(1 year, 12 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will also support Amendment 113 in this group in the name of my noble friend Lord Fox, which I have put my name to.
Imagine this House’s response to a public sector procurement Bill or statutory instrument that came before your Lordships’ House with the following provisions. The Government could, without reference to anyone, set up a new procurement channel that was mainly for people who knew Members of the Houses of Parliament, and particularly government Ministers. The companies offering the items would not have to be trading, or could just have a few weeks’ incorporation, and would still be included in the special channel. Normal scrutiny and due diligence would not be required of such contacts. These contacts would have preferential treatment over existing and trusted suppliers. They would be 10 times more likely to get a contract, many running into multi-millions of pounds, than other companies not in that special channel, many of which would have had a trading history of years of supplying relevant, safe and reliable goods and services. In addition, those on the special channel would be able to make three times the normal profit margin before the usual and rigorous value-for-money checks were carried out.
Quite rightly, we would be outraged and would see that as unethical and an unacceptable way to spend billions of pounds of taxpayers’ money. I hope that a fatal Motion would be put so that such provisions were stopped in their tracks. However, that is exactly what happened with the VIP channel set up for PPE in 2020. The findings of the National Audit Office and other reports that have been investigating the VIP channel paint a picture that is not acceptable and should never be part of an ethical public sector procurement process. The National Audit Office reported that companies referred to the VIP channel lane by Ministers, senior MPs and Peers had a success rate for gaining PPE contracts 10 times greater than other companies, many of which had a history of supplying reliable PPE in the other procurement routes. Parliamentary Questions show that 41 out of 111 contracts awarded through the high-priority lane by May 2020 had not gone through the formal eight-stage due diligence process.
If speed is required in public sector procurement, the normal rules of probity and ethical standards cannot and must not be ditched. We know that it leads to some with access to government Ministers’ personal WhatsApp contacts, telephone numbers or email addresses ending up making many billions of pounds for nothing more than having those contacts, and the door is open to the public sector market with the ability to supply goods and services. It is reported that some individuals have made over £29 million in personal gain from a company that was not even incorporated when they were lobbying government Ministers to get in the VIP lane, and indeed, when they eventually landed a multi-million-pound contract, they provided some goods and services that were not fit for purpose and could have put our NHS staff at risk had they been used.
Amendment 72 prevents another VIP lane from being set up that creates special and lucrative routes to market for those with privileged access to Members of the Houses of Parliament, and particularly to those in the Government. It will still allow the Government to procure in an emergency but would ensure that one route to getting to market exists—one doorway, with the same due diligence and rules applied regardless of who made the recommendation of the individual or company, rather than a fast-track and light-touch scheme for those who have a contact who is a senior politician or government Minister.
Without this simple amendment, there is nothing in the Bill to prevent another unethical procurement scandal that could set up a VIP lane and become another get-rich-quick scheme for some who have personal access to government Ministers and senior politicians. As the National Audit Office said, contracts awarded by the department through the parallel channel made up only 3.6% of all contracts awarded but accounted for 52% of expected contract value.
With this in mind, I ask the Minister: what in this Bill would prevent another VIP channel from being set up that is predominantly populated on contracts from senior politicians and government Ministers? I look forward, as I am sure many noble Lords do, to hearing what the Minister has to say to reassure the House that the Bill has provisions that will prevent the kind of scandal that the country saw with the VIP lane set up. It was mainly populated by those who had contact with senior politicians and government Ministers, who made millions of pounds in personal gain for those contracts while going through a regime of much lighter touch than that for those not in the VIP lane. If the Minister cannot convince the House that provisions in this Bill will prevent this from happening again, I am minded to test the opinion of the House.
As a matter of objective, Clause 11 is meant to ensure that, in carrying out public sector procurement, bodies are
“acting, and being seen to act, with integrity”.
Amendment 72 will do exactly that, and ensure probity and integrity, so that never again will taxpayers see their money used in such a cavalier and unethical way as they did with the PPE VIP channel. I beg to move.
My Lords, I have tabled Amendment 97 for two reasons. First, it is to ask for an assurance from the Minister that the procurement review unit will be set up, and secondly, it is to put down a strong marker on the reasons that the Minister’s department presented for attempting to exclude my amendment as constitutionally improper.
The Minister will recall that, in the responses to the Green Paper, there was a warm and widespread welcome to the proposal that an autonomous unit should be set up within the Cabinet Office to oversee contracting authority compliance with the new procurement rules and so help to realise the benefits intended from the transformation of public procurement legislation. In turn, the Government’s response gave a clear commitment to set up what it now labelled the procurement review unit. This is not in the Bill, however. Therefore, will the Minister Pepper v Hart that commitment, so to speak, by stating in the House that this remains the Government’s clear intention, and that during the passage of the Bill an effective PRU will be established, along the lines indicated by the Government’s response to the consultation?
On the second issue, the slide presentation to the briefing given to Peers on the PRU between Committee and Report, which I was unfortunately unable to attend, stated that the principle of indivisibility of the Crown means providing statutory powers to Ministers whereby they can direct action to be taken by central government departments—in other words, another part of the Crown—and is not usually provided for in legislation. To do so also risks fettering the non-statutory powers Ministers already hold.
I had not previously heard the principle of the indivisibility of the Crown, nor that this principle inhibited Parliament from including specific instructions to Ministers in legislation. It is, after all, an assertion of prerogative—executive sovereignty against parliamentary sovereignty—although oddly qualified by including the adjective “usually” in its attempted exclusion of legislation.
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman. These Benches concur with a lot of what she had to say. When I asked why the number of postal voters should not be in the Bill, the Minister replied that it was better to deal with it flexibly, under secondary legislation. I note that the Bill states that the number of proxy votes which can be used by an elector is four. What is the difference between having this in the Bill for proxy voters but not for postal voters?
My Lords, I have a question more out of ignorance than expertise. I am old enough to have gone round as a young man in the days when different parties competed in treating the matrons of care homes, and relying on them to collect all the votes up and make sure that everyone voted in the right direction. I am sure that that no longer happens—let us hope that it is something that we left behind in the 1960s. However, this raises questions about care homes. How are people assisted to vote? Who posts their votes for them or holds their proxies? I wish for a little assurance about this.
I want to follow on from the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, because his concerns were also mine. I am not clear what the definition of some of these issues would be in law and how they would be taken by the courts. Are there issues like this in legislation elsewhere and has there been interpretation by the courts, particularly regarding spiritual injury? For example, if someone was to stand up in a Catholic church and ask for people not to vote for candidates who supported abortion, would that constitute spiritual injury? Would that be undue spiritual pressure in determining which way people vote?
This is a very finely balanced issue, and I have not come across it before. Therefore, the Minister needs to explain very specifically where the lines and the boundaries are. It is a balance between people having the right to freedom of speech and of faith—I say that as somebody who does not have a religious faith—and the issue of them not being unduly influenced or forced to go against what they believe in. It would be really interesting to hear a clear definition and clear examples from the Dispatch Box for us to be able to determine exactly what this means in legislation.
I shall give my noble friend an American example, which has been debated in the United States very recently. There have been Catholic bishops who have suggested that President Biden should be denied communion, as a Catholic, because he is not prepared to be sufficiently anti-abortion. That, it seems to me, would be undue spiritual influence—although the spectacle of a Catholic bishop or archbishop being prosecuted for undue spiritual influence would be quite an interesting one.
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I wish to speak in support of the probing Amendment 35 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman. We have to ask what my noble friend asked. What is this trying to solve? In the regulated period of one year and at a figure of £700, we are saying that an organisation that spends £1.91 a day for 12 months before a general election could be committing an offence. That is the amount that would have to be spent per day by the organisation or £13.46 a week or £58.33 a month. The very simple question I would like to ask the Minister is: how was that daily amount of £1.91 calculated? Why is it deemed to be illegal if an organisation exceeds that amount and exactly what problem does it solve?
My Lords, may I ask the Minister a question? I do not entirely understand this clause and the unincorporated association element is the least clear to me. I googled “unincorporated association” this morning and came away more confused than when I started. I think we would all be very grateful if the Minister’s office could circulate a letter explaining why this is there, what sort of organisations they have in mind, whether there is a history or problems with unincorporated associations and, if so, what they were, so that we have some idea of why this is necessary. I get a sense from others who have spoken that we are puzzled by where this clause is coming from, why it is there and what it is intended to do.