Recall of MPs Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Saltaire and Lord Norton of Louth

Monday 19th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to support the amendment, which should be read in conjunction with Amendment 39 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes. It strikes me that the problem is that there are too few signing places but they are open for too long a time. If the period is shortened, that would presumably free up resources that might help to cover the cost of having more places open within a short period. If the two were put together, it could be cost-neutral but very beneficial to all those who want to take part in the process.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, managed to entertain us for more than an hour during the first day in Committee. I fear that he may be hoping to do the same on the second.

Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Saltaire and Lord Norton of Louth

Tuesday 5th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

I think that that is unlikely, but this is obviously something on which we should perhaps consult informally with the industry, to see whether there are any serious concerns. I am not aware that there are and, as I have said, the current voluntary register is in the same league but slightly more expensive.

Amendment 113, from the Opposition, would amend the reference to the setting of the subscription charge from one that requires the Minister to seek to recover the full costs to one that would require the Minister to ensure that the charge is set so as to recover the full costs of the registrar’s activities. I recognise that it is intended to emphasise the importance of ensuring that the charge recoups completely the cost of the register, but assure the Opposition that the Government are very well aware of the importance of ensuring that the register is fully funded by the industry.

We expect that the register will cost around £200,000 a year to run and that that cost will be borne not by the taxpayer but by the lobbying industry. The register that the Opposition have suggested would cost a great deal more—possibly nearer the £3 million that it costs to operate the Canadian register. Perhaps they would like to consider how they would ensure that those costs were recovered from the much larger number of individuals and organisations that they intend to capture.

The Opposition’s Amendment 114A would remove subsection (2) from Clause 24, thereby affecting the regulation-making powers under that part. The Joint Committee on Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform has recently published a very thorough and thoughtful report on the delegated powers included in the Bill. The Government are giving the committee’s recommendations careful consideration and will respond formally shortly.

I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Norton, that I responded to his Amendment 115 before he had spoken to it. Rather too many meetings over the past day left me less well organised than ideally I should have been. I took him down as saying that the Government believe in transparency but not too far. I would say that the Government believe in transparency, but want to be proportionate in our approach. I fear that some of the amendments that have been floated today have suggested that we move from a situation of extremely moderate transparency to one in which there will be a very burdensome set of regulations, which would go further than we need to at this time.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My noble friend is now talking about moderate transparency rather than transparency, so he is already limiting it. He is very keen on “proportionate”, I have noticed; it has come up a number of times today. I am just wondering how proportionate it is to introduce a register of perhaps 350 companies when we have not established how many of them already publish their client list. If most of those who are going to be registered already publish their client list, it is proportionate at the wrong end, because there is no point, really, in doing it. It is not good enough just to establish how many would be covered by the register; we need to know whether it would actually add anything to our knowledge of what those companies are doing and who their clients are. There may not be any point in doing it.

My point is that, if you are going to do it, do it properly; if you want transparency for lobbying and you are going to be comprehensive, there will be a cost to it. If you are going to do it properly and have a register, I am afraid that you have to go down the Canadian route. My argument is that you can avoid doing that by going down my route, whereby you get transparency of lobbying, not simply listing lobbyists.

Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Saltaire and Lord Norton of Louth

Tuesday 5th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

That is, again, a fair point, which the Government will look at. We are extending regulation into lobbying here and are reluctant to go too far too quickly. There may be a means of considering further extension on review. The noble Lord will know that we now have a regular practice of having a five-year review of legislation. If whichever Government are then in power decide that this is inadequate, we will see what can be done.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

I come back to my noble friend’s point about who would be included in the register. He gave the figure of 350. Does he know how many of those would be caught who do not already reveal who their clients are?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, that stretches my expertise very considerably. I will have to consult and write to the noble Lord about that. It is a good academic question. The Government have been quite clear that there is no exemption from the requirement to register for large multidisciplinary firms that conduct consultant lobbying. We refined the exception provided in paragraph 1 by amendment in Committee in the other place to clarify that it will not be enjoyed by organisations such as, for example, law firms if they run consultant lobbying operations and lobby in a manner which is not incidental to their other activity—even if consultant lobbying is not their primary activity. As such, they will be required to register if they meet the other criteria outlined in the definition of consultant lobbying. The provisions outlined in paragraph 1 provide an important and effective exemption for those whose limited involvement in lobbying is in a manner which is merely incidental to their normal professional activity. However, it brings within its scope those that provide consultant lobbying as a major part of their activities and firms for which consultant lobbying is a significant part of their activity.

Opposition Amendment 39 provides a long list of exemptions from the Opposition’s definition of professional lobbying. Exemptions are provided for constituents contacting their Member of Parliament, persons making communications on their own behalf, persons responding to government consultations or an invitation to submit evidence to a parliamentary committee, persons acting on behalf of government, persons not receiving remuneration, and those responding to a court order. That is a very large and unwieldy list of exceptions partly because once one extends this to professional lobbying, the question of definition itself becomes much more difficult. That is, again, partly why we have stuck to consultant lobbying in our approach.

Finally, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, asked about sovereign powers and the Government of Taiwan. It is very helpful that he has raised Taiwan but it would probably be better, to be absolutely sure that I am correct, that I offer to write to him on that specific point. I would like to reassure him as far as I can.

I hope that I have managed to answer most of the points in these amendments. I have outlined why it is not necessary to extend the register to those who lobby on their own or their employer’s behalf, because it is clear whose interests are being represented. Our proposals will deliver a focused, problem-specific register and, as such, we believe that these amendments are not necessary. I urge the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

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[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, that is a very fair intervention. That is one of the reasons why we hesitate to include people whose main responsibilities within the charity or company for which they work is to contact government. The public affairs departments of major companies are the ones dealing with government, trying to interface between the company and the political process, and it would be the public affairs departments of many companies with which one would therefore logically deal. I know many people who have gone to work in the public affairs departments of companies—I am sure we all do. It is very often where people who have been involved in politics go afterwards to earn what they failed to earn in politics.

The noble and learned Lord is absolutely correct to say that in the exact definition of a professional lobbyist we are talking about people who are employed by a company, campaigning group or charity and pursue its interests in its relations with government. A consultant lobbyist is someone who lobbies on behalf of someone else apart from their own company. Theoretically, I suppose it is possible to imagine a consultant lobbyist all of whose income comes from one external client but the majority of consultant lobbying firms provide assistance, advice and lobbying for a large number of clients. That is the industry with which we are all familiar and with which those of us in government often interact. That is the distinction we make.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, before the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, responds, my noble friend has really not addressed the distinction between those who do the activity and the activity itself. The Government are supposed to be trying to provide transparency about the activity, not simply listing those who may engage in it—in this case, only some who engage in it.

The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, referred to what I said at Second Reading about what is in effect an alternative to this rather clunky mechanism being proposed by the Government. What I was proposing gets fairly comprehensively at the activity of who is lobbying on each measure that the Government bring forward. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, may wish to note that my Amendment 115 is intended to get at that. It is an alternative to what the Government are proposing and it would actually deal with that particular problem. My noble friend may wish to bear that in mind in responding to the amendments because I am not sure he has established that there is a need for this part of the Bill, certainly not compared with the alternative that I am putting forward, which actually gets at the nub of ensuring transparency of lobbying.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

If I might add to that, particularly if there are only 350 registrations.

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[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

Perhaps we need to discuss between Committee and Report which definition of senior civil servants Ministers and various Members of the House wish to adopt. I was adopting my own understanding of the senior Civil Service, which is the 5,000 I mentioned.

I will be interested to hear from the Opposition whether they also need to be included in this. Again, that is something that perhaps the Opposition Front Bench and the Government should usefully discuss between Committee and Report. I come back to say that the best can be the enemy of the good in requiring too many people to be brought within the context of this Bill. I take the very powerful speech from the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, about non-ministerial departments to mind. I also take some of his other points about particular senior civil servants. We will consider all these points and, in that light, I trust that the noble Lord will be willing to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, I do not understand my noble friend’s point about numbers. It is irrelevant in the sense that it is the consultants who are doing the lobbying to those people. It does not matter how many they are. It is merely the fact that they are engaging with some of them that requires them to register.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

The register is of lobbyists. If we wish to include in the register every single Member of Parliament and others with whom they interact, we would get into a very complicated business. The question is who you wish to define as a consultant lobbying—as Amendment 3 says—to government.

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[Lord Norton of Louth]

I add my support to my noble friend’s amendment, but it does not go far enough. Partly for the reason he just mentioned, I would be more ambitious, along the lines indicated by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. There is no reason why you cannot have a rolling publication after the event excluding, following the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Martin, the venue because that is not really germane. It is the substance of the discussion that matters. I would be more ambitious than my noble friend Lord Tyler.

As the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours said, the amendment links to what I am arguing. It moves us in the right direction, so I am fully in support; it is just that I want to go further because this is a database of meetings between Ministers and external organisations and we need to extend it in terms of who is being seen. Just confining it to Ministers creates problems, so we need a larger database, or we certainly need to be able to identify those who are being lobbied.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, I am fascinated to hear this great outbreak of revolution in transparency. We thought that we were set out on a constructive step forward on transparency. I am not sure that I want all Ministers’ and civil servants’ diaries published the day after they meet anyone, which I think is what the noble Lord, Lord Norton, was beginning to suggest.

I will try to answer the various probing amendments. A number of them, starting with Amendment 54, are about stiffening the independence of the registrar. Amendment 54 would require the Minister to consult with the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee before appointing the registrar. I am not aware whether that has yet been requested by the committee itself, but it is an interesting proposal.

The amendments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, would prevent any person who had been a civil servant or a political adviser in the previous five years being appointed registrar. This is also thoughtful, and designed to provide assurance regarding the independence of the registrar which, of course, the Government are entirely committed to establishing and maintaining. Under the Bill, the registrar will be appointed according to the public appointment principles of open and fair competition and the Minister will be able to dismiss the registrar only where they are satisfied that there are reasonable grounds that he is unable, unwilling or unfit to perform the functions of his office. If thought unreasonable, any such decision by a Minister could be challenged in the usual way, by judicial review. The registrar will be independent of the lobbying industry and the Government, and will have a clear remit to operate independently of the lobbying industry and the Government.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, seeks to extend the positions that will not be eligible for appointment as registrar to capture those officials who would be required to submit information to him or her under his new clause. The Government are not persuaded of the case for the noble and learned Lord’s additions, and would therefore resist this amendment.

The Government recognise the importance of ensuring that the registrar is independent. We are confident that our proposals secure that, but are grateful for these suggestions and will of course consider whether they should be pursued further.

Amendment 63 has attracted a considerable amount of support. It would require that, in addition to the statutory register of consultant lobbyists, the registrar would be required to keep and publish a central database of ministerial meetings with external organisations.

House of Lords: Membership

Debate between Lord Wallace of Saltaire and Lord Norton of Louth

Thursday 24th October 2013 Grand Committee

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, retirement is essential to this because unless we are going to have a House that grows older gracefully and has very little renewal, we have to have a scheme that encourages retirement. The House has been getting older. After 17 years I have just passed the average age of the House. We need good new Members because we do not entirely want to be a House that represents the wisdom of 25 years ago, and therefore we need to address the question of retirement. I have had one or two conversations with older Peers who have suggested that a more dignified retirement arrangement, in which the House recognises the service of those Members who are retiring, would be of very considerable assistance to them. I am willing to take that back and, indeed, I have already discussed it with the Leader of the House. I think that it is something which we should all attempt to progress as best we can.

On a financial leaving package, let me simply say to the noble Lord, Lord Norton, that we receive allowances in this House; we are not paid. Most of us, the noble Lord, Lord Norton, and me included, have pensions. I think that I can guess what the size of his academic pension will be when he retires. I had a discussion with an older Labour Peer who said that I did not understand how working-class people like him would survive without their allowances. I reminded him sharply that I knew roughly what his academic pension was, and that if he could not survive on a professorial pension there was a real problem.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My point had nothing to do with pensions because there is no salary, so it was not premised on that—that was the analogy that I was drawing with House of Commons. The resettlement grant has absolutely nothing to do with pensions.

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[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, let me simply say, because time is short, that service in this House is a privilege which we should not expect to have to be bought out of. That is the view which I and a number of others hold. The Government remain unconvinced that we should attempt to buy older Peers out. I recognise that there is a substantial problem which older Peers think about in terms of party balance. I think that it is also the recognition issue that we are concerned about and very much want to continue.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, asked whether the Government would respond to the PCRC’s proposals for all-party talks. We will certainly respond to that report.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

Before my noble friend leaves his previous point, is he saying that service in the House of Commons is not a privilege?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, Members of the House of Commons earn their keep and are much more often in the prime of life. Most of us who come here have earned our salaries elsewhere and have pensions from elsewhere. That is part of the distinction that I am making.

Queen’s Speech

Debate between Lord Wallace of Saltaire and Lord Norton of Louth

Monday 14th May 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, there is room for a discussion and a concordat between the two Houses. We have also seen in the evidence that there is some resistance to putting into statute a further codification of the relationship between the two Houses because, as I have heard many noble Lords say, the jurisdiction of the courts and litigation would not necessarily be desirable. The Government did notice and will consider the recommendations of the Joint Committee with regard to initiating preliminary work on a concordat between the two Houses, but such work ultimately would be the responsibility of the two Houses rather than of the Government, as it would be concerned with constitutional conventions.

I want to make one other brief point. I was puzzled to hear a number of noble Lords say that this Chamber is not part of the legislature. Erskine May has been quoted on several occasions. On the first page, chapter 1, page 1, paragraph 1 states:

“Parliament is composed of the Sovereign, the House of Lords and the House of Commons. Collectively they form the legislature”.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

I think that my noble friend is confusing a point. People are not saying that the House of Lords is not a part of the legislature; they are saying that it is not a legislature.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

I will return to those speeches that I have read. I admit that I have never taken the MA in legislative studies at the University of Hull, but I referred back to my views. This House is clearly part of the legislature; this is a two-Chamber legislature.

Constitutional Change: Constitution Committee Report

Debate between Lord Wallace of Saltaire and Lord Norton of Louth

Wednesday 7th December 2011 Grand Committee

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, the Government value enormously the work of this Committee in focusing greater attention on the intricacies of our constitutional protections and of the process of constitutional change. We look forward to a continuing dialogue, spilling over, we would hope, into a more informed public debate.

On this occasion, as we have heard, the Committee has found our response disappointing. I am sorry for that. The Government are not persuaded that the recommendations represent an appropriate way of proceeding.

At the heart of our disagreement, as the noble Lord, Lord Parekh, in effect suggested in his speech, is a fundamental difference of view about our current constitutional arrangements in their current unwritten form. As it stands, constitutional legislation has no special status. To provide a special process for deliberating on constitutional legislation, therefore, runs up against the problem of definition, which the committee itself acknowledges, as well as the question of what is significant and not significant.

The Government’s argument, therefore, is that constitutional legislation has to go through an effective, proper, constitutional process. We have parliamentary sovereignty. The legislative process is, therefore, the way to proceed.

I have been sitting here trying to remember what it was that I taught, as a very young university teacher, when I tried to teach the British Constitution. Things have changed a great deal since then, but the question as to what is constitutional has in many ways become a great deal more complicated. I moved on to teach international relations and the European and International dimension is in many ways the most difficult; confusions over British sovereignty and constitutional sovereignty hit us very regularly.

We have had the debate on the EU Bill, which I helped to take through this House—the question of what happens when British sovereignty is infringed. On the other hand, the IMF programme of 1976 fairly clearly infringed British sovereignty. I recall one of the Cross-Benchers some months ago arguing that the placing of British troops under foreign command would be a fundamental invasion of British sovereignty, which would have clear and significant constitutional importance. The Secretary of State for Defence remarked to me the following day that British troops had just been serving under Turkish command in ISAF in Afghanistan and that indeed British troops had first served under foreign command in the First World War. So the question of what we think is of constitutional significance—indeed what we think constitutional sovereignty is as such—is itself deeply contentious.

I got myself into deep trouble two years ago in Jersey for suggesting that the relationship with the Crown Dependencies was a matter of constitutional significance which was open to constitutional change. I was denounced for a week as a French spy and various other things in the Channel Islands press.

The domestic issue of what is constitutional—the relationship between the Executive and the legislature, and between the Government and Parliament—is clearly fundamental, but the question of whether the courts are part of this is something that we rather skirt around. When we said goodbye to the Law Lords, I was fascinated to discover that the move to a Supreme Court had indeed been taken by legislation on a partisan basis by a Gladstonian Government that was in office for only a short time more than a hundred years ago; and that the collapse of that Government and the return of the Conservative Government led to this reform being pushed back for a mere 130 years.

The relationship between central government and local government is not, it seems, a matter of constitutional significance, although we make it so on a regular basis. The relationship between central government and the devolved Administrations has clearly become part of our constitution now. The relationship between the political elite in government and Parliament and the wider public—the disillusioned, even alienated, citizens—is one that, as the noble Lord, Lord Wills, rightly pointed out, we all need to take much more into account. The question of the interrelationship between different changes is, again, one that we stumble over. I have heard several people over the past few weeks suggest that a future referendum on the relationship between the United Kingdom and the EU might provide a result in which those in England had a clear majority in one direction and those in Scotland had a clear majority in the other. That would absolutely have constitutional significance.

The process of constitutional change cannot be apolitical or consensual. It is essentially political; it defines the rules of politics. The idea of non-partisan constitutional reform, which one or two contributions suggested, seems to me to be a chimera. Alfred Venn Dicey, much cited as a neutral constitutional authority, was also rabidly anti-Irish and wrote pamphlets against home rule. Professor Philip Norton, whom I have long regarded as one of the greatest living authorities on the British constitution after only Professor Peter Hennessy—and therefore as authoritative and neutral—is also the noble Lord, Lord Norton, who has very strong and partisan views on House of Lords reform and a number of other constitutional issues. We cannot criticise government proposals as political; of course constitutional reform is political. The question is: how do we handle them and do we need different procedures?

One of the defining principles of the British constitution is its flexibility and that it is based on parliamentary sovereignty. Therefore, constitutional change is made through legislation. The core of the committee’s recommendations was for a special statement to accompany any constitutional Bill to set out the expected overall impact of the legislation. What consideration had been given to the measure before publication? What public engagement had there been? Had there been formal pre-legislative scrutiny? What post-legislative scrutiny was envisaged? The Government’s response indicated that most of the information suggested for publication is already available in the Explanatory Notes that accompany each Bill on publication. It may be that we need to consider further whether the Explanatory Notes might be accompanied by a written ministerial statement, which would be different in form but perhaps not in substance.

There are a number of other comments that one needs to make. I do not think we would wish to go into the details of internal government deliberations. I can assure noble Lords that the Cabinet committee system works extremely well at the moment, partly because this is a coalition Government and we have to negotiate through Cabinet committees. Some of our discussions are extremely sharp. The Cabinet committee system now works much more fully than it did under the previous Government for obvious reasons.

The additional hurdles—parliamentary or wider—that are suggested, will be the subjects of continuing discussion. As the noble Lord, Lord Parekh, suggested, these would be part of a major process of constitutional change. The House of Lords itself is perhaps now the largest backstop to ill-considered or overpartisan constitutional reform being pushed through the Commons. But for the Government to spell out exactly what it means by constitutional change would itself be a change in the fundamental constitutional arrangements. When the Public Bodies Bill is quoted as a constitutional Bill, we are exploring what is the outer fringes of what we regard as constitutional.

The process of post-legislative scrutiny is a matter for Parliament and the Government to determine, and I hope that noble Lords would accept that is a useful piece on which the Government should leave post-legislative scrutiny for Parliament to decide.

A number of noble Lords have quoted the Cook-Maclennan model. I remind noble Lords that I was myself a little involved in that, and so was the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, as a neutral adviser on all this. Part of the basis for the Cook-Maclennan discussions was the expectation that Labour might not get an overall majority in 1997, so it was in effect part of a necessary preparation for what might have to be a coalition Government. Perhaps that is something that political parties should think about for the future, but it was on that occasion a preparation for something that did not happen. On this occasion, perhaps none of us prepared for something as fully as we should have done, which we had not expected to happen.

There were particular reasons of urgency underlying the decision to introduce the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill and the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill without publishing them first in draft. I hope that I have done my best to explain that. In contrast, the process of House of Lords reform has been one on which we have gone through all the stages of consultation—Green Papers, White Papers, committees—that noble Lords could ask for, and I am not sure that it has necessarily built consensus yet or will ensure easy passage for the Bill when it is published. That is, again, of the nature of constitutional change. Building a consensus for a non-partisan constitutional change is something that academics may hope for but politicians may think is perhaps beyond what is acceptable.

The UK is facing a period of continuing constitutional change, because it is going through a period of significant social and economic change and coming to terms with highly significant changes in its international environment and in the relationship between domestic arrangements and its international obligations and constraints. We will therefore continue to need and value the work of this committee and we look forward to a continuing dialogue with the committee.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

The Minister referred to facing constitutional change, which rather implies that the Government know what “constitutional” means. As far as I interpret his speech, he seems to be confirming that the Government do not know what a constitution is and that the “two Ps” test, which worked quite well for the Constitution Committee, appears to be beyond the Government.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, the question of constitutional change is one that we will continue to argue over, and the definition of what is constitutional and is not constitutional is something that evolves through debate and argument in Parliament as well as in academic seminars. Most of us think that we know what is constitutional when we see it, but sometimes we disagree with each other.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Saltaire and Lord Norton of Louth

Monday 21st March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth]

That is why the amendment says “impractical or”, not “impractical and”.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, it still refers to the fact of the holding of the election being,

“impractical or injurious to the economic, social or public health of the nation”,

as opposed to external circumstances that, while not being injurious to the election, certainly could make it impractical to hold it. However, I do not think that my noble friend’s amendment covers the circumstances where the external event could make it difficult actually to hold the election. I think that that is more than just a technical point, quite apart from what criteria the Prime Minister would use and what the threshold would be.

I have raised these points because they go beyond normal technical difficulties. They also illustrate the difficulties that arise when you devise formulas to try to address situations that, by their very nature, are unforeseeable. The technical matters point to the general principle agreed by your Lordships’ Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. It said that,

“it would be unrealistic to specify in the Bill a constraint which would embrace all of the possible circumstances in which it might seem appropriate to change a polling day”.

Problems arise when you start specifying circumstances. You can bet your life that a circumstance will come along that is glaringly obvious to everyone but was not covered when the legislation was going through. The greatest safeguard on the use of the power is the fact that it must be approved by both Houses and must be accompanied by a statement setting out the reason for seeking to vary the date of the general election.

That brings me to Amendment 25, tabled in the names of my noble friends Lord Rennard, Lord Tyler and Lord Marks. It provides that an order made by the Prime Minister under Clause 1(5) would have to be approved by a two-thirds majority in the other place. It also provides a role for the Speaker to certify whether the order had been approved by a Division and had the support of at least two-thirds of all MPs. I recognise the logic behind the amendment, as the Bill provides that a vote on an early Dissolution of the other place would require the support of at least two-thirds of all MPs. That measure is designed to ensure that an early general election can take place where there is cross-party consensus, a point emphasised by my noble friend. However, the order-making power in Clause 1(5) is somewhat different from the power for early Dissolution. Unlike the power to force an early Dissolution, it is a power to vary a scheduled general election and is limited in terms of time. Also, my noble friend may have sought to put in something to avoid abuse, but I believe that the circumstances are such that that would not occur, given the safeguards in place.

However, I am grateful to my noble friend for clarifying that this House would still have a role to play. As I understood it from some of the things that he said at Second Reading, it was not clear whether this House would still have a role to play. Given the comments that have been made by a number of noble Lords, that is important. In the light of that, I want to consider the amendment. I will consider, too, the fact that this provision would again involve the Speaker of the other place. That has raised issues where it appears later in the Bill, so I would want to reflect before agreeing to something that again would give the Speaker a role. It is something that I would want to have an opportunity to discuss with the authorities in the other place. Therefore I am certainly willing to consider it in the light of his assurance that this House would still have a role to play and what the implications might be for the other place.

The other point that my noble friend made was on local elections. There might be circumstances where it would be desirable to move a general election date but where local elections could continue as scheduled. However, and more important, this Bill focuses solely on what is strictly necessary to establish fixed-term Parliaments. To try to introduce other issues could lead to complications.

These are important issues and I hope that I have given assurances that the Government’s mind is not closed to them. I believe that there are safeguards in the Bill, which I hope will be added to by noble Lords agreeing to government Amendment 26. In the mean time, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, to withdraw his amendment.