Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 26th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Naseby (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I have a very different view from the opponent of the clause standing part. The UK Government, regardless of who is in power, obviously recognise at this point in time that the fundamental dimensions of this Bill are about the safety of the United Kingdom against terrorism. Our problem is that we are still a very open nation.

Whether it is in Afghanistan, the Middle East or Asia, in all those parts of the world we take an active role in promoting democracy. We see it occasionally with refugees who come to this country. Genuine refugees are welcome, but hidden within the alleged genuine refugees are, too often, terrorists or quasi-terrorists. It is against that background that my noble friend on the Front Bench is rightly introducing this Bill in Committee. If people think I am exaggerating, I have had personal death threats from the IRA. I happened to represent Northampton South, which had an IRA cell in the early 70s. Colleagues may know that I have been deeply involved in Sri Lanka for 50 years, and I am sorry to report that some number of illegal entrants to our country were active members of the LTTE Tamil Tigers. So the challenge is there, and we need to recognise it.

I praise those in our party who have decided the time has come to look again at the sentencing of terrorism. The problem is made worse by the misunderstanding—whether it be genuine or otherwise—of the difference between human rights and the original European Convention on Human Rights, which, of course, was the basis of our Human Rights Act. That is fine, but it should not cover elements where a war took place. Again, I cite Sri Lanka, because that was a ghastly war between a democratically elected Government and a terrorist movement, proscribed by the United Kingdom Government in in its last few months in 2001. The law that looks after the rights in that context is international humanitarian law.

It may surprise colleagues to know that under the generosity of previous Governments, we in the UK allowed the number two man running the Tamil Tigers to have an office in Camden. Okay, he was a British citizen, but he was in charge throughout the period when I was involved, and his wife—an Australian lady, now, obviously, with joint British citizenship—was involved in recruiting child soldiers. We had these people living in our midst. I say to my noble friend on the Front Bench: well done in bringing the Bill forward. Clause 1, to me, is absolutely fundamental to it, and I wish it a safe and swift passage.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]]

My Lords, it is a privilege, as always, to follow the noble Lord. I respect his point of view and the experiences he has had. I am sure he will appreciate we are concerned with the rule of law and preserving the reputation this country has for justice done in the proper way.

Terrorist activity is an aggravating factor in sentencing. Section 30 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 enables courts to increase the sentence if it is established that the offence has a terrorist element. But the 2008 Act limited the use of this provision to the specific offences in Schedule 2, which were those most commonly connected with terrorist attacks or ancillary to them. The primary offences listed involved murder, manslaughter, violence to the person and explosives, nuclear, biological material and hijacking offences. The proposal in Clause 1 extends the offences that can be aggravated by a terrorist element to include any offence in the whole criminal calendar punishable with imprisonment for more than two years. This is an enormous widening of the provisions of the 2008 Act. The main feature of these provisions is that the issue of whether there is a terrorist element in an offence is not determined by a jury, notwithstanding the fact that these cases will inevitably be heard on indictment in the Crown Court.

The decision that there is a terrorist connection becomes part of the sentencing process, to be determined by the trial judge alone after conviction. Could the Minister explain the process the Government envisage? Would it be the equivalent of a Newton hearing, with a separate trial of the issue in which evidence is called and arguments heard on which the judge’s decision is based, or would the judge be entitled to come to a conclusion based on the evidence he has heard in the trial before the jury? It is an important decision. It is not just that his finding will add years of imprisonment to the individual defendant but, as my noble friend Lord Marks said a moment ago, it will trigger the terrorism notification requirements and the restrictions on early release contained in the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020.

Surely, in the traditions of the criminal law of this country, a suspect believed to be involved in terrorist offences should be charged with those offences. It should be for the jury to decide whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain such charges. It cannot be right to charge the suspect with lesser offences and allow the judge to add the icing to the cake. There is no way in which this clause can be satisfactorily amended; consequently, the only thing to do is throw it out.

Let me give a pertinent example which everybody will understand after the events of last year. Suppose a jury finds a Whitehall protestor guilty of occasioning actual bodily harm to a rival protestor outside the gates of Downing Street, by punching him on the nose and stealing his flag. Under this clause, the judge could find proved, after the jury’s verdict, that the use of force to influence the UK Government and intimidate the public was for the purpose of advancing an ideological cause and therefore well within the definition of terrorism in the pursuit of, shall we say, exiting the European Union. Does the Minister—whom I welcome to his seat in the House of Lords—agree?

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]]

I join noble Lords in welcoming the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, to his place in the House of Lords. I am sure he will make an enormous series of contributions to our debates on justice issues—not just criminal justice, but civil justice. He is very welcome.

This is a very important Bill. I think everyone in the House, certainly on this side, is very keen that the Government be given legitimate tools to fight terrorism as hard as possible. One legitimate tool must be the use of greater sentences, where appropriate, for people who commit terrorist offences. In principle, we on this side are not against the idea of expanding the circumstances in which an offence can be regarded as aggravated because of a terrorist connection, which is what Clause 1 does.

Also, in principle, I do not think it necessarily wrong for the judge to be given very substantial powers to make judgments on what the appropriate sentence may be. The most obvious example of this relates to murder, where the judge in effect has the power to determine whether the offender should be given a whole life sentence, which will obviously have huge ramifications for what happens to that defendant. Indeed, such a decision had to be made quite recently on the conspirator convicted in relation to the Manchester Arena bombings —he was given a whole-life sentence by Mr Justice Baker. That was a very significant occasion.

I am very keen to discover precisely what process the Government have in mind for how a decision will be made on what are more or less serious offences than the normal ones. What process is envisaged in which a judge can decide whether an offence is aggravated by terrorism in the sense envisaged by Clause 1? In principle, I think a fair process can be envisaged and it may not be wrong for the judge to decide that rather than the jury. However, I am very interested to hear what the Government have to say about it.

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I will also speak to Amendments 3, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 73, 74 and 75. I will also signal my intention to propose the removal of Clauses 33, 34 and 35.

Clause 33 was intended to provide explicit provision so that Scottish Ministers might impose a polygraph condition as a licence condition for specified released terrorist offenders. Clause 34 was intended to provide explicit provision so that the Northern Ireland Department of Justice might impose a polygraph condition as a licence condition for specified released terrorist offenders. Scotland does not currently have express provision for polygraph testing, but Scottish Ministers have broad powers to set licence conditions under Section 12(1) of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993. Northern Ireland does not currently have express provision for polygraph testing, but the Department of Justice has broad powers to set licence conditions under Article 24 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 and Rule 3(2)(e) of the Criminal Justice (Sentencing) (Licence Conditions) (Northern Ireland) Rules 2009.

Through discussions on the legislative consent of the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly on the provisions of the Bill, it became apparent that while this clause would enable a fully comparable UK-wide approach to polygraph testing on licence, pursuit of this provision in Scotland and Northern Ireland was not strictly necessary and could result in Scottish and Northern Irish Ministers withholding their consent for the Bill. The Government remain of the view that polygraph examinations are a useful additional tool in supporting the effective management of terrorist offenders, and we hope that the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly will see the demonstrable benefits of its introduction in England and Wales.

This Government will continue to legislate on reserved matters but, as an expression of our respect for the existing powers of the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Assembly in relation to the setting of licence conditions, and as a demonstration of this Government’s reasonable approach to those discussions, we have now agreed to remove the provision on the clear understanding that, should this Scottish Parliament or Northern Ireland Assembly or a future one change its view on polygraph testing, it will be able to implement the measure without additional legislation being required.

Clause 35 was intended primarily to provide supplementary provisions to Clauses 33 and 34 that would restrict the circumstances in which the devolved Administrations could impose mandatory polygraph examinations as a licence condition for certain terrorist offenders. As a result of the removal of Clauses 33 and 34 from the Bill, Clause 35 is no longer needed. The clause was intended to ensure that regulations could be made to ensure that polygraph conditions were confined only to those offenders’ licences where it was necessary and proportionate to do so, to ensure standards for the examinations and that appropriate records and reports kept in relation to testing were consistent across the UK. Polygraph examinations are already carried out on sexual offenders in England and Wales. The conduct of those polygraph examinations is governed by rules made under Section 29(6) of the Offender Management Act 2007. Amendments 2, 3, 17, 18, 21 to 26 and 75 are consequential on the removal of Clauses 33 to 35.

Amendment 73 is necessary to ensure that the measures that permit introduction of polygraph testing in a licence condition for terrorist offenders in England and Wales are commenced two months after the Bill receives Royal Assent. Previously, when explicit provision was sought and set out for Scotland and Northern Ireland as well as for England and Wales, we had agreed that the provision should be commenced via regulation to allow sufficient time to develop the relevant infrastructure in those jurisdictions. As explicit provision is no longer made for those jurisdictions through this Bill, and polygraph testing is already used by the probation service for sex offenders in England and Wales, the same delay is not now required. As such, the usual commencement of two months after Royal Assent is appropriate. I beg to move.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I have many reservations about the value of polygraph tests. They rely on measuring several physiological processes—pulse rate, blood pressure, perspiration and so on, the changes that may take place in the course of questioning. However, the emotional and physiological responses recorded may arise from such factors as simple anxiety about being tested or fear of being judged deceptive, or a host of things—perhaps the state of one’s digestion after food. There is an inherent ambiguity in the physiological responses. The reluctance to use polygraph evidence is precisely because the response may mimic the response expected of a person seeking to deceive.

What is meant by “failing” the polygraph test? Failing the test means exhibiting a certain physiological response to a question. What is truth? The examiner cannot know whether that response means that the answer is a lie. However, there is no punishment for failing the test—whatever that means—or for exhibiting that response. That does not breach the terms of the offender’s licence. The individual will not be returned to prison. Alterations may, however, take place in the conditions of his licence, and those could be onerous.

The irony is that, in the course of questioning, the person being questioned may provide information truthfully that will have an adverse effect on him. He has not failed the test because his body does not react to his telling the truth, but he has provided information that may lead to his punishment. He has of course lost his right to silence, a right first developed in the late 17th century as a check to arbitrary rule. It has been regarded over centuries as fundamental to the fairness of the criminal law in this country and in the common-law countries all over the world.

Faced with the terrorist atrocities that we have seen in this country, the loss of the right to silence may seem a worthwhile price. Obviously that is not the immediate view in Scotland, nor in Northern Ireland. Let us face the dilemma: the proposals for England and Wales do not involve imprisonment for a lie but possible imprisonment for telling the truth or, since it is mandatory to answer the questions, even for remaining silent. Faced with legal and moral issues such as this, the drafters of the Domestic Abuse Bill, which is proceeding this week here also, as the Minister will know, decided that it was appropriate to proceed with a three-year pilot before finally rolling out the use of polygraphs generally in that field. Why is a different approach taken in this concurrent Bill?

It is interesting to note that the case studies in the MoJ memorandum on these proposals indicate that the information provided led to warrants being issued and physical evidence obtained in the offenders’ respective homes to contradict what they had said. However, there is no indication how often that has occurred or how many times such activity has proved nothing, and nothing has come of it. Will the Minister deal with that in his reply?

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]]

Like the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, I too have considerable doubts about the reliability of polygraph material. This series of government amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, indicate some degree of shambles on the part of the Government. They are withdrawing the polygraph provisions for Scotland and Northern Ireland. Had they consulted the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Executive prior to the initial publication of the Bill, they would have seen what the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Executive had to say about them.

In the light of what was said by those two Governments, why did the UK Government introduce these provisions? It is plain from what the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, is saying that the Scottish and Northern Irish Administrations do not want them. There is a reference to the various provisions that might allow them to introduce them as licence conditions. However, neither of the Administrations have indicated that they want these powers, so why on earth were they introduced in the first place and when was it that the UK Government decided to respect those views? If they did not consult those two Administrations before, why not?

Separate to that, on the use of polygraphs, what advice have the Government sought from police forces in England and Wales? To what extent would those police forces be confident about using polygraph testing?

Moving on, the effect of Amendment 73 would be that Clause 32, which sets out the conditions for polygraph testing for terrorist offenders in England and Wales, would come into force two months after Royal Assent rather than by regulations. Why have the Government reduced the degree of scrutiny available to the introduction of polygraphs by removing the need for regulations? Separately, what provisions are available in the Bill to stop the use of polygraphs if they prove to be ineffective?

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[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]]

My Lords, Clause 4 and my Amendments 4 and 5 concern the imposition of serious terrorism sentences of detention in a young offender institution for offenders aged 18 or over when the offence was committed and under 21 when convicted. A serious terrorism offence is defined in Clause 2 and that definition is carried into the Sentencing Code through new Schedule 17A. Part 1 of the new schedule lists a number of very serious terrorism offences, while Part 2 lists other broadly serious offences where the judge determines that there is a terrorism connection. On Part 2, I repeat the points I made earlier on Clause 1, although here they are applied with less force because the offences are, by and large, much more serious so the aggravation of the sentence is likely to be less severe.

The structure of the sentence for a serious terrorism offence for young offenders is defined, as it is for adults aged over 21, as the aggregate of a custodial term and an extension period during which the offender is to be subject to a licence. A serious terrorism sentence is to be imposed where there is a significant risk to the public of serious harm caused by the offender in future terrorism offences where the court does not impose a life sentence and where the multiple deaths condition as defined in the Bill is met, so these are indeed very serious offences. The term of the sentence is defined as a minimum custodial period of 14 years and an extension period of between seven and 25 years. There is a very limited exception to the requirement to impose a serious terrorism sentence on detention where there are exceptional circumstances that relate to the offence or to the offender which justify not imposing the sentence.

I accept entirely that these are very serious offences so the sentences are very serious indeed, but for young offenders aged 18 they are what might be called “no hope” sentences. A period of 14 years in prison in a young offender institution would take the young offender to the age of 32.

There may be many cases where such a sentence is justified, but there are—or may be—others where it is simply too great. Our Amendment 4 would provide for a minimum term of 10 years instead of 14 years, without affecting the judge’s discretion in an appropriate case to impose a custodial term of longer than 10 years if that would be the appropriate sentence for the offence under the general provision of the Sentencing Code. Amendment 4 is balanced by Amendment 5, which adjusts the minimum term on licence upwards from seven years to 10 years.

The rationale behind these amendments is that there is a wealth of evidence for a number of propositions. For younger people in particular, the effect of very long custodial terms is particularly destructive, depriving them of their chances of education and building productive lives. For young people in particular, even those convicted of terrorist offences, there is hope of rehabilitation, deradicalisation and using educational opportunities to help turn their lives around and give them chances to make worthwhile lives for themselves even at the end of a long custodial sentence. Young people in particular benefit from the help and support to be offered by the probation service and others to offenders released on licence, and may benefit to a greater extent than older offenders from both deradicalisation programmes and education—vocational and general—which they might undertake on licence to help them come to terms with the real world on their release after what is anyway a very long sentence.

I therefore suggest that it would be of advantage to society, and to us all, to rebalance the division of a serious terrorism sentence, so as to have a greater period on licence to follow a minimum period in custody, which, while still very long, would be somewhat less draconian than presently proposed, and would not affect the right of the judge to impose a longer sentence in an appropriate case. I beg to move.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I am always intrigued by the thought processes that must be brought into play in fixing a minimum sentence in a Bill. I would like the Minister to outline what consultation there has been concerning the minimum sentence of 14 years for a young offender between the ages of 18 and 21—a “no-hope sentence”, as my noble friend Lord Marks described it a moment ago, and I completely concur with everything that he said. I cannot imagine that it is a Minister who initially chooses the minimum number of years for imprisonment. Somebody in the Ministry of Justice must have drunk his cup of coffee and plumped for a figure to put in for the Minister to sign off on. I do not suppose he will ever have met a young offender—“Let’s just say 14 years sounds good.”

I want to contrast this with the role of a sentencing judge whose sentencing discretion is not bound by statute. The judge sitting in a serious case of terrorism would not be there if he had not had a lifetime of experience in the criminal courts, developing his instinct and his trained capacity to weigh the seriousness of one case against another. Other experienced practitioners and academics who have studied criminology have provided the judge with sentencing guidelines. They give him a guide to the accepted range and indicate what aggravating or mitigating factors he should have in mind. In addition, the judge will have the benefit of counsel’s submissions and a probation report from an experienced officer that will give him an insight into the background of the defendant. There may also be medical reports and, sometimes, witnesses prepared to speak up on the young man’s behalf.

This clause introduces an arbitrary minimum sentence as the guideline unless there are “exceptional circumstances”. There are no guidelines as to what those exceptional circumstances are: if the past is any guide, we will have to wait for the Court of Appeal to lay them down. The minimum sentence is chosen by a civil servant who, in all probability, has never been inside a court. So we get an arbitrary 14-year minimum sentence and an arbitrary seven years on licence. What is the evidence that this is the correct balance? Who said that? Why cannot a judge be left to do his job?

It seems to me that the only purpose of a minimum sentence is to make a single day’s headlines to the effect that the Government are being tough on crime, and specifically on terrorism. There is no question of looking at the individual who is before the court, and considering his future, his welfare, his rehabilitation or whatever. In putting forward this amendment, my noble friend is testing the rationale for the balance in the Bill, and I look forward to a full exposition from the Minister in due course.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, concluded his remarks by saying that the amendment was “testing the rationale” of these sentences, and that is indeed clearly the case. The first amendment reduces the minimum term in custody and the second increases the period on licence. Both the noble Lords, Lord Thomas and Lord Marks, referred to these as “no-hope sentences”. I understand the sentiment they expressed on these extremely long and very serious sentences being given to children—but they are not really no-hope sentences, are they? YOT and, more likely, probation and the Prison Service will have been working with these people for many years to give them hope that, when they get out of prison and are on licence and, eventually, off licence, they can go on to lead a constructive life.

Now this is a very tall hurdle. I understand that; we are dealing with the most serious sentences that one can imagine. Nevertheless, that is the role of probation and it is very important, I would say, for the young person to see that there is hope at the end of the period, because it is far more likely that, if they see that hope, they will engage constructively with people in prison and carry on that constructive intervention when they leave on licence. So I have some questions for the Minister. What assessment has been done of the likelihood of reform of offenders—is there any data on that? Also, what is the number of young offenders now in custody who are likely to be in custody as a result of this legislation? Are there any examples of where longer custodial sentences have helped young people to go on to lead lives in which they no longer offend?

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We believe in judicial discretion, for all the reasons mentioned by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford in relation to the previous group, and for all the reasons which we discussed in the previous short debate. We do not believe that Parliament or any Minister can foresee what circumstances might persuade a judge to exercise less severity in these very serious offences. However, I suggest that the use of the word “exceptional” introduces a straitjacket, and I make that suggestion on the authorities because the use of the word “exceptional” places the judge in the position of having to make a finding that the circumstances are exceptional: that is, that they are so far away from the norm as to justify a finding, effectively, of fact that they are an exception. Without such a finding, he cannot use any discretion. The lack of discretion, I suggest, can be inimical to the interests of justice, and for that reason I invite the Committee to agree ultimately to a different formulation and invite the Government to consider a formulation that allows just a bit more flexibility than the Bill as drafted permits. I beg to move.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]]

[Inaudible]—is in relation to the necessity for the judge at trial to have full discretion in passing sentence. I do not wish to repeat that, but I will add a particular comment. When a judge is faced with a provision such as this, he has to define those circumstances which influence him. He has to set out in his sentencing remarks precisely what factors influence him. Things have moved very considerably over the decades away from the swift disposal of a defendant by a judge with very little comment. What he says is important not just for the defendant to understand why he is being sentenced in that way but of course, if there should be any appeal on sentence, for the Court of Appeal to understand precisely what it was at the time that the judge had in mind. “Exceptional” circumstances is too great an imposition on the judge’s discretion and I believe that my noble friend’s proposal that it should be “significant” is right.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Thomas, have explained their thinking behind the amendment to replace “exceptional” with “significant” to give more discretion to the judge. As the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, said, in any event a judge will explain the reason for finding exceptional or significant reasons for reducing a sentence.

My questions are for the Minister. What does he believe are exceptional circumstances, and what exceptional circumstances would justify a lesser sentence? In what circumstances would such lesser sentences be appropriate?

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[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 9 in this group. Both are minor technical amendments to Clause 23. Amendment 8 would make a minor amendment to Clause 23, which introduces the terrorism sentence with fixed licence period in Scotland. The amendment would add the sentence of detention without time limit to the “waterfall” list of sentences of imprisonment and detention that a court can impose in relation to an offence. This would ensure that the new terrorism sentence was available only where a court did not impose a sentence in this list, which includes the indeterminate sentence of detention under Section 208, making the order of sentencing options clear.

Amendment 9 would simply remove a now redundant reference to new Section 205ZC(6) in subsection (4) relating to the new terrorism sentence introduced in Clause 23 due to an amendment to that provision on Report in the Commons. Subsection (4) defines the meaning of the aggregate term in relation to a sentence of detention in respect of the new terrorism sentence in Scotland, as it applies to offenders of at least 16 years of age but under 21. I beg to move.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]]

My Lords, the Minister’s words brought to mind many waterfalls that I know and love in Scotland, but I will forgo the opportunity to comment on Scottish criminal law. I am sure that both these minor and technical amendments are perfectly justified and I have no more to say about them.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, for the clarity with which he introduced these two technical amendments. Perhaps I may ask two questions. First, on Amendment 8, what would the implications have been had this amendment not been made? I was not clear from what he said whether it would change any position. Secondly, in relation to Amendment 9, how many further convictions would have been included without the decision to limit the availability of the new sentence to cases of conviction on indictment?

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[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]]

These are three simple amendments dealing with the sentencing framework for England, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The Bill as drafted removes the chance of parole for anybody, irrespective of their age, if they have committed a dangerous terrorist offence. As I have made clear, we on this side of the House are keen that there be strong penalties, because the aim is to prevent terrorism. However, we do not think it right that the possibility of parole be removed altogether for those people convicted when they are under the age of 21.

There are three reasons for that. First, the possibility of change must be higher when you are under 21. We are not starry-eyed about this, but that possibility should be there. Secondly, it will make prisoner management easier, as all prison governors attest. Thirdly, you avoid the possibility of the detention of someone over a very long period of time, and the sense that that person has served his sentence will create a recruiting sergeant in certain communities.

Each case has to be looked at on its merits; release would occur only when the Parole Board was satisfied. Occasions when mistakes have been made are all too well known and, indeed, have inspired this Bill. But if the aim is to provide as much security as possible for the community as a whole, then removing the chance of parole for anybody under 21—and it is only a chance of parole—is a mistake. I beg to move.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]]

The law has always distinguished between the adult and the young offender in many ways. Policy has always been to make every effort to rehabilitate the young before they become hardened criminals. It is even more important not to turn them into hardened terrorists.

“What works?” asked the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton—the Scottish wing of the strike force. A large incentive when persuading offenders to amend their ways is the fact that they have their chance, before the Parole Board, to have release if it is appropriate and safe.

The outcome of prison is the person who walks out of the gate at the end of the sentence. What has happened to him inside? Has he been radicalised or rehabilitated? Some go in with no particular ideology and are radicalised. Others go in radicalised and must be given the opportunity to change their lives. They should be managed with the personnel and tools described by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart.

Young people can rehabilitate if they are given the courses and programmes that exist to enable them to gain skills to support themselves outside the prison environment. The longer the sentence, the more difficult that is. Prisoners convicted of terrorist offences provide a further problem. Have they retained the beliefs that got them into trouble in the first place? Or are they still radicalised? I was pleased to hear of the theological and ideological interventions that are promised to deal with problems such as those.

I support these amendments, because I believe we should continue that long-held view that young people should be treated differently and given a chance to turn their lives in a different direction.

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[Lord Naseby (Con) [V]]

My Lords, the Bill makes a welcome change to the sentencing, release and monitoring of terrorism offenders by toughening up the law. This is a time of higher risk—something that has not been referred to by our noble friends the lawyers. I am no lawyer, but I study the Middle East and south Asia in some depth, and I have lived abroad for a number of years. I have very good contacts in those parts of the world and, in my judgment, the risk of terrorism at this time is higher than we have ever experienced.

I might say as a side issue that I get concerned when organisations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and others call vociferously for the deletion of Clauses 37, 38 and 40. I am, frankly, not impressed by their objectivity. I wish I could be, but they and others I could mention, such as Freedom from Torture, do not in my experience bring objectivity to these types of cases. I contrast that with the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the ICRC—although it is not involved in these cases on the whole—and Médecins Sans Frontières, both of which are involved in issues relating to torture, and they are very objective in their assessments.

It is objectivity that one wants. The British public has to understand and be convinced that any change that is made will help to deal with terrorism. I think, on having looked at the Bill, that Clause 27 is right. It is all very well for noble Lords to say that the numbers who abscond or the cases where people are released early are small, but the number of people who were killed in Manchester was not small. In most places where there is terrorist activity, the numbers are not small. I see my role in the upper House as being one where I look after the British public. It is not a risk assessment. The only risk is that someone will reoffend. When facing the challenge of that situation, I do not think that we can suggest to the British public that some of these men and women who have carried out heinous crimes should be released early on an objective risk assessment.

I make one other point. As it happens, I am doing a bit of work on national service, something which older Members of your Lordships’ House may well have done in the Army, the Royal Navy or the Royal Air Force. In my case, I was a pilot in the air force. I think of myself at the age of 21. We were all 18 years old when we did our national service. We were young men who were risking our lives and we were ready to fight; many lost their lives. I wonder whether 21 is too high an age; I personally would drop it to 18, which was the age at which you had to do your national service. However, that goes rather wider than what we are considering here.

As far as I am concerned, the Government are taking absolutely the right road. We have to toughen up on sentencing and we have to toughen up on early release and the monitoring of offenders because the risks at this point in time are very real.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) (V)]

My Lords, by coincidence I am once again following the noble Lord, Lord Naseby. I would remind him that there have been high-risk periods before. His words reminded me of the Brighton bomb case, in which I took a part. The person I represented had been involved in a bombing campaign that covered some 28 seaside resorts, and the Brighton bomb case was the final one. When I look at Clause 31, I reflect on that case, because that clause, like the other clauses we are dealing with, is the one which says that there should be no parole for terrorism offences committed in Northern Ireland. In the Brighton bomb case, those who were convicted and sent to prison within weeks of the Belfast agreement were returned to Northern Ireland to serve out their sentences there—and within a very short time they were released. We have faced problems like this before.

The benefits of a two-thirds release system have been outlined by previous speakers: they encourage people to behave while in prison and to engage in deradicalisation and rehabilitation courses. That is done to persuade the Parole Board that the individual is safe to be released—to advance by hope and decrease hopelessness, as my noble friend Lord Marks put it. The Parole Board ought to have a role in this, and I was impressed by the views expressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, that perhaps the Parole Board should at least have a role in advising on the conditions of release as opposed to the governor taking on the role, as is being proposed.

There are dangers in automatic release at the end of a sentence. No doubt the full sentence has been completed, but the automatic release at the end of that time without any Parole Board involvement is a danger, as my noble friend Lord Marks and the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, have argued. I do not think that the solutions that have been developed and put into the Bill are necessarily the right ones, so I support my noble friend in his attempt to have these clauses removed.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) (V)]

My Lords, we have had interesting debates on both this and the previous group. In closing the previous group, the Minister said that the proposed lack of involvement of the probation service in this particular group of prisoners was a consequence of the sentencing structure and was not a reflection on the Parole Board itself. I understand the point he has made, but what has been said repeatedly on both groups is that there is expertise in the Parole Board. My noble and learned friend Lord Falconer asked whether there were two elements here. One is the possibility of early release, while the second is a point raised again just now by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, about the conditions of release for a prisoner who has served their whole term. I do not understand why that level of expertise should not be accessed when considering these types of prisoners.

I shall make a couple of other brief points which are different from those which have been made by other noble Lords. They arise from briefings that I have had from the trade unions. The Prison Officers’ Association believes that removing hope from prisoners puts its staff at risk. It is a point that the association makes repeatedly and is an important one to feed into this debate. The second point has been made by the National Association of Probation Officers—that is that the workload of probation staff working on the ground in prisons is so high that they are not managing to deliver to their required standards. They are being allocated around 70 prisoners each. I understand that the Minister has talked about these various programmes, and I know that we are talking about a very extreme group of prisoners. Nevertheless there is the practical working position of prison officers, probation staff and others in prisons to consider in trying to make these institutions work and to reduce recidivism when prisoners are released.

Even so, both the group of amendments we are speaking to now and the previous group illustrate the potential for changing the Bill to bring the Parole Board back in. That would reduce the potential risk to the public.

Courts: Resourcing and Staffing

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Thursday 14th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, I regret that the balance and good humour shown by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Saville of Newdigate, in his excellent maiden speech was not available to us during the testing times when we were discussing the legality of the war in Iraq and all the legislation that followed. I look forward to hearing a great deal more from him. I express my personal regret that the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has decided not to continue in post. I can understand why he has taken that decision.

I also congratulate the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, on securing this important debate and repeat what he said: the system is in a sorry state. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, reminds me of the old Stafford Assizes Court. On the wall was a plaque which recorded the longest trial in English legal history—as I recall, it was a Victorian plaque, and I think it was 17 days, which is very different from the length of trials we get today. I blame the Xerox machine. It was when the Xerox machine came in that we were swamped with paper. Today that mass of paper is scanned and digitised by any sensible advocate, but the huge amount of material now put before counsel is quite out of scale to what happened before.

“Case management” is a good phrase, but what it actually means is constant visits to criminal courts on applications that are unnecessary and, more importantly, unpaid, such as bail hearings and plea and directions hearings. In the last case I appeared in, some two years ago, there were five such hearings for matters which could easily have been resolved over the phone or by email. Most were to inquire how the CPS was getting on with the disclosure of exhibits and unused witness material. Although I was appearing there for nothing to allow my junior to make a living by appearing in other cases, very often there were counsel for the prosecution and for other defendants who had nothing to do with the case who had simply had the papers thrust into their hands by the clerk of chambers the night before.

Problems seem to have arisen with prison production delays. Where is that prison van? How much time do you have to see your client before the hearing commences? Day after day you could have an extra cup of coffee in the canteen well knowing that your client had not arrived. The noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, referred to interpreters. In the case I referred to, the Farsi interpreter was saying whatever he wanted to say rather than translating what was going on. Fortunately my junior was a Farsi speaker, so that interpreter lasted a morning before he was replaced, but a whole day was lost as a result of the freelance interpreter who had been employed in that case. Witnesses get lost. You can always guarantee that if the police go off on a motorbike, that is the end of that. You will never see them again. Jurors are always late arriving and are sometimes not there at all, particularly in London. In the criminal courts, there are computer difficulties with out-of-date equipment and grudging use of equipment such as photocopiers, particularly for defence counsel.

Another issue is social inquiry reports. In my youth, the probation officer was pretty independent and you could reckon that he would give you a fair run for your money on behalf of your client. He now seems to be giving recommendations to the court about the risk to the public of the defendant being at large, very often without even seeing the defendant. That has happened in a number of cases in which I have been involved. Risk is the primary cause why sentences have increased to the extent they have, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, pointed out. I agree that the level of sentencing has increased beyond all recognition.

There are other problems, including court closure. I come from a rural area. Rural transport is very difficult. It seems to be assumed by the Lord Chancellor that everybody has access to a car and does not have to rely on buses that go once a day. At one time, justice was brought to the people. Magistrates’ courts in my part of the world were held anywhere. I recall appearing in Pwllheli where they had to cover-up the snooker table before the court sat. The doughty clerk of that court was Mr William Lloyd George, later archdruid of Wales, who went under the bardic title of Ap Llysor, which means “son of a solicitor”. Justice came to the people. We had five assize courts. There are now two court centres in Caernarfon and Mold. In reading the Library Note, I was amused that the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee found that in north Wales there is a seven in 10 chance that a Crown Court trial will go ahead on the date specified. The same report says that in Manchester there is only a two in 10 chance of a trial going ahead on the date specified. That is disgraceful, and it just shows the lack of proper organisation that exists at that sort of level. Given the loss of time and wages for victims, witnesses and litigants, it is not surprising that the evidence given to the House of Commons committee was that only 55% of those who had been a witness were prepared to do it again. Some of them had waited for hours, while some were not told why they had been sent home—the defendant had pleaded guilty—so they were unwilling to be witnesses ever again.

My noble friend Lord Lester has dealt with legal aid. Legal aid exhausted me at the time of the coalition Government and I do not propose to go any further on that topic.

The Rolls Building is described by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, as an exception. I do not doubt for a moment the quality of justice that goes on in that building, which advertises itself as,

“the largest specialist centre for the resolution of financial, business and property litigation anywhere in the world … A centre of excellence for high value dispute resolution”,

with,

“31 court rooms, including 3 ‘super courts’ to handle the very largest international and national high value disputes and 4 courts configured in ‘landscape’ format for multi party cases”.

It also says that it has:

“In court facilities for parties to use their own IT, including electronic presentation of evidence and cabled broadband”.

So when I appeared there some three years ago, I thought I was going to get Rolls-Royce treatment. Far from it. My experience was that it was light years behind the Old Bailey. The equipment was not available for giving an Excel presentation; I was told, “You can’t use that cable; it belongs to someone else who came here and left it behind”. The robing room contained the cleaning staff, who were eating their sandwiches and drinking cups of tea, and the toilets were filthy. I wrote to my noble friend Lord McNally about it at the time, and I hope it has improved.

We were in the middle of a case one day and the alarm system went off. A voice said that everyone had to leave the Rolls Building. There is a circular staircase but it was cracked and we could not get down it. I saw a sign saying “Emergency exit” so I headed for it, but I was stopped by a man in uniform who said, “This is for staff only”. “I could die,” I said, “you’ve got to let me through,” but no, it was for staff only. Ultimately I found myself outside, to discover that it was only an exercise. So do not talk to me about the Rolls Building as being the centre of everything that is good.

Much has been made in this debate about the judicial system. I do not have time to go into that. All I will say is that we need strong judges to deal with government, even more at this time than perhaps at any other. Michael Gove, before he departed, commented on 23 June 2015 that,

“dedicated court staff cope with those snow drifts of paper, archaic IT systems and cumbersome processes … it astonishes businesses and individuals alike that they cannot easily file their case online”.

What a pity that he departed for different pursuits.

The House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, in its report Efficiency in the Criminal Justice System in May 2016, said:

“Central government spending on the criminal justice system has fallen by 26%”.

Where has the money gone? Into prisons. They are building one in my home town, not far from where I live. I hope the new Lord Chancellor has time to buckle down and show that she can reform and run the system efficiently at every level.

Sexual Offences: False Accusations

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Thursday 10th March 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

I am sure that there will be a lot of sympathy around the House and elsewhere for what the noble Lord says. Of course, we must not interfere with police operational independence. However, the points that he eloquently makes about proportionality in view of the death of Sir Edward and the likelihood of any significant evidence one way or another being unearthed at this stage are valuable, and I take them on board.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, there are sound public policy reasons for keeping the anonymity of a complainant throughout the trial and beyond, but are there not also sound public policy reasons for giving the trial judge the discretion, after an acquittal, to consider whether the identity of the complainant should be released if he is satisfied that it is a false accusation and not tainted by mental illness?

[Lord Faulks]

The noble Lord makes an important point. But of course, he will know only too well that someone who has had a false complaint made against them is vulnerable to prosecution for perjury, perverting the course of justice or wasting police time, and that an individual has the right to sue for malicious prosecution or defamation. So remedies do exist.

Insurance Industry: Whiplash

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Tuesday 1st March 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

My noble friend is quite right to draw the House’s attention to the very major problem of the significant increase in the number of claims and our large number of claims in comparison with other European countries. One of the reasons that insurers give for settling these claims is that it costs them too much to fight the case. Of course, if our plans to raise the small claims limit to £5,000 come into effect, this will no longer continue to be a valid reason for not contesting claims. Anyone who is notified of what sounds suspiciously like a fraud should not do anything to encourage it. If individuals are invited to take part in such an endeavour, they are potentially committing a criminal offence.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, the Minister referred to the court costs. Have the coalition’s policies of banning referral fees produced any results? Has the number of frauds gone down? Are there any statistics on that as yet, following the Insurance Act 2015?

[Lord Faulks]

The Government are attacking this problem on a number of different fronts. Referral fees is one; the LASPO reforms is another; and there is the MedCo portal, which means that all whiplash injuries must go via a neutral evaluation with limited costs. All are contributing to a decrease in the number of whiplash claims, but there are still too many, and we still feel that there is fraud at the root of all this.

FIFA

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Thursday 4th June 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, this is a fast-unfolding story. I am sure we can be generous enough to acknowledge the major contribution the United States Department of Justice has made to this matter. In the mean time, we stand ready to assist. It is a fast-developing situation. The SFO has been aware of allegations relating to FIFA for some years. It is keeping the situation under review and is ready to assist in any way it can. We do not think there is a lack of resources. Although the SFO is involved in a number of high-profile and difficult cases, including the LIBOR manipulation, resources are not an issue in this case.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, soliciting a bribe is a crime. Will the SFO make inquiries of the members of the England bid team for the 2018 World Cup, which achieved only two votes out of 22 from the committee, about whether they were approached by anybody for a sweetener in relation to their bid?

[Lord Faulks]

The Swiss authority’s investigation is particularly focused on the 2018 World Cup bid on the basis that the jurisdiction is based on FIFA being a Swiss private company. If there is any information that we have in this country, we stand ready to assist on that, too.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Monday 1st June 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, in a debate in the other place shortly after the European convention was signed in October 1950, the Conservative spokesman, Duncan Sandys, son-in-law to Winston Churchill, welcomed the convention as a binding treaty, fashioned as it had been, as other speakers have noted, by Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, later Lord Kilmuir. He said that it imposed a common obligation,

“on all the signatory States, to assure to their citizens the rights which it contains. What perhaps is the most novel and important feature of this Convention is … the setting up of a European Court of Human Rights, to which cases … can be referred for adjudication”.

He added:

“It is rare for a democracy to be overthrown in one single sweep. There is almost always a twilight period, during which human rights and civil liberties are being progressively curtailed and undermined. It is in this critical stage that the publication of the proceedings and the judgments of the Court might very well have a decisive influence”.—[Official Report, Commons, 13/11/1950; cols. 1412-13.]

Emrys Roberts, the Liberal MP for Merioneth, whom I later came to know well, said that the rise of fascism in Italy and Spain and the aggression of Nazi Germany might have been prevented if the human rights contained in the convention could have been guaranteed by all the states of Europe. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, said, that was the context in which the convention came into being. Mr Roberts said:

“Every State that refuses to sign the Convention on Human Rights will stand condemned in the eyes of the public of Europe”.—[Official Report, Commons, 13/11/1950; col. 1468.]

As it turns out, the convention and the court have been great successes. In my own field of law, military justice, the successive decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in the 1990s were the decisive influence in causing this Parliament radically to reform the military justice system so as to bring it into line with modern standards of justice. It is dismaying to hear suggestions that the military should be excluded from the protection of the convention, not just for themselves but for the people who may be in their custody. That was an issue that was very live during the second war in Iraq.

The right-wing press with which we are blessed seem incapable of grasping that the European Court of Human Rights is not an offshoot of their hated European Union, and has no power to bind our Supreme Court or to enforce its decisions. Putting aside these misconceptions, it is necessary to grapple with the arguments put forward by the serious proponents of a British Bill, the two junior Ministers now at the Ministry of Justice, Mr Dominic Raab and the noble Lord, Lord Faulks.

First, they are right to argue that some of the judges of the present court lack weight and experience and to point to the huge backlog of cases, but these are questions that have already been addressed. The Brighton declaration in 2012, following the high-level conference under the chairmanship of the UK, called for the court to concentrate on the most serious violations of human rights, for the amending of the convention to enable trivial cases to be thrown out at an early stage and for the continued refinement of the process of selecting judges. The answer is not to remove from the European court the highly experienced and competent British judges but to demand a better system of appointment from other member countries. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, could enlighten us as to how far the Brighton declaration is being followed up.

Secondly, the noble Lord and Mr Raab argue that the European court has extended its remit with a degree of judicial creativity and activism that is unacceptable. They cite in particular the issue of prisoner voting. They regard such a question as falling well within the margin of appreciation that should be accorded to a democratic national order governed by the rule of law. However, that means we stand next to Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary and Russia; of the 47 countries in the Council of Europe, those are the only ones that have a total ban on prisoner voting, and they are not perhaps the most progressive regimes. Enlightened opinion on this side of the House believes that, as in other major European countries such as France and Germany, it is in the public interest to help to rehabilitate those prisoners who are serving small or medium-term sentences by giving them a stake in the political process. I was interested in the possible solution to the impasse suggested by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, and no doubt that will be followed up.

A third area of criticism is the question of deportation. Here the argument is that the British courts have pre-empted decisions in Strasbourg by allowing prisoners to resist deportation on the grounds that their rights to a family life under Article 8 of the convention would be breached. Yet in the case of RB (Algeria) in 2009 the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, stated that he could find no Strasbourg case where deportation had been overruled on human rights grounds other than under Articles 2 or 3—that is, a risk to life or the possibility of torture. Preventing deportation under Article 8—a risk to family life—is a British-made law. In an individual case, it may indeed be a merciful and just decision. My noble friend Lord Marks was right to point out that most of the decisions that attract such awful publicity are decisions not by the European court in Strasbourg but by courts in this country, upheld very frequently in the Supreme Court.

However, I suggest that the criticisms from the noble Lord and Mr Raab pale into insignificance when compared with the real gains that the convention has meant for the vulnerable in our society. Decisions have led to the protection of people against state power and led to changes in the law and in regulations concerning care homes, child victims of abuse and trafficking, women subject to domestic and sexual violence, those with disabilities and victims of crime.

Today the press have suggested that the Prime Minister is at odds with Mrs May and Mr Gove on the issue of withdrawal from the convention. Good. The shades of Duncan Sandys and Lord Kilmuir will doubtless applaud him, and I am sure that he will have the full support of this House. This is a particular issue where the ancient Salisbury convention, which was invented for another time and another constitution of this House, surely cannot have effect. This House will say no.

Criminal Bar: Funding

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Thursday 15th January 2015 Grand Committee

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, I, too, thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, for introducing this debate. My interests are declared. I started off as a salaried partner in a small country solicitors’ office in north Wales in 1961 on a salary of £1,000 a year. Despite our limitations, we could provide for our clients the highest quality of representation in criminal cases via the availability of legal aid and the existence of a strong and expert independent Bar. I could and did instruct on behalf of legally aided clients Lord Elwyn-Jones, Lord Hooson, Sir Ronald Waterhouse, Sir Robin David and other distinguished barristers of the Wales and Chester circuit. Incidentally, I was present with Lord Hooson on the last day of the Moors murder trial. I took him for a cup of tea afterwards, which he almost certainly needed after sentencing.

In every serious criminal case, there was a team on both the prosecution and the defence side led by outstanding silks who were capable of guiding the preparation of cases, were accustomed to taking big decisions and to giving wholly independent advice. In those days, there were the resources of time and money to ensure that cases were properly prepared and presented by experienced people, and I believe that the interests of justice and of the community were properly served. I like to think that my own generation at the Bar preserved those traditions and that the quality of service in Wales with outstanding advocacy from Gareth Williams, Alex Carlile and others has made sure that those traditions continue. Those who have succeeded us have struggled with increasing cutbacks. The input of an experienced solicitor in court disappeared long ago, and it is not only on the defence side that standards have slipped. A lack of resources on the prosecution side has also increased delays and wasted time and money.

But while there were difficulties in the recent past, there was nothing on the scale of the cutbacks now being pursued by the Lord Chancellor. In my view, they will destroy the criminal Bar. Like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, I could not possibly advise a bright youngster to embark on such a career at the present time. There is nothing in it; there are no glittering prizes to reward years of study and struggle. Certificates for leading counsel are granted by judges through gritted teeth, and the fees are a fraction of what they once were.

Solicitors concerned in criminal work now have to become solicitor advocates in order to survive financially, and routinely take the work on which entrants to the criminal Bar would in former days have depended, and it does not stop there. If leading counsel today has a junior at all, it is like as not a solicitor advocate with a direct financial interest in the instructing firm. This often leads to inexperienced and insufficiently qualified persons in that important role. If anyone doubts that, I recall a recent case in a court adjoining the one in which I was appearing where the solicitor advocate junior applied immediately for an adjournment when he was called upon to cover for his temporarily absent leader.

Barristers’ fees in the Crown Court account for around £300 million of the criminal legal aid budget. They have been effectively static since 1997, during which period retail prices have increased by 54% and public sector pay by 49.9%. The average annual payment to criminal barristers made by the Legal Services Commission, including all graduated and VHCC cases in the year 2011-12 was £52,000, from which they paid all their expenses, including up to 20% for chambers’ fees.

The Next Steps consultation by the Ministry of Justice was found to be defective in the High Court on judicial review. That consultation paper was introduced with the following statement by the Minister:

“This is a comprehensive package of reform, based on extensive consultation. I believe it offers value for the taxpayer, stability for the professions and access to justice for all”.

I absolutely and profoundly disagree. In that paper, no attempt was made to evaluate the financial consequences of the proposed changes. They were said to be “uncertain”. They are not at all uncertain. They will do significant harm to the criminal justice system by damaging the supply and the quality of the criminal advocacy service. As a result of the judicial review application, last September the Ministry of Justice was forced to disclose the KPMG report which it had commissioned to advise it. Only then did it appear that the ministry had told KPMG to make broad assumptions about cost savings, profit margins and the availability of investment capital for restructuring businesses which appear to have been plucked out of the air and were completely without evidential foundation. Yet after a further three-week consultation forced upon them last September, the Lord Chancellor persisted in adhering broadly to his original cuts, and his conclusions are now again subject to renewed judicial review application. Are the public to be properly served?

When I look around the area designated in north-east Wales, from Llandudno to Llangollen, an hour and a half’s travel, and consider that the two custody suites are at St Asaph and Wrexham, some 35 miles apart, I find it impossible to conceive that the interests of the public in access to justice, whether in the English or Welsh language, can be served by the wholesale reduction of legal aid contracts to two firms of solicitors. The knock-on effect on the local Bar in Chester will be considerable.

The response to the original Next Steps consultation by Treasury counsel, which conducts the most serious and complex prosecutions in this country at the Old Bailey, put the position very well, saying that:

“skilled and experienced defence advocates, whose capacity and ability inspires the confidence of the court, the prosecution and their professional and lay clients … shorten, straighten, sustain and hasten the trial process: their continued presence is nothing less than vital”.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, pointed out, our judiciary is largely drawn from experienced counsel. Destroy the Bar and the whole foundation of our judicial system is put at risk.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Tuesday 9th December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, I am moved to continue with Wales because I acted for my community—the Gresford community—when there was a proposal to opencast mine part of Gresford colliery at a time when there were about 260 bodies still buried in it as a result of the 1934 disaster. Your Lordships will appreciate how people felt about that: they felt that there had been a stitch-up between the National Coal Board and the local authority.

Since the matter had not been properly advertised, we took it to judicial review. We could not, however, expect every member of the community to be involved, so a committee of about eight people was set up to instruct solicitors and counsel to appear on this judicial review. It is those eight people I am thinking about, who might be found liable for costs. I can tell your Lordships that even then—back in the 1970s or maybe the early 1980s—costs were a considerable issue for these people before becoming involved in this matter. The result was that the judicial review was successful. The county council advertised properly and the villagers —the community—then made contributions to the consultation that took place. Although the decision to permit opencast mining went ahead, it was with very stringent conditions. The National Coal Board was very concerned to keep to those conditions, so the work was carried out strictly in accordance with them and the land was replaced to such a degree that it is now the training ground for Wrexham Football Club. Your Lordships will appreciate that in that case a decision was taken that excluded a community which had the highest sensitivities about what had happened. The fear of costs was something that might have deterred that successful action altogether.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

I wish to support the Motion of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and resist the Minister’s Motion on rather a broader basis than perhaps has been suggested so far. The problem, or one of the problems, with the Minister’s Motion is that it leaves intact the central thrust of Clauses 65 and 66, which were of course objected to and disagreed with by the Commons on the basis set out in Commons Reason 106A:

“Because it is appropriate to impose duties, rather than confer discretions, on the High Court”,

et cetera. My deep disagreement with that basis of rejection is that I do not believe it is appropriate in this jurisdiction to impose duties and to narrow or eliminate discretions on the part of the judiciary.

In Committee in July, I suggested that it is difficult to think of any area of law less suitable than this one for this sort of legislative interference. We are here concerned with the inherent supervisory jurisdiction of the courts to hold the Government to account; to ensure that the rule of the law is observed when the Executive take action. Yet here is another example of the Government seeking to weaken those powers with the inevitable chilling effect, and in many cases making it practically impossible to bring a challenge. The fresh ministerial amendments still leave intact the provision that you cannot bring judicial review unless you give a whole series of particulars about how the process is to be funded.

In that same debate, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern—my respect and admiration for him is second to none, not least since he had the sagacity 22 years ago to promote me to the Court of Appeal—rightly pointed out that it was the judges themselves who had originally sought to underpin the rule of court under which judges had previously exercised their judicial review jurisdiction by giving it legislative form. Thus was enacted the section of which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, spoke a little earlier: Section 31 of what used to be called the Supreme Court Act but, since the invention of a Supreme Court, is now called the Senior Courts Act. However, it must be recognised that Section 31 merely facilitated the exercise of the judges’ supervisory jurisdiction; in no way did it seek to constrain, limit or inhibit it. It imposed no duties on the judges and you will search it in vain to find such.

Now, though, in this clause, as in the one that we discussed a little earlier, the Government are intent on seeking to eliminate the judges’ powers and to impose duties upon them. I echo what the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said about the earlier proposal: this is an amendment of constitutional importance. In truth, it is not a party political matter. It is a question of where the boundary should be drawn between the Executive and the judiciary. The judiciary in this country, unlike its American counterpart, has always fully recognised the sovereignty of Parliament. We do not strike down primary legislation. Parliament, in turn, has not hitherto sought to whittle down the judges’ supervisory jurisdiction, and it is really inappropriate that they should now start to do so.

If the Government have their way on this or, on reconsideration later, on the previous or the next amendment, the constitutional balance will have shifted. The fact is that the Motions that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is advancing are ones that are truly worth fighting for.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Monday 27th October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (LD)]

My Lords, my name is added to a number of these amendments, and I will not repeat everything that has already been said, most especially by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and my noble friend Lord Marks. However, I cannot let this debate pass without making three comments about the unusual speech made by my noble friend Lord Horam.

First, his speech was inaccurate. He blamed judicial review for delays in infrastructure development and for making infrastructure development more expensive. Had my noble friend taken the trouble to read the successful judicial reviews of infrastructure development, he would have found that in 95% of the cases—and I may be underestimating that—the judicial review was granted because of the incompetence and sloppiness of officialdom ranging from government departments through to local authorities and other statutory organisations. The answer to that is for those public authorities to prepare their cases properly, to make their planning applications in due form and for Ministers, in appropriate cases, to call in major planning issues so that they can be decided more quickly.

Secondly, my noble friend’s speech was unusually statist. In his career he has, in a very distinguished way, exercised his principles repeatedly, having been a member of three political parties. As I understand it, he left his first party—the old Labour Party—because he regarded it as too statist, yet nothing could sound more statist than what he said just a few minutes ago. I am personally in favour of HS2, fracking and the Severn barrage.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

Hear, hear.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas. However, I would be the last person to deny those who are opposed to those sometimes controversial schemes the opportunity to question them, if appropriate, by way of judicial review. Taking the contrary view is statism of the most extraordinary kind.

Thirdly, my noble friend’s speech was unjust because it seemed to remove the notion that there should be issues of principle about which people can take dramatic action. He has done it himself twice by changing parties as he moved from old Labour towards the party which he now represents with distinction in your Lordships’ House. However, that is the sort of exercise of principle, on more than one occasion, which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, was talking about in moving the amendment. These are not pragmatic actions over small sums of damages; they are actions over great issues of principle. Even if some claimants would not actually win their personal actions for judicial review, we know, from the cases which we have all read and in which some in your Lordships’ House have appeared, that enormously important issues of principle for the future arise from them.

I will stray into future amendments, as others have done. Some of those points of principle have been made extremely successfully by interveners—NGOs that have chosen to put in submissions. Some have done so so effectively that their written submissions have changed the course of a case. Surely we should not inhibit justice by these rather mean provisions, which, in my view, my party—the Liberal Democrats—should never have given a single piece of powder or a single piece of shot to support.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Monday 14th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

I am very surprised that the noble Lord thinks that somehow the Ministry of Justice has failed to notice that it costs the Government a great deal of money to keep prisoners in custody. It is painfully aware of that, and of the cost. However, the ministry is also aware of its obligation for the protection of the public, and it is in balancing these issues that it comes to the very difficult decisions that it has to reach.

It is right that offenders serving indeterminate sentences—IPPs—should continue to be detained post tariff if their detention is necessary for the protection of the public and they are therefore not safe to release. There is evidence that IPP prisoners who take the opportunities presented to them to reduce their risk are beginning to achieve release in greater numbers. Since 2010 the number of IPP releases has grown, and we have seen over 400 IPP releases in 2012 and 2013. The percentage of IPP cases considered where release was ordered was 6% in the 2010-11 report, whereas in the 2012-13 report the figure was 16%.

Of course, we keep the matter under review. The amendment, as I understand it, would effectively lead to the prisoners who are within the scope of the amendment being automatically released, as it would mean that there was no discretion for the Parole Board to do other than to direct release. That is not the Government’s policy, as noble Lords are aware, and I will be unable to accept the amendment on those grounds.

I should also say that there would be difficulties with the amendment as it stands, regardless of the acceptability of the principle. The amendment would add a subsection to Section 128 of the LASPO Act directing the Parole Board to release IPP prisoners who had a tariff of less than two years. Section 128 is not about the duty to release indeterminate sentence prisoners but, rather, gives the Secretary of State the power to change the Parole Board’s release test by order. The amendment, however, appears to direct the Parole Board to release certain prisoners without any consideration of a test whatsoever.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, to whom I pay tribute, as others have, for his tenacity and his great concern for these prisoners—indeed, concern has been expressed for them all around the House—suggests that the amendment would be a gentle push. With very great respect to the noble and learned Lord, as it is currently expressed the amendment would be a very firm shove indeed. However, I understand that the intention is that these particular prisoners would be released at the point at which they would naturally fall due for Parole Board review, thus phasing their release. Presumably, the retention of the Parole Board’s role in the process is designed to align as much as possible with the current statutory arrangement. However, it would be problematic to give the duty to release to the Parole Board if in fact there was no discretion for the board under this proposal. For these reasons, I do not think that the amendment is the right way to achieve the noble Lords’ objectives.

However, in turning away and facing the principle rather than the detail, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, has chosen to concentrate on those with tariffs of under two years, who he suggests have been particularly disadvantaged as they could not have received an IPP after the 2008 changes to the IPP statute. In fact, it remained possible to receive an IPP with a tariff of lower than two years until IPPs were abolished, where the offender had a serious previous conviction, and a fair number continued to do so. While between 2005 and 2008 courts were obliged to impose IPPs in certain circumstances, this was only where they found the offender to meet the dangerousness threshold. The statute, however, did not oblige courts to find the offender dangerous if he had a previous Schedule 15 conviction and it was clear that the court need not conclude that a previous conviction made the offender dangerous if it would be unreasonable to do so.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, and some other noble Lords have seen an analysis of the management information that was put together last year relating to the situation of IPP prisoners who were sentenced before July 2008 with tariffs of under two years who remained in prisons and whose tariff had expired. It is the Government’s view that this analysis supports that position in respect of the group. It provided clear evidence that the continued detention of short-tariff IPP prisoners remains justified and that the Parole Board still considers that in many cases they pose an unacceptable risk to the general public and to themselves. The majority—80 prisoner cases of the 100 sampled—were assessed as at high risk of serious harm, whereas none was assessed as being at no risk of serious harm. Almost all of that sample had had recent parole hearings and were deemed unsuitable for release. However, the fact that 11% of the sample were in fact approved for release clearly also demonstrates that, where risk has been reduced enough to be safely managed in the community, short-tariff IPP prisoners are being approved for release by the Parole Board using the current release test.

I know that many noble Lords keep themselves closely informed of the National Offender Management Service’s ongoing work to enhance support for this group of prisoners, but a brief reprise of those efforts bears repeating. We have come a long way in terms of management and support since the introduction of the sentence. For example, NOMS has made substantial improvements to the waiting times for IPP and other indeterminate-sentence prisoners. Once they have been approved for open prisons, in addition IPP prisoners have improved access to accredited programmes and they remain a priority group for interventions. Sentence planning instructions have been overhauled to emphasise that there are a range of interventions, not just accredited programmes, that can provide useful evidence for parole hearings. This has also been emphasised in discussions with Parole Board members. Measures have been taken to ensure that programmes can be delivered more flexibly, supporting greater access and the inclusion of offenders with more complex needs, such as learning difficulties. NOMS will continue to oversee positive changes to the management of IPP prisoners. As I said earlier, the reality is that IPP prisoners are now achieving release in greater numbers under the current arrangements.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Before the Minister moves on, regulations were passed to permit lie detector tests to be carried out in respect of prisoners who are subject to IPP provisions. Are those tests carried out and, if so, what is the result? I have been informed by an experienced organisation that it is necessary to pass a lie detector test in order to establish that the particular offender is not at risk.

[Lord Faulks]

I am not aware of the question of lie detectors and whether or not they are used. I will write to the noble Lord when I have some information about it.

Measures have been taken to ensure that programmes can be delivered more flexibly, supporting greater access and inclusion, including offenders with complex needs, as I was indicating. I was asked about the case of James, Wells and Lee. The noble Lord, Lord Wigley, pointed out that the decision was that the retention of those prisoners was contrary to Article 5.1 and was therefore an arbitrary detention. I dare say that he will know, from having studied the decision, that the European Court of Human Rights did not hold that the sentence itself was unlawful. It was the unavailability of courses that was considered to be a breach of Article 5.1. I am sure the noble Lord would accept that it is simplistic to suppose that attendance at a course would automatically result in someone being appropriate for release. Clearly, it is carefully managed to ensure that so far as is possible those courses are reached. Those who attend the courses will not necessarily be eligible for or suitable for release. Equally, some who do not will be. However, I accept it is a matter of considerable assistance.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, said, the construction of a statutory duty is a matter of the purpose as construed on examination of the relevant statute. In response to a debate about this section, the Lord Chancellor’s predecessor, Kenneth Clarke, said that he would look at progress after the LASPO changes had taken effect. I mentioned earlier that the rate had increased. The position is—I am afraid this is more or less the same answer that I gave in the debate initiated by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley—that there are no current plans to review the release test for prisoners serving IPP sentences whose minimum term has expired, although we continue to use a range of measures to improve their progression and reduce the risk that they pose. The Government’s position is that it is right that IPP prisoners continue to serve their sentence until they are assessed as safe to be released into the community by the Parole Board. The Government were left with this rather crude device by the previous Government. They repealed it, but none the less they have to be extremely mindful of what lay behind the introduction of this provision; namely, the protection of the public. I accept that there is great concern that those who would have received a lower tariff sentence might seem on the face of it to be languishing in prison for far too long. However, there are factors which I have attempted to draw to the Committee’s attention which do not, in the view of the Lord Chancellor and the Government, warrant a change of approach to that discretion.

Of course, it is a matter of anxiety. While others are attending the opera, I am—as the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, would have it—having sleepless nights. However, the duty of the Government remains to protect the public, notwithstanding the persuasive arguments that have been put forward by noble Lords. I ask the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, to withdraw the amendment.