Ukraine

Debate between Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Campbell of Pittenweem

Tuesday 18th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, this new and sensible procedure of not reading out the Statement because we have all read it leaves me with the problem of how to open one’s speech. I will compromise by thanking the Minister for coming to answer our questions.

I do not really have anything new to say. To emphasise that, I am going to read out the first paragraph of the shadow Secretary of State’s reply to the Statement in the other place, because my position will not deviate from it. He said:

“I welcome its contents and make clear Labour’s full backing for the steps the Government have been taking on international diplomatic efforts to de-escalate threats, on defensive support for the Ukraine military, on necessary institutional reforms within the country, and on tough economic and financial sanctions in response to any fresh Russian invasion into Ukraine.”—[Official Report, Commons, 17/1/22; col. 63.]


So I do not believe that we differ in any significant way from the Government. However, I have some questions.

I understand that 13,000 Ukrainian citizens have been killed in the conflict so far, and many must have been killed on what I will loosely call the Russian side. The first objective must surely therefore be to stop the killing. Moving into the area of objectives, could the Minister set out what our policy is, first, on direct military engagement and, secondly, on recognising any of the Russian concerns? I hope she will reaffirm that we are overwhelmingly committed to a diplomatic solution; those diplomatic solutions do not look very optimistic but I hope she can flesh out some strands of optimism.

In 1994—I may get these things slightly wrong—the Budapest agreement was signed and Britain is the guarantor of that agreement. As I understand it, although I cannot claim to have read it, it was a comprehensive agreement that settled the future of Ukraine. It settled its boundaries and did a brilliant job of denuclearising the country, and we would all have hoped that that was how it would settle down. The agreement sought to answer all the questions. Now I have to ask the Minister whether it has any relevance today at all.

In 2014 the Normandy format was created—in Normandy, I believe, because it had its essence at the Normandy celebrations. It is a format of four countries: France, Germany, the US and Russia. On 6 January this year, it met. As far as one can tell, there was little progress, but, hopefully, we have some way of getting to the essence of what those conversations were. My simple question is: was there any progress?

A second institution is the NATO-Russia Council, which has been meeting somewhat infrequently. However, it met on 12 January. Reports from the Secretary-General of NATO seemed a bit downbeat, but does the Minister have any more positive interpretation of what happened? Are there any areas for optimism?

Like any Opposition, even when we agree with the Government, we inevitably end up saying, “You should try harder”, and I shall say that they should try harder. Should there be more diplomatic effort? I am not saying that the Government do not grasp this, but the news, for want of a better barometer, does not seem to grasp just how serious the situation is. There have been a number of efforts by UK diplomats and politicians to meet the Ukrainian Government, but should there be more? Should the Foreign Secretary visit Ukraine? Should there be something as innovatory as the Defence Secretary going to Moscow?

My experience of negotiation is somewhat depressing. One of the things that is depressing about negotiation is the success of negotiation by attrition. What I mean is, if you spend enough time talking in concert with your allies and you talk and listen to the other side of a debate, you get closer by sheer volume. Therefore, I encourage the Government to see where more face-to-face contact can take place and where there can be more conversations between different people, or different nuances. I seek an assurance that we are using our best skills to try to understand the Russian position. There must be people in Russia who recognise just how serious and dangerous this is. We have to try to find some common ground and we have to ask ourselves—I know a lot of people are concerned about it—whether we retain sufficient diplomatic capability in the Russian area. Do we have adequate Russia skills?

Our military support was clearly welcomed by Ukraine, but I do not know what it consisted of. Perhaps the noble Baroness could flesh that out. How many UK personnel were involved? How many are still in Ukraine and are they at risk? There is an interesting phrase in the Statement that I hope the noble Baroness can flesh out. It says that we are supplying Ukraine with anti-armour defensive weapons systems. I guess if you are in a tank with a missile coming towards you, it is a bit difficult to interpret why this is only a defensive system. How does one signal to the enemy that what we are providing to Ukraine is a weapon that is really only usable in a defensive situation? How many personnel are involved in the training to use this weapon? Are any left in Ukraine?

Ukraine recently suffered a major cyberattack. It is not mentioned in the Statement, but I understand that a new cyber co-operation agreement has been concluded between NATO and Ukraine. What role will Ukraine play in this? Is it already active?

Finally, on the reference yesterday to the Indo-Pacific tilt, can the Minister confirm that resources must be centred on Europe and NATO? AUKUS is a great concept, but it must not draw resources from where the threat is greatest.

As I said at the beginning, we have no fundamental criticism of the Government. We face a very grave situation. History teaches us that wars are much easier to get into than to get out of. If war breaks out in eastern Ukraine, many people will die. All efforts must centre on securing peace.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, I take no issue with the terms of the Statement, nor with the remarks of the noble Lord who has just spoken, but I think it is helpful if we try to put into context the political objectives of Mr Putin. Put baldly, they are these: to break Ukraine and to intimidate NATO. Mr Putin sees a client Ukraine as essential to Russia’s interests and believes—I believe, falsely—that western capitals will back down in the face of his aggression. The overarching purpose is to create a sphere of Russian interest in eastern Europe—an objective for which, I may say, he was given some encouragement by the sometimes lukewarm support given to NATO by President Trump.

It is clear, in my judgment, that any accession to Mr Putin’s demands would break both Ukraine and NATO itself. The truth is that NATO poses no threat to Russia. If we consider the enhanced forward presence with which the United Kingdom is most closely associated, the deployment of the battle group to Estonia, it consists of some 900 men. That will hardly challenge the substance of the Russian state.

We should not forget, though, that the people of Ukraine have been under considerable stress and strain. They have been under cyberattack in a particularly personal way, and we know now that there is the threat of false flag diversions. However, I am clear in my mind that we are right to support the Government of Ukraine politically and to provide them with defensive weapons. I am clear in my mind that we are right to make it clear that the United Kingdom will be part of severe economic measures against Russia if military action is commenced. The people of Ukraine continue to show their courage and resilience in the face of provocation and imminent threat, but, increasingly, they show that they wish a future in the Euro-Atlantic community, which is their sovereign right, and one that we should be willing to defend.

I have but two questions for the Minister. What discussions have the United Kingdom Government had with other members of NATO and the European Union to ensure unity of purpose in both those organisations? In particular, why was it that RAF aircraft, two C17s, taking defensive weapons to Ukraine, chose not to fly over Germany? Was there a political reason behind that decision?

Modernising Defence Programme

Debate between Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Campbell of Pittenweem

Tuesday 18th December 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. When I first read it, I thought it was the sort of statement Pepys might have made—and probably with better reason. It is essentially a classic “We will try harder” statement. Let me illustrate. I was reading through it and trying to find something substantial, and I tripped over the phrase,

“the MDP has identified three broad priorities”.

I thought, “Well, that is different”. I went on to see what they were:

“We will mobilise, making more of what we already have ... We will make the most effective use of them … We will improve the readiness and availability of a range of key defence platforms”.


The noble Earl’s party has been in power for eight years. What has he done in the previous seven years, if not these sorts of motherhood-type things? It does say something tangible: namely, that,

“we will reprioritise the current defence programme to increase weapon stockpiles”.

I feel that “reprioritise” must have a specific meaning: to take from somewhere and give to somewhere else. One can hardly criticise increasing weapons stockpiles to more sensible levels—but can the Minister tell us where the money is being taken from to be reprioritised in weapons stockpiles?

Later in the Statement is the sentence:

“And, where necessary and appropriate we will make sure we are able to act independently”.


We are in the gunboat business again. What sort of independent missions does the noble Earl have in mind? To make that statement, defence must have developed a series of scenarios. Where does the noble Earl feel that acting independently would be a sensible thing for the United Kingdom to do?

Turning the page, the Statement says that,

“we will modernise, embracing new technologies to assure our competitive edge … targetting priority areas”.

This is 2010. Surely a good Administration who have been in power for eight years should have been doing that all along.

It is really only on the second page that there is anything new. We are going to have a “defence innovation fund” and a “transformation fund”. Can the Minister set out in detail what these funds are intended to do and what the difference between them is? The Statement reads:

“I will ring-fence £160 million of MOD’s budget to create this fund”,


and then talks of further funding. Previously, it speaks about “£50 million” in the “next financial year”. That is £210 million—a little over 0.5% of the defence budget. This is nothing like the amounts of money required to make a significant impact. Later, it says:

“We will embrace modern business practices”.


What are they? Why have they not been embraced before? I like this phrase:

“We will develop a comprehensive strategy to improve recruitment and retention of talent”.


Is that code for, “We are going to fire Capita?” It comes from such a low base that surely getting rid of it and having the MoD doing its own recruitment would be the way to go. Is it not true that, with Capita’s help, we are losing net numbers of trained personnel?

The Statement goes on to say something that might actually be meaningful—that a permanent net assessment unit will be established. That could mean a radical change in how the MoD makes its decisions. It could mean a movement towards the centre or it could mean that it is just some unit that passes comments. Can the Minister spell out what structural changes will be made to make this net assessment unit meaningful?

Earlier, the Statement reviews how the threat has become more significant in a whole series of areas and talks about £1.8 billion of extra money. I think that all this money has been announced before—I will be happy to be corrected on that. But can the Minister set out in some detail where and when the money will be spent? I have an uneasy feeling that it is just about enough to keep up with the increased threat.

The only glimmer of hope in the Statement is in the last paragraph:

“There is more work to be done as we move towards next year’s Spending Review”.


I hope that that is code for defence setting out to try again to get some more resources. The programme hinted at in the Statement—let us it call it “SDR 2015-plus-plus”—is unaffordable without cuts or more money, or are we going to muddle on yet again overpromising and underdelivering?

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Earl for repeating the Statement. I share many of the observations that the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, made in the last moment or two. This is the second time that I have heard the Statement, because I took the opportunity to go and hear it when it was first delivered in the other place. I have to confess that hearing it twice has not improved it, in spite of what I anticipated being the mellifluous tones of the noble Earl, for whom I have the greatest respect. Looked at in the round, the Statement could easily have been made at any time in the course of its nine months of gestation. It contains a whole list of promises but is largely silent about how the promises are to be delivered.

When we examine some of those promises, we see that they reflect things which the Ministry of Defence should be doing now as a matter of course. Surely we are currently enhancing,

“efforts with our allies and partners”.

Indeed, one would think that the very possibility of Brexit would surely make that an even more urgent requirement. Are we going to “act independently”? For example, if independent action in defence of an overseas territory were required, surely we would be capable of doing that at the moment. Why are those two issues focused on in that way that they are in the Statement?

Nor is there any mention of the immediate challenges that face the Ministry of Defence, such as the gap of billions of pounds in the equipment budget—an issue that the noble Earl will recall I have raised with him on two recent previous occasions. How will that gap be filled? I will return to the question of financial support in a moment or two, because the Statement contains a couple of sentences that justify careful reading and interpretation.

There has already been reference to the fiasco of Army recruitment. How will that be remedied? Is the company that has responsibility simply to be sacked? Why not go back to the previous system, which, as far as I recall, was effective? Was the idea of letting it out designed to save money? If it was, it has certainly not been successful in the sense of producing the promises that were made in respect of it.

Finally, there is the question of the continuing fall in and erratic nature of the value of the pound. How is that affecting the ability of the Ministry of Defence to continue with its programmes of acquisition? What steps, if any, has the Treasury offered in order to assist if necessary because of these fluctuations?

Perhaps the most important passage is the one to which I referred a moment ago and said that I would come to. Two consecutive sentences say:

“We also need to create financial headroom for modernisation. Based on our work to date, we expect to achieve over the next decade the very demanding efficiency targets we were set in 2015, including”—


here there is a typographical error—

“through investment in a programme of digitally enabled transformation”.

I know of no government programme of “digitally enabled transformation” in the recent past that has proved anything other than more expensive than intended and with delivery several years after it was originally projected. It is a pretty optimistic tool to use in the issue of finding headroom in defence spending. I suspect that that tells us that the Ministry of Defence is not expecting any more increase in expenditure.

In advance of today’s Statement and the publication of the report, there was an apparently well-sourced leak that the Secretary of State for Defence was going to announce that one of the ambitions would be to raise defence expenditure from 2% of GDP to 3% annually. That did not appear in the Statement. When the question was put to him specifically in the other place by the Chairman of the Defence Select Committee, he very neatly sidestepped it. I suspect that that might well be an ambition of the department—but I equally suspect that the Treasury has made it pretty clear that that ambition is not capable of being resolved.

It is also a pity that we have had the Statement and that the publication of the report did not take place in sufficient time for it to be considered as a whole. I very much hope that the noble Earl will, through the usual channels, be willing to commit to endeavour to have a full-scale debate on the terms of the report. That is a much fuller indication of what the Government’s intentions are—albeit, so far as the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, and myself are concerned, that the report and the Statement leave a great deal to be desired.

Defence Modernisation Programme

Debate between Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Campbell of Pittenweem

Monday 29th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement, and perhaps I may be the first to congratulate him on his birthday. That is the charming bit over.

We welcome the decision to separate out the modernising defence programme from the national security capability review. That, frankly, is not much of a statement because anything has to be better than a Cabinet Office-led NSCR which is financially neutral. But this Statement reads as though one has had access to a whole series of other Statements, so I will confine myself to trying to understand the detail of what it sets out. Early on in the Statement it says:

“Following agreement of the high-level findings of the national security capability review”.


Are the high-level findings of that review already in the public domain? If not, can the noble Earl tell us what the other high-level findings of the review are? Have they been published, and if they have not, will he explain why we have heard about just one finding and not the whole suite?

Later in the Statement we are promised that the national security capability review will be published later in the spring. Seasons of the year can be variable in this place, so can I ask for an assurance from the Minister that we will have a precise definition of “spring”? This morning I took the trouble to google the word and you have two choices: meteorological spring ends on 31 May while astronomical spring ends on 21 June. I will settle for either date provided that we have a commitment that the review is going to be published. The reason I am looking for that assurance is that I think I have been told—I may be misquoting the noble Earl—in one of our many debates on defence that there would be the second annual report on SDR 2015 by the end of 2017. The end of 2017 was last month. Is there to be a second annual report on SDR 2015? If so, when?

Later in the Statement there is slipped in—“slipped in” is unfair, but it is towards the end of a long paragraph—the commitment:

“However, we must do more to ensure that we use our resources effectively and deliver the efficiencies that the department has committed to”.


What are those efficiencies? Are they the ones committed to in SDSR 2015? The noble Earl will know from our debates about defence, of which we have had several in recent months, that virtually nobody believes that such efficiencies are achievable. Indeed, in the areas that one has been able to measure, the reduction in resource has clearly stalled. What does the noble Earl mean by “efficiencies”? Having been in the efficiency business in my professional career, I define “efficiencies” as achieving the same with less resource or achieving more with the same resource. All too often in defence, “efficiencies” has meant cuts. Could we have a categorical assurance that these efficiencies genuinely will be about achieving more with less? If it really is about more with less, why, in the last seven years, have the Government not achieved those efficiencies anyway?

Later in the Statement, we are told that the “programme”—that is, the defence modernisation programme—

“will involve four strands of work”,

but it then goes on to define only one. What are the other three strands? It sounds very precise and as though there is a very clear plan behind the Statement. If there is, could it be revealed to us? The fourth strand is to look at what is required to contribute to the “three national security objectives”. I am sure that in the tons of paper that the MoD produces I could find what the three national security objectives are, but could the Minister enlighten us as to what the three national security objectives are that the fourth strand pursues?

Following the Statement in the other place there was a debate. Somewhere in that debate there was a commitment by the Government to deliver the report on the defence modernisation programme by the Summer Recess. Will the Minister restate that it will be delivered by the Summer Recess? Could he give us some feel as to the certainty of that, particularly given the failure to deliver previous reports by their due date?

I do not think that the Statement says anything about “financially neutral”, but in the debate that followed the Secretary of State for Defence said on at least four occasions that the defence modernisation review would not be financially neutral. I think he said it four times, but perhaps it was more often. Does “not financially neutral” mean that the Government have decided to provide more money for defence? Presumably “not financially neutral” does not mean that there will be even less money. I hope that is what it means, but could we have a straightforward yes or no answer: is more money to be found for defence? Whatever the answer to all these questions is, I have real trouble in my own mind understanding how a fiscally neutral NSCR will work with a not fiscally neutral defence modernisation review.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, I join in the congratulations to the noble Earl on his birthday and thank him for repeating the Statement. He must feel, to some extent, that today is a rerun of the discussion we had last Monday. On these occasions tribute is often paid to the Armed Forces, but I have a question on that. What evidence is there of any impact on recruitment and retention as a result of the uncertainty that has surrounded these issues? I also remind the noble Earl that, as some of us in the House will remember, a lot of the language in the Statement is very similar to what we saw and heard in Options for Change and Frontline First. We know that the outcome of both exercises was a substantial reduction in defence expenditure and hence in capability as well.

There are only two passing references to NATO. I press the noble Earl on how far, and to what extent, interoperability with NATO and our other allies will lie at the very heart of the exercise it is now proposed to carry out. As has been said on a number of occasions in response to questions in the other place, the Secretary of State asserted that the exercise would not be fiscal-neutral. Last Monday the noble Earl rather adroitly avoided answering my question as to whether he agreed with the Secretary of State, and indeed the head of the Army, that more money needs to be spent on defence. I offer him another opportunity to answer that question and I hope he will forgive me if I ask: yes or no?

International Headquarters and Defence Organisations (Designation and Privileges) Order 2017

Debate between Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Campbell of Pittenweem

Tuesday 7th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, I am sure the House is grateful to the noble Earl for his very lucid setting out of the statutory provisions that are engaged here. Without the help of the House of Lords Library, I still managed to chart a rather uncertain course through the legislation. I wonder whether it is not now time for a review, or perhaps a revisal, so as to bring together, in one statute, the various provisions to which the noble Earl referred.

I make no challenge to anything that the noble Earl has said in support of this, although there is one article in the order which he may be in a position to answer some questions about. In Article 5, the immunities which are otherwise conferred are subject to the exception of,

“the seizure of any article connected with an offence; or … the seizure of any article under the laws relating to customs or excise”.

I can understand the purpose behind these exceptions, but I am interested to know—it may not be possible to answer this off the top of the head—just how often these exceptions have been called upon.

The issue of NATO is one which we debate as part of wider consideration of defence. I wonder whether it is not now necessary to have a full-scale debate on NATO, not least because of the potential consequences which there may be for that organisation as a result of the decision to leave the European Union. The United Kingdom, of course, is not leaving NATO, but it seems to me inevitable that there may be some consequences—political, perhaps, if anything—from that decision.

As the noble Earl will understand, some have taken the opportunity of the result of the referendum in this country to reopen the argument in favour of a European army. I will say in parenthesis that I have been told by some who voted to leave that they did so because of the possibility of a European army—but of course by the very act of leaving, we have robbed ourselves of the veto which we could undoubtedly have imposed in relation to that. I take the very strong view, fervent remainer though I may be, that the creation of a European army would be wholly inappropriate and have damaging consequences for the defence of the whole of the north Atlantic area, in particular for those countries in Europe that apparently have such enthusiasm for it.

I did a little research on this. As long ago as 2008, Madeleine Albright, who was then the Secretary of State in the United States, during a discussion about the extent to which there could be a more independent security and defence policy for the European Union, drew attention to what came to be called the three Ds: delinking, discrimination and duplication. Her argument was very strongly in favour of the fact that what was then being proposed could well have the consequence of reducing the essential commitment to NATO, from which we all derive strength and support, by the United States.

At the Warsaw summit, NATO resolved that there should be much closer co-operation with the European Union, but of course co-operation is rather different from the notion of establishing separate structures, separate command and control and, perhaps most significantly in this context, a separate area of expenditure by European Union countries on defence, thereby taking away expenditure necessary to achieve the 2% target, which was of course established at the summit held at Celtic Manor. I have little doubt whatever about the importance of continuing the argument against a European army.

I finish by saying that the enhanced forward deployment to which the noble Earl referred is an important illustration of the fact that Baltic countries in particular can look to NATO for the kind of support which they feel it necessary to ask for in the light of what one might describe as the more expansionist attitudes of Mr Putin and Russia. It is no secret that Mr Putin would wish to destabilise NATO. That seems to be the strongest possible argument for its continuance.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I feel I must apologise to the House because, amazingly enough, I did not come equipped today to discuss Brexit, European armies, NATO in general, the 2% target, Russia, Putin or anybody else. But since we are making general points, I would point out that the Labour Party does support NATO—indeed, we are proud to have actually created it.

I have taken rather the opposite point of view. Given the constitutional niceties of this House, even to suggest that one is going to oppose an affirmative resolution produces a constitutional crisis that rocks the whole building. Whenever I stand up at the Dispatch Box, it is because I have drawn the short straw because I have the SI to do. I spend some time working out what to do to make it interesting. Sometimes you expose the Government’s poor performance, as we did last night, or point out that the order is not going to work, take a swipe at the primary legislation, ask some clarifying questions or ask that clever question that rocks the Minister back on his heels and sends him scrambling for the Box. On this occasion, however, despite the considerable efforts of my researcher and myself, I have to report that we have no questions and the Opposition are content that the order should be approved.