(14 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberWell, that has to be one of the feeblest replies to a statement that I have heard. The only person who seems to be out of his depth at the moment, rather surprisingly, is the shadow Chancellor. There was one thing missing from that rant: an apology. He was the City Minister. I will move on to all the things that we need to do to regulate the City, but I will first remind him that he stood at this Dispatch Box for two years as City Minister and could have done any of the things that were either in my statement or in his reply, but he did not. The truth is that he is man with a past, and we will not let him forget it—even if he does. I took the opportunity to look at his website on which he lists all his achievements in politics, but he does not mention the fact that he was City Minister. He does not mention the fact that he invented the system of City regulation that failed so spectacularly. He might have forgotten what he did not do in government; we will not.
Let me deal specifically with some of the right hon. Gentleman’s questions. He asks how the lending targets will be monitored. I told him in the statement that the Bank of England is going to monitor them. [Interruption.] “How are they going to be enforced?”, Opposition Members cry. The chief executive’s pay will be linked to the targets, and I made it very clear in the statement that, of course, if the deal is not met we will return to the issue.
The right hon. Gentleman talks about transparency. In 13 years, the previous Government never implemented transparency in the City of London. Some £11.5 billion of bonuses were paid in the year in which he was the City Minister, but we are introducing the most transparent regime of any major financial centre in the world.
The right hon. Gentleman continues deliberately—because I know he must know the numbers—to get the sums wrong on the bank payroll tax and bank levy. Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs confirmed that there is a £2.3 billion net receipt from the bank payroll tax, and that is spelled out in the March 2010 Budget book, which the Labour Government published. We are raising £2.5 billion every year from a bank levy that he opposes— right?—unless he has changed his mind on that. [Interruption.] He now supports it. Well, that is good news.
Perhaps, then, the right hon. Gentleman will listen to the right hon. Member for Edinburgh South West (Mr Darling). The right hon. Member for Morley and Outwood (Ed Balls) quoted quite a lot from the newspapers in his reply. Well, this is from The Daily Telegraph: “Bankers’ bonus tax failed, admits Alistair Darling,” who said:
“I think it will be a one-off thing because, frankly, the very people you are after here are very good at getting out of these things and...will find all sorts of imaginative ways of avoiding it in the future.”
That is from the then Chancellor who actually introduced the tax on which the right hon. Gentleman now pins his entire economic prospects.
Let me end by saying this: the right hon. Gentleman calls for things that he simply did not do in government. On pay and bonuses, he says control them in the nationalised banks; he did not do that last year when he was in the Cabinet, and he did not do it at all when he was in the Treasury. He calls for transparency; he did not introduce it when he was in the Cabinet or in the Treasury. He talks about reforming the banking system; he is the person who designed the banking regulatory system that failed, but he does not admit it. He talks about the bank levy; he wrote 11 Budgets and never put one in. And on lending, he tried as a member of the Government to secure lending agreements throughout the banks, and he completely failed. The truth is this: he is a man running away from his past, with no plan for the future.
Anybody looking reasonably at the settlement will have to agree that it is a welcome step in the right direction. In normal times, Governments should not intervene to force banks to lend or to reveal commercial details of pay, and I very much hope the Chancellor will confirm that it is a one-off, with one exception. Does he not agree that, without further transparency on bonuses, we will never know whether banks are fuelling risks and mistakes for which one day, as a result of the way they misallocate risk, we may have to pay? Will he also support the Treasury Committee’s initiative, outlined in a letter to the Financial Services Authority, and supported by Sir David Walker, to secure that much higher level of transparency?
I thank the Chair of the Treasury Committee for the welcome that he gives to the package. Of course, in any normal times one would not want to have to negotiate lending agreements with the banks or, indeed, be in a situation where half our banking sector was in part in the public’s hands, but that is the situation that we inherited as a Government and why I felt that the agreement with the banks was necessary, as well as the additional tax that we are levying on them.
My hon. Friend specifically raises the issue of transparency and his proposals that I know he has put to the FSA. As I said in my statement, we have a voluntary agreement this year on disclosure, which already goes beyond those of other financial centres in the world, but, having consulted, we will legislate in the coming year, and his proposals will deserve close attention.
(14 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that unemployment went up by 1 million under the previous Government. We know that even in the good years, the problem of youth unemployment increased and that we as a country were not able to do much about it. This Government are determined to tackle that head-on with reform of the welfare system so that it always pays to work and, at the same time, with the new Work programme, which will give young people the skills and opportunities they need to get off those unemployment rolls.
In giving evidence before the Treasury Committee, Lord Turnbull made it clear that spending as a proportion of GDP should be nearer 40% than the current level of nearly 50%. The OECD has said that the deficit will retard growth. Will the Chancellor make more of the case that action is needed to tackle the deficit not just on financial grounds but to help release the wealth-creating sectors of the economy?
My hon. Friend is clearly correct that it is unsustainable for the Government to be consuming almost 50% of national income. Lord Turnbull observes that under Labour and Conservative Governments in the past, the number was closer to 40%. Of course, the deficit reduction plan that we have set out brings that about.
(14 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
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I do not know how much longer we are going to have to wait for a serious economic proposal from the shadow Chancellor. I suspect that time is running out for him. Let me repeat that we have introduced a code of practice that extends to 2,500 firms. There were 25 firms covered by the code of practice presided over by the right hon. Gentleman when he was in the Cabinet. We have introduced a permanent bank tax, which he and the Cabinet stood against during the general election.
The shadow Chancellor says that he wants a properly regulated banking system. However, he has opposed our proposals to regulate the banking system, we still do not know whether he supports the proposal to give the Bank of England a serious role, and—let us be clear about this—he has absolutely no idea about how to increase lending in the British economy, which he did nothing to achieve when he was in the Cabinet. Part of the pattern of an Opposition who have no serious plans to clear up the mess that they created is their habit of jumping on every passing bandwagon,
People will look at the shadow Chancellor and say that, although it is difficult to think of a way in which he could reduce his economic credibility further after the week that he has had, he has done just that today.
First, what steps are the Government taking to ensure that an international agreement is reached on the need for more transparency in regard to bonuses and remuneration? Secondly, does the Chancellor believe that shareholders should be much more actively engaged in restraining pay and remuneration, given the evidence that we heard from the chief executive of Barclays this morning that no conversations on the subject had taken place between Barclays and its shareholders?
I certainly want to see much more international action on transparency, and I have held discussions with all the European Finance Ministers about how that can happen. We also want the Basel III arrangements to be implemented by all the G20 countries, and to be translated properly into European law.
I strongly agree with the my hon. Friend’s sentiments about shareholders. We want them to be more involved in pay and remuneration, and we want to find a way of improving corporate governance in that regard. That is one of the issues that we are discussing with the banks, and I know that the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills is considering it as well.
(14 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberWe have a specific review of advanced manufacturing to see what more we can do to help it, and I intend the Budget on 23 March to focus very much on supporting economic growth and removing the barriers to the expansion of manufacturing businesses and others. We are looking both at specific sectors, such as advanced manufacturing and pharmaceuticals, and at cross-government issues, such as planning and employment law, so that we provide not only the economic stability that we have delivered in recent months, but the platform for economic growth.
Further to that question and that reply, the Government’s efforts so far in that regard consist of “The path to strong, sustainable and balanced growth”. Frankly, it is an insubstantial document—well short of a strategy. The Chancellor has given us a firm lead on fiscal policy. Will he now commit to cutting through what appear to have been a large number of interdepartmental arguments about this, and give us a clear strategy for growth in his next Budget?
The first thing that I would say is that, of course, deficit reduction is an essential platform for economic growth. The fact that this Parliament, almost alone in Europe, is not having to discuss the sovereign debt crisis is in itself testament to the success that we have had. But we need now to turn around many Departments that have not really thought for years about this question: how do we stimulate private enterprise and private sector growth? We have inherited government machinery that is not equipped to deal with that. We are turning that around, and the Budget in March is the focus point that I expect all Departments to work towards.
(14 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberUntil the shadow Chancellor’s last few words, I was looking forward to saying that I agree with just about everything that has been said from both Front Benches. None the less, there is a good deal of cross-party consensus about what is being discussed.
The Chancellor is faced with a difficult situation: a regional currency crisis that is largely not of his making, a close neighbour with strong historical ties in the eye of the storm and an inherited financial commitment to assistance at the European level.
The Treasury Committee took advantage of the Chancellor’s appearance before us last week to cross-examine him on these matters in some detail. That appearance, his speech today and particularly the terms sheet, which we have just received, have given us a good deal of information, and I am grateful to him. I am relieved, according to that information, that any increase in the loan, which is permitted by the legislation, will be debated on the Floor of the House.
We now know the price of the loan for the first time, broadly speaking. It looks sensible, although I notice that it can be varied under the enabling legislation. As my hon. Friend the Member for Rochester and Strood (Mark Reckless) has pointed out, we have discovered from the terms sheet that the loan is junior in the debt hierarchy to support through the EU mechanism. It would be useful if the Minister, in the winding-up speech, told us whether the Irish can repay the loan early without penalty. I do not think that that is what is stated in paragraph 5(c) of “Other Terms” in the loan agreement—I have obviously had very little time to read it—but there is also a reference to “exceptions” in the bracketed part of the sentence.
A number of hon. Members and I would like to know whether the Government have considered purchasing assets held by the National Asset Management Agency, as an alternative to part or all of the loan.
As far as I know, this bilateral loan has no direct precedent. The UK has gone further than was needed to fulfil its legal obligations. The Chancellor made a strong and persuasive case, which was supported by the Opposition. However, I think that that decision needs close scrutiny, as does the decision, which straddled the previous Government’s tenure, that left the UK with extra contingent liabilities as a result of the mechanism. We may have been put in the unsatisfactory position of making EU budget payments to bail out the eurozone, even though we are not a member of it.
It is important to bear in mind that demand for a bail-out originated not with a request from Ireland, but from the fear among eurozone members of contagion spreading from Ireland to Portugal and Spain. Most hon. Members agree that bailing out the eurozone is primarily its business and not ours. It is true that the collapse of the zone would generate shockwaves throughout the region, and possibly the world. However, the eurozone does have the capacity to bail out weaker members and, to the extent that the stability of the whole financial system is at stake, our contribution should usually be made via the International Monetary Fund. It is for those reasons that I was relieved when the Chancellor confirmed before the Select Committee that the legislation will be unique to Ireland and does not contain enabling powers for further bilateral eurozone bail-outs.
I appreciate that. The Chancellor has referred to 2013 on a number of occasions, and my hon. Friend has referred to the possible unlawfulness of the mechanism on a number of occasions, including in private discussions.
This is a crisis of the eurozone, for which UK taxpayers are footing part of the bill. The UK will have to engage with members of the eurozone to limit the damage now and to construct something better for the future. I will touch on a few of those points in the moments that remain. I recognise that the problems to which I refer may be intractable. First, as the Chancellor has said, the senior creditors have been exempted from a haircut. The Chancellor told us that this was because of the risk of contagion. He is probably right, but the resulting moral hazard is large and will have to be addressed.
The second issue that I wish to raise, which naturally none of the authorities wants to talk about, is the fact that even the measures for Ireland and for Greece may not prevent default. The crisis may be one of solvency, not liquidity. That has a bearing on the lender of last resort provisions for the eurozone. It is possible that a sovereign default could trigger a banking crisis and even failure in parts of the eurozone, because banks hold a large amount of sovereign debt on their balance sheets. Such a bank failure could be highly toxic.
It is worth bearing in mind that the great depression of the 1930s was triggered as much by bank failures after 1931 as it was by the stock market collapse of 1929. I do not want to play the role of Cassandra, but I plead that contingency planning at European level be done now for the risk of such a bank failure. On the basis of the eurozone’s responses to the crisis so far, I am not optimistic that that planning is being done. The eurozone is fearful of leaks, and those doing the work would be terrified of that possibility. I have no doubt that that would inhibit their work. In addition, pessimism on such issues in European circles does not exactly make such work a career-enhancing prospect for the eurocrats who would have to do it. Let us just hope that they are doing that work.
The third problem that I wish to refer to—I shall leave it at that given the time available—is the long-term future of the eurozone itself in a world in which the bond markets have discovered that the no bail-out clause is toothless. I should say at this point that I have never opposed the eurozone on ideological grounds or on grounds of principle, but I have been wary on practical grounds, particularly the ground that the no bail-out clause may turn out to have no clothes. That is exactly what has happened.
Does my hon. Friend share the concern that because we are taking part in the Irish bail-out on equal terms with the euro members, we are setting a precedent that will put political pressure on the Government to take part in other bail-outs? Does he believe that the Government will be in a position to resist that pressure?
I have no doubt that the Government are listening to my hon. Friend and others, who will put pressure on them to resist the pressure from other quarters. I agree with his point.
It seems to me that very little work is being done on the possibility of the euro crisis leading to more general examples of the no bail-out clause’s bluff being called. I would be surprised if there had been any such work. I cannot be sure, but it strikes me as highly unlikely. It is the Ark of the Covenant that the eurozone will continue indefinitely.
When the Chancellor came before the Treasury Committee, he assured us that eurozone members were
“having a discussion about the permanent eurozone bail-out mechanism.”
I will not, because I am about to conclude.
Any new bail-out mechanism, however, may itself lack credibility in the absence of a common European fiscal policy. That is why the discovery that the no bail-out clause is a paper tiger will remain an enduring problem for the eurozone’s stability, a problem from whose consequences the UK will certainly not be immune.
(14 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberA lot of Back Benchers want to say something and I would like to accommodate them, but there is important business to follow in the form of Backbench-led debates, so brevity is of the essence from the Back Benches and the Front Benches alike.
In June, the Red Book was forecasting that the savings ratio would remain broadly steady at about 6% for the next five years, which is quite near its long-run average for the previous 40 years. On page 67 of the most recent document however, the new forecast assumes a fall in the savings ratio to just over half that, and for the remainder of the Parliament, at only 3%. Is the Chancellor worried about that fall in the savings ratio, and will he consider measures to address it?
Yes, I have, of course, seen the forecast for the savings ratio and we will want to address it. It has the savings ratio returning to its average of before the recession, and I think all parties in this House, and certainly the Government, will want to find ways of encouraging saving more effectively than was the case in the past, and to address that particular problem.
(14 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Gentleman makes a good point of which we need to take account, but I still think that the credit rating agencies potentially have an important role. They are listened to in the market, are the basis on which financial transactions take place, and should be trusted, but in the present circumstances they are certainly not. However, I am grateful for his question.
On bonuses, there is outrage among not just Opposition Members but, for example, right-wing Governments in Germany, France and Sweden, that a banking system that owes its continued existence to massive Government intervention should pay itself mega salaries and bonuses entirely out of line with the top of business, let alone ordinary taxpayers. There is outrage especially because those gigantic bonuses often drove the recklessness in the first place. The overweening power of the banks attracts almost universal hostility, especially given that 90% of investment bank profits, in an era of austerity, are directed not at strengthening balance sheets, at shareholders through dividends, at customers through lower fees or at taxpayers, but at bonuses.
France, among several others, has demanded a mandatory cap and that there should be no guaranteeing of bonuses, but Whitehall, as usual of course, argues that it would not be practical. However, if the G20 Governments insisted on limits and made continued liquidity provisions dependent on compliance, no bank could refuse. I believe that Her Majesty’s Government should now be taking the lead in the G20 not in succumbing to lobbying from the City of London and the British Bankers Association, but in reining back bonuses on a much greater scale than we have so far seen, and to much lower levels, and in ensuring that they be paid only in exceptional circumstances.
On the broader question of averting future financial crises, attention has so far largely focused on enhancing capital control, but that does not actually have a good record in this regard. At the outset of this latest crisis, virtually all financial institutions across the globe had capital adequacy of between one and two times the minimum Basel regulatory requirements—at least at that level, and in some cases twice as much. Basel III, which has just reached its provisional conclusions, is scarcely any improvement. The core top-tier capital requirement is only 4.5%, and the contingency capital requirement is only 2.5%. Of the EU’s top-50 banks, 45 already meet that standard, and Basel III is actually proposing that the requirement not be introduced until 2019. This is simply nowhere near good enough. A much better possibility might be counter-cyclical capital controls, enforcing different levels of bank capital at different stages in the economic cycle. I can see the point of that, but I suspect that it would leave open the problem of the degree of ratchet and the timing of it. I suspect that that would be far too problematic.
An alternative approach—many have talked about this—is the introduction in Britain of something like the Volcker rule, restricting banks from undertaking certain kinds of speculative trading, notably proprietary trading. Of course that would certainly stop banks doing what they are doing at the moment, which is trading on their own books with the money of depositors. The key point, however, is that it would not overcome the too big to fail problem when applied to investment banks. For example, I do not think it would prevent a repetition of the collapse of Lehman Brothers; neither would it address the interconnectedness—the Chancellor was speaking about this a few moments ago—of today’s banks, with counter-party relationships and exposure between commercial and investment banks, and insurance companies. That is the problem. I say this with regret, but any rule-based reform is almost certain to face the risk of regulatory arbitrage, because financial institutions invent ever more sophisticated products that are simply aimed at getting around regulatory controls. I therefore do not think that what I have described is an adequate answer. For all those reasons, the force of argument and the balance of advantage point strongly towards separating retail from investment banks, in establishing distinct, narrow banks that are conservative, transparent institutions with no financial instruments or incomprehensible balance sheets.
I am being intervened on by someone whom I cannot resist. I am only too glad to give way to the Chairman of the Treasury Select Committee.
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman. On that point, does he agree that the Government have done the right thing by creating the Vickers review? The review will examine, in depth and carefully, without rushing a reform, whether structural reform of the banks is required, and will give us guidance on how to protect ourselves from the too big to fail problem.
I entirely agree with that, and I was just about to make the same point myself. I hope I can also take the hon. Gentleman with me when I say that Parliament should have the opportunity to express its views to the Vickers commission before it reports, rather than simply making comments when its work is virtually a fait accompli. Indeed, that is one of the purposes of this debate.
The key advantage claimed for the model that I am describing is that it would remove the implicit taxpayer guarantee—that is, the capacity of the financial conglomerates to use retail deposits, which are implicitly guaranteed by Government, as collateral for proprietary trading; or, as the Treasury Committee put it, I think rather nicely, banks playing
“at a high-stakes casino table with…taxpayers’ chips.”
I have a lot of respect for this model, but the crux of it is that the withdrawal of the taxpayer guarantee would be a sufficient deterrent to prevent investment banks from engaging in highly risky investments that might collapse, with serious and far-reaching consequences for the national economy. The real question—which I do not think enough people have asked—is whether that is likely to be true. The fact is that if a financial institution outside the protected narrow banking boundary threatened systemic contagion, it is difficult to believe that the Government would not attempt some form of bail-out. I therefore have to say, regrettably, that I doubt whether the narrow banking model could, by itself alone, be relied on to overcome the problem of moral hazard and too big to fail.
Does that mean that there is no solution to the too big to fail problem? Not necessarily. There is an alternative to narrow banking as a means of preventing a bank from gambling away other people’s money, which is the recent Kotlikoff proposal in the US. It is a proposal that deserves serious consideration—consideration that I hope the Vickers commission will give it. In the US context, it is proposed that all financial companies become pass-through mutual funds. They would have a 100% equity ratio, to ensure bank solvency, and the payments function of banks would be performed by cash funds that would be 100% reserve—for example, through Treasury bonds. Such banks could, of course, still initiate new mortgages and new loans, but these would not be funded through deposit accounts until they had been sold to a mutual fund. The key point is that the bank would never hold them; in other words, the bank would never have an open position. Banks would not own assets—apart, of course, from their offices and so on—and they would not then be in a position to fail or trigger a bank run. That is a significant proposal.
For those—and there are plenty of them—who want to take greater risks beyond a cash-based mutual fund, there are already hundreds of investment avenues that would continue to be available, such as foreign exchange, derivatives, real estate, hedge funds and all the rest. The key difference with this limited-purpose banking would be that any failure in such investments would be incurred by the investor, not by the bank. That is the crucial point. There would be no problem with the banks being too big to fail or trying to insure the uninsurable risk of financial contagion. Critically, there would be no future claims on the taxpayer.
This reform would overcome a critical market failure without the need for any vast new complex regulation. I say that for the benefit of those on the Government Benches. It is, in effect, a market solution. It is true that it would not necessarily prevent asset bubbles—I do not think that anything can do that, certainly not in this area—but under limited-purpose banking, such bubbles would not threaten the entire financial system. Anyway, there would be nothing to preclude some form of macro-prudential authority from having oversight in this area. I think that that would be a very good idea.
I am not suggesting that this reform would be a panacea, because I do not believe that a panacea exists in this area. It should, however, be thoroughly investigated by the Vickers commission and, I hope, by the Government. I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that at present Britain has the most profoundly dysfunctional banking system of any G7 country. It came nearer to collapse than any other in the autumn of 2008. I believe that we need to break up the mega-banks, with their addiction to mortgage lending. We need smaller banks and, in particular, specialist business banks such as infrastructure banks, housing banks, green banks, creative industries banks and knowledge economy banks. Only that kind of fundamental reform of the banking system, involving all the elements that I have described, can provide the foundation for the economic and social transformation of this country that we all want. I commend the motion to the house.
(14 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberI apologise for breaking up my hon. Friend’s excellent speech. Does he agree that a crucial point that we must get across to the FSA tonight is that the increase in these compliance burdens will be paid for by the consumer who will therefore lose out? The loss of perspective from the FSA and the inflexibility of its approach in implementing the changes are reflected in the large number of people here today.
Absolutely, and I am very grateful to my hon. Friend the Chairman of the Treasury Committee for bringing that up.
The £1.7 billion costs being pushed on to the consumer mean that £1.7 billion will be taken out of the savings pool. We simply cannot take that approach if we are trying to encourage people to save and to pay off their debts. That is why the changes are so fundamentally wrong. IFAs will have to bear the brunt of them, especially those with small operations where the requirement to sit exams, recapitalise and install new compliance systems, as well as all the other requirements of RDR, will often be handled by the same individual who is offering advice to the customer. Hector Sants estimated that implementation might mean a loss to the IFA community of 20% of the professionals who work in this arena today. Adair Turner has said that this is an acceptable cost, but I do not agree. It is unacceptable that up to 3,000 professionals according to the FSA’s figures, and more according to other research, will lose their livelihoods. Among those who stay, the cost will be passed on to the consumer, as my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie) has said.
There are many questions to ask. Will the RDR deal with the cowboys? Will a reduction in the number of IFAs encourage a savings culture or detract from it? Is it right that when we are encouraging entrepreneurs to set up new businesses, the outgoing regulator should be bringing about such devastating change to this industry? My constituent Mike Jeacock is typical of the type of IFA who is threatened by the RDR. He runs a high street shop in Stourport-on-Severn and he networks for new business among his mates in the Stourport Workmen’s Club. These are not high-rolling wealth managers prowling family offices in Mayfair. We are talking about people who earn a living honestly servicing the financial interests of people who can afford little but who need financial advice.
The retail distribution review is a significant market intervention, and market interventions, particularly of such a fundamental and far-reaching nature, require overwhelming evidence of consumer detriment and the appropriateness of the solution. In addition, any solution needs to meet cost-benefit requirements. Does the RDR satisfy these tests? It appears to be based on a combination of unfounded assertions, limited and contradictory research and, as regards some of its solutions, little more than a hunch that the outcome will somehow be better than the present system.
It is estimated that up to 10,000 experienced IFAs of good standing will be forced to retire for no valid reason.
(14 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberIf we were to choose precisely where the policy applied on a much more closely defined geographical basis, we would have difficulties such as distortive behaviour, problems in enforcing the policy, the bureaucracy that may be involved, the need to establish where a company’s principal place of business was, and the difficulty of policing the scheme. Also, labour markets tend to be somewhat larger than constituency or even local authority areas. My hon. Friend is right to highlight the circumstances in Portsmouth, but there are neighbouring seats with a very low level of public sector employment and quite a high level of private sector employment. Such labour market flexibility can exist.
I take my hon. Friend’s points about the limited resources, the risk of bureaucracy and the difficulty of policing the scheme, but Robert Chote, while he was still at the Institute for Fiscal Studies, described the regional relief scheme as
“complicated…prone to avoidance and oddly targeted.”
I have had a number of representations to that effect. What assurance can my hon. Friend give that the scheme will not be accompanied by an enormous amount of extra regulation and a much higher compliance burden?
My hon. Friend raises a fair point. We are determined that in administering the scheme, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs will adopt a light touch as much as possible. The problems of bureaucracy and avoidance would be much greater if we tried to drill down to constituency or local authority level as opposed to regional level. I assure him that our assessment is that gains for participating businesses will greatly outweigh any administrative costs that they may face.
(14 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberOrder. There is enormous interest but some pressure on time, so brevity from Back Benchers and Front Benchers alike is vital.
I think that the public were shocked to discover that the UK was going to be bailing out a eurozone member, not just through the IMF or bilateral loans, but through the European stabilisation mechanism—that is, through the EU budget. Will the Chancellor reassure the House that he will seek to block British participation in any replenishment of the €60 billion mechanism?
Let me first say that it is our intention not to be part of the permanent eurozone bail-out mechanism, which of course is the subject of discussion, not least at the December Council. It would be our intention that that mechanism should return to what it was designed for in article 122, which is dealing with natural disasters. There has been a balance of payments support mechanism in the European Union for many years to deal with the accession of the central and eastern European countries. Both that mechanism and that balance of payments support drew from the same €60 billion, and we would certainly not be in favour of somehow replenishing it to make good the amount of money that, potentially, will be committed to Ireland.