(9 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have also been checking up on this point. I am assured by the department that any woman who had asked for a state pension statement since 1995 would have known what her pension age had been changed to under the Act. Given the uncertainties around the amounts of state pension that any woman could receive under the very complex system that we have at the moment, if a woman had planned her retirement on the basis of that, she would surely have got a pension statement and known about her state pension age change.
Given that the noble Baroness has done work on this, how many women have actually applied for pension statements since 1995?
I do not have those figures, but I can try to find out for the noble and learned Lord and write to him.
(11 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Deben, that this is an elegant amendment. However, although it might be bracket free, it has an awful lot of commas and sub-clauses. I have listened very carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong, and the supporters of this amendment who did not speak but are distinguished Members of your Lordships’ House, to see whether there are new arguments to justify passing an amendment that would—like the ones that we discussed on Monday and in Committee—undermine the purpose of the Bill, which is to put same-sex marriage on the same basis as opposite-sex marriage, and although I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong, for this ingenious amendment which seeks to undermine the Bill through secondary legislation, its effects are the same as those of the amendments that went before. I am still puzzled as to why those noble Lords feel that same-sex marriage somehow undermines opposite-sex marriage and, indeed, their own.
We do not believe that the Bill needs to provide for two classes of marriage—one gold and one base, which would be the effect of the amendment—but we do feel that the time has perhaps come to stop having this argument. I and my colleagues will not support the amendment.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, for his amendment. I think that we were all very grateful to him on Monday evening when, in view of the hour, he decided to degroup it so that we could debate it today.
Even allowing for the intervening hours, however, it will not come as a surprise to the noble Lord or to anyone else that we do not feel able to accept this amendment however—to use my noble friend Lord Deben’s word—ingenious or, as my noble friend Lord Lester said, extraordinary it is. As the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, said, it contains within it, in paragraph (b), the same distinction between a marriage of a same-sex couple and a marriage of an opposite-sex couple that was embodied in Amendment 1—admittedly without the brackets, although I am not sure if it is for better or for worse.
The amendment which my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern moved sought to have two different institutions of marriage in law: one for same-sex couples and one for opposite-sex couples. As my noble friend Lord Deben said, this is another attempt. In all fairness to my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern, when moving his amendment on Monday he said:
“This is the minimum that seems to work, although I and other noble Lords think that it may be possible to go further. The later amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong, to which I and others have added our names, indeed goes further than the minimum”.—[Official Report, 8/7/13; cols. 13-14]
My Lords, government Amendments 93 and 128 to 132 amend provisions in the Bill relating to marriage in consulates and on Armed Forces bases overseas to exclude their effect in relation to Northern Ireland. Clause 13 repeals the Foreign Marriage Act 1892 which applies UK-wide. Schedule 6 makes provision to replace that regime of consular and Armed Forces marriages overseas with a new regime providing for marriages of both opposite-sex and same-sex couples in consulates and on Armed Forces bases.
The legislative consent Motion concerning the Bill which the Northern Ireland Assembly agreed on 24 June does not cover Clause 13 or Schedule 6. In light of the terms of that legislative consent Motion, these amendments amend the extent provisions of the Bill so that the relevant provisions which would fall under the Northern Ireland Assembly’s legislative competence do not extend to Northern Ireland. The effect of these amendments is that opposite-sex and same-sex couples marrying under the law of England and Wales in consulates and on Armed Forces bases overseas will be married under new procedures to be introduced by an Order in Council to be made under Schedule 6. These new procedures will also apply to opposite-sex couples marrying under the law of Scotland, and in due course to same-sex couples as and when the law in Scotland is changed to allow them to marry.
However, couples marrying under the law of Northern Ireland will marry under the existing legislative framework; namely, the Foreign Marriage Act 1892. This will mean that those officiating in marriages overseas will have to operate two distinct systems when conducting marriages depending on whether they are marriages under the law of England, Wales or Scotland on the one hand, or the law of Northern Ireland on the other. While this will add to the complexity of the system, it is a consequence of the Northern Ireland Assembly not having given legislative consent to the relevant provisions in the Bill, and so to be consistent with the convention we must make amendments to reflect that.
Perhaps I may turn to government Amendment 106 in this group. It is a technical amendment which provides for the definition of “England and Wales legislation” used in the Bill also to be applied to the Marriage Act 1949. The amendment inserts an interpretation provision for the definition into that Act. Finally, government Amendment 125 is minor and technical. It adds the definition of “superintendent registrar” to the list of defined expressions already set out in Clause 17(2). This is necessary for completeness.
I commend these amendments as they will improve the Bill and I hope that your Lordships will feel able to support them.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, very adequately, concisely and accurately explained exactly what the review is about.
The point is that the claims that the noble Baroness has explained to us are legitimate. As my noble friend Lord Alli said, the last time I heard the noble Baroness speak with such passion about these issues, apart from in Committee on this Bill, was during the passage of the Civil Partnership Bill.
In the mean time I can recall at least two carers Acts put forward by my own Government. There was the free personal care Bill, and there have been numerous discussions about finances and inheritance tax. Although we may not necessarily discuss those matters in this House to conclusion, certainly there are plenty of Members of Parliament in the other place who can and could put down amendments. I would be more sympathetic, perhaps, if I thought those things had happened, but they have not. My noble friend Lady Kennedy is right when she says that you have to question the purpose of this amendment when all those opportunities have been missed. We ask the noble Baroness not to press this amendment but if she does I will be voting against it.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, for moving the amendment and the other noble Lords who have put their names to it. It would amend Clause 14, under which the Secretary of State will arrange for the operation and the future of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 in England and Wales to be reviewed. The amendment requires the terms of the review to be extended to consider first, the case for enabling carers and family members who live together to register civil partnerships and secondly the case for creating a new legal institution to give carers and family members the same benefits as couples in a civil partnership.
I recognise, as we did in Committee, that many views have been expressed very passionately. I listened in particular to my noble friend Lady Hooper, who made an important contribution to this debate arising from her own circumstances. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, that, in many respects, the issues that have been raised about inheritance or the rights to have a say, for example, about funeral arrangements or related matters are issues in their own right. I will say more later about whether there has been a clamour for them, but my principal position is that this is not appropriate for a review of civil partnerships.
First, there is the issue of the nature and purpose of civil partnerships. They were designed to provide rights and responsibilities akin, to use the word of the noble Lord, Lord Alli, to those of marriage for same-sex couples. I note that the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chester thought that they possibly mirrored marriage too much. I think he said that was the view when they were brought in. These rights and responsibilities were provided because under the Civil Partnership Act people were unable to marry because they were the same sex. As civil partnerships are akin to marriage they have a formal means of entry and exit. They have imported the prohibited degrees of affinity parallel to those in marriage law. They have similar rules governing deathbed civil partnerships and financial and property arrangements.
(11 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Baroness knows very well the answer to that question. All the votes about the principle of this Bill were free votes in both Houses. We in the Labour Party made it completely clear that we would whip on two issues only, which were issues of public policy to do with teachers and registrars, and that is what we did. We have been completely clear, open and honest about what we were going to do.
As the noble Lord, Lord Fowler, said, the fundamental issue here and particularly in the Commons—the democratic House—is that all those MPs have to go back and face their constituents about this issue. They will have to face them every week about this issue. So they would not have voted on a free vote for this Bill had they not felt it was the right thing to do. That is exactly what they should do.
Frankly, the idea that noble Lords in this House are somehow pushovers or sheep to be led through the Division Lobbies is completely absurd, as this debate shows. If I might repeat what I said in Committee, this amendment is a nonsense and the House needs to reject it.
My Lords, Amendments 96 and 134 seek to provide in the Bill for a referendum on marriage of same-sex couples, to be held on or after 24 October 2013. I recognise that the date has been brought forward somewhat from the amendment that we discussed in Committee; otherwise, it is very nearly identical to that amendment, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Swansea, supported by my noble friend Lord Cormack and the noble Lord, Lord Singh.
It will come as no surprise to the House that the Government are unable to accept these amendments. We do not believe it is a sensible course of action, nor is it required. I listened carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Singh, said in moving his amendment, and I recognise his strength of feeling on this issue. As he knows, he and I do not agree on the principle of the Bill. Nevertheless, I profoundly respect not only his view but the depth of feeling with which he holds it.
There are one or two points that I wish to take up on this matter. There was one practical matter to start with. The noble Lord almost suggested that it was a conspiracy that the Government could put my noble friend Lady Stowell’s letter into the Library, but somehow his could not be. That is just the way the House operates. However, what I can say is that the Government can place documents in the House Library and if the noble Lord would like me to, I am happy to place a copy of his reply to my noble friend Lady Stowell in the Library, and would be pleased to do so if he feels it would be helpful to the debate.
I was not saying that it was conspiracy. It was my ignorance about the proceedings and the way the House operates. I was happy that there was a way of debating something, and then I found a block. You cannot do that.
I know that the noble Lord did not say it was a conspiracy. I think that he used the phrase that it was blocking off debate and almost suggested that it was done deliberately. It was not. As he indicated just now, these are the rules of the place, but if he wishes a copy of his reply to be put into the Library, we will certainly arrange for the Government to do that. The noble Lord is nodding assent to that proposition.
The letter which my noble friend Lady Stowell sent to the noble Lord relates to issues about consultation. She noted, for example, that the British Sikh Consultative Forum issued a formal submission to the consultation on equal marriage and that government officials met representatives from the Sikh Council UK as recently as 4 April this year. They held pre-consultation meetings with the Sikh forum in December 2011 and held another meeting during the consultation period with the interfaith community in May 2012, which involved representatives from the Sikh faith.
What is the meaning of consultation when you talk about a course previously decided on? That, in my view, is not consultation. My other point is that I have spoken to all those groups that have been mentioned. They were totally opposed to the legislation, but that is not reflected.
My Lords, there will always be situations where there are disagreements. Nevertheless, it has been the case that efforts were made to engage with not just the Sikh community but with other communities. It is a fundamental part of the Bill that the Government readily recognise—indeed the official Opposition readily recognise too—that there are religious organisations and faith communities which do not believe in same-sex marriage. That is why an important part of the architecture of this Bill is to give protection to these faiths. That is an important part that has come out of the discussions and the process that have brought us to where we are today with this Bill.
It was also suggested that the Government had somehow been impervious to argument. It is worth reminding the House that, as part of the whole process, the Government listened to what the Church in Wales said and produced an opt-in procedure. There has been additional protection for chaplains employed as members of staff. We added ecclesiastical law to the measures not affected by the Bill. We have clarified that marriages of same-sex couples are void when the couple are aware that their religion has not opted in. We have ensured that the consent of a governing authority to opt in to same-sex marriage does not automatically fall if the governing authority changes.
Significantly, on Report on Monday—and the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, commended the Government for this—we introduced an amendment which gave extended meaning to the word “compelled”. We also brought forward an amendment to change the Public Order Act to clarify that criticism of same-sex marriage is not a hate crime. On other issues, for example on humanist weddings, the Government have been prepared to listen. There were amendments earlier today on fast-track procedure for gender recognition, and a technical, though important, amendment to reflect the absence of a legislative consent Motion from Northern Ireland for overseas marriages in consulates or Armed Forces bases. On a number of these issues the Government have listened and made appropriate amendments to the Bill.
It has also been said that the use of referendums in the United Kingdom remains very much the exception in our constitution. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth, and indeed myself, were members of your Lordships’ House’s Constitution Committee when it looked at the issue of referendums. I do not think that I am betraying any secrets—it comes through in the report—that we thought referendums should be the exception. However, the genie was out of the bottle and therefore if referendums were going to be used the report clearly stated that they should be on matters of substantial constitutional significance. It gave some examples: to abolish the Monarchy; to leave the European Union—the subject of the debate in the House of Commons last Friday; for any of the nations of the United Kingdom to secede from the UK; to change the electoral system for the House of Commons; and to change the UK’s system of currency. While I recognise that what we have been debating in your Lordships’ House on this Bill is a matter of profound social policy, I do not think that by any stretch of the imagination it could be described as a matter of substantial constitutional significance. We acknowledge that what we are doing is a significant change to marriage law, and I recognise that many are uneasy about the proposals, but I say again that this is not a significant constitutional matter.
I make the point that, at the time, both the noble and learned Lord and I would have said to Conservative Ministers, “Please consult with the people”. They would have found that the people clearly said, “No way do we want this”. They would then not have got into the difficulties they did when it got to the rest of the United Kingdom.
The point is that under our constitutional, democratic architecture, Members of Parliament make their judgments, cast their votes and then answer to the electorate. That is the appropriate way in which we go about these matters.
The Prime Minister was mentioned. Anyone who has heard the Prime Minister talk on this issue knows that he does so from real conviction. It is a great credit to the Prime Minister that he has had the courage to give leadership on this issue and that this Bill has got to where it is today.
Support has also been reflected in recent opinion polls. My noble friend Lord Norton of Louth referred to that. I remind your Lordships of a House of Commons Library research paper on this Bill. Here is a summary of polls on same-sex marriages offering a two-way choice: October 2011, ComRes—51% support; 7 March 2012, ICM—admittedly not a majority but 45%; May 2012, YouGov in the Sunday Times—51%; December 2012, YouGov—55%; December 2012, Survation—60%; December 2012, ICM—62%; February 2013, YouGov in the Sunday Times—55%; 5 February 2013, YouGov in the Sun—54%; 19 May 2013, YouGov—55%.
However, I make the point that numbers are not everything. This Bill is about putting right a wrong. We believe in the importance of the institution of marriage. We wish to ensure that gay and lesbian couples can be part of it in the same way as opposite-sex couples. We want to get on with that, and therefore I ask the House to reject this amendment.
My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, for the graciousness of his response. I also thank noble Lords who spoke in favour of this amendment: the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Waddington, and my noble friends Lord Martin and Lord Listowel. They put the position perfectly, although I was a little concerned to be called a “conservative”. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Fowler. He did not respond to any of the specific concerns raised, but in many ways the manner of his response exemplified the concerns that I raised earlier; my thanks again to him. It is late, I sense the mood of the House, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(11 years, 4 months ago)
Lords Chamber My Lords, I think it might help your Lordships’ House, and the progress of debate, if I do not say anything at this time on the other amendments, and respond to these in light of the debate that takes place. That will probably mean that I do not repeat myself.
Government Amendments 9 and 10 clarify the meaning of “compelled” in Clause 2, which provides important protections for religious organisations and their representatives from participating in religious solemnisation of marriages of same-sex couples. They have been tabled in response to concerns raised in your Lordships’ House and in the other place that the protection from compulsion set out in Clause 2 may be narrow because the meaning of compulsion is not clear. A number of noble Lords have raised that concern, not least the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, my noble friend Lady Berridge and the noble Lord, Lord Hylton.
My Lords, I will briefly also congratulate the Government. With their Amendments 9 and 10 they have clearly assuaged the majority of people’s fears. My noble friend Lord Brennan said that they comprehensively assuaged fears, which must be a good thing. The proposal from my noble friend about guidance sounds entirely correct, but I know from long experience that sometimes guidance takes rather longer to draft than we might like. However, discussions about the guidance, even if it is not fully drafted, might be a way forward in this particular little logjam. I am very happy to support the amendments.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have spoken and who have welcomed the Government’s amendments. I am pleased that the amendments have given the reassurances that the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, spoke about, as did my noble friend Lady Berridge, and the noble Lord, Lord Brennan. Certainly, that was our intention, because we were conscious of the concerns that have been raised. I noticed that on the basis of that my noble friend Lady Berridge did not speak to Amendments 15 to 17. I also thank my noble friend Lord Lester for welcoming the Government’s response to the legislative report on the Bill from the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I can assure him that it has been placed in the Library, but I believe that the response is also available in the Printed Paper Office. I am glad that he welcomes these amendments and believes that the legal structure is in place to give the reassurances that have been sought. We have said on many occasions and from all parts of your Lordships’ House, not least from this Dispatch Box, that the security and protection of religious freedom that we wish to give to religious institutions is very much an important part of the architecture of the Bill. I hope that these amendments help to give that reassurance and to reinforce that protection.
Amendments 18 and 19, which the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, spoke to and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, referred to, were rehearsed in Committee and I readily recognise the noble Baroness’s wish to explore the same ground again today. The intention of the amendments appears to be to ensure that any religious organisation or individual is not penalised by a public authority simply because they have expressed the view that marriage should be only between a man and a woman, or because they have decided not to participate in a religious solemnisation of marriages of same-sex couples.
It is important to remind ourselves that Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 places a duty on public authorities to have due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination, advance equality of opportunity and foster good relations between people who hold and do not hold particular protected characteristics. It applies to the protected characteristic of religion or belief, not just to sexual orientation, and, as we have already made clear, the belief that marriage should be of one man with one woman is a protected belief. Let me also make it clear that the equality duty is a duty to think, not to act or to produce a particular outcome; it does not require any particular outcome. If, for example, a public authority withdrew its facilities from an organisation or treated an employee less favourably, simply because of the expression of a belief about the marriage of same-sex couples, it would be acting unlawfully, both in failing to apply the duty properly and potentially committing an act of unlawful discrimination under the Equality Act.
Members of your Lordships’ House may recall that when we debated this in Committee, I referred to the decision of the Judicial Committee of your Lordship’s House in the case of Wheeler v Leicester City Council in 1985. That was a case in which the council banned a rugby club from using its ground after some of its members attended a tour of South Africa. The council was using a predecessor of a public sector duty to justify its actions. In that case, the House of Lords held that the decision was irrational; it also found that the decision was procedurally unfair and that therefore there was an improper purpose, which resulted in the council’s decision being quashed. I believe that the same reasoning would apply here.
The noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, asked me about something that I said during my opening, when I moved the amendment. I am happy to repeat it. Clause 2 will clearly prevent criminal or civil action being taken against any religious organisation or representatives merely for refusing to undertake acts protected under this clause. That includes, but is not limited to—this picks up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, that the words in brackets in the amendment are not exhaustive—disciplinary or other action taken in the employment context. In all circumstances, a person who has suffered a detriment simply because they have not done one of the acts specified in Clause 2 will be able to rely on the protections in that clause to show that such conduct is unlawful and to obtain a remedy within the context of the particular claim.
Furthermore, if a public authority is prevented, as Amendments 18 and 19 suggest, from having any regard to an individual’s or an organisation’s beliefs about the marriage of same-sex couples, it would be unable to consider how its own decisions could potentially discriminate against or otherwise disadvantage people who do believe that marriage should only be between a man and a woman. In fact, therefore, it could have the absolute opposite effect from that which I am sure that the noble Baroness seeks to achieve. I believe that that would be an unintended and harmful consequence of the amendment as drafted.
It is our view that an amendment of this kind would be unhelpful and unnecessary and that, rather than amending the legislation, the best way is to ensure that the equality duty is properly understood in the way that it is applied. We will seek to improve the guidance on its use; although, in all honesty, I cannot say that that will be made available before Third Reading. We are currently discussing with the Equality and Human Rights Commission how best to take forward our commitment to review the relevant guidance so as to include clear and helpful guidance for employers and public bodies in the context of this Bill when it is enacted. We will take that work forward as quickly as possible as part of the implementation of the Bill if enacted, although no timetable has yet been agreed. I believe that that is a sensible way to move forward.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. In the absence of the detail of the guidance, can he give the House a general assurance that the government guidance will make it clear to those responsible for applying the Equality Act that to do so in a way that raises the concerns that we are dealing with would be to act irrationally?
My Lords, it is very dangerous to try to draft guidance on the hoof, as it were. I think that I have expressed, both today and in Committee stage, in response to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness—and, indeed, in a very detailed letter that I sent to those who had taken part in a similar debate in Committee and which is in the Library—the points that the Government believe are important and which provide the necessary protections. As my noble friend, Lord Lester, said in Committee, there is always the possibility of someone acting in an idiotic way. What we seek to do with the guidance most fundamentally is to try to eliminate—or to reduce to an absolute minimum—the number of times that anyone would act in an idiotic way.
I have one further point. I think that the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, raised the issue of the judgment in the case of Hans-Christian Raabe. I will quote from the High Court decision of Mr Justice Stadlen in order to allay, again, concerns that the duty is being misused.
In paragraph 256 of the judgment, his Lordship said:
“As I have said, there is in my judgment nothing to suggest that if Dr Raabe had expressed his opposition to same sex marriage and set out any religious basis for that opposition, that would have been considered by the Defendant or Mr Brokenshire to be a reason for revoking his appointment. In fact he did not set out any religious basis for the views expressed in the 2005 Paper and there is no reason to suppose that the revocation of his appointment would inhibit or deter any person who opposes same sex marriage on religious grounds from publicly expressing such views for fear of being rejected for a similar appointment in the future. Mr de la Mare pointed out the most obviously offensive features of the Paper did not form part of any religious belief”.
Therefore, it is very clear from his Lordship’s judgment that the concern which has been expressed did not form any part of that decision. In those circumstances, I again commend the government amendments to the House and hope that the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, will not pursue her amendments.
My Lords, I want to say something about the nature of the debate on the Bill in the House today and on previous occasions, as it is has been very acrimonious.
My Lords, the amendment is a response to the concerns expressed by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern that Clause 11 as drafted is potentially misleading and would benefit from further clarity. Clause 11(1) provides that marriage, in the law of England and Wales,
“has the same effect in relation to same sex couples as it has in relation to opposite sex couples”.
Under my noble and learned friend’s Amendment 33, which we debated in Committee, he argued that the clause will be clearer if it stated that the provision is subject to the later provisions—namely, the provisions in Schedules 3 and 4. Following the debate, my noble friend Lady Stowell and I considered carefully the points that my noble and learned friend made. They have been discussed with parliamentary counsel, and we have agreed that it would do no harm to provide a signpost to those provisions in Clause 11. That is what the amendment is intended to do, and I believe that it provides the clarity which my noble and learned friend sought. I hope that he is satisfied that we have sought to address his concerns, and I beg to move.
Yes, I certainly am. This is a correct elucidation of the situation and I am very grateful to the Government for accepting the point that something required to be done.
(11 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we have had a very interesting and passionate debate about extending civil partnerships to unpaid carers and family members who share a house. I, too, was present at the debate we had during the passage of the Civil Partnership Bill. I said then that I thought my noble friend Lord Alli was right; that was not the Bill. He is right now that this is not the Bill. That is not to say that this is not an important issue. Of course it is a most important issue.
I just wonder why—or maybe I have missed this and a noble Lord can tell me—this issue has not been raised in the passage of the many Bills that we have had before us in which it could have been raised in the intervening period. We have had Bills about carers. I put down an unsuccessful Bill about free support for people at home. There have been many times when this House could have taken on board these issues and made its views clear in appropriate Bills to do with income support and carers. Yet, again we find ourselves discussing this important issue during the passage of a Bill to do with, in this case, equal marriage. That does not do service to both the importance of the issue of carers and the fate of people who care for their relatives, or the issue before us, which is the same-sex marriage Bill. That is a shame.
On these Benches we do not think this is the right Bill. We think this a good issue and an important issue but we suggest that this is not an appropriate amendment. Will the Minister clarify the Government’s review of civil partnerships—which we understand because we helped the Government to put forward the amendment from these Benches in the other place? How far does he believe that review will go and where will it end up? Our understanding is that it is a review looking at whether one would have opposite-sex civil partnerships and, if so, how that would work.
My Lords, this has been a very good debate and the issues have been thoroughly explored. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, on introducing it in the way that she did. I do not think any of your Lordships who have spoken in the debate in any way question the validity—or the value, rather—of the relationships that exist between siblings or other family members where they have mutual duties or care obligations. Indeed, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, mentioned a particular case of a young man who helped someone who was injured in a riding accident. Certainly, our society, country and communities benefit enormously from the caring relationships that exist the length and breadth of the country. I imagine that many noble Lords can think within their own families of relationships of mutual support between a brother and sister, between sisters or brothers, or intergenerational support.
The amendment moved by the noble Baroness would amend the duty in Clause 14 requiring the Secretary of State to arrange for the review of the operation and future of the Civil Partnership Act so that the scope of the matters to be reviewed includes consideration of the possibility of extending civil partnerships to,
“carers and those they care for”,
and to,
“family members … who have cohabited for 5 years or more and are over the age of eighteen”.
The terms of reference for the review of civil partnerships required by Clause 14 were published on 13 June and a copy has been placed in the House Library. The review will look at the operation and future of civil partnerships in England and Wales. It may help your Lordships if I note what the scope is, according to the published terms of reference. They say that the review,
“will cover England and Wales and will … Examine evidence about how well the current arrangements for civil partnerships are working, drawing on views from the public and organisations with an interest and international comparisons … Assess the need and demand for civil partnerships when marriage is available to all, and whether any changes to civil partnership arrangements are necessary … Identify all the implications of and issues raised by the identified options (including risks and devolution issues) … Assess the costs and benefits of the options … Make recommendations for any changes to the operation and future of the CPA”.
In response to my noble friend Lord Lester, it is not the Government’s understanding that that would extend to issues of cohabitation. In a Written Ministerial Statement on 6 September 2011, the Government said:
“The findings of the research into the Scottish legislation do not provide us with a sufficient basis for a change in the law. Furthermore, the family justice system is in a transitional period, with major reforms already on the horizon. We do not therefore intend to take forward the Law Commission’s recommendations for reform of cohabitation law in this parliamentary term”.—[Official Report, Commons, 6/9/11; col. 16WS.]
I think that my noble and learned friend may have misunderstood me. I quite realise that the Government have set their face against doing for England and Wales what has happened in Scotland. However, I was asking whether the Government are rejecting the recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which welcomed the idea of consultation to take account of the potential discrimination that may arise between cohabiting opposite-sex couples and civil partners. I thought that was the forceful point that really led to the public consultation.
I apologise if I misunderstood the point being made by my noble friend. As I indicated last week, clearly we are giving consideration to all the recommendations of that report. No one has told me anything to the contrary since then and I think it is still our ambition to have that report available for your Lordships before consideration of this Bill on Report. The matter will obviously be dealt with there.
I am sorry but what I am really asking the Minister is whether the Government are saying that this review will—or will not—cover the point that I have just made. It is important to know.
My Lords, that was not quite the question. The question was how much these family partnerships save the taxpayer in care costs and how much it would cost to give them the same advantages as civil partnerships, not necessarily using the same legal framework. I suggest that if the Government do not want to face this, it is purely because there are too many of these partnerships. There are very many more: a multiple of 53,000. That is why the Government will not face up to this duty, which has been owing to these people for a very long time.
My Lords, I apologise if I misunderstood the question asked by the noble Lord. If information assessing the benefit to the state is available, that question may be capable of an answer. I will certainly ensure that that information is made available. I imagine there will be plenty of opportunities to discuss these kinds of issues when the Care Bill, which is already before your Lordships’ House, is debated at greater length. I will certainly ensure that the noble Lord gets the estimates that have been made, and I apologise if I misunderstood his question.
The review will look at whether civil partnerships are still needed, or whether there is a case for extending them to opposite-sex couples. Much of this debate proceeded on the basis that they would continue, whereas in fact that is only one of the options. I note the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Alli, about how he saw civil partnerships perhaps developing, and how there might be a liturgy associated with them in times to come. No doubt that is a point he and others will make to the body conducting the review. Questions do arise from the change to marriage law which we are making in this Bill. It will result in the apparent anomaly of same-sex couples having the choice between marriage and civil partnership, while opposite-sex couples will only be able to marry. It was for that reason that we sought this review.
Regarding parents, children and siblings, as the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, said, the positions of siblings are indistinguishable. However, it is the case that parents, children and siblings already have a legally recognised relationship, one to the other. These relationships already afford certain rights. For example, children and siblings are recognised in intestacy rules. The extent of those rights is clearly a separate issue from the question of future civil partnerships. That is why we believe that it would be inappropriate for them to be considered as part of this review. It could lead to legitimating relationships within the prohibited degrees of relationship.
We will come later to the amendment of my noble and learned friend, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. However, even if the reasons for the prohibited degrees of affinity perhaps stem back to what one might call a biological concern, there are still issues of power relationships within very close families. These may not necessarily be obvious, but there is also protection there against any undue pressure. As was also said in one of the contributions, what if life circumstances change? Suppose that two sisters enter into a civil partnership, and one later wants to marry someone else or to enter into a civil partnership with someone else.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, made the point that there is a legal entry but there is also a legal exit. In these circumstances, the idea of a judicially determined divorce—let us not beat about the bush, it would be a divorce—could very well be much more damaging to a previously existing relationship than would otherwise be the case. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who reminded us of Irving Berlin—yes, there was a reason why I hesitated over his name—and his theory of “Lord help the sister who comes between me and my man”. That is probably a very pertinent point. I know the point, but the reason I hesitated was because I was told that the late Isaiah Berlin once sat next to a very prominent politician who could not understand the question about “White Christmas”, so I wanted to make sure that I had actually got the name right.
My Lords, the noble and learned Lord has just amused your Lordships about Irving Berlin, but what he said shortly before that is not right either, is it? One cannot generalise too widely on these things, but surely the bitterness that comes with the breakdown of a sexual relationship is likely to be greater than a breakdown in a sibling or family relationship.
Having sisters of my own, I intervene to suggest that the noble Lord, Lord Pearson, has not seen sisters at war with each other.
My Lords, I should perhaps just leave this on the reply of the noble Baroness, Lady Farrington. Turning to the rights and responsibilities of carers, of course they play an invaluable role in our society, caring for people. No one disputes that. The Government strongly value the role and commitment of carers. Indeed, we set out our priorities in November 2010 in a cross-government strategy: Recognised, valued and supported: next steps for the Carers Strategy. The mandate to the NHS Commissioning Board also contains a clear objective on enhancing the quality of life of people with long-term conditions and their carers. Achieving this objective will mean that by 2015, the 5 million carers looking after friends and family members will routinely have access to information and advice about the available support. When it comes to financial support for carers, the Government have announced that carer’s allowance will continue to exist as a separate benefit outside of universal credit, so that carers will continue to enjoy the support of a dedicated benefit.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for giving way. I was very intrigued by what he said about the Care Bill, which is now before the House in Committee. I appreciate my noble friend Lady Knight’s comment about how we get really fed up when we are told that it is not the appropriate Bill to propose a certain amendment. My noble and learned friend the Minister has said that the Government really appreciate the work of carers and we are grateful for it. However, if the Government are so committed to the work of carers, would it not be possible for the Government to bring forward their own amendment to the Care Bill?
That is the responsibility of a different department. I would be very brave to make that kind of commitment here without consulting, but I am sure that my noble friend’s words will be noted. The noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, made the point that he never liked the arguments about vehicles. I am not really trying to make that argument, because I have argued that there are in fact some very serious differences. The noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, also made the point that the issues being raised are really not appropriate for this Bill. They are relevant perhaps to a finance Bill rather than a partnership Bill, as they relate to the rules of inheritance tax or the terms of benefits.
As the noble Baroness knows, those arguments have been well rehearsed. I was not in your Lordships’ House nine years ago, but my noble friend Lady Northover has said in response to one or two of the comments that have been made, “Oh, I remember that point being made then”. The Government then sought to oppose proposals of this kind, and this Government share the view that civil partnership, as it then was and as it has evolved and developed over time, is not the appropriate place to open up these new, significant policy questions. The review is about civil partnerships. It would be inappropriate to open it up to look at unrelated issues of carers and family law, and particularly the question of tax and benefits. We have also indicated that we do not wish to delay or add to the cost and complexity of a review which the Government have committed to undertake as soon as possible in response to calls that were made in the other place. The other issues that are opened up are vast, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, made clear. I therefore ask the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, before I forget, perhaps I may correct the Minister on the following point: it was Irving Berlin who was invited to the White House to discuss politics and the conduct of a war. It was only much later that it was discovered that the President had called for Isaiah Berlin.
I am grateful to all those who have spoken. Our discussion has caused me to focus on three themes. The first is obvious: there is no time to waste. There are lots of old folk who need help. Every time I have inquired at the Whips’ Office or the clerks’ office when Bills have come forward, I have been told, “Oh, it’s not relevant. This won’t do for siblings”. It is not that the issue has been forgotten, as some have said.
I am focusing also on freedom of choice. Once this Bill has passed, everybody in the country who is over 16 will be able to choose to enter a legal bond with somebody else, except those who are related. That is why I do not support the noble Lord, Lord Lester—as he knows—in relation to cohabitants. They can choose; they could get married. Maybe in future they could have a civil partnership and make a contract if they have not done so; I would not dump our very unsatisfactory matrimonial law on them without their choice. However, siblings have no choice at all. They are faintly recognised as relatives in some other laws, but there is really very little help for adult siblings.
There has been some talk of my amendment somehow devaluing equal marriage. I say to those who have made that point that this Bill is about equality. Those who are gaining equality should not rest on their laurels. On the contrary, having reached their target, they should hold out their hand to others to give them the same help, despite perhaps the same objections, as is being given in this Bill for same-sex marriages. It is not a religious question. I cannot imagine for a minute that any review would ever expect any religious authority to bless the union of related people. Religion has nothing to do with it—so I did not quite follow the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Alli. What I am thinking of is some union—it need not necessarily be a civil partnership—some formal contract or some recognition that could be extended to siblings, and, believe me, there has been no opportunity to do this in any of the Bills that I have followed during the past few years.
I support the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, in saying that this need not cost anything in relation to inheritance tax. It could be rolled over; it could be deferred at nil cost to the Government.
I do not agree with those who say that civil partnerships are different. Sex has got nothing to do with it—some chaps here may not agree with that—now that we have changed the definition of marriage. Even at the moment, if two people get married, no one inquires as to whether it is a sexual relationship. As we all know, neither adultery nor consummation will play any part in remedies or definition of marriage in the future. This really has nothing to do with sex. We are not talking about sisters committing incest—that is a crime anyway. We all realise that that is beyond the bounds of possibility; it is nothing to do with that. It is to do with the fact that the whole definition of marriage has changed. My bet is that a new case before the European Court would probably succeed because the law of Europe prohibits discrimination on the grounds of birth, status and sex inter alia. I cannot see a ground for not extending some advantages, as appropriate, to those who are related and therefore unable to take advantage of all the variety of unions that are open to others.
(11 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberI beg the noble Baroness’s pardon. It is interesting that both noble Baronesses, and the noble Lord, are members of the committee.
We are clear that Amendments 13 and 18 are unnecessary. We believe that they would add confusion to the law. As the noble Baroness said, the public sector equality duty is a duty to have “due regard”, not a duty to act. The due regard must balance discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation equally with discrimination on the grounds of religious belief. It would not permit a public body, even with the intention of eliminating discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, lawfully to treat a religious organisation less favourably on account of its beliefs about same-sex marriage. Furthermore, the authority would be in breach of the clear protections in the Bill that will permit religious organisations to remain outside the system of same-sex marriages.
As the noble Lord, Lord Lester, said, the Equality Act 2010 is a carefully crafted piece of legislation, thanks to many noble Lords present in the Chamber today. It established a balance between protection against discrimination on grounds of religion or belief and protection against discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. To single out one belief—that marriage should be between a man and a woman—risks undermining the protection afforded to religion as a whole, with its entirety of beliefs and practices, because it sets up this one belief as requiring explicit protection. Therefore, Amendment 13—and Amendment 18, which seeks to achieve a similar effect—would prove unhelpful and unnecessary.
My Lords, I will start by thanking the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, my noble friend Lady Berridge, and the noble Lords, Lord Singh and Lord Hylton, for bringing the amendments before your Lordships’ House in Committee. It has given us an opportunity for a very useful debate, which has been conducted in a very courteous fashion. It was clear that genuine concerns were being expressed. What is interesting is that there is no distinction anywhere in the debate between the objectives of what noble Lords wish to see. It is very clear that religious freedom, including the rights of religious organisations that do not wish to opt in, should be secured.
I will take the advice proffered by my noble friend Lord Lester and not reply to every point. However, it is important that I reply to some of them. My noble friend referred to Pepper v Hart, but we cannot get to that stage if we do not in fact say anything. I will also take up his suggestion, echoed by my noble friend Lord Deben, of putting in written form the points that were raised and my responses.
Amendment 13 seeks to ensure that no religious organisation or individual is penalised by a public authority simply because it has exercised its rights under the Bill to not offer or facilitate same-sex marriages, or because it has expressed the view that marriage should be only between a man and a woman. My noble friend Lady Berridge indicated that there was an anxiety that other religious denominations wished to have the same kind of safeguard and security as has been afforded to the Church of England and the Church in Wales. As I indicated to my noble friend Lord Cormack when he moved an amendment on Monday, there is a historic reason for the distinction for the Church of England and the Church in Wales: namely, the duty on priests in these churches to marry people in their parish. This duty is not incumbent on priests, ministers or imams in other religions and faiths.
The specific context of this amendment is Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010, which places a duty on public authorities to,
“have due regard to the need to … eliminate discrimination … advance equality of opportunity … and … foster good relations between persons who”,
hold or do not hold a particular protected characteristic.
It is absolutely right—I think that this has been echoed on all sides of your Lordships’ House—that religious organisations and individuals should be free to express their beliefs about same-sex marriage, and to make the decisions protected by this Bill about whether to conduct or participate in same-sex marriages, without fear of repercussion or penalty of any kind. I hope I can clarify for your Lordships that, as the law stands, a public authority would in fact be acting unlawfully if it attempted to rely on the public sector equality duty to treat a religious organisation adversely simply because that organisation did not wish to conduct same-sex marriages, as is explicitly allowed under this Bill.
A policy of penalising people or organisations which have religious or philosophical beliefs with which a public authority disagrees would in itself be discriminatory. One element of the duty is to have due regard to the need to eliminate unlawful discrimination. It is not meant to be itself an instrument to discriminate unlawfully. For a local authority, for example, to withdraw meeting facilities from a church because it decided not to offer same-sex marriage would be likely to be unlawful direct discrimination because of religion or belief. We believe that it would be subject to successful legal challenge, a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.
The noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, commented that there is nothing in the Bill which states that it would be unlawful for a public authority to punish a religious organisation which had not opted in. The courts have considered the question of whether a local authority can use equality legislation to punish an organisation with views of which it disapproves. In the case of Wheeler v Leicester City Council, the council banned a rugby club from using its ground after some of its members attended a tour of South Africa. It used the then Race Relations Act to justify its decision. The case went to the House of Lords, which held that the decision was irrational and that it was an improper purpose, because the members of the rugby club were legally entitled to go on a tour, just as an organisation is entitled not to opt in. I believe that the reasoning in that case to have a clear read-over in this particular case. Similarly, a local authority could not have a policy of refusing to promote staff who have expressed a belief that marriage should only be between—
On that very point, why is it that registrars who from conscience, from their heart and beliefs, will not conduct this kind of marriage have been sacked?
My Lords, obviously they cannot yet have been sacked because of this legislation, because it is not yet an Act. As my noble friend may recall, we debated the position of registrars at some length on Monday evening. The explanation given then was that registrars perform a public function. As was pointed out by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, judges, who also exercise a public function, are not allowed to pick and choose which cases come before them. Similarly, a local authority could not have a policy of refusing to promote staff who have expressed a belief that marriage should only be between a man and a woman. This would be unlawful direct discrimination, and the equality duty requires public authorities to have due regard to the need to eliminate such discrimination. The equality duty cannot make lawful an otherwise unlawful or oppressive act.
My noble friend Lady Berridge quoted the impact assessment regarding the threat of litigation. It is of course not possible completely to rule out any possibility of somebody bringing legal proceedings. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Alli, who pointed out—and as my noble friend Lord Lester quoted on Monday—some authorities do idiotic things. No legislation can provide for every eventuality. However, we believe that the Bill minimises this possibility as far as possible by making it absolutely explicit that those relying on Clause 2 are permitted to refuse to be involved in solemnising same-sex marriages. There would indeed be no cause of action. We believe that an application for strike-out could be made early in any proceedings, as there would be no reasonable prospect of success in such claims. The noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, said that the inclusion of Clause 2(5) and (6) and the protection they provide undermine the protection which we believe is already in place with regard to Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010.
The amendments to the Equality Act 2010 in Clause 2 provide that it is not unlawful discrimination to refuse to carry out acts specified in Clause 2(2). These specific exceptions are provided to ensure that the Equality Act is not in conflict with the protection provided in Clause 2, so that the law is clear and consistent. This aspect of the Equality Act is the only area of legislation which requires this explicit treatment, as otherwise it would conflict with Clause 2.
We should also remember, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, indicated, that the equality duty is a duty only to have regard. It is not in itself a duty to act, but rather a duty to think. It does not require that particular action is taken or that any specific objective or outcome is achieved. As the noble Lord said, “having regard” also means that we have to have regard to primary legislation, such as what would be in this Act if the Bill is enacted. I hear what my noble friend Lady Knight says about concerns that sometimes guarantees do not always seem to follow through many years later. However, what we are dealing with here—I think that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made this point—is a fundamental part of the architecture of this legislation: namely, that there should be religious freedom not to opt in. Therefore, it would be unthinkable for a court not to have regard to a fundamental piece of the legislation we are passing. I certainly hear what the noble Baroness—
Does my noble and learned friend also agree that the Human Rights Act compels this legislation to be construed compatibly with religious freedom as defined in the European convention?
Indeed, my noble friend is right. Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights gives that right to freedom of religious belief and expression. The noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, said that sometimes the courts are reluctant to second-guess public authorities. It is highly unlikely that the court would do something which is in direct contradiction of what Parliament has clearly expressed and intended not just in the Bill but in all the statements that have been made by Ministers and, indeed, by almost everyone who has participated in these debates.
It is also important to note—again, this point was made by my noble friend Lord Lester and picked up by my noble friend Lord Deben—that amendments can sometimes have unintended and adverse consequences. I know that is certainly not the intention of the noble Baroness who moved this amendment, but the equality duty applies to and protects equally various protected characteristics, including religion or belief so a public authority has to bear in mind the impact of its policies on people holding different religious or philosophical beliefs, such as the belief that marriage should be only between a man and a woman. If, as the amendment proposes, a public authority is prevented from having any regard to individuals’ or organisations’ beliefs about same-sex marriage, it would be unable to consider how its own decisions could potentially discriminate against, or otherwise disadvantage, people who believe that marriage should be only between a man and a woman. That would remove an important protection for people who hold such a belief. I know that this is not what the noble Baroness intends but it illustrates the fact that when you try to solve one problem you can create another.
As I say, I recognise the concerns that some public bodies might be overzealous or mistaken in their exercise of the equality duty or misuse it to the detriment of those who do not agree with same-sex marriage. As I have indicated, no Government can give a copper-bottomed guarantee that some public authorities will not act irrationally. It is important that we ensure that public authorities understand their responsibilities under the Equality Act 2010 correctly, and how these relate to beliefs about marriage. With that in mind, the Equality and Human Rights Commission has undertaken to review its guidance for public authorities to ensure that the position is as clear as possible. As I have said, while I appreciate the intention behind this amendment, it is unnecessary and could have adverse consequences quite at odds with its intention.
I turn to Amendment 17. The concept of compulsion is readily understood in its natural meaning, and to subject anyone to any type of detriment or unfavourable treatment because they refuse to participate in any way in religious solemnization of same-sex marriages would clearly be understood as a violation of their legal right under this Bill not to participate. We are therefore confident that Clause 2 provides strong and effective protection to ensure that religious organisations and their representatives cannot be forced to participate in same-sex marriages against their belief. The Explanatory Notes to the Bill set out the position, as quoted by my noble friend Lady Berridge: the concept of compulsion is a broad one, which would include, but not be limited to, attempts to use criminal or civil law, contractual provisions or the imposition of any detriment to force a person to carry out the activities protected in Clause 2. The clause provides no specific remedy, but makes clear that no attempt at such compulsion would be upheld.
Less favourable treatment by a public authority of a person or organisation who does something which the Bill makes clear they are legally entitled to do would, in itself, clearly be unlawful and open to judicial review. The imposition of any penalties—civil or criminal —on a religious organisation or representative in order to compel them to opt in, or to participate in, religious solemnisation of same-sex marriages is clearly unlawful under the Bill.
Clause 2 will clearly prevent criminal or civil action being taken against any religious organisation or representatives merely for refusing to undertake acts protected under this clause. This includes, but is not limited to, disciplinary or other action taken in the employment context. In all circumstances a person who has suffered a detriment simply because they have not done one of the acts specified in Clause 2 will be able to rely on the protections in that clause to show that such conduct is unlawful and to obtain a remedy within the context of the particular claim.
Perhaps I could remind my noble and learned friend of my other suggestion: that detailed conversations should be offered to the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, my noble friend Lady Berridge and others on this point.
If my noble friend had allowed me to finish the sentence that I had started when he intervened, I would have said that, having received it, those who wish to pursue this matter further in discussion with myself and my noble friend Lady Stowell—
My Lords, I do not wish to be consulted, but I suggest that the document or letter is put into the Library so that it is in the public domain. Otherwise it will not appear in Hansard.
May I suggest that all those who have taken part in the debate should have a copy sent directly? Could my name be added to that list?
My noble friend has taken part in the debate and I usually make it a matter of practice to send a copy to everyone who has taken part. The noble Baroness, Lady Royall, makes a constructive suggestion. I will make sure that it is put in the Library and if, on the basis of the letter and follow-up, it is thought that a discussion would be necessary or wanted, I would certainly be happy to accommodate that. In the light of these comments and the reassurances that we have sought to give, I hope that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords who took part in this debate. The noble Lords, Lord Lester and Lord Alli, and various other noble Lords have emphasised the need for clarity in legislation. The Bill, as drafted in the House of Commons, is already subject to amendment by the Government. It is clear that there are situations in which law which is drafted in the first instance by draftsmen requires clarification. That is why the House exists.
This particular piece of legislation falls at the interface of a number of different human rights—rights of religion and other rights. That is why it is so difficult for the House. The Bill seems to be based on the assumption that the act of marrying is separate from the act of registering a marriage, and the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, demonstrated quite clearly that that is not the case. It is one single act. It is that which raises the whole spectre of public function. I raised this issue and specifically asked the Minister at Second Reading about the risk attached to the public function obligations of religious organisations that are in that hybrid position—those other than the Church of England and the Church in Wales. I did not get any answer to that question.
In the context of the Bill, we are looking not only at the acts of marriage but at the unintended consequences of the legislation before your Lordships’ House. They go much further than the act of conducting or permitting the conducting and so on of a marriage. They go to the whole remit of public authorities in funding, enabling and resourcing organisations such as youth clubs and schools, and in teachers’ ability to speak freely. We have a number of amendments still to come before the Committee in this context. My amendments would have dealt with some elements of these issues but there are other amendments that relate to them. I put it to the Committee that the issues are not quite as clear as some noble Lords would wish to state.
The fact is that there is a clear distinction in the legislation between the Church of England, the Church in Wales and other churches that solemnise marriage, which is that the Church of England and the Church in Wales are not in a position in which they will decide whether to opt in or out without further legislative process outwith this Parliament. That is what makes the difference and it is why we have the quadruple lock for the Church of England, which is not a sufficient lock for other churches. That is why I have tabled these amendments.
I do not wish to be in any way contentious or to delay the House but I cannot help remembering that the Catholic adoption agencies that have now closed as a consequence of legislation were also argued for on the basis of religious freedom. That argument was lost and there is no religious freedom there in the provision of services. It is profoundly important that we ensure that we do not further create very difficult situations. I will therefore, for the moment, withdraw and not move my amendments but reserve the right, having heard what the Minister had to say, to come back to the House on Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(11 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberAgain, I have not for a moment said that the rest live in a moral vacuum. I simply stated what religion is all about, because that seems to have been lost in this debate. Very often the debate is religion against society, and it is not that.
My Lords, I will address the amendments moved by the noble Lords, Lord Curry of Kirkharle and Lord Singh of Wimbledon, in a moment, but I start by speaking to government Amendments 21 and 51. Government Amendment 21 specifies the relevant governing authorities for giving consent to same-sex marriages according to the rights and usages of the Jewish religion. It replaces the provisions currently in the Bill with a definition that reflects the current arrangement for the Jewish community.
During the Committee evidence sessions in the other place, Sarah Anticoni of the Board of Deputies of British Jews’ Family Law Group referred to drafting issues which it had brought to the Government’s attention. This amendment is the result of discussions with the Board of Deputies of British Jews about those drafting issues, and the Government are very grateful to the board for its helpful and constructive contribution to the completion of this amendment, despite representing a wide range of views on same-sex marriage.
The Marriage Act 1949 already provides a definition of “secretary of a synagogue” in respect of the registration of Jewish marriages. This is because the Jewish religion already has specific provisions for its marriages in the Marriage Act which date back to 1753. This amendment ensures that the new provision in respect of the relevant governing authority reflects the modern structure of the Jewish community.
Government Amendment 51 provides that, where a governing authority has given consent to marriages of same-sex couples, that consent will not be affected purely by a change in the person or persons constituting that governing authority. Where a governing authority provides consent and thereby opts into conducting marriages for same-sex couples, a change in the person or persons who make up the authority will not render the consent void, negate it or remove it. The consent will still stand. However, this does not prevent the new governing authority from revoking the consent and deregistering the building, but this amendment makes clear that that would not happen automatically.
Amendment 22, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Singh, provides a specific reference to the governing authority of the Sikh religion in relation to opting into same-sex marriage. I assure the noble Lord that no disrespect is intended towards the Sikh religion, or towards any other denomination or faith that is not specifically mentioned in the Bill, and that this amendment is not needed.
It may be that no disrespect is intended, but disrespect has been taken and many people are extremely upset about it. I still do not know why the omission occurred. Was it inadvertent or was it deliberate?
I apologise if any disrespect has been taken; it was certainly not the intention. A general reference to the governing authorities of religious organisations other than the Church of England, the Jewish religion and the Quakers is already included in the Bill—not by specific reference, but it is covered. The governing authority for the Sikh religion would be covered by this and would enable the members of the Sikh religion to determine who would be their relevant governing authority for the purpose of consenting to same-sex marriage.
The Government do not think it desirable to specify in legislation the governing authority for any particular religious organisation. That is properly a matter for the members of the religious organisation themselves. For the Government to seek to prescribe this would be an inappropriate interference in the internal governance and autonomy of religious organisations, which should be free to decide, and indeed change, their decision-making arrangements for themselves.
I think it was reflected in what the noble Lord said that he is trying to replicate the specific reference that the governing authorities of the Jewish religion and the Society of Friends—the Quakers—have within the Bill. However, as has already been indicated, they are both in a different position, given their particular treatment under the Marriage Act 1949, which arises from arrangements put in place hundreds of years ago to reflect their particular circumstances at the time. They have long had different arrangements under marriage law and therefore their governing authorities are already specifically referred to in the Marriage Act. In line with that treatment, specific reference must be made to their governing authorities in this Bill. This is not required for other religious organisations, where the relevant governing authority should be determined by the members of each organisation. Indeed, my own religious denomination, the Church of Scotland, which has places of worship in England, is not referred to in this Bill—for the very good reason that there is no historical reason why it should be.
Amendment 20 is similar to an amendment debated in Committee in the other place. It inserts provisions regarding the definition of the relevant governing authority, whose written consent is required to opt into the registration of a religious organisation’s place of worship for marriages of same-sex couples. The amendment provides that where there is a dispute over the recognition of the governing authority, the Secretary of State is required to consult members of the religious organisation and if necessary hold a ballot in which at least 66% of members cast their votes. Members are defined as people who have been on a formal membership roll for 12 months or who have attended the majority of services held over a 12-month period.
As I have already indicated, the Government do not believe that it is right for the state to restrict the independence of religious organisations and interfere with their internal governance in this way. Quite properly, that is a matter for each religious body to determine for itself, and we believe that the Bill as it stands gives adequate clarity about what is required regarding the consent of the governing authority of a religious group to marriages of same-sex couples, since the question of who the governing body is will be a matter of fact in each case. If there is a dispute over the identity of the relevant governing authority, that is a matter for the religious organisation to deal with internally, and we do not wish to create additional burdens for religious organisations. Nor indeed do we wish the Secretary of State and the state itself to become involved in internal disputes within a religious organisation.
The noble Lord, Lord Singh, gave us a very helpful explanation as to why he had moved this amendment with reference to the authority in his Sikh religion. It is helpful to have that information about the structure of the Sikh religion, because it illustrates exactly why it would not be proper for the Government to intervene in a religious organisation and its internal workings. It would be quite wrong for the Government to determine which part of the Sikh community should prevail, and it would be a near impossibility for the Government even to identify every religious organisation in the country and make the kind of provision that he would make. Undoubtedly someone would be left off, and that has its own implications. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Singh, that the references to the Jewish faith and to Quakers are for long-standing historical reasons, and I invite the noble Lord, Lord Curry, to reflect on the fact that it is not appropriate for the state and the Secretary of State to intervene in such a way with the internal workings of a religious organisation. On the basis of that, I invite the noble Lord not to press his amendment.
I am grateful for what has been said, but it does not really explain the concerns at all. If there had been any sort of research into the Sikh religion, the Government would have had precise answers as to the state of play in that religion and what and who is the authority. No research whatever has been done. It has been considered unimportant and that is what really upsets. The concern is very similar to that of my noble friend Lord Curry: that any fringe group can say that it is in charge of this or that. If the Government do not wish to take note of someone speaking on behalf of the largest and only relevant authority in India, that is up to them, but this is aiding a “divide and rule” culture that is unhelpful, and that will not be welcome in the community.
My Lords, this echoes precisely what I was saying at Second Reading. It is a very good example of what is wrong with this whole process. We started off with one unhappy minority and we are going to finish up with 15 or 20 who have not been consulted in the process to the extent that the others have.
My Lords, I appreciate the point that the noble Lord, Lord Singh, is making, but I ask him to reflect on the fact that the exceptions are exceptions for historical reasons of the Church of England and the Church in Wales where there is a common-law duty with regard to priests in relation to people within their parish. Quakers and the Jewish faith are included for reasons that go back centuries. Every other religion in England and Wales is treated in the same way. Even my own denomination, the Church of Scotland, is treated in the exactly same way as the Sikh faith is treated by the provisions in this Bill for the religious organisation itself to determine what its appropriate authority is.
It is quite clear from what the noble Lord has said that there is no doubt within his faith as to where that authority lies, just as in my own denomination the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland would be the obvious authority. The fact that he has been able to make very clear where that authority would lie just shows the importance of it being determined by the religion itself. I also ask him to reflect on the fact that if we included his amendment, every other faith and denomination would have to be included as well. That would be an impossible task for a Government and would take them into having to decide which the proper authority of some religions is, and I do not believe that is where the state should go.
My Lords, I would just add that if the state were to conduct such an exercise and purport to decide for religious bodies what the proper religious authority is, difficult questions would arise under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The “relevant governing authority” is... | ...if the marriage falls to be registered by... |
---|---|
the Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of the Commonwealth | the secretary of a synagogue certified under paragraph (a) of the relevant definition (certification by the President of the Board of Deputies) |
the person or persons duly recognised by the members of—(i) the West London Synagogue of British Jews (“the West London Synagogue”), and(ii) the other synagogues that are constituents of or affiliated to the Movement for Reform Judaism | —either the secretary of the West London Synagogue, as certified under paragraph (b) of the relevant definition—or the secretary of another synagogue in a case where:(i) the secretary is certified under paragraph (d) of the relevant definition by the secretary of the West London Synagogue, and(ii) the synagogue is one of those which are constituents of or affiliated to the Movement for Reform Judaism |
the person or persons duly recognised by the members of—(i) the Liberal Jewish Synagogue, St. John’s Wood (“the St. John’s Wood Synagogue”), and(ii) the other synagogues that are constituents of or affiliated to Liberal Judaism | —either the secretary of the St. John’s Wood Synagogue, as certified under paragraph (c) of the relevant definition—or the secretary of another synagogue in a case where:(i) the secretary is certified under paragraph (d) of the relevant definition by the secretary of the St. John’s Wood Synagogue, and(ii) the synagogue is one of those which are constituents of or affiliated to Liberal Judaism |
the person or persons duly recognised by the members of the synagogue by whose secretary the marriage falls to be registered | the secretary of a synagogue certified under paragraph (d) of the relevant definition (certification by the secretary of the West London Synagogue or the secretary of the St. John’s Wood Synagogue) in a case where the synagogue is not one of those which are constituents of or affiliated to:(i) the Movement for Reform Judaism, or(ii) Liberal Judaism |
My Lords, Amendment 26A in the name of my noble friend Lord Alli would remove the special arrangements made in the Bill to require the legal recognition of marriages of same-sex couples as civil partnerships in Scotland and Northern Ireland. I sympathise with the sentiment behind these amendments. British same-sex couples who get married in England or Wales but choose to live in Scotland or Northern Ireland will not have their status legally recognised for what it is. However, it is the nature of devolution that we cannot impose the will of Westminster on devolved Administrations in areas where it has ceded authority.
Marriage law is devolved to both Northern Ireland and Scotland, meaning that any desire by Westminster to legislate in this area for the whole of the UK requires the consent of these Administrations. I know that Scotland is in the process of looking at same-sex marriages at the moment, so I hope that we shall shortly see same-sex marriage introduced in Scotland and therefore this issue will become somewhat less relevant.
In Northern Ireland, civil partnerships have been available since 2005. However, Northern Ireland has chosen not to consider extending marriage to same-sex couples at this time. A Motion calling on the Northern Ireland Executive to legislate to allow for same-sex marriage was narrowly defeated in its Assembly last month. I recognise my noble friend’s frustration at this. However, I ask the Minister, what are the implications if the legislative consent Motion is not agreed to by the Northern Ireland Assembly? Does it mean that married couples of the same sex living in Northern Ireland may be left in a worse position, having no legal recognition of their status whatever? What might be the implications for children and pensions? I am concerned about the legal implications of such a disparity of recognition and hope that the Minister will be able to answer the questions I have around this issue.
Couples in a civil partnership are prohibited from adopting children in Northern Ireland—a situation which is currently being challenged in the High Court. For those couples who have been married and adopted children in England and Wales and who move to Northern Ireland, what will be the status of their adopted children? Will the couple be recognised as the legal parents where they are living?
In relation to pension rights and accrued survivor benefits, if a married same-sex couple have been living in England for 10 years and then move to Northern Ireland, will they lose the right to those accrued benefits, or will they be carried over to their civil partnership status?
My Lords, I welcome the opportunity to clarify how the Bill, which makes provision for marriage of same-sex couples under the law of England and Wales, affects Scotland and Northern Ireland. I assure your Lordships that the Government have had lengthy and considered discussions with Scotland and Northern Ireland Ministers and officials to ensure that where the Bill touches on devolved matters, it does so appropriately. I understand where the noble Lord, Lord Alli, is coming from on this but it is not possible for us to accept his amendment or, indeed, those spoken to by my noble friend the Duke of Montrose, which would cut across the approach that we have been discussing with the devolved Administrations.
Indeed, the effect of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Alli, would be to remove the relevant part of Schedule 2 to the Bill. It might be helpful if I explain the effect, and importance, of Schedule 2. Without the provisions in Schedule 2, if a same-sex couple married in England or Wales, their relationship would not have legal status if they subsequently travelled or moved to Belfast or Glasgow. It is not that their marriage in England or Wales would become a civil partnership; it would have no status whatever under the law of Scotland or Northern Ireland.
But it does not have a legal status in Northern Ireland and Scotland because it is a marriage in England and Wales. What the Bill is proposing is for this Government and this Parliament to request—because that is all we can do—the devolved Administration in Northern Ireland and the Scottish Parliament to accord it a lower status in those territories.
My Lords, the position is that, as things stand at the moment, there is no provision in either Scotland or Northern Ireland for same-sex marriage. Therefore, if a same-sex couple who are married in England and Wales were to move to Scotland or Northern Ireland, their relationship would not have a legal status of marriage in Scotland or Northern Ireland because that provision does not exist. There is no such thing at the moment in Scotland or Northern Ireland as same-sex marriage. Schedule 20 to the Civil Partnership Act 2004 lists the overseas same-sex relationships which are treated as civil partnerships in the United Kingdom. This partly answers the question raised by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss.
At the moment, overseas same-sex marriages are not recognised as marriages in England, Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland. They are treated as civil partnerships in the United Kingdom, and Section 213 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004, under which Schedule 20 has effect, also sets out the general conditions which must be met for such relationships to be recognised in the United Kingdom. If the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Alli, were to be carried, we would have the slightly anomalous situation where a couple moving to Belfast or Glasgow would be in a worse position than a same-sex couple who married in Portugal, or elsewhere overseas where same-sex marriage is permitted, and then went to live in Scotland or Northern Ireland.
Under the current law, the 2004 Act, these same-sex marriages contracted, for example in Portugal, would be treated as a civil partnership. If this Bill becomes an Act, we do not wish to see a situation where a same-sex couple married in England would have lesser legal status in Scotland or Northern Ireland than a same-sex couple who married in Portugal. It is for that reason that Schedule 2 exists. As the noble Lord indicated, marriage and civil partnerships are devolved matters. The noble Lord asked why Secretaries of State for Scotland and Northern Ireland could not get together with Scottish or Northern Ireland Ministers to make them marriages. That is not how devolution works. Legislation would have to be passed by the Scottish Parliament or the Northern Ireland Assembly.
As the Bill anticipates, referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, the Scottish Government have indicated that they will bring legislation before the Scottish Parliament to bring about same-sex marriage as a legal status in Scotland. That is why, if noble Lords look carefully at the provisions for Scotland in Schedule 2, the order-making power would not have effect if the Scottish Parliament passes legislation for same-sex marriage. In many respects, what is there is deliberately framed, recognising the likelihood that same-sex marriage legislation is to be brought forward in Scotland in the relatively near future.
It is probably also fair to say that same-sex marriage legislation does not appear to be on the horizon in Northern Ireland. That is why the position regarding Northern Ireland is that there is not an order-making power, which will lapse in Scotland when or if Scottish law changes, but rather one that sets out in primary legislation the same position for same-sex marriages contracted in England and Wales in Northern Ireland, as is the case for same-sex marriages contracted in other countries, such as Portugal. People there would be in the same position in Northern Ireland as they would at present.
Last week, the Scottish Parliament passed a legislative consent Motion to the provisions in this Bill which impinge and deal with devolved matters affecting Scotland. The question was asked what would happen if we could not get a legislative consent Motion from Northern Ireland. Our concern would be that this would risk leaving couples with no legal status in a part of the United Kingdom. This could have important European Convention on Human Rights implications. We would need to consider this carefully if this situation arose and whether amendments to the Bill would be needed.
I know that this is not what the noble Lord, Lord Alli, wishes to see, but given the devolution settlement, this Parliament should not legislate for same-sex marriages in Scotland or Northern Ireland and I do not think that anyone in this Parliament is arguing for it. However, in the absence of legislation there, it is important that we give couples who have contracted a same-sex marriage in England and Wales a legal status in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Without the schedule they would have no legal status, so we are putting them on a par with couples who are married in other countries which have passed legislation on same-sex marriage.
My Lords, I always understood that the first purpose of an order was to be a blanket order to cover all situations. What remains from my questions is: what process does the Minister expect to use for the implementation of the order and what account does it take of the separation of powers? I think that he was saying that the Scottish Parliament has agreed that you can cross-mix the powers.
My Lords, the Scottish Parliament has agreed a legislative consent Motion to the provisions in the Bill relating to Scotland, which is very much what we are talking about. The procedure is that the order-making power would be subject to the negative procedure. I am aware that the Delegated Powers Committee has suggested looking at the possibility of there being an affirmative power. We will obviously give consideration to that, but the power also requires the consent of Scottish Ministers. That will be the process. Consent will be required from Scottish Ministers and there will be a negative procedure in this Parliament, subject to our considering the recommendations of the Delegated Powers Committee.
With regard to the separation of powers, I tried to indicate that this is a general position, not a question of the Secretary of State determining the legal status of each couple individually by order. It is a general power that is being given and it is therefore appropriate for the legislature to give that power to the Secretary of State, and for the Secretary of State then to exercise that power. It is not an appropriate matter for the courts because they obviously cannot exercise such a power on a general basis and would have to consider these matters case by case. As I have indicated, that could place a considerable burden on the courts. It would also mean that those who had moved to Scotland and were petitioning the Scottish courts for recognition of their status would, during that period, have no legal status at all. That is not a satisfactory position in which to put these couples.
Perhaps I may write to the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, about her question on accrued pensions. There is provision to make some variation of the orders and there may be some situation in which that issue would be relevant. However, I will write to her and confirm that position.
My Lords, does it not require a statutory provision in Scotland to make this work? Therefore, it is not a matter for the courts in Scotland; it is a matter for the Secretary of State and Ministers in Scotland to make a statutory order to make the rule part of the statutory law of Scotland.
As ever, my noble and learned friend expresses it far more concisely than I do.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply but, as he probably recognises, I am not happy with it. If I got married in England or Wales, I would expect my marriage to be recognised in Scotland and Northern Ireland. It is the essence of the union. For us to have found a mechanism in the Bill to convert marriages into civil partnerships feels as though it was too difficult politically to keep them as marriages. It is clearly a nonsense for couples to be married in England and Wales, and then be treated differently in Northern Ireland and Scotland. For us, in this Parliament, to determine that a marriage in England and Wales should not be treated as a marriage in Scotland and Northern Ireland, without putting the question—as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, just indicated—to the Secretary of State for Scotland, and those Scottish Ministers for that order, or indeed to the Northern Ireland Secretary of State and Ministers, is for us to be complicit in perpetuating an inequality. Nevertheless, I will read what the Minister said and reflect, but I have no doubt we will return to this on Report. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
(11 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Cormack for moving the amendment. As he indicated, it is a probing amendment, and I hope that from both the response of the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, and what I am about to say that he will be reassured that there is good reason why clergy of the Church of England and the Church in Wales are identified separately in the Bill.
As my noble friend indicated, the amendment would make plain that no duty of the Roman Catholic clergy to marry couples is extended by the Bill to same-sex couples. I am grateful for the opportunity to explain the position. In respect of this amendment, whatever his duties in the Catholic Church or under Roman Catholic canon law are, a priest of the Roman Catholic Church is under no legal duty according to English law to marry anyone. If a couple of some other faith, or who are for example simply not members of his congregation, come to him, he does not have to marry them.
However, there is a common-law duty to marry parishioners, which applies to the clergy of the Church of England and the Church in Wales. That duty arose because of the establishment of the Church of England and the previous establishment of the Church in Wales. The purpose of Clause 1(4) and (5) is to ensure that this duty does not extend to the marriage of same-sex couples.
However, given that no other religions are or have been established in England and Wales, no common-law duty arose in respect of the clergy of other religious organisations. It is therefore not necessary to have a provision in the Bill ensuring that such a duty is not extended to the marriage of same-sex couples. All other religious organisations are entirely free to decide whom they wish to marry according to their rites.
Therefore, Roman Catholic clergy, along with ministers of other religious organisations, are fully protected under Clause 2. The amendment would therefore achieve no change in the law but could produce confusion and doubt as to whether the clergy of the Roman Catholic Church might be under a legal duty to marry opposite-sex couples when, in fact, they are not.
I hope that that straightforward and simple explanation satisfies my noble friend. However, it has been important and worth while for him to have moved the amendment to provide an opportunity for that explanation to be given.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Royall. I have a number of Roman Catholic friends who have been somewhat concerned, and I am grateful that all this is now on the record. I am only too glad to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.