Deep Sea Mining Bill

Lord Triesman Excerpts

Friday 7th February 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Triesman (Lab)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox, on introducing an important and timely Bill. I was also pleased to hear her remind us that she is from Plymouth. I hope that she is able to travel home and back to us without any unwanted contact with the deep sea as she makes her progress. I also place on the record our appreciation of the steps taken to introduce the proposals in another place by the noble Baroness’s honourable friend Sheryll Murray. It is clear from debates at all stages that there is broad support for the Bill—and so it will be from these Benches in your Lordships’ House.

I personally welcome the Bill. I dealt for nearly three years with the interpretation of the international law of the sea, and also with territories, including the hyper-fragile Antarctica territories for which the United Kingdom is responsible. What we do on land has significance for the habitats in the oceans, and how we treat the oceans will have vital ramifications for life on land. The earth is, in a couple of words, wholly interdependent.

I also express appreciation for the work of the FCO officials, not least for the provision of a really helpful set of Explanatory Notes. As the notes observe, part 11 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which was modified in 1994, provides for regulation of deep seabed mining. Individual states that are signatories to the convention are required to make certain that mining contractors act within domestic law in each of the assenting states so as to be sponsored by those states for the conduct of the work. Moreover, all those contractors must enter a contract with the International Seabed Authority before any activity can commence, whether exploration or mining mineral resources. Some may regard such a system of safety interlocks as being inhibiting. I do not, and it is clear in moving that the noble Baroness did not think them inhibiting either. I am sure that she is right; this is a prudent set of arrangements.

It is also true that few commercial businesses were interested initially. Companies I spoke with gave three interlinked reasons for that. First, it was technically difficult and expensive to undertake such work, as the commercial risks were high. Secondly, there was little clarity about what might be found, and in what quantities. Again, that compounded the commercial risk. Thirdly, even if there were significant polymetallic nodules or resources lying in the sediment at slightly deeper levels, it was not clear that there was a significant enough market, given that there are known polymetallic resources on dry land and that the size of existing markets for mined products might not at one stage have been sufficiently large. That gave little reassurance to businesses assessing commercial risk. The consequence, at least in my view, was that it was close to impossible to price the risk. Companies could not price it in allocating their own working capital, and neither could they or market analysts price it for either quoted markets or for private equity or debt. It was pretty much beyond reasonable computation. No wonder that things moved at the pace of a deep-ocean snail.

What changed all that—and I was very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox, for touching on these facts—is that there has been a considerable move in a positive commercial direction. There has been progress in the development of technologies capable of operating in deep water, both submarines and robotics, and the rapid growth in demand for polymetallic nodules and polymetallic sulphides, as well as cobalt and rare earths—which are of some significance in this—created by the huge economic surges in China, India, Russia and Brazil, and now in Turkey, Mexico, Indonesia and Nigeria, has all but overwhelmed the supplies that might be available on land. The same has happened with other commodities as varied as oil, concrete, iron, wheat and beef, which are all part of the same economic trajectory. Finally, the science has become clearer about what could be found at different depths, making the targeting of specific minerals a practical task. In short, it became easier to price risk, raise and deploy capital with a degree of certainty about the returns, and then commence the work.

Two problems immediately surface. The original convention and consequential legislation did not cover all the new circumstances that we have seen and which have been among the areas of change described by the noble Baroness and by me today. The updating this new Bill aims to achieve would be welcome enough on those grounds alone. However, it helps us add the second missing ingredient: the environmental issues and our responsibility to protect the environment. We cannot regard this obligation as merely helpful. It is obligatory and summed up in the initial iteration of Clause 5 of our own 1981 Act. I will quote it briefly because the groundwork was set at that time. It states:

“In determining whether to grant an exploration or exploitation licence the Secretary of State shall have regard to the need to protect (so far as reasonably practicable) marine creatures, plants and other organisms and their habitat from any harmful effects which might result from any activities to be authorised by the licence; and the Secretary of State shall consider any representations made to him concerning such effects”.

That is not a bad start. However, more than 30 years on, and guided by the Rio Declaration, particularly at principle 15, we know more but still not enough about the environment. A precautionary approach seems very sensible. That precautionary approach, urged on us by the World Wide Fund for Nature and many others, should be part of our focus today. We have urged the same approach on other nations in fragile environments, for example in our legislation on the Antarctic and in our criticisms of some of the mining proposals others have had in respect of the Arctic as well.

I hope that the House will not misunderstand the argument I am trying to put. I do not say for a moment, “Do nothing until we know every possible consequence”. That is not what I mean by “precautionary”, and would be a legal and practical veto on doing anything. I accept that it is impossible to say that nothing is permitted until we know everything; there would be no progress at all if such an overwhelming test of efficacy was to be imposed. I argue, rather, that we should proceed in a circumspect and incremental manner, using what science can tell us wherever possible.

The first-order question is easy: should we protect the environment and husband its living resources? The answer is obviously yes, but what follows? Perhaps the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox, and others involved in advancing the Bill may take a view, even if not in the course of today’s debate. I just wish to record some things which we need to resolve, but I do it in a wholly friendly spirit, because these issues concern us all.

Will the entire procedure for granting exploitation contracts be sufficiently robust and well integrated, given the multiple issues—authority at the mining location, knowledge of the ecosystem at the location, and control over mining practices? Not all the information or decisions will lie in the hands of any one party. They will need to be integrated to get a holistic picture and avoid the scope for real error.

Is the ISA able to monitor and police at scale? I have no doubt that it can do it in a limited way, but I am not as convinced that it can do it at scale; that is something that we should explore. Do we have evidence of risk of extinction for affected species? For example, do we know if sedimentary plumes below known densities of specific depths are dangerous or benign? Can scientists advise us on risk mitigation capable of being written into any set of regulations? What density of mining activity in any one location will be allowed on environmental grounds? Indeed, what will be the criteria for awarding permissions?

There is an opportunity to mine between 1,400 metres and 5,000 metres below the surface. I think that I am right in saying that it is usually near active or extinct hydrothermal vents in the earth’s crust—and I am grateful to the noble Baroness for identifying these parts of the globe. But we know that those are precisely the locations of a vast array of aquatic life; they happen to be particularly dense in species of animal life. Preferred methods will spread the sedimentary plumes far more widely than the water column where the mining is actually undertaken. Will the Government perhaps be able to commit themselves to funding longitudinal research to ensure that we know as much as possible about each incremental step so that we can make the best informed decisions without preventing the development of this commercial and necessary opportunity?

I hope that no one will say, in answering, that we should rely on the United Nations agencies for the research, as they take too long—and much of the research, to be candid, is not that great. We, along with the United States and some our European partners, have universities capable of really credible research in these areas, and I would wish to see that done because I am much more confident of the quality of the research that could be done that way.

Important as these questions are, progress today on the Bill is important, as it will be in later stages. For those reasons, I finish by saying that we support the Bill and wish it rapid progress, and I thank the noble Baroness for introducing it.

Iran

Lord Triesman Excerpts

Monday 25th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Triesman (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, for repeating the Statement made earlier in another place. I believe that the agreement between Iran and the western powers, increasing the likelihood that Iran will not build a nuclear weapon in the near future, is of genuine significance. The next six months are, then, of the utmost importance.

We congratulate those who have been closely involved, especially Secretary of State John Kerry, on what appear to have been months of discreet diplomacy even before the events of this last few days, and my noble friend Lady Ashton on her remarkable lead role in negotiations. She is entitled to the warm thanks of this Parliament and this nation. Her Majesty’s Government have plainly played a substantive part—a part which I straightforwardly acknowledge, including the role of the Foreign Secretary. I also join him in congratulating officials in the FCO, of whom I have great memories, and my right honourable friend Jack Straw, whose role in initiating some of these steps was so important.

It is clear that what we have here are steps along a road. The whole journey is very far from complete, and there is no guarantee that the journey will be completed. None the less, the political momentum to secure this interim deal is extremely important. I echo the Foreign Secretary’s words about how we should approach the next part of the process—that,

“nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”.

The agreement has manifest limits. It results from a co-ordinated approach, including the use of sanctions if real progress is not made for any reason. Should we find that progress is not made, we must conclude that those arrangements should continue—co-ordination, sustained negotiation and sanctions would have to be deployed again.

The agreement places constraints on Iran’s nuclear programme, in return for which we ease financial sanctions. It sets limits on nuclear aspirations and makes provision for serious inspections. It does not halt the nuclear programme, and although the inspectors are obviously to be more intrusive, their rights to intrusion are not exhaustive. It does not dismantle Iran’s nuclear capability. It cannot therefore guarantee to bridle all future developments. I know that many will argue that it should not, but I can see the basis of the anxieties in Israel and the Gulf about this. It is important for us to encourage them to give this process a chance, whatever those anxieties might be.

To give it a chance, it is essential to keep up pressure for a full, comprehensive agreement. John Kerry’s sense of urgency in the last couple of days is well placed: momentum in this is vital. Next, the ground rules for the next steps need to be expressed. The Iranian nuclear ambitions must be capped. The international community must have total, unrestricted confidence in verification. No part of the programme can remain hidden. There can be no “inalienable rights” to enrich. These issues must form the bedrock of the work to come. To achieve these bases, it would be helpful if Her Majesty’s Government could answer some questions that I think may be of genuine significance.

Although the agreement concedes daily access for the IAEA inspectors at Natanz and Fordo, there is no clarity about access to the heavy water research reactor or other facilities at Arak. How often will inspectors be allowed to see Arak? I note the Foreign Secretary’s statement of reservation, which was quite rightly included in his Statement. What steps will be taken to dismantle Fordo? That is not specifically covered by the agreement, but is likely to prove vital if the world, and in particular the region, is to feel confident about the most deeply buried facility and the one that potentially offers the most unrestrained danger. Does the agreement achieve IAEA inspector access to Parchin, where it is generally thought that tests have been conducted on the detonation mechanisms of a nuclear weapon?

How will Iran be required to meet the full obligations of the IAEA under the non-proliferation treaty? After all, these go far further than the interim agreement. Is there a real understanding between the P5+1 and Iran on what is meant by those words “right to enrich”?

What steps will the United Kingdom take—as I believe we can—to engage regional allies and friends, including Israel and the Gulf states, to provide the confidence which I suspect they genuinely seek as we go through the process of the remaining talks?

What measures will we and others take to sustain pressure? I note what the Foreign Secretary said. The relief of $7 billion with immediate effect is obviously very important, but are the measures set out in the Statement really likely to be adequate if the process does not go forward as we wish it to? It needs continuous progress, not least because of the issues of Syria and Geneva II. The engagement of Iran in the process of sorting out the appalling problems of Syria seems to us of the highest importance, as we have shared in this House many a time.

This has been a setback in nuclear terms for Iran, but it is not the end of the task. What are the benchmarks that we should expect for progress in reaching the comprehensive agreement? How should we make an assessment? I know that talks are often private and confidential, but those around the world will ask that question.

I do not say any of that to be churlish; I have a fair measure of optimism in my heart today. However, we need urgent and sustained progress. We have made what is a very good start, but it needs to be drawn to a great conclusion. I conclude by saying that, in this process, we have had a bipartisan approach and the Government have our support.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord very warmly for his very constructive and bipartisan comments. I think it is extremely important that this is seen as something to which the entire political community within Britain is committed, that we take it forward together and that we make sure that we are all well informed as we go forward together on the dangers, but also the possibilities.

I am also grateful to the noble Lord for his compliments to the Foreign Office team and the Foreign Secretary himself. There have been occasions in the past few months when I have felt like saying to the Foreign Secretary, when I meet him, “Is this a short visit to Britain or are you here for two days?”. As we all know, he has been travelling a great deal in pursuing this issue. The noble Lord is also absolutely right to give strong compliments to the American Secretary of State and the State Department team—and, of course, the other European diplomats, not least at all our colleague, the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, who have also worked flat out on all this.

I stress that this is only an interim agreement for six months. There is a lot more still to be done. On the question of how often inspectors will be allowed to visit, the agreement as signed provides some details on enhanced monitoring including,

“Daily IAEA inspector access when inspectors are not present for the purpose of Design Information Verification”,

et cetera, with relevance to Fordo and Natanz. However, the details on the exact degree of access are part of what needs to be sorted out between now and January, when we hope the six-month clock will start ticking.

As the noble Lord will know, there is not yet agreement between the two sides on the right to enrich. We are clear that every signatory of the non-proliferation treaty has the right to develop nuclear power for peaceful nuclear purposes, but we have not yet reached a full agreement with Iran on how that fits in with the full and detailed IAEA obligations.

Lastly, the noble Lord talked about the potential overlap with the Syrian conflict and the Geneva II talks. Let me stress that this is a negotiation with Iran about the nuclear issue; it does not have a direct overlap into other issues. Of course we may hope, however, that if we are successful in achieving a comprehensive settlement, it will have wider impacts on relations across the Middle East as a whole.

[Lord Triesman]

My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, I understand about the daily inspections in two sites, but I was very particular in asking what the inspection regime for Arak will be.

Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan

Lord Triesman Excerpts

Thursday 7th November 2013 Grand Committee

[Lord Triesman (Lab)]

My Lords, in congratulating the noble Baroness, Lady Cox, not least on her tenacity, and other noble Lords who have taken part in this debate, I hope that they will forgive me if I wince and say, “Yet another debate on Sudan”. Those of us who have been there often will feel it the most acutely. The noble Lord, Lord Alton, used the word “anger”, to which I subscribe. There have been more years of conflict and more than 1 million additional people have been affected in the past two years. There are 190,000 more Sudanese refugees in South Sudan. There is further conflict and differences between different groups on political objectives, including between the herders and other farmers. There is, I suppose, conflict between settled communities and those who see very little relevance in being settled because they move with their herds and because borders are not particularly relevant to them.

Two months ago, mass demonstrations about the cost of living and the economy of the country were met by a brutal regime with live ammunition and tear gas, and with mass imprisonment. Negotiations on the safe demilitarised border zone have gone into reverse. Nothing is safe. Nothing is demilitarised. No border zone has been agreed. An African Union peace initiative, through the African Union Peace and Security Council, was twice rescheduled amid sharp African Union criticism once again of the Government of Sudan, and was not responded to by that Government. There was a rather better report on the Government of South Sudan, but none of it yet is making a difference.

It has to be said that South Sudan is both a source of and a destination country for men, women and children who have been subjected in some cases to forced labour and sex trafficking, including women and girls from Uganda, Kenya and the DRC. Inter-ethnic abductions continue but at least the South Sudanese Government have recognised the issues and are trying to intervene. The economies of South Sudan and Sudan, with their high level of interdependency, are continuously disrupted by border disputes and oil transmission fees. I understand that oil reserves are set to halve within 10 years if no new fields come on stream. Exploration of new fields is of course almost impossible amid the military clashes.

War crimes are committed with virtual impunity. There has been no action to enforce international criminal arrest warrants. A large United Nations operation, with at least 4,000 troops in Abyei and 7,500 in South Sudan, has had far too little impact. As the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Guildford said, instability is spreading right through the region—through the DRC, and to a lesser extent in Uganda, and the Central African Republic. Uganda’s help for South Sudan historically has been the basis for the Sudanese Government’s sponsorship of murderous groups, including the monstrous Lord’s Resistance Army and now other groups which have taken its place.

I suppose that, with a feeling of some desperation, we are tempted to ask what is new. There is little point in demanding a great deal more intervention from the UK Government, much as I would wish to. I think that the Government lack the means or the local alliances to do much, and I fear that they lack the will. Of course there will be protests and those protests are important. There will be realism about humanitarian aid. I urge the Government to find alternative routes for aid rather than those through Khartoum. That will not do any longer. Is there more that could be done? Are we destined to return to this debate again and again, to these issues with no real answers? I am one of life’s optimists but this would be a dismal prospect for all of us and I ask if there is new ground we could break. Let me make a modest attempt.

First, of course African issues will be resolved ultimately in Africa for the most part, and by Africans. That must make us focus on the African Union and its machinery and on the sub-continental regional bodies. The issue of capacity in those bodies is critical. It has been for years. The problem is not just money or a lack of outstanding individuals, because there are some outstanding individuals, and it is not just the presence of a mass murderer at the head of the Government of Sudan. Would the Government consider, as a European initiative, a joint EU-AU review of the financial and skills needs of the African Union, carried out routinely at intervals of not more than three years, with a report on the outcome of those discussions and an annual report on the milestones? Then we at least could see some machinery and assess whether it works.

Secondly, would the Government, through the Security Council, advance the case for a standing arrangement—I am not saying a standing force—that can call into existence a peacekeeping force much more rapidly, rather than with the delays during which many more people die? Will the Government, through our multinational treaties, alliances and membership organisations, seek the full commitment of everyone in those bodies to act on the arrest warrants in all the jurisdictions that they cover? Al-Bashir is a wanted mass murderer. Will Her Majesty’s Government introduce targeted sanctions? The response in the Chamber to a question just a few days ago was that we had talked to the Nigerians about this without any indication of what happened next—that truly will not do now. It will not do.

Thirdly, will the Government, through its aid programme in the multi-national infrastructure initiatives, look for economic developments which would make a much greater difference? There has been a wider discovery of oil far from ports and from infrastructure. Most of it would be transformational but the countries involved need to co-operate in order to make any difference. Will we assist them to make a difference and give some economic hope?

Finally, on occasions I have heard the aspiration to join the Commonwealth expressed in Juba. I do not know whether that is a workable concept—it may not be yet—but it would certainly provide skilled resources in training, including in health and in the treatment of polio. It would provide links to trade and expertise in all Commonwealth countries. It would provide local trade links, for example in Uganda, Kenya and the region, which might be fundamentally helpful in the development of South Sudan. It would provide a secretariat able to assess the capacity needs and the choreography for the provision of greater capacity; and it would tell the enemies of democracy that they face a worldwide community of democratic nations who will not let this pass.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, it has been an impassioned debate. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Cox, for pursuing this issue as she has done so vigorously over many years, and I know that the work of the Associate Parliamentary Group for Sudan and South Sudan also continues to do that.

The right reverend Prelate pointed out that what we see happening across the border between Sudan and South Sudan is also happening across Sudan and South Sudan’s borders with their neighbouring states. This is part of a set of regional conflicts which now sadly flow across the Sahel and central and east Africa. The Lord’s Resistance Army has just made another cross-border attack. As we know, it operates from Uganda, through South Sudan into eastern Congo. Recent events in the Central African Republic, where the Government have been overthrown, have reportedly been supported by groups from Darfur; groups in Darfur have very often obtained their weapons from Libya, Chad or the Central African Republic. Some of these groups move very easily across frontiers. We recognise that part of this is tribal, part of this is ethnic, part of this is racial, and part of this now, sadly, is also the militant Islamic ideology which attracts youths from across those countries. It brings in foreign fighters and foreign ideas of the sort that the right reverend Prelate commented on, breaking up what had been relatively peaceful relations between different communities and different faiths and raising severe problems for all of us, across Africa. I am happy that we will be debating the dreadful situation in eastern Congo in the not too distant future.

Within Sudan, neither the Government in Khartoum nor the Government in Juba control their entire territory. The Government in Khartoum have the advantage of armed forces and external arms supplies and, as we all know, are misusing them in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. There are linked conflicts across the border, with each Government claiming that the other continues to support the rebels within what they regard as their territories; and the border, as established under the comprehensive peace agreement, is not yet accepted by either side. We must recognise that the SPLM in the north refuses to recognise the borders as established.

We have heard a lot about events surrounding the demonstrations in Sudan, which Ministers have condemned both publicly and privately. We certainly want a more democratic space to open up in Sudan. We deeply regret that the Government of Sudan continue to get arms supplies from outside. We are not entirely sure which countries they are coming from, but they are clearly from the forces in what we used to call the Eastern Bloc. We have a fairly good idea where some of them come from. We meet regularly with opposition groups both within and outside the country. That includes meeting the leadership of the SPLM-North, although we do not support its stated aim of overthrowing the regime by force. We also recognise that the Sudan Revolutionary Front is itself a loose coalition of different bodies and not entirely cohesive in its operation.

I must say to the noble Baroness, Lady Kinnock, that we do not channel aid through the Government. We are co-operating with technical preparations for debt relief, but we have made it abundantly clear that debt relief will not be possible until the conflicts are resolved and that the benefits must flow to promoting development in Sudan.

On Darfur, we continue to look with horror at what is happening, while increasingly understanding that some of the militias are not entirely under the control of the central Government in Khartoum. We regret that the Doha document has not in any sense been adopted and that the situation in many ways continues to deteriorate. The question of what we can do about it on our own is difficult.

The noble Lord, Lord Alton, talked about the comparison with Libya. It is much easier to enforce a no-fly zone, or even to intervene, in a country where almost the entire population lives within 50 miles of the coast than it is to enforce a no-fly zone a very long way from the coast—across the borders between South Sudan and northern Sudan—let alone over Darfur. We continue to work with others on the situation in Darfur. We continue to ask within the UN for an effective review of the not very effective UN force in Darfur.

We are doing what we can, but we recognise that it is not enough. Restrictions on access to Darfur are part of the problem. We all understand how appalling what is going on in South Kordofan and Blue Nile is. Local organisations, with support from international partners, are gathering evidence of abuses. We do not have access to those areas to gather evidence first-hand. Noble Lords will know that the two Presidents have met on a number of occasions. We hope that the recent improvement in relations between Sudan and South Sudan will help to resolve the conflict, but we all recognise that the conflict has a dynamic of its own.

Within South Sudan, there are also problems of internal conflict. The noble Lord, Lord Hussain, talked about the conflict in Jonglei, which the South Sudanese Government claim is being supported by the Khartoum Government. We have to recognise that these have aspects of ethnic conflict between tribes. I am tempted to say that some of these are cattle raiding with AK-47s. Unfortunately, with AK-47s you can kill an awful lot more people than you could with spears. There are elements there where government as such—the idea of a settled state—has not developed. In Abyei, as we all understand, the conflict between the Misseriya and the Ngok Dinka has elements of Cain and Abel about it. We are talking about settled tribes versus nomadic tribes. There again, once the weapons are freely available, the challenge is very clear.

On Abyei, we do not recognise the outcome of the unilateral referendum held by the Ngok Dinka community held last week. However, we understand the frustrations that led to it taking place and the extent to which external forces and pressures imposed an extra layer on what were traditional local rivalries and conflicts. Almost three years have elapsed since the referendum should have taken place simultaneously with the wider referendum for South Sudan, but we have seen, as we all know, repeated failure to move forward by honouring existing agreements.

What are the UK Government doing about that? We are no longer an imperial power within the region. We have to work with others. We are working as closely as we can with the African Union and the high-level panel. We are certainly providing the support that we feel will help in the circumstances. We are also, of course, working through and with the United Nations. We are doing our best to make the EU a more active player than it has been. The United Kingdom and France are pushing our EU partners to be more engaged across the whole of northern, eastern and central Africa. It is not a message that all our EU partners are yet willing to hear. The British and the French continue to be by far the most actively engaged. We have to recognise that, as people like me go round other capitals, we have to try to explain to them why our interests are engaged in some of these areas because the problem of refugee migration across the Mediterranean is not entirely disengaged from what is happening across the Sahel and elsewhere.

We wish that the Arab League was more active—the Arab League of which Sudan is a member. The Doha agreement was after all moderated by the Qataris, but we would like to see stronger Arab League involvement. We would like to see more active Chinese involvement. The Chinese have real interests at stake in the supply of oil from South Sudan through Sudan. I am told that the Chinese have now become something of a moderating influence, but I think we all understand that the Chinese Government are reluctant to get too heavily involved in outside intervention.

DfID has a major commitment to South Sudan. I have not been to Juba or Khartoum but I have talked to a number of people working in the aid field in Abyei, Darfur and Juba itself. We are working to try to build the capacities of that very new and undeveloped Government. We saw the change in the Cabinet as being a positive development, and we continue to support them in every way that we can.

The two Permanent Secretaries of DfID and the Foreign Office visited the two capitals in October, and my honourable friend Mark Simmonds is going to Juba at the end of this month, so we are and remain actively engaged. The noble Lord, Lord Triesman, asked for a joint EU-AU review. That is a highly desirable development and I will take that back. As I said, we have to work hard to make sure that all our 27 partners in the EU are committed to this and we have to recognise that the AU has some severe limitations on its own capacities. Going towards a standing arrangement of a peacekeeping force may stretch the AU further than it is yet able to go.

We should recognise that there are AU forces in place—Ethiopian forces in Abyei and Ugandan forces in Somalia—and a brigade under UN auspices in eastern Congo. So a number of African countries are now quite heavily committed. They lack transport, intelligence and logistics. The Government in Juba are pretty dependent on UN helicopters for transport around the country.

[Lord Triesman]

I understand only too well the point that is being made about the AU. My suggestion was that the discussion should happen under the auspices of the Security Council because it is possible for other kinds of forces—for example, as we found with Scandinavian police forces in Darfur—to have a very significant role in peacekeeping.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

I take that point and of course the UN also has to have a large role. With regard to the Nordic countries, I also recall that the three guarantors of the comprehensive peace agreement were the United Kingdom, the United States and Norway. We continue to raise these issues regularly within the UN Security Council. It is a matter of continuing discussion and we will continue to push very hard. I sincerely hope and trust, and am confident, that noble Lords here, including the noble Baroness herself, will continue to push us to maintain that pressure. Having answered, I hope, most of the points raised in this debate, I will conclude my speech.

Syria: Peace Initiative

Lord Triesman Excerpts

Tuesday 15th October 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

Of course it would. However, we are proceeding slowly and cautiously. There was an Iranian invasion of the British embassy compound only two years ago and we are conscious, as the Foreign Secretary said in his Statement to the Commons the other day, that the Iranian political system is a complex structure and that to be President of Iran is not necessarily to command all power in Iran. When President Rouhani returned most recently he was cheered in the streets of Tehran, but he was booed and his car was apparently pelted by members of the Basij militia.

[Lord Triesman (Lab)]

My Lords, I probably should start by making it clear that it is no part of the Official Opposition’s policy to nominate President Putin for the Nobel Peace Prize. The initiatives on Syria, particularly in relation to chemical weapons, are plainly welcome, although there is much more to do on Geneva II. I understand that the Foreign Secretary has done some months’ work on deepening the relationship with Russia, but it does not seem to have deepened enough for it to be a reliable way of achieving the objective in the effort to defuse crises. What positive steps will the Government take, perhaps with the United States and France, to deepen that relationship so that it is more reliable?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

As noble Lords will know, the Russians are not easy companions. Foreign Minister Lavrov is giving a big speech in Brussels today, I understand, on the relationship between Russia and Europe as a whole. Although we welcome the more constructive relationship that we are having at present on a number of Middle Eastern problems, we are also moving towards the EU summit at the end of November on the Eastern Partnership, and Russian behaviour towards Ukraine, Armenia, Moldova and Georgia regarding the possibility of those states signing association agreements with the European Union is, to say the least, not particularly constructive, nor is the effort that it is making to interrupt Lithuanian exports to Russia.

Israel and Palestine

Lord Triesman Excerpts

Thursday 10th October 2013 Grand Committee

[Lord Triesman (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, for giving us the opportunity of having this conversation. We remain firmly in support of the two-state solution. I do not think there is a difficulty in holding a discussion of other kinds of plans, of alternatives, but I would be disappointed if we were distracted by that process from the two-state solution.

I have tried in the past few days to get a careful, hard-headed assessment of current prospects from those who are most closely involved. I want to focus on two elements, one political and the other economic. On the political one, it is hard not to say anything other than it is great to see the three-year hiatus in the peace negotiations finally broken by the efforts of Secretary of State John Kerry and his intention to reach a deal—comprehensive, as he described it, rather than interim—by April 2014 and to know that there are more frequent meetings taking place in which the United States has a far greater involvement and is very pro active. Those who are closest to the process have described John Kerry as being plainly, personally, deeply committed in driving the process. I use the words that they have used to me, and I applaud and congratulate that.

Of course, it may fail. The point has been made today that past predictions of breakthroughs have not always come on stream as we would have wished. Condoleezza Rice expressed that view, as many of us will remember, in 2008. But this is a serious United States push. That is what we demanded they should do, and that is where we should offer our encouragement.

On the economic front, which is being led by Tony Blair on behalf of the quartet, it may very well be that the quartet’s role is now being expressed more in the economic construction, and that is a very useful thing to do. Any political success will have to be underpinned by economic advance. People will feel an ownership of a new kind of economy. They will have an interest in each other’s success. That is vital. The eight-point plan in the economic initiative—and I strongly recommend it to the noble Lords: it is well worth reading—covers construction, including the institution of personal mortgages; agriculture; tourism; telecoms; power; water and light manufacturing. These are all building blocks of a viable economic future. They have been drawn up with the active engagement of the Palestinians and the Israelis. They have been supported by the global investment world and by international donors. The United Kingdom has a proud record of being a significant international donor in that environment. We should be proud of that.

Building two states will, of course, focus on land, boundaries and security, but it should also focus on economic and other institution-building. That is where there is going to be a chance of designing a real future and resilience in that future. The plan that has been guided by the work of leading global consultants is perhaps the most serious that we have seen yet. It is a plan: it is accomplishing a plan which is the hard thing; making one is often the easier part of the process. It is absolutely critical, however, and I hope that in our Parliament we will be cautious about any further name-calling or unhelpful criticism, rather than putting our shoulders behind what seems to be the most serious effort that we have seen in a very long time.

Syria and the Use of Chemical Weapons

Lord Triesman Excerpts

Thursday 29th August 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Triesman]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the House for the knowledgeable and detailed debate we have had. It reflects the complexity of the circumstances on the ground—the facts; the assessment of the possible consequences of anything we do; and, indeed, the ethical issues. Winding up for the Official Opposition obviously and rightly leads me to express my conviction that the amendment being considered in the House of Commons today in the name of the leader of the Opposition is the right approach. The very stark balance that we have heard in the debate in this House probably suggests that everybody has the same sense of caution before proceeding rapidly. That is not party political; it is just serious people thinking very hard about what we should do.

We are dealing with an appalling crime. It is plain from the undisputed evidence available that a large number of people have been savagely murdered with poison gas—babies, children, women and men, dying in convulsions. Of course, it is true, as colleagues in this House have pointed out, that 100,000 have already died from a variety of causes. But that is not in itself a reason to blunt or dim our revulsion. No tyranny should be able to act with impunity. The Attorney-General is certainly right to say that he has no doubt that this is a war crime—a crime against humanity. Of course, such crimes against civilians can be committed with a wide variety of weapons, not only gas, but it is a war crime.

The United Kingdom claims no special rights in arriving at such a judgment. We are part of an international system. We share our responsibility with others around the world and that is why we helped to seek the weapons inspection by the United Nations. Our special responsibility, if we have one, is to look at ourselves candidly—at whether we are meeting the exacting standards of our own making—before we ask anything of others, especially our exceptional Armed Forces. This House will want to get it right.

The attacks in Ghouta reawaken a horror that has stalked us for well over a century. I believe that it takes a very particular kind of dictator to gas his own people. That poses the question of how we should proceed. For a start, we must proceed with absolute clarity on the facts. Our judgments must be based on the facts. There should be no moves in the dark or with inconclusive information. Many noble Lords rightly start with the fundamental understanding that action has its consequences. Only a liar or a fool will say that they know exactly what those consequences will be. Inaction has consequences that are as profound. Whatever we decide, we should be in no doubt that this dictator and others will conclude that they can use any weapon, however venal, if it carries no consequence for them. If, as in Syria, a tyrannical ruler with a tyrannical army is overstretched militarily, these weapons might become a cheap and deadly alternative to using other kinds of force.

We need a proper sequence to arrive at a decision. The watchwords to guide us towards credible decisions are “proof” and “legitimacy”. In my view, the people of the United Kingdom will accept nothing else. First, the evidence from the United Nations inspectors must be presented and assessed. Ban Ki-Moon is right to demand it. Were proscribed weapons used? What is the compelling evidence that is available about perpetrators? The evidence is plainly growing but it has to be assembled and assessed properly. The Government were at risk of moving well ahead of having the evidence that they would need—that we would all need—to feel that there was a compelling case.

Secondly, the United Nations must be taken seriously and treated with respect, even if it sometimes disappoints gravely. It must explore all sensible options; many suggestions have been made in this Chamber today. The United Nations, however, cannot be treated as a sideshow.

Thirdly, the legal justifications must be clear. I wish to emphasise what was said by my noble and learned friend Lord Goldsmith and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, in their forensic approach—mixing, it is true, both law and doing the right thing but none the less setting out what those criteria should be. It is also clear, and I want to be clear, that in a United Nations context Russia cannot dictate the international decisions in this matter. Of course it is better to approach them diplomatically, but a veto cannot necessarily be the final word in these circumstances.

Fourthly, the strategic aims must be explicit. What intervention is contemplated and what aims will they be said to have served? We need evidence-based decisions in all these areas. I am afraid that the Government have yet to make their case and the House has said that forcefully over the long hours of today. They must go further in what they have to say, and I advise that they do not do it in a rush but that they do it soon, because a febrile atmosphere can be dissipated only by a timely response.

The alternatives must be included in that evaluation—alternatives which have been suggested in this House and elsewhere. The evidence itself does not dictate the options and the judgments that should be reached—judgments on regional balances, consequences for minorities and so on. A wide variety of matters of all kinds must be considered. Evidence will tell us how safe our footing is, but then comes the political judgment of what will make the lot of the Syrian people better and also what is required in our response to war crimes. Those are both responsibilities.

Finally, we should not downrate the importance of the responsibility to protect. This addition to the 2005 millennium conference at the United Nations in which some of us were involved was a huge advance for the United Nations and I am proud that the United Kingdom was a decisive part-author of that development. The tests of action and of what kinds of action can be taken only when we have taken every sensible rational step to establish the facts and the evidence. That is what we owe our country and the international community.

Sudan: War Crimes

Lord Triesman Excerpts

Tuesday 9th July 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, we are not the only external actor influencing Sudan. We have to work with the Chinese, who are major actors in terms of external influence on Sudan, the Arab League countries and others. As the noble Baroness will know, there is a tripartite body consisting of the United Nations, the African Union and the Arab League which is attempting to mediate on what is happening in Blue Nile and South Kordofan. I do not in any sense underestimate the horrors of what is happening there.

I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for sending me some material on what she witnessed in her recent visit. It is the most appalling—I emphasise—series of interconnected conflicts from Darfur all the way across to Jonglei and Blue Nile. Part of the problem is that Governments in both South Sudan and Sudan are weak and do not control the whole of their territories.

[Lord Triesman]

My Lords, the Minister made the point that President al-Bashir would be hard to capture in his own capital. That is of course entirely true, but he must be one of the most widely travelled Presidents of almost any country in Africa. He is at meetings and conferences throughout Africa, throughout the Middle East and occasionally completely out of the hemisphere. What influence are we trying to bring to bear on those other countries that he routinely visits and which do not necessarily have an adverse view of bringing a war criminal to justice?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, the noble Lord will be well aware from his own experience as a Minister how complex these issues are. It is not just a question of Sudan and the ICC. There are delicate questions of Kenya and the ICC at the moment as well. Her Majesty’s Government do of course make representations to other Governments whose territories ICC-designated people visit. Unfortunately, Britain does not command as much influence as we might like in a number of countries in the third world.

G8 Summit

Lord Triesman Excerpts

Thursday 13th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Triesman]

My Lords, I join everyone in thanking the noble Lord, Lord Trimble, for initiating this debate and for his very powerful introduction. On behalf of these Benches I thank the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Bath and Wells for his very considerable contributions while a Member of this House. We wish him well.

It is always sensible for a Government hosting a G8 to set out its priorities and achieve focus. The work leading up to a G8 summit needs focus, and the sequence of conferences feeding into the summit are a critical part of achieving a coherent outcome. As the noble Lord, Lord Brooke said, the Prime Minister trailed his programme in detail, especially, I though, at Davos. He has planned the whole process for a long time. It will be a key moment to judge his effectiveness, because in this case I am convinced that he will be judged by real outcomes.

Recent G8 summits have been choreographed as relaxed fireside chats among the leaders of the world, or at least among those who purport to be its leaders. Of course, these are the optics of such a meeting, but the tests are always of the substance. What should we look for in the final communiqué? What will success look like? The first objective is to create a major boost to growth through trade, which I think is a point also made by the noble Baroness, Lady Jenkin. From 2008, following the sharpest decline in world trade since the great depression, the people of this country, as elsewhere, have been looking for a credible plan for growth. They will look to the G8 in its general review of whether that is possible.

In my view, the reality is that the Government are desperate for some good news from the G8. The United Kingdom has flat-lined. It looks much more like the long period of stagnation which the Japanese economy experienced than an economy on the move. David Cameron will want the G8 to point in a direction that he appears to be unable to achieve with his own Chancellor. So trade improvement is mission critical to this summit.

The combined IMF report and the latest Institute for Fiscal Studies report showed that the next two general elections will be played out to the accompaniment of the harsh tunes of austerity. There is no optimism here about debt reduction or other missed targets: they are all going to be missed. The limited data that the noble Lord, Lord Trimble, mentioned on inventory growth has to be placed in context, as I am sure he would do himself. It is about stocks rather than about finished manufacture and growth. The IFS states:

“We should expect not just 2015 but also 2020 to be an austerity election. Spending reductions are set to be a long-term feature of the UK's public finances, rather than a short and sharp experience”.

What on the horizon could lift that gloom? The best bets are on the potential free trade agreements between the EU and G8 partners. The EU/United States negotiations are due to start; if successful, the Government believe that this might add £100 billion to the EU GDP and more than £80 billion to the United States GDP—all stimulating world trade. If all the free trade agreements succeed, the boost to the world economy could be—these are big figures, I know—more than £1,000 billion. Noble Lords will have anticipated the point that I want to make. These are EU negotiations; what an extraordinary moment for the Government to embark on what may be a populist and gadarine policy that could sever the United Kingdom from the EU. That is now a palpable risk. No wonder that some eminent Conservatives look with dismay at the Eurosceptic brigade among them. What a time for those who want to liberalise and reform the global economy, as we do, to pander to the protectionism and nationalism of some of our vocal xenophobes.

I make one further point on the trade priority. Some fireside corner of this G8 must assess the consequences of the collapsed Doha round. The G8 continues to take far greater value from trade out of Africa than we put in. That point was made by a number of noble Lords. The mispricing and underpricing of African commodities is a motor for African poverty, disease and conflict. The inflated prices that the advanced world extracts for sophisticated, not always useful products; our unwillingness to transfer knowledge and capacity; and the willingness of some people to renege on the G8 promises at Gleneagles are all millstones on Africa. My noble friend Lord McConnell was right to remind us of the significance of what was said at Gleneagles, and the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, reminded us of the 0.7% as well, which is very important. There was progress at the hunger summit of 8 June, but if we fail Africa by not recognising its interests in world trade, that would be at best myopic and at worst a betrayal.

Tax evasion and avoidance is, rightly, the second major priority. While the warm-up discussions have revealed some big differences of opinion about where tax liabilities are generated and tax can be collected, these are key issues, and I applaud the Prime Minister’s intent on this. Whether individuals or Google-style companies are involved in evasion or avoidance, these matters need to be addressed. The noble Lord, Lord Trimble, was right to remind of us of the nine multi-nationals in such a position. That is not a critique of fair tax planning, but it is a call for opposition to what may be the Canadian and Russian objections that could scupper the process.

David Cameron should come back to Parliament to report that he has secured five practical steps. First, we need a clear reform of country-by-country reporting where multinationals publish all the key information required to assess their tax liability—revenues, profits and taxes in each country in which they operate. Secondly, disclosure of tax avoidance schemes and systems should be extended to all global transactions. Thirdly, we should seek greater transparency in tax havens, disclosing information on who is hidden behind front companies and trusts. The G8 should launch a convention on tax transparency. Canada is not entitled to block such arrangements. Fourthly, the G8 global assessment of the impact of controlled foreign company rules with attention to developing countries would be helpful. I note that the Government are reluctant to get into this area but it is a global package that would strengthen their own G8 priority. Fifthly, we should seek reform of the corporate tax system to prevent profit shifting and the use of opaque havens. The current system lags far behind global economic developments and the wiles of specialists. I heard what the noble Lord, Lord Howell, said about the perhaps unconquerable barrier of complexity. Tax cannot be put into the “too difficult” box, although I thought what the noble Lord said was intriguing and I intend to read and study it with great care.

Will the Minister respond positively to those five suggestions, designed to bolster the G8 priorities of the Government? The points made about the impacts on transparency are also a priority. We support the focus on land and extractive transparency, and progress would unquestionably be a blow to corruption. I join in commending the African Union’s land policy initiative and commend Kofi Annan’s reports on the imbalances of trade which are impacting on Africa. I am tempted to recommend an initiative on transparency and anti-corruption in international football, but I might be straying a touch too far today.

In general, this is the right time to push for anti-corruption agendas. Many will advise the Prime Minister not to push too hard in case some of those to whom he speaks recoil. Russia’s interests in Cyprus have been mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Trimble; the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, has mentioned some of these matters and a quite remarkable set of statistics from Delaware. A commitment to transparent public registries would transform matters. It would never be easy again for international criminals to work the way that they do and have the freedom that they have had. We should not settle for a lesser or cosmetic solution. I hope that the Minister will assure the House that the Prime Minister will put on all appropriate pressure, including on the United Kingdom’s overseas territories.

I started by commending focus and I finish with a word of caution about too narrow an agenda. The G8 provides opportunities to share thinking and it would be a waste if environmental degradation, nuclear proliferation and the death spiral of Syria—as the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Bath and Wells just reminded us—were not covered properly. The G8 needs to prepare for the tough issues. On all these priorities my greatest anxiety and, in my view, the gravest test for the Prime Minister, lies in split-personality thinking in the United Kingdom Government.

We say that we want co-operation on fundamental propositions from nations with whom we appear to want no real or deep relationship. We tell them that they are consistently wrong about a wide spectrum of things. We raise three melodramatic cheers for every veto we exercise, whether it is a real one or just theatrical. We do not seem to understand that partners become less inclined to work with us each time that we do that. We need to consider that if we want partners, let us behave like partners. This will be the test of the contention of the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, about whether the Prime Minister has put a foot wrong. The dance is not yet over. I wish the Government well and I put these matters in plain terms precisely because I wish them well. There is nowhere better than Northern Ireland to face and resolve the toughest issues.

Russia: Non-Governmental Organisations

Lord Triesman Excerpts

Wednesday 12th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, we actively discuss with our partners in the European Union and the Council of Europe a whole range of concerns, including those about Russia. I think I am correct in saying that one in every four cases before the European Court of Human Rights at present concerns Russia.

[Lord Triesman]

My Lords, we share the anxieties that have been expressed. I was interested to hear the Minister mention in his very first response NGOs from outside Russia. What is the current status of the relationship between the Russian Government and the British Council, and is the British Council able to conduct its normal and completely proper work inside that country? If I may follow up a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, is there perhaps an opportunity for a side meeting at the G8 to underline this issue with the Russian President?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, the British Council was under considerable pressure some years ago. Indeed, my wife and I were in St Petersburg and visited Stephen Kinnock, who was then the head of the office there, the day after his office had been inspected by the authorities in a clear attempt to intimidate its activities. At present, however, the Alliance Française is being pursued, not the British Council. The British Council does its best to operate in rather difficult circumstances.

Government Communications Headquarters

Lord Triesman Excerpts

Monday 10th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Triesman]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement made in the other place. It is important to start with some clarity over the precise subject that we are discussing today and we do so on this side against a background of agreement that I think is shared in both Houses, and across all sides of both Houses, about the values that are expressed in the Statement and the importance of protecting the United Kingdom and those values. It is clear that that is absolutely common ground.

The Guardian newspaper has revealed information obtained from Mr Edward Snowden, a former CIA contractor, that the National Security Agency in the United States has, so far as we understand it, collected huge quantities of information on telephone calls, e-mails and other online information. Some, but by no means all, of this surveillance has been focused on United States citizens. Much is said to have come from Google, Yahoo, Facebook, Skype and other digital sources. It will therefore include surveillance of people who are not US citizens.

While the United States Administration have acknowledged the truth of the telephone surveillance, the technology companies have denied that any online information has been provided that was not covered by a federal court warrant before it was handed to the US Government.

I do not want, and it is not my place, to comment on United States policy on this matter or on the extent to which the Patriot Act makes such actions in the US legal. Those are matters for US politicians and US courts. However, I accept what the Foreign Secretary has said—that all the surveillance is directed not just against terrorists but against many different kinds of criminals, such as cybercriminals, paedophiles and people who wish to steal intellectual property.

We need to focus on the issues for the United Kingdom and to allay the plain anxieties of UK citizens and the UK media about the extent of UK involvement, its character and the legal basis for anything that has happened in our country. As Douglas Alexander put it on the “Today” programme this morning in response to Simon McCoy, “We need to be able to reassure the public ... there is an understandable level of public concern, given the reports in the newspapers over the last couple of days, and given how much we all rely on the intelligence agencies here in the United Kingdom to keep us safe”. There have been assertions and counterassertions. Today we begin the process of understanding what has happened from the United Kingdom’s point of view.

First, I will deal with what might be called the straw dogs. I want, for complete avoidance of doubt, to be clear about what we are not saying today. I do not doubt for one second that in the complex battle with terrorism or organised crime we need to collect data. It is an intrusive but entirely essential task for our security services. I will not accept from these Benches that we would ever willingly or knowingly put UK citizens or others at risk. We, too, will give no comfort or inadvertent assistance to terrorists, as the Foreign Secretary said.

Secondly, we have no doubt whatever that this means that there will be co-operation between friendly states trying to achieve the same objectives.

Thirdly, the balance between surveillance and privacy is a very hard one to strike. Perhaps it is impossible to get it entirely right as circumstances change. The Foreign Secretary said, in replying to questions on the Statement, that mistakes will always be made. I am not even saying that mistakes have been made, but this is obviously something that we will all want to keep in mind. Privacy will be compromised to some extent, whatever balance we agree. However, there has to be a proper balance if we regard the proper privacy of citizens as important—important not at the risk of their life and limb but important none the less in a democratic society where we enjoy private life within the law. The United Kingdom would never have settled for a Stasi-style state. This weekend, the Foreign Secretary described his approach as “necessary” and “proportionate”. That is a matter of the balance. We try to enshrine the balance as best we can in law, and I must return to this point in seeking clarification from the Minister. We need better to understand the terms that the Foreign Secretary has used.

Fourthly, every Minister who has dealt with the intelligence services, including GCHQ—and I am proud to have been one of them—knows that we are dealing with people of the greatest integrity, and it is not any part of my submission to your Lordships that we have grounds for suspicion. They are excellent as a group and are outstanding in their service to the United Kingdom. I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, made essentially the same point on television over the weekend, and it is a view that I share.

Fifthly, I hear the expression that law-abiding British citizens have “nothing to fear”. We have probably all used that kind of phrase on one occasion or another, but it often conceals more than it reveals. Of course those acting within the law should not fear oversight but most of us also value our privacy, at least to some extent, and can value it without wishing to commit any acts of terrorism. I am never happy about the extent to which search engines inspect my tastes, purchases, and whereabouts and so on in pursuit of business, even when I do not want them to. Prism is therefore a concern for honest reasons, not dishonest ones. How we use it or perhaps contribute to it is also a concern for honest reasons, not dishonest ones.

On the “Today” programme this morning, Sir Malcolm Rifkind said that no access surveillance data of the kinds that I have described could be collected without explicit ministerial approval. I think that that was reflected in the Statement but I want to check. As I understand it, Sir Malcolm was referring either to material that the UK’s intelligence agencies may wish to collect for themselves or to material collected by a foreign agency that the intelligence services here might wish to access. He said, “The law is actually quite clear. If the British intelligence agencies are seeking to know the content of e-mails about people living in the UK then they actually have to get lawful authority. Normally that means ministerial authority”. I understand that the foreign agency might offer material out of mutual friendship and concern for the well-being of our or other citizens, and I repeat that this has an unavoidable impact on privacy but is very important for our safety. However, Sir Malcolm’s point was that there is an explicit law on permissions. He was not making the point that we should never try to catch terrorists by such means—quite the contrary.

Therefore, none of my questions is intended to help any terrorist. I have thought carefully about these questions, which in the past I would have been able to answer or would have been inclined to say I could not answer before your Lordships in this House for security reasons. These questions are not hostile; rather, they are exploratory. I ask them against the clear background of saying that we want the criminals whose attacks may be directed towards this country and who are never constrained by the question of any international border to be prevented from causing us harm and brought to justice.

How many instances of data acquisition by our intelligence services have taken place in the past three years in the ways that have been alleged by the Guardian? What precisely is the legal framework, what are the procedures and what are the protocols under which a United Kingdom Minister could ask for information from American agencies?

Did Ministers authorise each and every one of these applications for data? I suspect that there will be a yes or no answer. The assurance of legality can be made clear today by answering that question. It will not aid a terrorist in any respect to know the answer but it should be a source of reassurance to honest, law-abiding citizens of the UK.

Would it be lawful for GCHQ to request information from Prism and for this to fall outside the scrutiny of any UK Act, including the Intelligence Services Act and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act? Mr Hague appears to have said in the Statement that that could not happen, but I would welcome confirmation.

What is the status of the request to search United States data? Would that be covered by a proper warrant just as would requests to obtain that information in this country?

Did the Intelligence Services Commissioner and the Interception of Communications Commissioner have oversight of the process that they exercised? I do not mean “Do they?” in a general sense but “Did they in these circumstances?”.

Will the Foreign Secretary be willing to discuss all these matters in detail in an appropriately confidential meeting of the Intelligence and Security Committee? Will the ISC be put in a position where it can add to the assurance that the public seeks without disclosing anything at all that may assist anybody who intends us harm? Will the Foreign Secretary set out for Parliament any concerns that he may have about the surveillance of United Kingdom citizens, or, if he has none, will he explain how he reaches a conclusion on that matter? He cannot regard this as something within the reach of the “nothing to fear” answer. How rapidly could the Government respond to these deeper questions which have been brought to the surface by these events?

I ask these questions in exactly the sense in which I started when responding to the Statement. We are as committed as anybody to the effectiveness of an intelligence service which, from experience, I know is among the best in the world, operated by the best civil servants this country could hope to have. The public are not often exposed to the nature of the service’s work—this is perhaps a necessary fact about that kind of work. However, some clarity on these questions will give real reassurance.