Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill

Lord Verdirame Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 14th May 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, when we debated paragraph 6 of the Schedule in an earlier group, I argued that it was inappropriate to include an international law exception in the Bill. Therefore, it will not surprise the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, to find that I do not support the extension to paragraph 6 that his Amendment 30 seeks to achieve.

The briefing sent by the Palestine Solidarity Campaign asserted that without this amendment, the Bill could compel public bodies to contravene the genocide convention. This extraordinary statement was explained in the context of the much-publicised opinion of a number of UK lawyers, including the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, that the International Court of Justice had ruled that there was a plausible case that Israel has committed genocide. As the then President of the ICJ subsequently made clear, this is a complete misinterpretation of the ICJ’s judgment. Judge Joan Donoghue, the then President of the ICJ, has stated that the court decided that the Palestinians had a plausible right to be protected from genocide and that South Africa had the right to present that claim in court. However, to correct something that is often said in the media, the court did not decide that the claim of genocide was plausible. So the items of international law referred to in the amendment, including the genocide convention, basically have the name “Israel” etched on them. Whether by design or otherwise, this amendment would simply make it easier for public authorities to find excuses to boycott Israel and it would be very damaging if this amendment were accepted into this Bill.

Amendment 32, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, raises rather different issues. I am conscious that I am in dangerous territory because of the acknowledged expertise in labour law of the noble Lord compared with my ignorance of labour law. However, it is my understanding that the ILO conventions do not have direct effect in the UK. I thought that we achieved compliance through our domestic legislation. The noble Lord spoke about ILO matters on the last Committee day and, while he made the point that the UK is bound by the ILO conventions, I do not think that he claimed that they had any direct effect in UK law.

If I am correct, this amendment is a very unwelcome addition to the Bill because it seems to give full legal effect to the ILO conventions directly. These conventions are not drafted as stand-alone laws but in rather broad terms. They lack a lot of definitions and the language is often rather vague. That is why national Governments have to adopt them using their own legislation. I am not speaking against the ILO conventions; I have no views one way or the other on the conventions. My point is that we comply with these conventions through our national law and that law is the foundation of labour-related misconduct, which is covered in paragraph 8. It seems to me that paragraph 8 means that we can hold overseas suppliers to the same standards to which we hold UK suppliers. In particular, it aligns with the provisions of the Procurement Act which was passed last year. That is a wholly proper basis for this Act, rather than some broader concept of principles that cannot be read directly into our law.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I rise to offer a few remarks on these two amendments.

Amendment 30 does not really extend what paragraph 6 already does, because the expression “international law” in paragraph 6 includes everything that Amendment 30 mentions. My criticism of it, aside from the points that were discussed on day 3, is that it is just redundant. “Convention” is just another term for “treaty” and “obligations under international law” will include obligations arising under treaties to which the United Kingdom is a party. They will obviously include the genocide convention. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not a convention or a treaty but a resolution of the General Assembly, but it is widely believed to reflect customary international law and so is binding on the United Kingdom.

The reference in the amendment to the Security Council resolutions is also unhelpful and confusing. Security Council resolutions will be binding on the United Kingdom provided that they contain decisions under Article 25 of the United Nations charter, because it is the decisions of the Security Council that are binding on member states. Those resolutions will be binding on the United Kingdom, whether we supported them or whether we abstained in those votes.

Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill

Lord Verdirame Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 7th May 2024 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Verdirame]

18: Clause 3, page 2, line 36, at end insert—
“(3A) Regulations under subsection (2)(b) may include descriptions of considerations (including disregard thereof) to give effect to the United Kingdom’s obligations under international law.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to provide for a clearer way of implementing the international law exception in paragraph 6 of Part 2 of the Schedule.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I rise to move the first amendment in this group, Amendment 18 in my name, with the support of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. It must be read together with Amendment 29, which is also in this group. I shall speak to both of them together. These two amendments deal with the problem arising from the international law exception at paragraph 6 of the schedule.

A number of noble Lords highlighted this problem at Second Reading. In my speech, I referred to the opinion on the Bill by the Richard Hermer KC. I disagree with certain aspects of his opinion, but I agree with his analysis of the effect of paragraph 6 of the schedule. As he put it, a breach by the UK of an unincorporated treaty does not normally give rise to a claim under domestic law, but paragraph 6 of the schedule provides a domestic law foothold for such claims on a virtually unlimited basis. Unless the paragraph is amended or removed, the consequence will be that, contrary to the purposes of the Bill, local authorities, for example, will make their own determinations about UK compliance with international law obligations. If there is a dispute about the correctness of the position they have taken, that dispute will be decided by our courts.

We do not normally implement international law obligations on such an unspecified and broad basis. What we generally do is give effect to specific international law obligations in a manner that is clear, and thus consistent with the rule of law requirement of legal certainty and clarity. There are countless examples of this approach, from the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 to the Human Rights Act. In essence, what happens is that the implementing legislation identifies specific provisions in a treaty that are to be incorporated in domestic law, and sometimes those provisions will be listed in a schedule to the Act. The legislation will then create special rules or mechanisms that Parliament considers are required to give effect to those international law obligations. Examples include the declarations of incompatibility under the HRA and Foreign Office certificates under Section 4 of the Diplomatic Privileges Act.

Paragraph 6 of the schedule to the Bill does not do any of that. It purports to import the entirety of international law—potentially all treaties, whether incorporated or not—in every rule of customary international law, and invites decision-makers to consider for themselves whether their decisions will be compliant with any such international law. It is an inherently uncertain and unclear provision. Moreover, the international law obligations that might be relevant in this field are contested and unsettled.

This is particularly the case for international legal rules on the duties of third parties vis-à-vis a serious breach of peremptory rules of international law—most notably, Article 41 of the International Law Commission’s articles on state responsibility provides for three very general obligations for states faced with a serious breach of international law by another state. Those obligations are non-recognition, non-assistance and co-operation; but whether this rule entirely reflects customary international law and what it specifically requires of a state are not settled.

Public bodies would also have to determine for themselves whether they can avail themselves of the international law exception. That too requires a complex international law analysis. Whether an entity is a public body under domestic law is, of course, a question of domestic law, but whether the conduct of that body is attributable to the state on the international plain is a question of international law. Universities might be an example of public bodies under domestic law—we have been discussing that in previous debates on this Bill—but it is not the case that the conduct of a university would ordinarily be attributable to the state as a matter of international law.

The amendment that we propose would maintain the international law exception but add clarity to it by ensuring that regulations are adopted to include descriptions of considerations, including disregard thereof, to give effect to the UK’s obligations under international law. There may be a better formulation than the one we propose, but in essence the idea is to replicate the manner in which we have given effect to international law obligations that have not yet come into existence: for example, those that may arise in the future under decisions of the Security Council.

An example of this power is in the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. It creates the power to make regulations for purposes of compliance with UN obligations and, more generally, for the purpose of compliance with any other international obligation. What happens in practice is that the Foreign Office lawyer, together with the Attorney-General, will consider the specific international law obligations that have arisen and then contribute to the drafting of clear, specific and precise regulations to give effect to those obligations. To be clear, the power that we are proposing will not, of course, replace the power in the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act. It would be in addition to that.

I understand that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, take the view that that power in paragraph 6 may not be needed and could simply fall away. Our proposal is a compromise that reflects the reality that this is a sensitive area and we thought that embedding in the Act a power to make regulations for purposes of complying with international law may, in this context, be useful. I beg to move.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 28 in this group and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for adding his name. I should first say that I am in complete agreement with the thoughts that lie behind Amendments 18 and 29, to which the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, has spoken so eloquently.

My Amendment 28 is simply a more direct way of dealing with the same problem. It deletes paragraph 6 of the schedule in its entirety, so that public authorities cannot use international law considerations as a means of avoiding the effect of Section 1 of the Bill. Public authorities are not experts in international law but might well seek to use ill-founded concerns about the UK’s adherence to international law as a smokescreen behind which they believe that they can hide their boycott activities. Put simply, it creates a huge loophole in the Bill.

I tried to compare the Bill with last year’s Procurement Act to see whether the exclusions in the schedule to this Bill are the same as the mandatory and discretionary grounds for exclusion in the Procurement Act. This was not easy, because it is clear that two completely different sets of draftsmen have been involved in the two Bills. However, the one thing that I am pretty sure of is that the Procurement Act did not have an international law exclusion ground, so the inclusion of paragraph 6 in the schedule to this Bill is somewhat puzzling.

I shall comment briefly on Amendment 31 in this group, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, and the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, because that would extend the range of things that public authorities could look at to breaches of international law outside the UK. Not only is this way beyond the Procurement Act exclusions as well, but it adds yet another loophole, making the loophole as big as it could possibly be in order to allow public authorities to justify boycotts. For that reason, I cannot support it. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s rationale for the inclusion of paragraph 6 in the schedule.

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[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

I am not sure that I entirely understand the noble Lord’s question, but I will reflect on it. We will come relatively shortly to a group that will look at these issues more broadly. If I am able to do so, I will come back to him at that point.

As I have already said, various concerns have been raised, which we will consider. I thank all noble Lords for their contributions. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Deben, that we value this House’s expertise, as I said at Question Time only last week. The Government will continue to think carefully about the important points that have been made. I hope the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. The key driver behind our amendments was a concern about clarity, as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, pointed out. International law is not just a law but an entire legal system, so to say that you cannot breach international law is like saying that you cannot breach Chinese law. The legislative instruction has to be more specific than that. That is the essence of our concern.

I do not think the power we are proposing in my amendments, supported by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, would be excessive, as suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Oates. We have other examples of that in the legislation. As for the Minister’s comment on sanctions, we already have powers in legislation to deal with sanctions, so there would not need to be an international law exception on such a broad and unlimited basis to cover that situation; we already deal with that in our existing legislation.

I thank those who supported our amendments and analysis, in particular the noble Baronesses, Lady Altmann and Lady Noakes, and the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar. I look forward to the proposals that the Minister said she would consider bringing forward on Report. With that, I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 18 withdrawn.

Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill

Lord Verdirame Excerpts

Tuesday 7th May 2024 Lords Chamber

Finally, like the noble Lord, Lord Mann, and my noble friend Lord Willetts—I have added my name to his amendment—I urge the Government to reflect carefully on whether universities, which are still in the private sector and are, by and large, autonomous organisations, really need to be in the Bill at all.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I will return to a question that I raised on the first day in Committee: the way in which the Bill will impact on academic collaborations. Out of abundant caution, I also refer to the register of interests: I am a professor of international law at King’s, although, as far as I know, if my understanding of the Bill is correct, I do not think I am involved in investment or procurement decisions.

I raise this issue because paragraph 20 of the Explanatory Notes states:

“The ban in clause 1 is not intended to prohibit a higher education institution from deciding to terminate a collaboration with a foreign university on the grounds of academic freedom”.


Can the Minister say whether it follows from that that the ban is intended to prohibit a higher education institution from deciding to terminate, or not to initiate, a collaboration with a foreign university on the grounds of political or moral disapproval of foreign state conduct?

Academic collaborations can come about in a wide range of ways. Sometimes it is just the initiative of a single academic, who will get in contact with academics they know and have worked with in another institution. If they are to be caught by the Bill, it is important to have clarity, because that is the sort of activity a lot of academics would be involved in. It appears to be an example of serious overreach of the scope of the Bill, which the amendments proposed would take good care of. However, I would like to understand a bit better from the Government how they think the Bill as it stands would impact academic collaborations.

[Baroness Blackstone (Lab)]

My Lords, I would like to add my support to that already given to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Willetts.

I should declare a past interest, if not a present one. I worked for many years as an academic and led two higher education institutions, where I was very much involved in international collaborations. Indeed, as a Minister, I led the then Labour Government’s campaign, known as the Prime Minister’s initiative, to include a number of international collaborations and international students. To pick up on the last speaker’s questions, if this Bill were to damage that in any way, it would be extremely deleterious and affect the long-term reputation and quality of British higher education.

The main problem I have with this has been reflected in what others have said. This Bill creates a problem that does not exist. We should never legislate to create problems that do not exist; it is a crazy way of going about things. I was very much affected, as the noble Lord, Lord Johnson, was, by the excellent and powerful speech of the noble Lord, Lord Mann. This will not help Jewish students one iota. There are many things we should be doing to ensure the safety and freedom of Jewish students in our universities, but this is of no help whatsoever. The other point I will pick up on is that made by the noble Lord, Lord Willetts: this will not do anything to help community cohesion, either, which is of course extremely important.

On freedom of speech, which is at the centre of this, one of the things that defines universities—it is part of the nature of the academy—is that argument takes place. It is part of their lifeblood. Indeed, universities have a duty to promote freedom of speech and argument, and in that I would include argument about foreign policy. There is no single foreign policy, as I was trying to say earlier, if in not a very coherent way. Foreign policy is diverse, and changes. It is a reflection of world movements of all kinds, and of economic matters as well as political ones. The idea of a top-down foreign policy is, to me, utterly ludicrous.

Perhaps one of the worst things about this Bill is its gagging nature. To suggest that you cannot discuss and debate the issues that lie behind the Bill is horrendous. It is not what mature democracies do; it is what tyrannies do. I am sure the Minister is not in favour of tyranny— I know her well enough to be fully aware of that—but what she is doing this evening is presiding over something that is somewhat tyrannical.

Universities are not in the public sector. They are subject to regular ONS reviews regarding their status; there is one going on at the moment. The Bill is, in a sense, jumping over this review by suggesting that they are public bodies. The next thing that will happen is that a review of this sort will be effected by the Bill, and we will have universities in the public sector. That will be hugely damaging to their autonomy, which has been central to British universities since the war and, indeed, before. This would lead to all sort of practical disadvantages, such as the loss of autonomy, including in respect of borrowing and investment, which would become a matter for the Treasury. At one time, the Treasury ran the UGC, and that was not a terribly sensible approach. The Department for Education would be the body that decides what universities could do in this area. That would make it very difficult for them to access commercial borrowing. Is that what we want? Surely not.

As the noble Lord, Lord Johnson, said, it is extremely heavy-handed, overkill and, in any case, unnecessary. Can the Minister tell the Committee where the pressure has come from to introduce universities into the Bill? Is this from the imagination of Michael Gove, who invented the Bill? I cannot see it coming from anywhere else. Have the Government had any sensible consultation with UUK and other representatives of the higher education sector about whether universities should be in the Bill?

Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill

Lord Verdirame Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 20th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)]

My Lords—

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, Amendments 3 to 5 are in my name. All the amendments in this group have the same objective, which is to find some ways of mitigating the rather unusual and perhaps slightly sinister language of

“political or moral disapproval of foreign state conduct”—

the language that gives the provision its title. Amendments 1 and 2 seek to achieve that objective by retaining that concept but raising the bar for its application. I agree that this approach may be sensible, and it is one that I encourage the Government to consider very seriously.

My amendments go a little further. I tried to think of ways in which the main provision of the Bill—Clause 1 —could operate without the novel concept of a prohibition on

“being influenced by political or moral disapproval of foreign state conduct”.

I note that this is not an attempt to frustrate the Bill. As the Minister will recall, I spoke in support of the Bill at Second Reading and I support the Government’s intentions. I am suggesting this different way forward because I am not really persuaded that the policy objectives require us to introduce this concept in our legislation. I urge the Government to test more proportionate and more focused ways to achieve those objectives.

As I understand those objectives, the core purpose is to ensure that public bodies, when taking procurement or investment decisions, do not impose a de facto sanctions regime or a de facto ban or boycott on a foreign state on the basis of their own judgments about a territorial dispute, the status of a foreign territory or the presence of a foreign Government in a particular territory. It seems to me that that objective can be achieved equally effectively by focusing the duty in Clause 1 on not having regard to territorial considerations, rather than in the current formulation of a duty not to be influenced by political or moral disapproval of foreign state conduct. Subject to the exceptions, it would still be the case that if a public authority were to have regard to a territorial consideration, it would probably do so because of disapproval of a moral or political kind of the foreign state’s conduct in the territory. But it would be better if we can get to the result that the Government are pursuing without that language of political or moral disapproval of foreign state conduct.

I accept that a criticism of the proposals may be that if we remove that expression “moral or political disapproval” from Clause 1, as my amendments would do, and focus instead on territorial considerations, the main provision of the Bill would not substantially improve on Section 17 of the Local Government Act 1988.

The Bill would supersede the Local Government Act in the part where it prohibits local authorities from considering non-commercial matters in relation to decisions about public supply or works contracts, including

“the country or territory of origin of supplies to, or the location in any country or territory of the business activities or interests of, contractors”.

This part of Section 17 of the Local Government Act would be omitted by the effect of a separate clause in the Bill. But Clause 1, even with the amendment I propose, would still go further than Section 17. In particular, the duty not to have regard to foreign state conduct in relation to territorial considerations, such as the existence of a territorial dispute, would still be able to capture indirect bans or boycotts, which I understand is the Government’s main concern.

I look forward to what the Government have to say. Again, I stress that my main concern is to encourage them to think of ways of tightening the language in Clause 1, and mitigating or perhaps altogether removing this notion of

“political or moral disapproval of foreign state conduct”.

[Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)]

My Lords, I apologise for my not being able to speak at Second Reading, although if I had, I would have agreed with my noble friend Lord Wolfson on much of what he had to say. I also apologise for slightly jumping the gun on the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, particularly as what he said was so interesting and informative.

I just wanted to question Amendment 1. If one is seeking clarity and certainty, introducing the idea of having a

“primary or sole factor in the decision”

seems extremely difficult to prove, whereas showing that the decision was “influenced” is much easier and, as I understand it, a recognised legal term.

--- Later in debate ---

Tabled by

[Lord Verdirame]

3: Clause 1, page 1, line 7, leave out “political or moral disapproval of”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, along with two other amendments in my name, seeks to focus the prohibition in Section 1 on territorial considerations in connection with foreign state conduct, rather than political or moral approval of foreign state conduct, as this is a more proportionate way of achieving the policy objective.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

I too shall not move my amendment, but I reiterate the point that it would be quite helpful if the Government gave some thought to that language that makes so many of us across the political spectrum, given the level of support for Bill, uncomfortable. Do we really need political or moral disapproval of foreign state conduct as a central concept in Clause 1? I would be grateful if further thought could be given to that question.

Amendment 3 not moved.

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[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My Lords, this debate has referred consistently to universities, but I do not want the point to get lost that there is an equivalent problem with local government pension schemes, where a succession of bodies take part in the decisions that are reached. Every fund has advisers, in particular advisers on ESG. The trustees are responsible for the decision, but they are under a legal obligation to give due regard to their advisers’ views. Now, because of the encouragement by the Government, the individual funds are not actually investing the money; the money is passed on to a pooled fund that equally has its advisers and its decision-makers. Somewhere in that thread of control, someone is a decision-maker, but I defy the Minister to tell us precisely, in the terms of this Bill, who it is.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have just a few points and questions, following the discussion we have just had. The first point is to seek clarity on whether my understanding of the last three lines of Clause 1(7) is correct. I understand those three lines simply to be saying that, where the decision-maker is a collegiate body, the duty to have regard applies to the individuals within that collegiate body who are taking the decision. That is how I read those three lines, but I may be missing something.

The second point arises from the comment that the noble Lord, Lord Johnson of Marylebone, made about universities. I suppose it is a point that comes up both under these amendments but also under the next amendments and in particular Amendment 8. Paragraph 20 of the Explanatory Notes, which speaks to Clause 1, states:

“The ban in Clause 1 is not intended to prohibit a higher education institution from deciding to terminate a collaboration with a foreign university on the grounds of academic freedom”.


I read that as implying that, other than on those grounds, the ban would apply to a decision to terminate a collaboration with a foreign academic institution. I would like some clarity on this, because I was a bit surprised to see that my reading of the definition of “procurement decision” would not necessarily have included a collaboration with a foreign academic institution as a procurement decision. It certainly is not an investment decision, but is a collaboration with a foreign academic institution in scope of the ban potentially? That is what I would like to understand. If so, it raises the question that the noble Lord, Lord Johnson, raised, of whether the individual grant holder who has, for example, a research collaboration with a foreign institution, is within scope of Clause 1. That is not clear to me.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, I have had advice from a professor of law at Cambridge University that it is not within scope where the research funding is not public. It is then a private act, not a public act.

Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill

Lord Verdirame Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 20th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I am broadly supportive of this Bill, but I have a number of concerns.

First, I share the concern expressed by other noble Lords that Clause 4 as currently drafted might have a disproportionate impact on freedom of expression, and in particular on political and academic speech. I understand the reassurances found in the Explanatory Notes—we heard to that effect from the Minister earlier —but it seems to me that principles as important as those need to be protected in the Bill rather than in the Explanatory Notes. I look forward to ways of improving the clarity of the terms of Clause 4, in particular.

Secondly, I am concerned about the impact of the Bill on universities. I declare an interest, in that I am a professor at King’s College London. I echo the concerns that the noble Lord, Lord Willetts, expressed on universities. At the heart of the Bill is a new duty to

“not have regard to a territorial consideration”

in a manner that would indicate

“political or moral disapproval of foreign state conduct”.

As Universities UK noted in its written evidence, universities, in their relationships with overseas higher education institutions, as well as with foreign businesses and states, are already subject to a number of duties, particularly with regard to national security, that require them to take into account foreign state conduct. We have to be sure that the new duty in the Bill does not create confusion around these other duties which are intended to protect universities and our country from the influence of unfriendly foreign actors, not least actors such as Iran, which are keen to set foot in our universities, radicalise students and propagate anti-Semitism.

My third concern mirrors the point raised by my noble and learned friend Lord Etherton and goes to paragraph 6 of the Schedule. There was some discussion in the other place about the legal opinion on the legislation by Mr Hermer KC, which was mentioned earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Hain. In that opinion, he identified the problem with paragraph 6 as clearly as anyone until, of course, my noble and learned friend spoke. He wrote:

“The fact that the United Kingdom is in breach of its obligations under an unincorporated international treaty (e.g. the UN Charter) does not normally create a foundation for a claim in domestic law before the UK Courts. Here though the Bill provides a ‘domestic foothold’ through paragraph 6 of the Schedule”.


He observes, rightly, that domestic courts are normally reluctant to review the conduct of foreign states, but the Bill would oblige them to tackle the issues because they will have to do so to determine the legality of the impugned decision. I agree with his conclusion that, paradoxically, paragraph 6

“will very materially increase the prospects of a domestic court pronouncing on the legality of various aspects of the occupation”.

He is, of course, referring to the Occupied Palestinian Territories in Israel, but the Bill goes much further than that. It would apply to any foreign situation where there is a territorial consideration. It would apply to Western Sahara, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and maritime disputes. In fact, it would apply simply to any question of foreign policy in relation to a territory because of the breadth of the definition of “territorial consideration” in Clause 1.

It is true that we do not normally implement international obligations in this open-ended way. We normally have primary and sometimes secondary legislation that is designed to ensure that the UK state, including its various organs, both local and central government, is acting consistently with international obligations. Paragraph 6 operates fundamentally differently. The effect is to create a sort of open invitation to any public authority to pick an argument with the Government of the day on a potentially wide range of foreign policy issues. If that happens, if a public authority invokes the international law exception, the Government will then have to decide either to do nothing, in which case they will be left with more of a problem than the Bill is designed to solve, or to pursue enforcement, in which case the question will be submitted to the courts with all the risks of litigation of issues that otherwise would not be submitted to judicial determination that come with that.

There is an evident tension between the stated purpose of the Bill, which is to make sure that the Government are in greater control of foreign policy, and what could happen as a result of paragraph 6 in the Schedule. At a minimum, this provision will need a lot of tightening, but I really wonder why it is there. The guidance on procurement, which has been in place since the 2016, simply states that unless the Government have put in place formal legal sanctions, embargoes or restrictions, there should be no scope for a regime of trade sanctions or embargoes to be developed surreptitiously through public procurement. I am not sure what has changed since then that has led to the introduction of paragraph 6.

Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland: Follow-up Report (European Affairs Committee)

Lord Verdirame Excerpts

Monday 11th September 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I, too, begin by paying tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Jay, and the committee for producing two extremely informative and thoughtful reports that do justice to the diversity of views and the complexity of the issues, including the legal issues on which I concentrate.

My observations are on the second report. The committee invited the Government to clarify the process by which they would decide whether the tests for the use of the so-called Stormont brake had been met. There is one aspect on which I think the Government should reflect. Article 13(3) of the protocol allows the EU to amend or replace EU law applicable in Northern Ireland without the consent of the UK. By contrast, new EU law cannot be imposed on Northern Ireland if the UK objects—that is the effect of Article 13(4). The Windsor Framework added Article 13(3a) to the text of the protocol. Read alongside the unilateral declaration appended by the United Kingdom, Article 13(3a) provides the international legal basis for the Stormont brake. One condition for the use of the Stormont brake in Article 13(3a) is that the amendment or replacement must significantly differ in content or scope from what proceeded it. The problem with this language is that it might appear to suggest that the EU’s unilateral legislative power to amend or replace existing EU law under Article 13(3) is broader than it needs to be. It is, of course, in the interest of the UK to defend a restrictive interpretation of Article 13(3). It is perfectly proper for the UK to do so as long as its interpretation is tenable.

It seems to me that one has to accept that an amendment or replacement would ordinarily introduce different content, but whether amendments or replacements that are significantly different in scope would be permissible under Article 13(3) is a different matter. So I hope that the Government will agree with me that in all their official pronouncements on the Stormont brake that it is necessary to maintain a consistent interpretation of the UK’s legal rights and obligations under the protocol as amended by the framework and, in particular as regards Article 13(3), to maintain an interpretation that states that those powers ought to be read quite narrowly.

In the little time available, there is only one further and more general comment that I would like to make. Table 1 of the report sets out a number of key dates in the implementation of the framework for the coming 12 to 24 months. The date by which the democratic consent vote under Article 18 is due to be held is 31 December 2024. There is another reason why that date is quite important. The Windsor Framework amendments to the text of the protocol, including Article 13(3a), to which I referred, were adopted with a decision of the joint committee, not with a formal new treaty.

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[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

I was explaining how the text of the treaty could be amended with a decision of the joint committee rather than a new treaty. The reason is Article 164(5)(d) of the withdrawal agreement, which empowered a joint committee to make amendments by decision to the text of the treaty, including the protocol,

“provided that such amendments are necessary to correct errors, to address omissions or other deficiencies, or to address situations unforeseen when this Agreement was signed, and provided that such decisions may not amend the essential elements of this Agreement”.

Using this pragmatic mechanism to achieve treaty change without going through the formal process of adopting a new treaty was a significant win for the Government in the Windsor Framework, but the mechanism it will expire on 31 December 2024—it can be used only until that date. Among the many windows of opportunity that have been discussed, this mechanism provides a further window of opportunity to consider changes to deal with problems arising from the implementation of the framework as they become apparent in the coming months. I hope that the Government and the joint committee will keep that possibility under consideration.