RAF: Operational Conversion Unit

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Tuesday 8th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, we recognise the utility of Belize as a training area, and it is indeed one of the options we are looking at.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

While we recognise that we have had to live without aircraft carriers, and then with aircraft carriers but without aircraft, when will the carriers be optimally equipped? The Minister seemed to imply in an earlier answer that that would be when 24 aircraft could be embarked and fully crewed. When will that be, how does that compare with the original plan, and what is the critical path: fully trained pilots or aircraft deliveries?

[Earl Howe]

With regard to whether the critical path is aircraft or indeed pilots, we clearly need both, and we are on track and within budget to deliver both in accordance with the planned rollout. For example, this will see initial operating capability for carrier strike—one squadron consisting of 12 frontline F35s and 18 pilots—in December 2020. Full operating capability, consisting of two squadrons, will be achieved in December 2023.

Army: Divisional Manoeuvre and Deployment Training

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Tuesday 8th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My noble friend makes an extremely important point, and we in the Ministry of Defence are always very conscious of the point he has stressed. But it is also important for all three armed services to look at the resources they have to see how they can use them even more effectively. The SDSR in 2015 and the modernising defence programme recognise the changed threat that faces us, and as a result the Army will be able to generate a more capable war-fighting division, at higher readiness, as part of the Joint Force 2025 programme.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I note that it is not the intention of the Government to deploy and manoeuvre at a divisional level, but I assume it is a capability we believe we have. Is that a capability we have? Do we have the logistics capability and the trained staff necessary for the complex task of manoeuvring large bodies of troops?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, yes, the Army is already prepared to deliver a division, albeit at best effort. As I have just said, it is working towards its Joint Force 2025 structures that will deliver a more capable force at higher readiness. The point the noble Lord makes about enablers and logistics is well made. The exercises in which the Army has participated recently have been a very good test of those enablers.

Modernising Defence Programme

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Tuesday 18th December 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. When I first read it, I thought it was the sort of statement Pepys might have made—and probably with better reason. It is essentially a classic “We will try harder” statement. Let me illustrate. I was reading through it and trying to find something substantial, and I tripped over the phrase,

“the MDP has identified three broad priorities”.

I thought, “Well, that is different”. I went on to see what they were:

“We will mobilise, making more of what we already have ... We will make the most effective use of them … We will improve the readiness and availability of a range of key defence platforms”.


The noble Earl’s party has been in power for eight years. What has he done in the previous seven years, if not these sorts of motherhood-type things? It does say something tangible: namely, that,

“we will reprioritise the current defence programme to increase weapon stockpiles”.

I feel that “reprioritise” must have a specific meaning: to take from somewhere and give to somewhere else. One can hardly criticise increasing weapons stockpiles to more sensible levels—but can the Minister tell us where the money is being taken from to be reprioritised in weapons stockpiles?

Later in the Statement is the sentence:

“And, where necessary and appropriate we will make sure we are able to act independently”.


We are in the gunboat business again. What sort of independent missions does the noble Earl have in mind? To make that statement, defence must have developed a series of scenarios. Where does the noble Earl feel that acting independently would be a sensible thing for the United Kingdom to do?

Turning the page, the Statement says that,

“we will modernise, embracing new technologies to assure our competitive edge … targetting priority areas”.

This is 2010. Surely a good Administration who have been in power for eight years should have been doing that all along.

It is really only on the second page that there is anything new. We are going to have a “defence innovation fund” and a “transformation fund”. Can the Minister set out in detail what these funds are intended to do and what the difference between them is? The Statement reads:

“I will ring-fence £160 million of MOD’s budget to create this fund”,


and then talks of further funding. Previously, it speaks about “£50 million” in the “next financial year”. That is £210 million—a little over 0.5% of the defence budget. This is nothing like the amounts of money required to make a significant impact. Later, it says:

“We will embrace modern business practices”.


What are they? Why have they not been embraced before? I like this phrase:

“We will develop a comprehensive strategy to improve recruitment and retention of talent”.


Is that code for, “We are going to fire Capita?” It comes from such a low base that surely getting rid of it and having the MoD doing its own recruitment would be the way to go. Is it not true that, with Capita’s help, we are losing net numbers of trained personnel?

The Statement goes on to say something that might actually be meaningful—that a permanent net assessment unit will be established. That could mean a radical change in how the MoD makes its decisions. It could mean a movement towards the centre or it could mean that it is just some unit that passes comments. Can the Minister spell out what structural changes will be made to make this net assessment unit meaningful?

Earlier, the Statement reviews how the threat has become more significant in a whole series of areas and talks about £1.8 billion of extra money. I think that all this money has been announced before—I will be happy to be corrected on that. But can the Minister set out in some detail where and when the money will be spent? I have an uneasy feeling that it is just about enough to keep up with the increased threat.

The only glimmer of hope in the Statement is in the last paragraph:

“There is more work to be done as we move towards next year’s Spending Review”.


I hope that that is code for defence setting out to try again to get some more resources. The programme hinted at in the Statement—let us it call it “SDR 2015-plus-plus”—is unaffordable without cuts or more money, or are we going to muddle on yet again overpromising and underdelivering?

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Earl for repeating the Statement. I share many of the observations that the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, made in the last moment or two. This is the second time that I have heard the Statement, because I took the opportunity to go and hear it when it was first delivered in the other place. I have to confess that hearing it twice has not improved it, in spite of what I anticipated being the mellifluous tones of the noble Earl, for whom I have the greatest respect. Looked at in the round, the Statement could easily have been made at any time in the course of its nine months of gestation. It contains a whole list of promises but is largely silent about how the promises are to be delivered.

When we examine some of those promises, we see that they reflect things which the Ministry of Defence should be doing now as a matter of course. Surely we are currently enhancing,

“efforts with our allies and partners”.

Indeed, one would think that the very possibility of Brexit would surely make that an even more urgent requirement. Are we going to “act independently”? For example, if independent action in defence of an overseas territory were required, surely we would be capable of doing that at the moment. Why are those two issues focused on in that way that they are in the Statement?

Nor is there any mention of the immediate challenges that face the Ministry of Defence, such as the gap of billions of pounds in the equipment budget—an issue that the noble Earl will recall I have raised with him on two recent previous occasions. How will that gap be filled? I will return to the question of financial support in a moment or two, because the Statement contains a couple of sentences that justify careful reading and interpretation.

There has already been reference to the fiasco of Army recruitment. How will that be remedied? Is the company that has responsibility simply to be sacked? Why not go back to the previous system, which, as far as I recall, was effective? Was the idea of letting it out designed to save money? If it was, it has certainly not been successful in the sense of producing the promises that were made in respect of it.

Finally, there is the question of the continuing fall in and erratic nature of the value of the pound. How is that affecting the ability of the Ministry of Defence to continue with its programmes of acquisition? What steps, if any, has the Treasury offered in order to assist if necessary because of these fluctuations?

Perhaps the most important passage is the one to which I referred a moment ago and said that I would come to. Two consecutive sentences say:

“We also need to create financial headroom for modernisation. Based on our work to date, we expect to achieve over the next decade the very demanding efficiency targets we were set in 2015, including”—


here there is a typographical error—

“through investment in a programme of digitally enabled transformation”.

I know of no government programme of “digitally enabled transformation” in the recent past that has proved anything other than more expensive than intended and with delivery several years after it was originally projected. It is a pretty optimistic tool to use in the issue of finding headroom in defence spending. I suspect that that tells us that the Ministry of Defence is not expecting any more increase in expenditure.

In advance of today’s Statement and the publication of the report, there was an apparently well-sourced leak that the Secretary of State for Defence was going to announce that one of the ambitions would be to raise defence expenditure from 2% of GDP to 3% annually. That did not appear in the Statement. When the question was put to him specifically in the other place by the Chairman of the Defence Select Committee, he very neatly sidestepped it. I suspect that that might well be an ambition of the department—but I equally suspect that the Treasury has made it pretty clear that that ambition is not capable of being resolved.

It is also a pity that we have had the Statement and that the publication of the report did not take place in sufficient time for it to be considered as a whole. I very much hope that the noble Earl will, through the usual channels, be willing to commit to endeavour to have a full-scale debate on the terms of the report. That is a much fuller indication of what the Government’s intentions are—albeit, so far as the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, and myself are concerned, that the report and the Statement leave a great deal to be desired.

Veterans Strategy

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Thursday 15th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, for introducing this debate. We have been discussing the challenge of veterans for a decade now. When I saw the title of this debate, I thought, “Well, let’s see where we’ve got to in actually achieving things”. The core achievement to date has been the Armed Forces covenant, which has had pretty widespread approval. It is therefore useful to measure how the Armed Forces have fared under its care.

It is important to realise what the covenant says. It is on one page and begins:

“An Enduring Covenant Between”.


The language is all quite flowery—there are three paragraphs—but right in the middle is a paragraph which, if it does not have teeth, has clarity. I fear that I have to tell noble Lords that it is not only not the best, it is almost the opposite. In fact, this paragraph says two things: that veterans “should face no disadvantage” and that in some circumstances there should be “special consideration”. It is against those tests—unless we want to change them—that we have to judge how well the Government are doing. So let us look at some areas.

Housing has been a real problem, particularly the way that local authorities behave, and the Government have worked hard on it. The progress report on the covenant is contained in an annual report, the last of which was published in December 2017. It said, talking about how local authorities had been instructed:

“The package included: ensuring Veterans with urgent housing needs were always given priority for social housing; encouraging councils to take account of the needs of the Armed Forces Community in their policy making, and introducing regulations to ensure councils did not disqualify Service personnel who had recently left the Services and did not meet the local connection test”.


We had a debate about a year and a half ago, in which I said that my test of this is Rushmore. Rushmore, for those who do not know, is Aldershot and Farnborough under a fancy new name. Its housing policy 18 months ago did not refer to veterans. I have looked it up and it now says precisely the things that the covenant calls for: the Government get a tick for that. There is a problem though. It says that veterans effectively have fair access to social housing. The problem is that there is no social housing. The problem with fair access to very little is that it is very little. It is the basic housing issues in this country, especially social housing, that we have to get right for all our citizens, including veterans.

Veterans are also part, sadly, of the scourge of rough sleeping. The data suggests that the incidence is about the same as in the general population, but I agree that there should be no rough sleeping, for any of our citizens. If we can tackle that issue then we will indeed do the right job for veterans.

The next area I looked at was training. There are lots of references in various bits of literature to how wonderful service personnel are, how well adapted to exciting jobs in the real world, but the individuals who illustrate this are frequently reasonably senior people who have done well. Does the system look after the private infantryman who has done four years and comes out at the age of 22 or 23? I fear not, and I hope that the Minister can disabuse me. Where would that individual traditionally have looked to in order to get some qualifications, because it is perfectly reasonable that people with life experiences do not have qualifications? He would have looked to adult education. Adult education has had its funding cut by £3 billion in recent years. There used to be 5.2 million people in adult education: the figure is now down to 1.9 million. Again, I am sure that service veterans are getting fair access to this, but they are getting fair access to one-third of the provision they would have received but a few years ago.

I then went on to look at mental health, which is a very interesting area. There have been clear improvements in recent years, making access to mental health services fairer and making sure that the transition between the military and the NHS is good. However, let us not kid ourselves that this is anything other than “not disadvantaged”. Indeed, the 2017 report on the covenant talks of,

“access times and outcomes at least as good (and sometimes better) than for the general population”.

It is commendable that it is being achieved, but it is all that is being achieved.

Let us move on to the second promise in the covenant. The precise words in that extremely powerful paragraph are:

“Special consideration is appropriate in some cases, especially for those who have given most such as the injured and the bereaved”.


We have talked about the bereaved and those injured, in the physical sense, but are there other senses of injury? If we look at mental health in the total population, the incidence of mental ill-health in veterans is not grossly dissimilar to that of the general population but—and it is an important but—on PTSD, the picture is different.

A press release from Kings College London has said:

“New research from Kings College London suggests the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan may have led to an increase in the rate of probable Post Traumatic Stress Disorder … among members of the UK Armed Forces”.


It went on to say:

“The higher rates of probable PTSD is primarily seen among ex-serving personnel who deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. Among those who deployed to the conflict, the rate of probable PTSD for veterans was 9% compared to 5% for veterans who did not deploy. The rate of probable PTSD among currently serving personnel was also 5%, which is close to the rate … in the general population … Among ex-serving personnel who deployed in a combat role to Iraq or Afghanistan, 17% reported symptoms suggesting probable PTSD compared to 6% of those deployed in a support role”.


It is clear that this illness is related, at least statistically, to combat experience. That seems to fall in the general territory of special consideration. When one looks at what PTSD is all about, it is terrifying. I looked it up on the NHS website and I am not sure how people survive it, with their,

“Re-experiencing … flashbacks … Avoidance and emotional numbing … Hyperarousal … Angry outbursts … depression … Drug misuse”,

et cetera. Here, surely, is the case for special treatment.

Unfortunately, according to the Defence Committee, the situation does not really seem to come up for special treatment. The committee said in its report:

“We are particularly concerned that the Armed Forces Covenant principle of priority treatment when a condition is service-related is not being consistently applied across the UK. The Department of Health and Social Care considers that the NHS founding principles on equality and clinical need constrain how it can provide priority treatment to veterans. This difference in interpretation is confusing not just to veterans but also to clinicians; this may add to veterans’ perception that the health service is failing them”.


It seems to me that this area falls classically into the second part of the covenant’s promise and that the Government are failing in not addressing it directly.

In many of the areas where service veterans suffer, the problem is that the general population is suffering, be it housing, training or mental health. I accept that the Government have achieved their objective of not disadvantaging veterans in many areas and have made good progress in recent times. We have to address the fundamental supply of those areas and be much better at being sensitive to the second promise, where special consideration should apply.

Trident

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Thursday 25th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I understand the noble and gallant Lord’s point. There is a £31 billion budget for the Dreadnought programme and we are currently confident that that estimate is robust. It is quite separate and distinct from other procurement budgets. We do not consider that it impacts upon them adversely—but we are conscious of the risks that he articulates.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, the BASIC report says that the Infrastructure and Projects Authority, which rates government projects,

“has rated Dreadnought Amber/Red, meaning that the IPA assesses that: ‘Successful delivery of the project is in doubt, with major risks or issues apparent in a number of key areas’”.

It goes on to say:

“Worse, the linked Core Production programme, which will produce a new submarine reactor core production facility … is the … only Red rated project”,


in the Ministry of Defence. Given this sorry state of affairs, what faith can we have in anything the MoD says about these programmes?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the amber/red rating for the Dreadnought programme in 2016-17 recognised that the programme was unaffordable at that time against the required profile, and that there were significant risks in the design-to-build transition. Since 2016-17, funding has been approved for the second delivery phase, the design has matured and governance has improved. The red rating for the core production capability reflects scope changes and associated delays and cost increases. We have to recognise that this is a very complex programme—probably the most complex engineering programme that any Government have undertaken—hence the caution in those risk ratings.

Armed Forces (Terms of Service) (Amendments Relating to Flexible Working) Regulations 2018

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Wednesday 10th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords, it seems a long time ago that we debated the Armed Forces (Flexible Working) Act, partly because it was introduced into your Lordships’ House before it went to the House of Commons. I went back to my files and noted that I had talked about the devils in the detail, although I did not come up with that idea first; several Members of your Lordships’ House had talked about that. In particular, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Walker of Aldringham, said that,

“the devil is going to be in the detail of the regulations drawn up to operate the system”.—[Official Report, 11/7/17; col. 1187.]

It would be fair to say that while on balance your Lordships’ House was supportive of the ambitions of flexible working, some concerns were articulated across the House—I suspect even by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee. In particular, the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, raised one of the concerns that has just been raised by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, about whether flexible working would be imposed rather than chosen voluntarily. While it may appear this evening to the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, that somehow this is a simple Act and that these regulations look straightforward, the reason for wanting them to come through the affirmative procedure was precisely because there were concerns that the devil could be in the detail. There were slight suspicions that the regulations would lead to a situation where flexible working could be required of people in circumstances where perhaps the Regular Forces seem overmanned—that might seem unlikely, but that was the sort of concern raised by the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt—which was why we thought this needed to come through the affirmative procedure.

The regulations as we see them look straightforward, although I am delighted to see that the Explanatory Memorandum is rather clearer and in ordinary English, for those of us who are not used to reading legislation regularly. I hope that the advice that will be given to service men and women will be even clearer than what we see in the Explanatory Memorandum. The rules look slightly opaque, and to put them into some sort of citizen’s English—even if it includes lots of three-letter acronyms that are much more familiar to the RAF or the Royal Navy than perhaps to the rest of us—would ensure that the information given to service men and women will make them want to look at using these provisions, and would be welcome.

The regulations look straightforward and very much in line with what the Minister outlined to us at various stages during the passage of the flexible working Act. That is perhaps not surprising, because, as the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, said, essentially we expect the Minister to listen and to respond. But we do not always know whether Secretaries of State or Chancellors of the Exchequer will manage to do likewise. While it is important that these regulations are discussed this evening, I do not see a reason to do anything other than affirm their progress.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, we will, of course, support these regulations. I fear the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, has in many ways the wrong challenge. The requirement that these be subject to an affirmative order has an effect that one comes across again and again in complex organisations: the knowledge that something will be scrutinised at the highest level produces very high-quality work. One of the key factors noticeable in these regulations—I take them together with the notes for the service personnel who will use them—is that virtually every question left unanswered in the primary legislation has been answered in them. Therefore, I welcome and support them. I have only one question related directly to the regulations, which is about the reporting procedure: will the frequency of their use be reported in the public domain, and if so, where?

The problem of being a Minister in your Lordships’ House is that nobody is here to enforce the rules. Accordingly, I looked at the Explanatory Memorandum to see if I could find something to say. I noted that one reason for these rules was to improve recruitment and retention in the Armed Forces. Essentially, it was an important piece of morale-boosting, which this Government certainly need. Total outflow from the Armed Forces has exceeded intake every year since 2011. I looked into this a little bit further; the way to find out what morale is like in the Armed Forces is to go to the regular Armed Forces continuous attitude survey. It is a brilliant document in terms of information—and a deeply depressing one for anybody who reads it. I will quote one or two statistics from it: satisfaction with pay has gone from 52% in 2010 to 31% now; satisfaction with service life in general has decreased—among both officers and other ranks—from its peak of 61% in 2009 to 41% now.

Dissatisfaction has been particularly acute in the Royal Marines. Members of this House have fought a little battle to keep ships retained for the use of the Royal Marines, yet we find that service morale among officers—that is, ratings for high morale—has gone from 64% two years ago to 23%; for other ranks, it has gone from 32% two years ago to a staggeringly low 9% now. I would defend the right of the Minister not to respond to this, but I hope he will rise to the occasion and give us some indication of how this crisis is being addressed. I put it to him that one of the reasons is leadership—I am not talking about people in uniform; I am talking about the politicians. SDSR 2015, which was published on 23 November 2015, promised annual reviews. That was a good thing, as I think it has emerged that the SDSR was underfunded.

The Government met their commitment and, roughly a year after that publication, they produced an annual review—the first annual report. The second annual report should have been published on 23 November 2017 but it was overtaken by, of all things, a review by the Cabinet Office. There must have been some squabbling because that metamorphosed into something called the Modernising Defence Programme. We were told that its main points would be published by the time of the NATO summit of 2018, and indeed we got a letter from the noble Earl. As ever, it read brilliantly the first time—these letters are always well drafted—but the second time you read it through you realised that it said absolutely nothing. There was not a single concrete piece of action in it.

If the noble Earl wants to rise to the occasion, I hope he will say when we will see real progress on the review and when the Armed Forces will recognise that they have a serious morale problem, with a programme to address it directly. Although I have served in the VR, I am not a military man in the sense that I have not served full time or been presented with any hostile forces, but I have talked to a lot of people who have. My summary of what they have said to me is: if you want effective forces, you have to have leadership, equipment, training and morale. These are not additives; they are multiplicities, and if any of them is at a low level, that affects all of them and you have wasted your money. We are not at all happy with the equipment area or the training area, and now we are not at all happy with the morale area, and I hope that the Minister will be generous enough to provide some answers.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in response to the introduction that I gave. Beginning with my noble friend Lord Attlee, whom I thank for his supportive comments, I think it is fair to say that Ministers felt duty-bound to respond to the recommendation of the Delegated Powers Committee to make these regulations affirmative. One reason that the committee felt as it did was that there would be a great deal of significant detail and that would really matter in the way that the arrangements were rolled out. I hope that, in common with the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, noble Lords will feel that, having read the statutory instrument, the devil is absent from the detail. Indeed, I hope that the Archangel Gabriel has exercised an influence on it, not least in the way it is expressed, which, as the noble Baroness helpfully said, is designed to be as clear as possible.

Perhaps I may turn to the questions put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe. First, on whether and to what extent we will publish the statistics relating to take-up after the scheme is launched, initially and going forward we will capture this type of data on our internal systems for analysis purposes and make adjustments where necessary. We do not plan to report publicly on the numbers who take up flexible service in the early years following the launch of these new opportunities. As we have said previously, a more valuable measure of the effectiveness of flexible service will be the long-term effect on recruitment and retention. That is the principal aim of these new policies.

The numbers who initially take up these opportunities will be modest. I have no doubt that they will grow over time but I think they will grow slowly. We envisage that it is unlikely that they will account for more than 1% of individuals—approximately 1,400—so we want to avoid undue focus on numbers for numbers’ sake. We feel that regular collating of external reporting information on such a small cohort would not be particularly beneficial. Having said that, we have pledged to report on the introduction of flexible service in the Armed Forces covenant annual report. If in future we have meaningful data on take-up, we will include it. We will of course provide information in the normal way in response to external ad hoc requests.

Armed Forces (Specified Aviation and Marine Functions) Regulations 2018

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Wednesday 10th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, the Armed Forces have come a long way on this issue of alcohol and drugs. The railway industry faced this challenge some 20 years ago and the position that the Armed Forces have reached is very similar. I sense that there is an ongoing significant challenge in the military. I do not have statistical data but if one wanders through Google and looks at the events there was certainly the tragic event of the submarine that highlighted these cultural problems.

The Minister’s speech tonight was a great deal better than the EM, because I think that I understand the regulations now. It seems to me that this statutory instrument is virtually identical to another one that covered the suspected offence side of it, and this is really just a matter of writing it across—I do not know whether there are any detailed differences.

The regulations essentially state that if one is doing any of these activities one must have alcohol levels below the specified limits. That leaves me with one question, which we wrestled with in the railway industry but is a good deal more acute in the military. That is a situation where an individual is not performing one of these activities—the most obvious example is the captain of a ship—because he is not the officer on watch. He is actually in his bunk asleep after an interesting night out. His subordinate drives the thing into another ship. There is instantly an incident, at which point, presumably, the captain would take command. There must be parallel situations in the Army, and perhaps, although less likely, in the Air Force. Are we clear about our expectations of these individuals who are on duty but not actively performing a task? Do we expect them at all times to maintain their lifestyles so that they are below the appropriate limits?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness and the noble Lord for their comments and I am glad that they are supportive of these regulations, which I hope they will agree are fairly uncontroversial in their content.

The particular question that the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, posed, is an interesting one. It is one that I have discussed with my officials. The short answer is that it would very much depend on the circumstances of the situation as to whether the captain of a ship would be tested for drugs or alcohol after a particular accident took place and he or she were away from the bridge when the accident occurred. The key point, however, is that the powers commit a commanding officer to order a test if he or she has reasonable cause to believe that a person was carrying out a safety-critical function or duty at the time of the accident or had carried out a safety-critical function or duty before the accident.

In the example that the noble Lord suggested, the captain will still have command of the ship and he or she may have given orders for the control or navigation of the ship before repairing to their cabin—let us imagine that situation. It would largely depend on the circumstances of that order and whether the person to whom the order was given was a fit and responsible person and in a fit condition to accept the responsibility. However, I can imagine a situation where a captain was away from the bridge following an accident and was not, so to speak, in the line of fire when it came to taking a drug or alcohol test, but where a commanding officer might feel that it was prudent for the captain to take such a test. It would be very much back to the test that I have just articulated if a commanding officer has reasonable cause to believe that any given individual was involved in a safety-critical function.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

I will explain my point just a little more. I am concerned not so much about the test as about what the Navy’s expectation is of a commanding officer. It seems to me that there is an implication that he should, in all circumstances, maintain a lifestyle whereby he is under the limit. Certainly in my organisation—fortunately, we did not have the same commanding officer situation—we did have a level of management where we ran a roster to make sure that we always had a sober general manager to handle any situation. The noble Lord probably cannot answer now, but I would have thought that there was an implied moral obligation that the senior person at sea, the captain, should maintain a situation below these limits.

[Earl Howe]

The noble Lord is absolutely right. He will see that in the regulations officers may be tested—they are one of the groups of people who can test. The alcohol limits for prescribed safety-critical duties have been set at two levels, higher and lower. The limits will not be amended by these changes. The majority of safety-critical duties correspond to the higher alcohol level for testing of breath, blood or urine; the lower levels apply to safety-critical duties that require a heightened speed of reaction in an emergency situation, such as aviation or carrying a loaded weapon.

I would not dissent from the noble Lord’s statement. He is absolutely right that the captain of a ship, to take that example, bears responsibility for the safety of the ship and its crew in all circumstances, which is why we have seen captains—on rare occasions—court-martialled for an accident that has occurred, even though the captain has sometimes not personally been on board the ship. I come back again to the point I made at the beginning: it would depend on the judgment of the person investigating the accident immediately after the event as to who was tested or not.

I hope that is helpful. If I can amplify those comments in a letter in any way, I shall certainly do so. In the meantime, I beg to move.

Royal Navy: Type 31e Frigate

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Thursday 6th September 2018 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My noble friend speaks with considerable authority on this matter. The modernising defence programme is about making our Armed Forces more capable, against the harder threats that we now face, and it is looking at how best we can use our growing budget to that effect.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, this Question prompted me to look at the National Shipbuilding Strategy, whose first birthday is today. When it was published a year ago, it was meant to be a solid basis for industry to develop. It is interesting to see how it is starting to erode. Paragraph 56 said of the Type 31e ships:

“The first will be in service by 2023”,


but “by 2023” means during 2022. The Minister has just answered a similar question by saying that it will be by the end of 2023. This is the first incremental crumble in the strategy. In paragraph 61, the strategy said:

“We have set a maximum £250 million per ship price for the Type 31e”.


Are either of those statements still sound, or is this one year-old strategy going to crumble incrementally, like all the strategies before it?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, our target dates have not changed, as I have already said, and we still believe that industry can deliver all five Type 31e frigates at a price of £1.25 billion. The national shipbuilding strategy is an overarching strategy for the future of naval ship-building in the UK over the next 30 years, and is much wider than the procurement of a particular class of ship. Type 31e is a pathfinder project for a new way of procuring warships, and we are learning beneficially from those challenges.

Afghanistan Update

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Wednesday 11th July 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement, and join him in paying tribute to those who have served in Afghanistan. We remember in particular the 456 service personnel who died and those who have suffered life-changing injuries.

I too believe that Afghanistan is a better place as a result of our efforts. We have achieved this through co-operation with our NATO allies. Nevertheless, a further commitment of 440 personnel is significant, and it is our duty to probe this. Noble Lords will understand that 440 on the ground will involve many times that number, as personnel are trained, deployed and rested.

It is appropriate to pause at this point. We will be sending people into harm’s way, and we civilians do not really understand what that is like. This place is enriched by the number of people who have done that; we even have one who has been in harm’s way. Afghanistan is a dangerous place, and NATO personnel were killed in the early days of these training missions. I wonder whether the Minister can give us a sense of the risk involved by telling us how many NATO personnel have been killed since the end of NATO ground operations, which I believe was at the end of 2014.

I shall now turn briefly to the Chilcot inquiry, if I may. I am told that it contained 2.4 million words, but I felt that it really had only two key recommendations: first, that the decision to commit military personnel should be taken by due process; and secondly, that before taking the first step one should have a plan for the second and subsequent steps.

On the first step, can the Minister explain the process by which the decision was made? Who was involved? Was the FCO or DfID part of the decision? Was the Prime Minister? What criteria were set to measure success? How were the risks to our troops’ lives assessed? Can the Minister assure us that the risks are indeed minimal, and that there are no scenarios in which our people will be drawn into combat operations?

Secondly, how long will the deployment last? Is there an end date, or at least a set of criteria to measure success and, hence, lead to withdrawal? Have all scenarios been considered?

We all hope and pray that the mission is successful but, sadly, history is littered with limited military interventions turning into full-scale war. Can the Minister assure us that in no circumstances will that be allowed to happen? I have complete faith that our people will be able to help the Afghans fight more effectively, but could the Minister give us more detail on the training that will be provided? Will it be complemented by softer essential skills such as policing, particularly with respect to corruption, and governance? Will the further input to produce those skills come from the FCO and DfID, or will our allies provide the resource?

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords, like the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement, and I echo the words of the Secretary of State and the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, on the commitments that this country has made to Afghanistan and the tributes paid to the service men and women who have given their lives in Afghanistan.

This is clearly a serious decision that is being announced today. As the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, pointed out, 440 service personnel is a significant number. It increases the personnel that we currently have in Afghanistan by two-thirds. It is noticeable that the decision has been made, we are told, in response to a NATO request, at the time of a NATO summit and on the eve of a visit by the President of the United States. What is not clear is when the request was made. When was the United Kingdom asked to make this additional commitment and when was the decision actually taken? Is the confluence of timings just ahead of the NATO summit intentional? Is it intended in any way to send a signal to the President of the United States that the United Kingdom at least is keeping up to its NATO targets?

There is a whole set of other issues associated with the nature of the contribution and some of the key decisions that need to be considered, which, as the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, has pointed out, have not necessarily been answered in the Statement. How long is this additional deployment intended to be? We have been told that about half the troops are due to be deployed in August 2018 and the rest by February 2019, but we are not told how long this is intended to last. The more deployments that we have, the more questions there are about the sustainability of deployments and the pressures put on Her Majesty’s services. While we pay tribute to the service men and women who are deployed to Afghanistan and everywhere else around the world, there is a question of the impact that this will have on forces morale. Is the Minister content that the resources are there to ensure that this additional deployment can be managed? Can he tell us a little bit more about what the Government’s exit strategy might be?

Finally, the Secretary of State commented that this shows our commitment to NATO, which,

“must remain the cornerstone of our defence”.

Nobody in your Lordships’ House would disagree with that, but does the Minister think that the President of the United States feels similarly? What discussions might the Prime Minister have with the President to try to ensure that, by the end of this week, the United States’s commitment to NATO is strong as that of the United Kingdom?

Single Source Contract (Amendment) Regulations 2018

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Monday 9th July 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for introducing this statutory instrument and apologise for arriving momentarily after he started. He mentioned that the changes introduced in 2014 were intended to improve value for money and MoD procurement arrangements in general and that, since then, £19 billion had been spent using the single-source procurement mechanism. Will he explain a little more how the changes proposed in the SI will benefit the MoD and the taxpayer? I heard him say that the changes will be of benefit to the supplier. While we do not want to do down the suppliers, it would be helpful to understand how the changes will benefit the taxpayer as well.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for presenting the regulations. Part 2 of the 2014 Act and the subsequent Single Source Contract Regulations 2014 are supported by these Benches. Unfortunately, I have lived through every bit of their creation and evolution. The key thing is: are they effective? The way to judge their effectiveness is, first, to understand the mechanisms, which the Minister has been invited to expand on, and, secondly, to look at how extensive they are. Does the Minister have at hand how much is being spent on equipment and infrastructure in a typical year, say, 2017-18? How much of that is single sourced? I believe the answer is nearly half. What proportion—and this is the key issue—are qualifying defence contracts? I wonder if he has similar figures for contracts with BAE.

The Explanatory Memorandum says that three of the five categories are “working well”, meaning that they describe the exclusions clearly. Two relate to land, I believe, and the third to government-procured equipment. Three are new or modified. The first, Regulation 7(b), is where there is international co-operation. The modification is that there should not be an exclusion if all parties agree. I have great trouble working out why parties would want to agree, because the mechanism is designed to give the Government, the SSRO, the MoD or whoever a better understanding of what is happening in the contract, giving them rights to challenge the suppliers. Why would anybody want to agree to this? Have any firms actually agreed to this?

The second modification relates to “intelligence activities”. This is clearly a case of unintended consequences because all intelligence activities are currently excluded. This turns it on its head to require only those contracts that are a risk to national security to be automatically excluded. Paragraph 7.9, I think, of the Explanatory Memorandum effectively defines “risk to national security”; that is, reports that would normally be required by the SSRO would contain information above a certain security level. Am I right in that understanding? Am I right that the key test will be the security level of the information that the SSRO would naturally demand if they became qualifying contracts? Otherwise, how is national security defined and who defines it?

The final modification relates to what one might loosely describe as novation. That does not give me any pain at all.

The key question about the modifications is: how many more, or what greater proportion of, single-source contracts will be brought into the ambit of the Single Source Regulations Office by these changes? Will the number be trivial or substantial? My final question relating to the order is: when will the MoD respond to the other SSRO recommendations?

Lastly, I have a question that is completely out of order. I point out to the Minister that the NATO summit is, I think, on Wednesday and Thursday. Will he give some indication of when he will give an overview of the defence modernisation programme promised before the NATO summit?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness and the noble Lord for their general support for these regulations, and for their questions. The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe—if I may address his questions first—asked about the level of MoD procurement spend for the last full financial year and the level of single-source procurement within that. In the last full financial year, 2017-18, the MoD spend on procurement was just over £24 billion, of which just over £8 billion went on single-source contracts. We do not track the value of defence qualifying contracts on a year-by-year basis, but I can confirm that since the framework came into force in December 2014, up until the end of May 2018, a little over £19 billion-worth of single-source contracts have been brought under the framework. For the same financial year, the MoD placed contracts worth more than £3.6 billion with BAE systems—about which the noble Lord asked me specifically—of which around £3 billion were on single-source contracts. I am afraid I cannot disclose the proportion of the single-source spend covered by the SSCR framework because it is commercial in confidence.

The noble Lord and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, asked how much the department expects this situation to change as a result of these regulations. We have identified approximately 8% to 10% of single-source spend which we would seek to bring under the regulations as a result of this amendment, subject to the consent of the suppliers in question. Obviously, before the contracts are signed, it is a bit difficult to quantify the amount of money that we expect to save, but I hope that that gives a rough order of magnitude to both noble Lords.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

Is that an 8% to 10% increase in the contacts which become qualifying, or is it a 50% increase in those that qualify? If the noble Earl does not know, I am perfectly happy to wait for a letter.

[Earl Howe]

I will vouchsafe to the noble Lord that my note is ambiguous on that point and I think, therefore, that I should write to him. We have identified 8% to 10% of single-source spend, which makes it more or less clear that we are talking about single-source spend as a whole rather than that proportion of the spend that comes within the framework. But I will confirm that.

The noble Lord asked me about the exclusion relating to international co-operative programmes which would require the consent of the suppliers involved. He made a very good point about obtaining consent, which was a matter on which we deliberated long and hard. We came to the conclusion that to remove supplier consent altogether would mean that we would have to seek agreement with partner nations, which in practice might sometimes be difficult to achieve. We believe that this proposal represents a pragmatic approach. In fact, we are reassured to note that such agreement on several large contracts has already been achieved with the supplier. Since the framework came into force in December 2014, 11 contracts have been made into qualifying defence contacts on amendment—that is, with the consent of the supplier in question—with a total value of more than £10 billion. The background to that is that many suppliers recognise that the Government are fully committed to implementing the framework and accept that it is in their long-term interests to co-operate with it.

The noble Lord asked me about how the intelligence exclusion would work in practice. Under current legislation, single-source contracts relating to “intelligence procurement” would be excluded from the framework. The problem with that is that experience has shown that there is confusion over exactly how this definition is applied. That is why we have proposed the amendment. Under this change, single-source contracts would be excluded where complying with the single-source legislation would involve having to release information to the SSRO that it is not authorised to see. That significantly raises the bar required for exclusion.

It might be easiest if I gave a hypothetical example. It may be that we sign a single-source contract allowing us access to a specific port overseas in support of a sensitive operation. If this becomes a qualifying defence contract, the reporting requirements under the framework would mean disclosing to the SSRO who the contractor in question was. That would very quickly reveal the location and the likely purpose behind the contract. It is that aspect that we wish to keep classified because of the risk of a negative impact on national security.

The noble Lord asked me when we will respond to the review of single-source legislation. I can tell him that when my right honourable friend the Secretary of State completed his review of single-source legislation last December, several proposals were identified which could improve the operation of the framework, but he asked officials to carry out further work on how these might be implemented, so as to avoid any unintended consequences. Part of that included an extensive process of cross-Whitehall engagement to ensure a fully joined-up position, as well as additional engagement with key stakeholders to take forward the proposals. That work is nearing completion, and we expect to publish our full response shortly.

Finally, on the noble Lord’s last question about the NATO summit and when we expect to announce headline figures from the modernising defence programme, unfortunately, I cannot promise anything this week—contrary to the hopes that I and others have expressed at similar previous occasions. We are endeavouring to make the delay in the announcement as short as possible, and I shall be sure to give the noble Lord as much warning as possible before that event.