significant harm.

Clause 31, for instance, invites local authorities to gather information far beyond what is necessary. Names, addresses and dates of birth are sufficient to identify a child and discharge oversight duties. However, the Bill’s wording allows for much more, including details of parental and children’s beliefs, educational philosophy, supplementary providers and even protected characteristics. This, to me, is mission creep, not proportionate oversight. As the department has itself acknowledged in past consultations, the bare minimum of data suffices to track children and ensure that no one falls through the net. To demand more because it might be helpful is not lawful data processing. Data protection law is clear: collection must be limited to what is necessary for the purpose. Helpful is not enough.

The risks of excessive data collection are not theoretical. Families have already seen sensitive information stored indefinitely, cross-referenced with other records and sometimes shared with agencies in ways that they did not consent to or even know about. One military family with whom I have interacted recounted how their local authority repeatedly contacted the father’s workplace about his children, despite clear instructions not to do so. Another home-educating mother described how, after deregistering a child with special needs, she was followed in public after being wrongly referred to social services. These are not safeguards; they are intrusions to undermine trust.

We must also remember that not all parents in the system are confident or well resourced. Some are vulnerable, fleeing domestic abuse or suffering with SEND bureaucracy. For them, intrusive data demands feel less like protection and more like surveillance. If the state is perceived as hostile, families may retreat from engagement altogether, making genuine safeguarding harder, not easier. That is why my amendment would tie permissible data collection to the Section 31 threshold of “significant harm”, which is already the bedrock of child protection law. It is the line that our courts have drawn between parental primacy and state intervention. Aligning data powers with that line ensures consistency, legality and proportionality.

Proposed new subsection (2) in my amendment would ensure proportionality by limiting data to what was essential for the specific risk identified. If the concern is neglect then collect information relating to neglect; if the concern is radicalisation, focus on that. Do not use safeguarding as a pretext for wide-ranging dossiers on families’ private lives. Proposed new subsection (3) would close off another danger: profiling. We should not be gathering data to build long-term behavioural profiles of children or to monitor families against vague benchmarks of compliance. That is not safeguarding; it is social engineering by stealth. Proposed new subsection (4) would require the Secretary of State to publish clear guidance within six months, so that local authorities, schools and parents know the limits of permissible data collection. That guidance should provide clarity, consistency and accountability.

Some might worry that the amendments would tie the hand of professionals. On the contrary, they would free them to focus on what matters. Instead of drowning in forms and files and data, they could concentrate on children at genuine risk. Excessive data is not neutral; it diverts time, money and attention from where it is most needed.

International law supports this approach. In MM v the UK in 2012 the European Court of Human Rights held that the retention of excessive personal data without clear necessity breached Article 8, while in Ali v the UK in 2015 the court stressed that decisions must be informed by accurate, relevant and proportionate information. We cannot claim compliance with Article 8 if we allow the indefinite harvesting of families’ and children’s private details “just in case”.

The amendment is not only for home educators, though their experience has highlighted this problem in the Bill. It would protect every family in the education system. It would ensure that schools are not turned into data collection points for the state and that local authorities are not saddled with the impossible burden of storing, processing and protecting sensitive information that they do not always need. Above all, it would protect children from being profiled, stigmatised, or surveyed in ways that bear no relation to genuine safeguarding.

In passing the Bill, we must not create a database state by accident. We must legislate with care, remembering that data is not neutral—it is power. It is the new oil, in fact. Used well, it can protect; used badly, it can harm. Amendment 502YQ would ensure that that power was exercised with clear limits, tied to the statutory threshold of significant harm. That is fair, proportionate and faithful to the principles of our child protection law. I commend it to the House.

[Lord Storey (LD)]

My Lords, Covid was certainly the rocket fuel for the growth of educational technology in our schools, which is now accepted as part of the school learning landscape. The UK’s education tech sector is the largest in Europe, spending, as we already heard, an estimated £900 million a year. However, there are real concerns that these amendments seek to address, which is why we will be supporting Amendments 493, 494, 502K, 502YH and 502YI.

The edtech sector is exempt from the Online Safety Act, and adherence to GDPR is inconsistent, to say the least. Large multiuse platforms such as Google Classroom and Microsoft Teams can enhance teaching and school management, but the absence of clear statutory standards leaves children’s education and school cybersecurity often at risk. We surely need a regulated framework to safeguard children’s rights, protect the data and prevent the commercial exploitation of children. We sleepwalked into the development of social media. Now that we see the harm that has been caused, we rush to try to do something about it. There is a strong case for developing a regulated framework to safeguard children’s rights and support schools in making informed and sustainable choices.

I want to respond to what I thought was a very thoughtful contribution by the noble Baroness, Lady Spielman. It made me think that six years ago I had a Private Member’s Bill on essay mills and contract cheating. That is now all for naught, because there are other ways of cheating, and AI helps that considerably.

I had an intern who one day said to me, “Lord Storey, here’s a speech for you”. I said, “Ooh, let me have a look”. I read the speech and thought, “Wow, this is great. I’ll use this”. He told me that it was AI generated. “Really?”, I said. I wondered whether in five or 10 years your Lordships’ House might be a very different place for speeches. Might we all succumb to using not our own thoughts and experiences but AI to generate speeches? Would anybody know in five or 10 years’ time, when the technology will be absolutely spot on?

I want to deal briefly with the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Barran. Amendment 502YU concerns reception baseline assessments. The Minister will recall that I raised this in an Oral Question. There is something a little perverse about the youngest children—five year-olds—doing their assessments on a screen. I have a degree of sympathy for the noble Baroness’s amendment, and I hope the Minister can shed some light on it.

Regarding the other two amendments, I know that SEND exceptions are mentioned, but as my noble friend Lord Addington said in his hugely important contribution, it is not either/or. We have to think through these amendments carefully, as there are other issues, not just special educational needs, that we need to be aware of. We do not want to agree something that creates problems for the future.

Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill

Debate between Lord Wei and Lord Storey

Thursday 3rd July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wei (Con)]

Perhaps I might build on that point. There seems to be a lot of conflation in this debate between home education and children who are missing education or invisible. It seems that all these measures are designed to try to find these invisible children. Is there not a risk, as I think the noble Lord is touching on, that we may bring in a system that does not actually find the missing children? The people who are very determined to abuse their children, or to hide them in very fundamentalist environments, are the very people who would not register their children even if we had a database. In which case, we would be going after all the people who are doing a good job in the noble Lord’s first few categories. Will the parents we actually want to get—the 39,000 or 300,000 or however many—really self-disclose? There is a real risk that we might not know this until we have imposed a huge amount of bureaucracy on all the parents who are doing a great job.

[Lord Storey (LD)]

I thank the noble Lord for his question. The answer is that, at the moment, we are not doing anything, which is why the children are going missing and why we do not know where they are. We therefore need to do something to ensure that those children have the opportunity of education and are safe.