Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Vaux of Harrowden and Baroness Noakes

Report stage
Monday 4th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I add my support to Amendment 2 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Vere. From the outset of this process, the Bill was intended to cover only small banks. That was made clear in almost the first paragraph of the original consultation. It was then extended and now covers all banks, regardless of size. I thank the Minister for making sure that the draft code of practice was published by the Treasury before Report; it has been incredibly helpful in this process, and we are all very grateful for that. The draft code of practice is clear that the resolution mechanism is designed primarily to support the resolution of small banks and that the Bank of England will not assume use of the new mechanism when setting a preferred resolution strategy of bail-in and the corresponding MREL requirements of a large bank.

So why does the Bill cover large banks? The argument from the Government seems to be along the lines of, “Well, it might be useful to have this flexibility”. That does not seem a very strong argument. As we have heard, larger banks are required to hold additional capital resources, known as MREL, effectively to ensure that they are able to bail themselves out—a process known as bail-in. If the Government are not confident that the MREL regime is sufficient for those larger banks, they should be looking to strengthen that regime rather than extending a measure that is designed specifically for smaller banks whose failure would not create systemic risk, to act as a further insurance policy for the big banks.

I am afraid that unless the Minister can come up with a stronger argument than he has so far, I will be minded to support the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, should she decide to test the opinion of the House.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I add my support to my noble friend’s amendment.

If the power were used on a bank that had already achieved the MREL set for it, that use of the mechanism would raise questions about whether MREL and the minimum capital requirements had been set correctly—and whether there had been a regulatory failure. In either event, the Bank is conflicted, whether through the setting of MREL in its capacity as a resolution authority or through setting capital levels through its PRA arm. I am clear that the Bank should not have the power to cover up regulatory failure, which this unconstrained provision allows. There is no way for the Treasury to stop the Bank using the power other than by using the power of direction that exists but has never been used in the existence of the Bank since nationalisation. Unconstrained powers are unhealthy. That is why I support my noble friend’s amendment.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, this group covers reporting and accountability to Parliament on the use of the resolution mechanism, which was probably the greatest area of discussion in Committee. The Bill gives significant rights to the Bank of England to impose costs on the banking industry. It can only be right, therefore, that the Bank should have to explain the reasons for its decisions and the outcome to both the Treasury and Parliament.

A number of concerns have been expressed throughout the process, and again today, about how the Bank might use the mechanism. At Second Reading, the noble Lord, Lord Macpherson of Earl’s Court, said:

“I can foresee circumstances where the Bank will choose to recapitalise a small bank rather than put it into a bank insolvency process, less because it is in the national interest and more as a way of minimising the reputational damage of regulatory failure”.—[Official Report, 30/7/24; col. 914.]


The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, said something similar earlier today. The noble Lord and others have pointed out that there is nothing in the Bill that would incentivise the Bank to control the expenses of the process; again, we discussed this to an extent earlier. Those expenses will be picked up by the FSCS, by the wider financial services industry and, ultimately, by the customers of that industry.

As we have just seen, the Government have tabled amendments to clarify that last point, which we have already discussed—but the point remains. Fears, which I share, have been raised that this resolution mechanism could become the default, rather than insolvency. I believe—others share this view, I think—that, in principle, a failing institution should be allowed to fail unless it is in the public interest for it to be bailed out. The draft code attempts to deal with this but the concern remains.

For all these reasons, it is essential that the Bank should have to explain its decisions and that Parliament should have the ability to scrutinise those decisions. For that reason, I have tabled Amendment 5, which would require the Bank to make a report to the Chancellor that must then be laid before Parliament every time a recapitalisation payment is made. The amendment sets out some minimum requirements for what the report should cover, including why the Bank chose to make a recapitalisation payment rather than allowing the institution to go into insolvency; the costs that will be incurred; and how those costs compare to the costs the FSCS would incur in an insolvency situation. It would also require a final report explaining what actually happened—and, if different, why—at the end of the resolution process.

Since I tabled Amendment 5, I am pleased to say that the Government have issued the draft code of practice—for which we are all grateful, as I said—and tabled Amendment 8. I am extremely grateful to the Minister for his constructive approach on this. Given that the two together deal with most of the areas covered by my Amendment 5, I will not push that.

However—there is always a “but” in these things—there is one important omission in the Minister’s Amendment 8. Although it requires the Bank to report within three months of any recapitalisation payment, it does not require a final report on what actually happened at the end of the resolution process. Although the resolution will happen quickly in many cases—the example of Silicon Valley Bank, where it happened over the weekend, is a good one—that may not always be the case. Under these rules, a bank can be put into a bridge bank for up to two years, which can be extended further. We can have multiple recapitalisation periods during that period, so the process can last a number of years. If the Bank reports within three months of each payment, we may never see a report on what actually happened at the end—for example, if the failing institution is put into insolvency two years later.

It is essential that the Chancellor and Parliament have an opportunity to review how the resolution worked out and, most importantly, to ensure that any relevant lessons are learned. So I have tabled Amendment 9, as an amendment to the Minister’s amendment, to cover that point. I think that this may have been the Minister’s intention all along, but I cannot agree with him that his amendment, as drafted, actually achieves this. On the report it requires, his amendment says:

“The Bank must report to the Chancellor of the Exchequer about … the exercise of the power to require a recapitalisation payment to be made, and … the stabilisation power and the stabilisation option to which the payment relates”.


Nowhere does it talk about what happened at the end, which could be a number of years later.

I am alive to the concern that we should not have too many potentially repetitive reports, so my amendment would have effect only if the reports published by the Bank, in accordance with the Minister’s amendment, do not cover the final resolution results. I hope that this is not controversial and that the Minister will be able to accept Amendment 9 to his amendment. However, as I say, it is essential that the final outcome of any resolution is made transparent and open to scrutiny.

If the Minister is unwilling to accept my proposal, or accepts the principle but does not like some of the detail—he has mentioned to me that he is not terribly keen on the three-month timeframe—perhaps he could commit to coming back at Third Reading with his own version of the amendment that satisfies the guaranteed requirement to report on the final outcome. He can tweak it as he likes on timing and things—I cannot get too excited about that—but, if he is not prepared either to accept it or to do that, I will be minded, I am afraid, to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 9 when the time comes.

The other amendments in this group relate to notifying the relevant committees of both this House and the other place of the use of the recapitalisation power. The amendments tabled by the Minister, as well as the amendments to his amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, arose from amendments that the noble Baroness put down in Committee. I am pleased that the Government have accepted those amendments. However, all the amendments do is say that the committees must be notified. Those committees need something to look at; it makes it all the more important that we have the reports we are talking about, both on the use of the recapitalisation power and on what finally happens, at the end of the day. I beg to move.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I have Amendments 11 to 13 in this group; they are amendments to the Government’s Amendment 10, to which the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has referred. Before I address those amendments, I shall refer briefly to the reporting amendments in this group. I certainly praise the Government for bringing forward their Amendment 8, as well as for beefing up the code of practice on reporting. However, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, that the issue of the final report made by the Bank of England is outstanding; I therefore support his Amendment 9.

On Amendments 10 to 13, I start by thanking the Minister for listening to the case, made in Committee, that parliamentary committees should be notified of the use of the bank recapitalisation power. I had tabled an amendment that named the Treasury Select Committee in the other place and the Financial Services Regulation Committee in your Lordships’ House; this was supported in Committee by fellow Members of the latter committee, as noble Lords might imagine. I retabled my amendment for Report—the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, added their names—but the Government then tabled Amendment 10, which was similar in principle to my amendment but drafted using the language of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023. That Act did not refer to the Financial Services Regulation Committee for the simple reason that it did not exist at the time—indeed, it was that Act that led to creation of that committee. So, following the helpful meeting that we had with the Minister, I was told that the Government were happy to refer directly to the Financial Services Regulation Committee. They suggested that this be achieved by my tabling amendments to the Government’s amendments. So I hope that, when the Minister gets up to speak to his amendment, he will confirm that he accepts my Amendments 11 to 13.

Noble Lords who have joined the House in the past eight years might be mystified by the reference to the Chairman of Committees in my Amendment 13. Although the House has not used the title since 2016, the post to which we now refer as the Senior Deputy Lord Speaker technically remains the Chairman of Committees. One learns something every day in Parliament.

Let me conclude by saying that I hope the principle of requiring notification to the Treasury Select Committee in the other place and your Lordships’ Financial Services Regulation Committee is now regarded as a precedent for any future creation of significant or unusual powers granted to the Bank of England or any of the other regulators in future. The strength of parliamentary accountability for those bodies, with their massive powers, must always be maintained—and, indeed, enhanced.

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[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 16 in this group and added my name to Amendment 7, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, just spoke. As she indicated, the two amendments are related in that the imposition of unnecessary costs, which is the target of my Amendment 16, will do nothing to help the financial sector grow, be competitive or, indeed, support the real economy.

I fully supported the growth and competitiveness objectives introduced for the PRA and the FCA in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023, and I am very glad that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has given her support to those. But I hope that the Government will want to go further and make all regulators, and indeed all other public sector bodies, pay attention to growth and competitiveness. Extending this to other organisations is important, particularly in the financial services universe, as they were not included within the competitiveness and growth objective in the 2023 Act.

One of those omitted at that time—perhaps we should have spotted it during the passage of the Financial Services and Markets Act—was the Bank of England in its capacity as a resolution authority. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has had to confine her amendment to the use of the bank recapitalisation power because of the Long Title of the Bill. But the competitiveness and growth objective ought to apply to the Bank as the resolution authority in toto, not simply when it exercises the new bank recapitalisation power but also when, for example, it is setting MREL levels.

My Amendment 16 adds a special resolution objective to the seven already listed in Section 4 of the Banking Act 2009, and it requires the Bank to consider the minimisation of costs borne by the financial sector when the recapitalisation power is used. It is not an absolute requirement, as it would be just one of eight objectives, and it is for the Bank to determine, under the 2009 Act, how to balance those various objectives.

When it is using the power, the Bank is playing with other people’s money. Ultimately, it is the money of those of us who are customers of the banks, because at the end of the day the money that flows through the banks will end up being borne by customers, and it is only right that the Bank should have regard to the minimisation of costs that are ultimately borne by the banks’ customers.

In Committee I tabled an amendment that focused on the costs being borne through the FSCS not exceeding the counterfactual of the bank insolvency procedure to which the Bank should be paying regard in any event. My amendment today is a less complex test and is simply designed to act as a reminder to the Bank that it should treat other people’s money as carefully as it treats its own. If it does that, it should also help to keep the sector competitive and to help it grow. I hope that the Minister will agree that this amendment is right in principle and that it responds to a number of concerns expressed by several respondents during the consultation on the power over the last year or so.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I support both the amendments in the names of the two noble Baronesses who have just spoken. I probably have a slight preference for Amendment 16 on the expenses—it is more direct—but we need something in the Bill that reminds the Bank of England that it is spending other people’s money, and that it needs to do that carefully and with care. These amendments are aimed primarily at that end, so I support them both.

Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Vaux of Harrowden and Baroness Noakes

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th September 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, this amendment is simply intended to try to obtain some clarification on how a recapitalisation payment that has been made by the FSCS to the Bank of England will be treated if the failing bank eventually gets into insolvency. This could occur if the bank is transferred to a bridge bank, the buyer is not found and the bank’s financial situation does not improve. There is a two-year deadline for the bridge bank although that can be extended in certain circumstances but, eventually, the process can end up with the bank being wound up.

If that happens, the recapitalisation payments should be treated as a debt of the bank and should rank ahead of all other liabilities, debts or other claims other than the fees of the official receiver when it comes to distributing any value that might be left in an insolvency situation. This is related to other discussions that we have already had and partially to Amendment 23, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, which we will debate later.

The principle should be that the shareholders, lenders and other creditors should not be put in a better position as a result of the recapitalisation. To put it another way, the industry-funded compensation scheme should not, in effect, be bailing out the losses of shareholders and creditors other than the depositors who will be compensated under the scheme should their deposits be lost in the insolvency. However, that is not clear in the proposed Bill, although it is entirely possible that I have missed something in the interplay between the various Acts that apply here. I would therefore be most grateful if the Minister could explain exactly how the amount provided by the FSCS would be treated in such a situation. It might most easily and clearly be dealt with by including it in the worked example that the Minister agreed to consider providing during our discussions on Amendment 1 on Thursday.

I should say that I suspect that my amendment as it is currently drafted probably does not work, and that it may require some changes to be made to insolvency legislation to work properly if there is an issue. Rather than worrying about the specifics of the amendment, I hope that the noble Lord will concentrate on the principle and explain how the recapitalisation payment would be treated in an insolvency process, as it stands, in particular in making sure that it does not advantage shareholders and lenders, and ideally point me to the relevant clauses of the relevant legislation. If I am right that the situation is unclear, we can sort the details out on Report. I beg to move.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I support the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has put forward, and in particular the request for worked examples, preferably with numbers in, because the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and I are accountants and we like looking at numbers rather than words. Having read the proceedings of the first Committee day in Hansard, I realised that I did not know how some of these things work in practice, so I think that it is important to have those worked examples.

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[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I will be brief. The noble Baroness raises some important issues in her amendment. I think the Minister confirmed earlier that shareholders would disappear because the Bank of England would take over their share capital, so they could not benefit from the use of the recapitalisation, but if there is any suggestion that the recapitalisation amount will excuse the bail in of some of the bail-inable liabilities, that would be pretty unacceptable. I hope that the worked examples that I hope the Treasury will enjoy working on while we are on Recess can illuminate how all this is going to work.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I find my head spinning a little about some of this. It comes back to the confusion about how the various flows here work, so that worked example is becoming more and more crucial. I come back to the principle that I raised before: recapitalisation by the industry should not bail out those who should be at risk in the case of a failure. MREL capital et cetera must surely be used up first before we take recourse to the industry. It is similar to, but slightly different from, the point we made in Amendment 17 that, again, people who are creditors of the failing bank should not be bailed out by the recapitalisation in the event that it all goes wrong. It seems rather confused, so I look forward to the worked example, and I wish the Minister good luck with getting something that covers all the aspects.

Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Vaux of Harrowden and Baroness Noakes

Committee stage
Thursday 5th September 2024 Grand Committee

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, it is me again, I am afraid. That is the trouble with getting enthusiastic about amendments during recess—you pay for it when you get back.

Amendment 3 is a probing amendment to find out the Government’s approach to using the recapitalisation power on more than one occasion. The amendment uses the technique of requiring the Treasury’s consent to the use of the recapitalisation power more than once in respect of the same financial institutions. My purpose in this amendment is not to debate the formal involvement of the Treasury, as I will return to that broader topic in a later group. I am using the amendment as a technique to find out whether there are any constraints at all on the use of the recapitalisation power on multiple occasions.

When the Bank of England decides to use the recapitalisation power, it works out what sum of money it needs to put the bank in a position where it can be sold on. We discussed in our debate on the previous amendment the kinds of expense that can count as recapitalisation costs for the purposes of the power. My own view is that the Bank must try at the outset to reach as clear a view as possible on the amount of the whole that the recapitalisation payment is designed to fill because, if the Bank does not do that properly at the outset—making a good, honest assessment of what the total cost will be—it cannot reach a realistic judgment about whether to proceed with a bridge bank or to initiate an insolvency process.

So I find it disturbing that the drafting of new Section 214E seems to allow the Bank to double-dip into the FSCS without any other process or consideration. If the Bank runs out of recapitalisation cover, it probably means that it did its sums wrong in the first place or that additional facts have emerged, increasing the costs in ways that were not anticipated at the outset. In either event, that can call into question whether the initial decision to use the bridge bank instead of the bank insolvency procedure was the correct one. It may also raise the question of whether the bridge bank strategy should be continued or replaced with the bank insolvency procedure.

It also brings into question the nature of the additional hole in the finances of the failed bank, which is covered in part in the previous amendment. It may not be clear that the incentives are in the right place for the correct judgments to be made about whether any additional costs arising from regulatory action or litigation should be accepted or challenged. If the costs are down to PRA action, there are clear conflicts of interest involved.

I completely understand the need for flexibility in legislation. I hope that the Minister will also appreciate that the open-ended nature of the Bank’s powers in the use of the recapitalisation payment technique carries particular problems when a second or subsequent attempt is made to obtain a recapitalisation payment. I hope that the Minister can explain how the Government see this power being used, if it is to be used more than once, and whether—including to what extent—there are mechanisms in place to ensure that the way in which the Bank uses that power is fair to the banking sector.

The Bill makes the banking sector pick up the costs. The sector itself will probably have had no involvement whatever in the failure of a bank yet it has to pick up the tab, ultimately borne by its own customers; that is whenever the Bank decides to use the recapitalisation powers. So it is only fair and reasonable that there should be some checks and balances in return. I hope the Minister can reassure the Committee that there are checks and balances and that, when the Bank uses the power in what has to be quite an unusual situation—for example, it has got the sums wrong or something else has caused a requirement for more to be put in—it raises the need for additional safeguards in order to satisfy the banking sector that the costs that will be loaded on to it are reasonable.

I beg to move.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I rise again briefly. The noble Baroness has made some really important points. Once again, I have attempted to deal with this as a reporting question in Amendment 12, which states that a report would be required each time a recapitalisation payment was made; that should stand anyway.

This can become quite significant if, for example, there is a situation where the Bank of England expects to be able to sell a bank immediately but that falls over and then goes into a bridge bank for two years—or, indeed, more—and picks up all those costs along the way. One can see a situation where you could have, for example, an annual payment covering the costs of the bank until the Bank eventually decides to put it into insolvency. The critical factor must be that, any time a recapitalisation payment is being considered, whether it is the first one or a subsequent one, the insolvency route is reconsidered at each point and this does not become an open-ended default drag on costs—but the reporting point, which we will come on to later, stands as well.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

Okay.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I am not sure who the “it” was.

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[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, this is another probing amendment. In this, I want to probe the circumstances in which the Treasury believes it would be appropriate for the UK banking industry to stump up for the recapitalisation of a foreign-owned bank. This amendment uses the technique of Treasury consent, as some of my other amendments do, but this is not what I am trying to talk about in this amendment. I am trying to probe the substance of using the recapitalisation power for the subsidiary of a foreign company.

Of course, I know that SVB UK was a foreign-owned bank and the simple answer to my question might be that this gives the Bank another way of avoiding what happened in that case: SVB was gifted to HSBC with the additional present of permanent exemptions from the ring-fencing regime. If we accept that we should avoid being held over a barrel by HSBC in future, this would be a good use of the power. So can the Minister say whether, if presented with the same facts as those relating to SVB UK, the Bank would have preferred to recapitalise SVB via a bridge bank and then sell it on a timescale consistent with achieving better value for money from the UK? The heavens are opening as we are discussing these important things.

More broadly, is it not the case that the Bank should satisfy itself that the foreign subsidiary banks are either adequately capitalised in their own right or parts of groups that are expected to be resolvable via bail-in-able capital, in line with international expectations? In general, the regulatory system for banks following a financial crash is designed to ensure that they hold capital or bail-in liabilities, which avoids the need for extraordinary support. When a UK bank subsidiary of a foreign company fails and requires money to keep it going, there has been at least a prima facie case that there has been some element of regulatory failure, either in the UK or elsewhere. There should not be an expectation that the failure of a foreign bank would impose costs on the UK banking sector—nor, indeed, the UK taxpayer, if that is the alternative.

It would be helpful if the Minister could explain in what circumstances the Government would consider it appropriate for the Bank to use the recapitalisation power in relation to foreign-owned banks and, perhaps more importantly, when the Government would not consider it appropriate to use the power. Can he also say whether any of this is likely to be covered in the code of practice? I beg to move.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, this weather sounds like the reason I ended up tabling a load of amendments in south-west Scotland: I had nothing better to do for a few days.

Again, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, raises a really important point. I have tried to attack it in a different way in Amendment 16, where I look at the recovery of money from shareholders. I will be interested to hear what the Minister has to say. I had in mind the sort of scenario where a foreign company sets up a bank in the UK, it does not go very well and it decides just to walk away from it, having perhaps removed all the assets in the meantime. Clearly, it does not seem fair that the costs of sorting that out should fall on the industry or, indeed, the British taxpayer. It would be really interesting to understand how we can ensure that foreign shareholders behave properly and how, when it does go wrong, we can recoup the money from them.

UK Infrastructure Bank Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Vaux of Harrowden and Baroness Noakes

Report stage
Monday 4th July 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 24 in this group, which is an amendment to the Minister’s Amendment 23. It is always rather strange speaking to an amendment to an amendment when the amendment itself has not been spoken to—but I will do my best.

First, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond on his Amendment 6. It is well drafted and encompasses what we understand by additionality in the context of the operations of the UKIB. In Committee, it was widely agreed that additionality was so important that it should be in the Bill. I think it was also agreed that the boundary between what is in this Bill and is in other documents outside the Bill, including the framework document which is not even referred to in the Bill, has been set in the wrong place. When I say that the Committee agreed these things, I do not suggest that the Government agreed, but the vast majority of the Committee was aligned on these matters.

The Minister has been generous with her time with noble Lords, and I thank her for the meetings she arranged and for her letter of last week. She gets a gold star for effort, but I am afraid that that is not matched for content. On additionality, my noble friend claimed that the absence of an agreed definition in the Bill could stop it developing over time. That is nonsense. Additionality, as a basic concept, has barely shifted in the many years that I have been involved in public sector matters. The essence of it is about, and always has been about, something that should occur that would not otherwise have occurred but for the particular intervention or action. It is a universal principle that can be adapted to a number of circumstances.

I then suggested to my noble friend the Minister that, rather than try to produce a specific definition, she could put a high-level definition in the Bill and take a Treasury power to issue guidance to UKIB. That too was brushed aside. The Treasury likes to keep stuff in documents, such as the framework document, which it alone controls. I remind noble Lords that, as my noble friend the Minister informed us in Committee, the framework document is not even legally binding.

Nevertheless, I recognised that the Treasury is something of an immovable object on this issue, so I decided that it would be better to pursue the Minister’s offer of a way forward and include additionality issues in the periodic reports which are required by Clause 9. I thought that half a loaf would be better than no loaf, but I have to say that Amendment 23, which my noble friend has tabled, is a serious disappointment. It represents no more than a quarter of a loaf.

Amendment 23 adds an additional reporting requirement to Clause 9 but it is a lop-sided approach to additionality. Its focus is on the extent to which UKIB’s investments in projects have encouraged additional investments in those projects. It therefore will cover the extent to which projects have enabled crowding in, but it does not explicitly cover crowding out, which has always been my biggest concern, because a bank with a high capital ratio and a low cost of capital can easily outcompete private sector financing. I do not believe that if UKIB were to finance the whole of a transaction to the complete exclusion of the private sector in circumstances where 100% private finance could have been obtained, it would be captured by my noble friend’s amendment—it would not come close to being captured by my noble friend’s amendment. Such a transaction would not have encouraged or discouraged private sector finance; it would have bypassed it completely. That is why my Amendment 24 refers to investments having been made by UKIB

“despite an adequate supply of private sector financing”.

My noble friend the Minister will doubtless say that it is not in UKIB’s strategic plan to do transactions without private sector financing. It was never in the strategic plans of the European Investment Bank to crowd out private sector financing, but it did it anyway, in collusion with private sector borrowers, who were quite happy to take soft loans from public sector lenders who were much easier to deal with than hard-nosed real bankers in real banks.

My noble friend the Minister has also referred in correspondence to the impact of the Subsidy Control Act, which became law earlier this year. I have to say that the Act, which refers to subsidy decisions, sits rather uneasily with the practice of doing investment deals in the context of a bank. I accept that at a high level it would apply to UKIB. I just think that the language is very difficult to interpret in the context of what UKIB would do. My main concern is that there would never be an enforcement action against UKIB because the crowded-out private sector financiers are exactly the same people who want to be invited to any crowding-in party. It simply will not be in their interest to try to get the Act enforced against UKIB.

For all these reasons, I am very disappointed that this Bill, which I have never regarded as a shining example of Conservative economic values in any event, is going to ignore the concept of crowding out, which ought to be something dear to any Conservative Government’s heart. I shall not move my amendment when we reach it in the Marshalled List, but I live in hope that there are still some Conservatives in the Treasury who might have a change of heart before this Bill reaches the other place.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 24 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, to which I have added my name. The noble Baroness has already eloquently explained the rationale for this amendment, so I will try to keep my speech reasonably short.

Like the noble Baroness, I was strongly drawn to Amendment 6 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, which would insert the critical additionality principle into the principles of the Bill. That would be the preferable approach, but, like the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, I have been persuaded, reluctantly, to go along with the Government’s approach of making this something the bank reports on.

That leads me to amendments in the final group about the timing of those reports, which are, at the moment, seven years apart. If this is to be the way we deal with additionality, the report timings need to be shorter.

UK Infrastructure Bank Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Vaux of Harrowden and Baroness Noakes

Committee stage & Lords Hansard - Part 2
Tuesday 14th June 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to move Amendment 12 and hope we can pick up a little speed with it. At Second Reading, I raised the issue of the UK Infrastructure Bank’s activities having the effect of crowding out private sector investment. My view is that there can be a role for state-sponsored organisations such as the UK Infrastructure Bank only if there is a market failure which needs to be addressed. The Government appear to agree with this, as the framework document for the bank includes an operating principle that the Bank should

“prioritise investments where there is an undersupply of private sector financing”.

That is, however, only in the framework document; we are coming back to our theme in Committee of what should be in the framework document and what should be in the Bill. It is unsatisfactory for this issue not to be in the Bill. My Amendment 12 is modest, because it states merely that the activities of the bank as specified in Clause 2(4) must be carried out

“only where there is an undersupply of private sector financing”.

I go slightly further than the wording used in the framework document, which refers to prioritising where there is an undersupply of private sector financing, but I believe that the UK Infrastructure Bank should positively avoid those activities which are adequately supplied with private sector finance.

Amendment 14 in the next group, with which I suggested my Amendment 12 be grouped, sticks faithfully to the wording of the framework document and includes the other operating principles, to which we will come. If the Minister prefers the formulation in Amendment 14 when we get to the next group, I certainly would not object, because my priority is to have the issue of crowding out firmly in the Bill. I beg to move.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, this amendment goes to the core of what the UK Infrastructure Bank should be about, and I am in complete agreement with the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, about the importance of the crowding out or crowding in of private finance, which was raised by many noble Lords at Second Reading.

I am stepping in to speak on this group because it impinges on the next, in which I have an amendment. The NIC says that the Bank should act as an “anchor investor” and should

“catalyse innovation, support due diligence functions and enable projects of public significance that may not otherwise take off”.

Most of us would agree that if the bank simply competes with or replaces available private finance, then it is a waste of time, damaging, distorts the markets and wastes taxpayers’ money. As the noble Baroness said, it must aim to solve market failures where otherwise good projects cannot be easily financed by the private sector. The Government obviously agree, but have not put this fundamental point anywhere in the Bill.

I support the principle behind the amendment proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, but I am not sure that the wording fully captures the crowding-in concept. That may be because the framework document does not do it terribly well either. The amendment and the framework document refer to the bank undertaking its activities only where there is an undersupply of private sector financing. Crowding in happens where private financing is available but the private sector is reluctant to invest, perhaps because of a particular risk. In that situation, we would want the bank to be able to invest, precisely to facilitate the investment of the private sector—to remove the blockage preventing the private sector involvement.

As I said, in the next group, we will come to my Amendment 14, which tries to solve the same problem in a slightly different way by putting the operating principles, which expressly highlight the need for the bank to aim to crowd in private finance, on a statutory basis, but that may not be robust enough for some. The noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, has proposed Amendment 65, which is also aimed at the same problem, but with only a one-off report at the outset rather than an ongoing obligation, so I think that does not go far enough.

We have different ways to try to achieve the end of ensuring that the bank fulfils its primary purpose of crowding in private sector finance and does not fall into the trap of crowding it out. I am agnostic as to how we achieve it, as long as we get that requirement into the Bill—and that we measure it, which we will come to in a later group. Does the Minister agree that this is a fundamental element and, if so, why is it not in the Bill? If she does not like our wording, could she suggest a different way to achieve it? Would she be happy to meet us to talk it through and try to work out how best to get it in?

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, we have had various discussions around operational independence so far, most of which, until now, have addressed the ability of the Treasury to change the mandate within which the bank operates. Clause 4 goes directly to the heart of the Treasury being able to directly meddle in the activities of the bank. It gives the Treasury the right to

“give a specific or general direction to the Bank”,

at any time, and which the board must follow, with the only safeguard being a requirement to discuss it with the board first. As we have heard, it can be pushed through, and any statements of reservation from the board can be hidden. On the face of it, it completely undermines the operational independence of the bank if the Treasury can actually tell it what to do.

The Minister has previously assured us that the Government would only use this ability to direct in rare circumstances, and she has said that there is a precedent for this type of direction clause. However, the Bill does not put any such restrictions on the use of direction—none at all—beyond the fact that it must be within the objectives of the bank. Therefore, those directions could be about whether or not to make a particular investment, or even the terms on which those investments could be made. It would allow the Treasury to insist on the bank financing vanity projects—I used the example of the bridge to Northern Ireland at Second Reading—or even to indulge in pork-barrel politics by directing investment into particular locations for reasons that may not be totally unpolitical.

The bank should not be put into those kinds of positions, and this Bill should not allow that to happen. Frankly, on the precedent argument, I always recoil when I hear, “We did it before”; those precedents were for different organisations and in different circumstances. It is not impossible that we might have actually got it wrong at the time. Just because we have done it before does not mean that we should do it again.

I have given notice of the intention to oppose Clause 4 standing part. I think that the clause is inappropriate, but I can concede that there might be occasions when it might be necessary for the Treasury to be able to direct the bank—I cannot actually think of any specific examples, but I can see that it could be possible. If the Minister can provide good reasons or examples for this right to direct being needed, then I could get comfortable with allowing direction in those clearly defined, limited and restricted circumstances. However, it cannot be right that direction can be given on the current unrestricted and unscrutinised basis. As I have said, that is not operational independence; it is hard to imagine how anything could be less operationally independent.

So please can the Minister explain, quite specifically, why the Government feel that they need this right to direct, and under what real and specific circumstances they can conceive of using it? If so, we can then work around this and try putting some restrictions and safeguards into the Bill to achieve that.

I have also added my name to the four amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, which attack the same problem from a different angle: to allow the Treasury to make recommendations to which the bank must have regard, rather than to comply with directions. I would prefer to remove all unnecessary meddling by the Treasury, as it were, but this might be a reasonable compromise. Similarly, the noble Baroness’s Amendment 30 is another important way of trying to get this operational independence well imbedded in the Bill.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, as noble Lords know, I criticised the concept of the UK Infrastructure Bank at Second Reading on the basis that it was the Treasury’s plaything and it had the Treasury’s fingerprints all over it. That was against the background of my not really liking public bodies being created to do things that I do not think there is any good reason for. I believe that once we have a public body set up—we accept that there is a reason to create a public body with access to privileged sources of financing—we have an obligation, as government, to put a proper control framework around it to ensure that public money is protected and that we have powers available to us to meet whatever circumstances might arise. So I part company with the two previous noble Lords who have spoken, because I think it is extremely important to have backdrop powers to be used when necessary.