Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill

Debate between Lord True and Lord Rooker

2nd reading
Tuesday 30th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Lord True) (Con)]

My Lords, if any noble Lords are concerned by the state of my voice, I should say that I have recently had a negative Covid test, but I have just had that cold which your Lordships will know all about. I would like to say how much I am looking forward to the contributions from everybody who is to speak, and congratulate my noble friend Lord Leicester, who was recently elected to this House, on making his maiden speech later; we all look forward to that.

It is a great privilege to open Second Reading on the Bill, which I trust will be welcomed by your Lordships’ House. Repealing the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 was a manifesto commitment both of the Government and of the Official Opposition. As the Labour Party manifesto put it, the Act

“has stifled democracy and propped up weak governments”.

I agree, and look forward to unequivocal support from the Benches opposite today and in Committee—you always travel in hope in your Lordships’ House.

The 2011 Act fostered uncertainty and stasis in our democratic arrangements. It led to paralysis when the country needed decisive action. It undermined the effectiveness and responsiveness of our democratic system overall. The flaws of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act are understood and have been analysed by many noble Lords, including your Lordships’ Constitution Committee—I am pleased to see the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, on the speakers’ list today. I am grateful for the depth of expertise and knowledge that your Lordships’ House has brought to bear on the scrutiny of the 2011 Act and that it will bring to bear on the scrutiny of this legislation.

The Bill seeks to return to the tried and tested position of the past over many centuries, replacing the 2011 Act with arrangements more in keeping with our best constitutional practices: delivering stable and effective government; upholding proper parliamentary accountability and public confidence in our democratic arrangements; and, above all, placing the British people at the heart of the resolution of any great national crisis.

The Bill will provide increased legal, constitutional and political certainty around the process for the Dissolution of Parliament and the calling of a new Parliament. I emphasise at the outset that the Bill focuses on the Dissolution and the calling of Parliament only, not any other part of the constitutional process. Ensuring that these arrangements are clear, stable and widely understood underpins the integrity of our constitution.

Your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, in its report of December 2020, warned correctly that the “origins and content of” the 2011 Act

“owe more to short-term considerations than to a mature assessment of enduring constitutional principles or sustained public demand”.

Indeed, the Act led to paralysis and uncertainty at a critical time for our country. An untenable situation arose in the last Parliament, when the Government were neither able to pass vital legislation through Parliament on their central policy nor call a new election and put the question to the people, who had already voted in a referendum for the very proposition Parliament was seeking to block. The result was deadlock and paralysis. The fact that Parliament had to introduce bespoke primary legislation in 2019 to bypass the Act in order to hold the necessary election was surely the final, damning indictment. In summary, the Fixed-term Parliaments Act is a political experiment that failed. It is neither credible nor effective and does not serve future Parliaments or Governments, whether they are majority or minority formations or coalitions.

I now turn to the details of the Bill. Before I begin, I reiterate my sincere thanks for the valuable work of Parliament, particularly your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee in the other place, and the Joint Committee chaired by my noble friend Lord McLoughlin, who I am also pleased to see here in his place today. I also add my thanks for the Constitution Committee’s most recent report on the Bill, which was published on 19 November. The Government welcome its consideration of the Bill and I can give an assurance that they will respond to the report before this House goes into Committee. Its consideration of the 2011 Act and the Government’s Bill has been valuable and has informed our approach, as will become evident.

The Bill is short; its purpose is clear and its objectives are known, because the British people lived with the previous system for centuries. It is a focused Bill of six clauses and one schedule. It restores the status quo ante, except in a few cases, particularly where practical changes to election arrangements made since 2011 have proven beneficial to the smooth running of elections—although I am certain that we will discuss that aspect of the Bill. It returns us to the tried and tested constitutional arrangements that have served successive Parliaments and Governments and that are a feature of our constitutional system.

Clause 1 repeals the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. Clause 2 makes express provision to revive the prerogative powers relating to the Dissolution of Parliament and the calling of a new Parliament that existed before the 2011 Act. This means that, once more, Parliament will be dissolved by the sovereign at the request of the Prime Minister. Within the life of a Parliament, Prime Ministers will once more be able to call a general election. That is a tried and tested approach that throughout our history has served successive Governments of different configurations.

By returning us to the status quo ante, the Bill will enable the link between confidence and Dissolution to be restored so that critical votes in the other place can once more be designated as matters of confidence, which, if lost, would trigger an early election—circumstances which many of us well remember from 1979. The other place will therefore continue to play its expected and key role in holding Governments to account and demonstrating whether they have the confidence of the elected House.

This is the status quo ante that we are all familiar with and understand. Under that system, our nation weathered many a constitutional crisis and accomplished enormous social change and social improvement without conflict, revolution or civil strife. That is the position the general public understand and under which our liberties have long been guaranteed.

Clause 3 restates the long-standing position that the prerogative powers to dissolve and call Parliament are non-justiciable. I understand that some noble Lords question why this clause is necessary at all and say that, after all, these prerogative powers are recognised as outside the purview of the courts. Let me explain: Clause 3 is drafted with careful regard to developments in case law. As noble Lords will be aware, since the GCHQ case, some prerogative powers that were previously considered to be non-justiciable have been reviewed by the courts.

The recent independent review of administrative law, which was chaired by my noble friend Lord Faulks, noted that

“the direction of travel in favour of regarding more and more prerogative powers as reviewable in principle is undeniable and has existed for many years”.

This culminated in the decision of the Supreme Court in Miller/Cherry 2 in relation to Prorogation. So, with respect to those noble Lords who say that there is no risk of the courts reviewing a decision to dissolve Parliament, I cannot simply say that the case law would suggest that this risk can be discounted, and recent events, in particular, have underlined this.

Clause 3 has been drafted with great care, taking on board the position of the courts that the most clear and explicit words are needed. It provides that any decisions relating to the revived powers to dissolve one Parliament and call another are non-justiciable, as well as the exercise of the powers themselves. This is to ensure that any preliminary steps leading to the exercise of these powers, including any request to the sovereign to dissolve Parliament and any related advice, cannot be reviewed by a court or tribunal.

Clause 3 further provides that a court or tribunal cannot consider the exercise of those revived prerogative powers or any related decisions, even if the court considers they are invalid or, in the language used by the Bill, “purported”. Nor may a court consider the limits or extent of those powers. Again, taking into account the case law, this is to make as clear as possible the position that all elements of the process relating to the Dissolution and calling of Parliament are covered by Clause 3 and are not a matter for the courts.

Let me be clear: there would be no change to the involvement of the courts, as the Dissolution and calling of Parliament is not an issue that has, so far, ever been considered reviewable. This clause simply confirms that position, preserves it for the future and protects the judiciary from being drawn into political matters.

Ultimately, judgment on the Government’s actions in calling an election is a matter for the electorate at the polling booth. I remember well the wise words of the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, on this subject at Second Reading of the original Bill, that it is not axiomatic that the timing of an election serves the incumbent Prime Minister. As the Joint Committee affirmed,

“it is appropriate for Parliament to make clear where it thinks the constitutional boundaries lie”.

This clause was unamended in the other place, and while I recognise that your Lordships will have questions, we do, I think, mostly agree that the prerogative power for Dissolution is, and should, remain non-justiciable.

[Lord Rooker (Lab)]

Before the Minister leaves Clause 3 —I am not a lawyer—will he explain the use of the word “purported” in two of the items? He has spent a lot of time on Clause 3, so I presume he is briefed on this to explain why “purported exercise” is also covered.

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I always seek to be brief, but one always aspires to be better briefed in your Lordships’ House. I anticipate that this will be the subject of some discussion in Committee, and I wanted to make some progress in this speech, but to answer the noble Lord, which is my duty, purported exercises of power or decisions refer to things that would be considered by a court to be invalid or a nullity and therefore not a real exercise of power or decision because they have been done on the basis of an error of law. The courts have noted that this could arise where, for example, a decision is made outside the limits of relevant power or without taking into account a relevant consideration.

The reference has been included to make it clear that all elements of the Dissolution and calling of Parliament process fall to the political and not the judicial sphere. The drafting takes account of previous judicial decisions, which I have no doubt we will discuss at some length in Committee. In particular in the case of Privacy International, the Supreme Court said that those drafting legislation should make clear whether such purported decisions are intended to be outside the jurisdiction of the courts. I am grateful to the noble Lord for his intervention, and I look forward to discussing this matter at some length—I hope not at some length—and I have no doubt that we will have a lively discussion in Committee, so I would like to make some progress, if I may.

Clause 4 provides a maximum parliamentary term of five years, calculated from the date of the first meeting of Parliament. This will ensure that elections are held at regular intervals by providing a longstop of five years, a maximum term which is of course still guaranteed by your Lordships through an explicit exception in the Parliament Acts. By reviving the prerogative powers, the Government could call an election either to resolve political deadlock, to seek a fresh mandate from the electorate or after a defeat on a major policy issue.

As I have set out, a Prime Minister will take a number of factors into account when choosing to call a general election. But of course, this would include— I can offer reassurance here—scheduled elections to the devolved legislatures. We recognise the practical administrative challenges of holding elections which are conducted under different arrangements simultaneously or in close proximity. A Prime Minister choosing to call an election would undoubtedly wish to take these matters into account.

Clause 5 introduces the Schedule, which sets out minor and consequential amendments. Clause 6 confirms that the territorial extent of the Bill is the UK, except for a very small number of amendments in the Schedule where the extent is more limited. The Schedule contains a number of minor and consequential changes, including to the parliamentary elections rules in the Representation of the People Acts 1983 and 1985, concerned also with the demise of the Crown and the Recall of MPs Act 2015. I would be happy to explain any of these in detail if your Lordships wished between now and Committee.

The Bill has undergone pre-legislative scrutiny. The Government are indebted to the work of the Joint Committee on the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. We have carefully considered the committee’s findings and amended the Bill in two respects, the first being the Title of the Bill. This small but significant change ensures the purpose and effect of the Bill is clear, reflecting its precise remit and its constitutional significance. Secondly, having reflected on the Joint Committee’s report, the Government agree that the trigger for the election process should be the Dissolution of Parliament. This amendment will give legal certainty that the election period will automatically follow on from Dissolution, providing a clear timetable leading to a defined polling date.

Let me conclude with the conventions which provide the flesh on the bones of the Bill. In restoring the status quo ante, conventions will once more govern the operation of the revived prerogative powers. Conventions can operate effectively only where there is shared understanding of them. That is why the Government published in draft their understanding of those conventions alongside the Bill for scrutiny—not only by the Joint Committee but by Parliament as a whole. We set out in that document:

“The circumstances in which a Prime Minister might seek a dissolution are underpinned by two core constitutional principles.”


First:

“The Prime Minister holds that position by virtue of their ability to command the confidence of the House of Commons and will normally be the accepted leader of the political party that commands the majority of the House of Commons.”


Secondly:

“The Sovereign should not be drawn into party politics, and it is the responsibility of those involved in the political process to ensure that remains the case. As the Crown’s principal adviser this responsibility falls particularly on the incumbent Prime Minister.”


We recognise that the conventions on Dissolution are part of an interlocking picture. Therefore, in our response to the Joint Committee, we have provided fuller explanations of the conventions on confidence Motions, Dissolution and Government formation. It is intended to provide the basis for discussion and debate among parliamentarians, building our shared understanding in and across both Houses and all those represented in them.

The value of conventions is not that they should cover every single hypothetical scenario but that they provide guiding principles and are an effective deterrent —in particular, the imperative not to involve the sovereign in politics. We welcome further discussion in your Lordships’ House on the conventions. That is the best way to develop our shared understanding.

This Bill will deliver increased legal, constitutional and political certainty around the processes for the dissolution and calling of Parliament. It will restore tried-and-tested constitutional arrangements which have been understood by the electorate for generations and are underpinned by the core constitutional principle that the Government of the day draw their authority by commanding the confidence of the elected House.

I hope these constitutional arrangements that have served us well in the past will continue to serve future Parliaments and Governments of all parties, whatever they may be. The ability of a Prime Minister to call a general election for reasons of political or public necessity, to turn to the people to give their judgment, is an essential feature of our democracy. The Fixed-term Parliaments Act disrupted that relationship. This Bill, we submit, will restore the proper balance to our constitutional arrangements.

I look forward to a constructive debate on not only the Bill but the conventions. I commend the Bill to the House.

Ministerial Code

Debate between Lord True and Lord Rooker

Tuesday 9th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend is absolutely right to say that the background, provisions and guidance have changed and evolved over time, and they will continue to evolve.

[Lord Rooker (Lab)]

Does the Minister agree that, when you are in position of leadership, asking people to do things, it is always good if you can set an example? Can he give us two examples of where the Prime Minister has done something under the code to set an example to other Ministers?

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, with nine seconds left, I deliberately gave rather a short answer to my noble friend to enable the noble Lord, who I very greatly admire, to make his point. I wish it had been a better point. My right honourable friend the Prime Minister adheres to high standards of behaviour, and he expects the highest standards of behaviour from Ministers every day—far more than on two occasions; every day.

Protocol on Northern Ireland: Disruption to Trade

Debate between Lord True and Lord Rooker

Thursday 14th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I can confirm for my noble friend that Northern Ireland exporters will, as will those in the rest of the United Kingdom, be able to take full advantage of trade deals we strike with third countries. Certainly, we will not be participating in trade wars between third countries.

[Lord Rooker (Lab) [V]]

One of the key lessons I took when briefly a Minister in Northern Ireland was the vital importance of attention to detail. Is not the Prime Minister’s lack of attention to detail the cause of chucking the Falklands to the Argentine, Gibraltar to Spain and Northern Ireland to the Republic? What is the Cabinet Office doing about the effect of Annexe 7 on the operation of Article 16 of the protocol?

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I do not agree with the noble Lord in his overall characterisation of the position. This Government are absolutely resolute that Northern Ireland remains an integral part of the United Kingdom and will remain so as long as its people determine. As I have acknowledged to the House, certain practical issues have arisen; these are being addressed maturely and sensibly by the Government, suppliers and business, and I believe that that is the way we should proceed, without, at this stage, talking about Article 16.

UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement

Debate between Lord True and Lord Rooker

Thursday 10th December 2020 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)]

The noble Lord, Lord Balfe, has withdrawn, so I call the noble Lord, Lord Rooker.

[Lord Rooker (Lab) [V]]

I am grateful to the Minister. To be honest, listening to him, I can hear that he is in an incredibly difficult situation with things moving outside the Chamber. I will confine myself to a single point. Northern Ireland will be treated differently—as it always has been—on the customs union and the single market, while it is out of the common agricultural policy, as the Statement says. My question is simple: what is the position of the rapid alert system for food and feed? Some eight to 10 notifications are issued per day around the European Union. How does Northern Ireland figure in RASFF? Is it out or will it be part of RASFF after 31 December, irrespective of whether there is a deal? Food production per head of population in Northern Ireland is far more significant than in England or, indeed, in Scotland, so it is an absolutely crucial issue for Northern Ireland industries. Will they be part of RASFF or not?

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, regrettably, I cannot give a specific answer to that question. I am certain that there is a specific answer and the weakness is in me. I assure the noble Lord that he will get an answer to that question.

Brexit: Civil Service Code

Debate between Lord True and Lord Rooker

Thursday 17th September 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I am not going to repeat in detail any position that the Attorney-General may or may not have set out. There are traditional rules on that. The Government’s legal position has been set out and sent to the chairmen of the Select Committees. Do the Government maintain the position set out by previous Administrations that law includes international law? Yes, they do.

[Lord Rooker (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, what concerns me is how civil servants who might be involved in corruption trials relating to the substantial number of multimillion pound Government contracts let without competition to friends of a special adviser to the Prime Minister will be advised. Any advice from the Minister to them?

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I think it is mildly wide of the Question before the House. Also, some quite serious allegations were made by the noble Lord. I simply repeat that there are very clear procedures available for civil servants who believe that they are being required to act in a way that conflicts with the code. They can start by taking it to their line manager, and the process goes on. As I have said, I am happy to circulate the appropriate procedures to the House.

EU Exit: End of Transition Period

Debate between Lord True and Lord Rooker

Wednesday 15th July 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord True]

My Lords, the noble Earl rightly says that Northern Ireland is on a separate track and governed by a separate protocol. Discussions are ongoing, as I think he knows. There will, as I told the House, be further information later this month. I take note of the points he makes about the timescale. The Government are well aware of the need for clarity and proper dispatch in carrying this forward.

[Lord Rooker (Lab) [V]]

What preparation has been made for 1 January 2021, when the UK will be out of RASFF, the rapid alert system for food and feed? Only EU members and EEA states, along with Switzerland, can receive the alerts—up to 10 a day in real time on major safety issues. What is the Government’s plan? The system started in only 1979, so there is nothing from the past to fall back on.

[Lord True]

My Lords, on the absolute specifics of what the noble Lord raises, which is an important issue, it would probably be better if I provide him with a detailed reply in writing.

European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 6) Bill

Debate between Lord True and Lord Rooker

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Friday 6th September 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rooker]

My Lords, I spent 27 years in the other place, so I know a little bit about the problems that Members have with the Table Office there. I can absolutely guarantee that this amendment would not be allowed in the House of Commons, because it is a textbook wrecking amendment. I do not propose to say anything else.

[Lord True]

My Lords, I have stated my case clearly and I now put it to the House. I beg to move.