Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Strasburger

Report stage & Lords Hansard
Wednesday 3rd March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Strasburger (LD) [V]]

I speak in support of Amendments 15, 17 and 18, which would remove Clauses 34, 35 and 37 from the Bill. Each of those clauses would, if retained, significantly increase the severity of the TPIM regime or reduce the safeguards against the misuse of TPIMs and miscarriages of justice. Their combined effect would result in a dramatic increase in the powers of the Secretary of State, all to the detriment of fairness, justice and the freedom of those subjected to TPIMs.

The existing TPIM regime gives the Home Secretary the power to confine an individual to a property, perhaps located a long distance from their home, with a plethora of restrictions on how they live their lives and communicate. These clauses would give the Secretary of State new powers to impose a total 24/7 curfew, which is effectively house arrest, and to make this non-stop detention unending, permanent or until the person dies.

The subjects of TPIMs, who may never have been convicted of anything, could be condemned to a far longer period of incarceration than violent criminals and terrorists who have been convicted and sentenced by a court. That could happen without them knowing the allegations against them and without them having had any chance to see the evidence on which those assertions are based, let alone to challenge and refute them. Clause 34, even after being amended by the Government, makes it even easier for the Secretary of State to decide, at the stroke of a pen, to put an individual under this tough house arrest regime.

As the law now stands, she needs to believe, on the balance of probabilities, that the person is or has been involved in terrorism. I am no lawyer, but I can still do arithmetic and I take “on the balance of probabilities” to mean that there is a greater than 50% chance that she is right and the person is a terrorist. The clause changes the threshold from “on the balance of probabilities” to “reasonable belief”. Since the Government accept that this change lowers the burden of proof, I calculate that that means that the probability of them being a terrorist could be less than 50%, but they could still be locked away indefinitely. That means that the probability of them not being a terrorist threat could be greater than the probability that they are.

How could that come about? It could just be an honest mistake, based on flimsy evidence. We had a very strong hint that this does happen, when the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, who has access to classified material, gave evidence to the Public Bill Committee. He said:

“There is a risk that mistakes can be made about assessing intelligence. I have reason to believe that. My concern is that you are opening up a greater margin of error if the standard of proof is lowered. It is a fairness issue based on the authorities having all the cards.”—[Official Report, Commons, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill Committee, 25/6/20; col. 6.]


Answering another question, he said that he knew of instances where the intelligence had been misunderstood. There you have it: a highly reputable and well-informed person is warning us that innocent people are being punished under the current standard of proof, let alone the lower standard to which the Government would have us agree, under Clause 34, as amended.

What sort of country are we becoming if we are prepared to lock somebody away, all day and all night, indefinitely, even if the chance of them not being a threat is greater than the chance that they are, and having given them no chance to defend themselves? Why, you might ask, are the Government seeking to tilt the scales, not once but three times, towards even more draconian powers, with less justice and fewer safeguards against mistakes or abuse? You would think that there must be strong and compelling reasons for this triple assault on the fairness of our justice system, but the sad truth is that the explanations that have been offered during the passage of the Bill are utterly threadbare and unconvincing. They have the appearance of having been retrofitted, long after these clauses were added to the Bill, in a forlorn attempt to justify the unjustifiable.

The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, with all his inside knowledge, searched for a good reason to lower the burden of proof and failed to find one. He said that

“it is not clear why there is any need to change the law in the manner proposed …where harsher measures are to be imposed, safeguards should be encouraged, not jettisoned.”

He also said that

“there is reason to doubt whether there exists an operational case for changing the TPIM regime at this … time.”

That is as forthright a condemnation of these three clauses as we are ever likely to hear from someone in his position.

What reasons have the Government come up with to justify lowering the burden of proof and therefore diminishing the safeguards against mistakes and misuse? We have been told that it will be easier to impose a TPIM, which frankly is a transparently circular argument. We have been told how hard it is to gather evidence to satisfy the current burden of proof. We have been told about pro-ISIS fighters returning from Syria being difficult to investigate. We have been told that it would simplify administration, although that is hardly a good reason for increasing the probability that innocent people are incarcerated by mistake.

All of these supposed justifications and all the others that have turned up and disappeared along the way were comprehensively holed below the water line by the Government’s star witness giving evidence to the Bill Committee. Assistant Chief Constable Tim Jacques gave evidence of behalf of the police and the intelligence services on 25 June last year. In answer to a question from Joanna Cherry MP, he made it clear that the current standard of proof is not an impediment to authorities getting a TPIM when they want it. His exact words were:

“MI5 has pointed out that there is no case thus far where the standard of proof has been a blocker.”


We have been told by the police and the agencies that there is currently no problem to be solved. The Government’s last resort in devising an excuse for these clauses is to tell us that we do not know what problems are coming down the track, and that it would be nice to have another tool in the toolbox. Well, on that basis we can justify just about anything—we could use the prospect of impending but unknown doom to excuse all manner of assaults on our liberty and our lives. This “just in case” style of legislation is fraught with dangers. Powers that we were told would never be used can quickly become heavily used and set the new standard. We cannot, in all conscience, allow the Government to get away with such slapdash explanations for making their powers even more draconian while reducing the safeguards against injustice.

Clauses 34, 35 and 37 are not needed. The Government have not come close to finding a cogent and convincing justification for them. They have no place in the Bill and must go. As Jonathan Hall QC, the independent reviewer put it so eloquently in his evidence to the Bill Committee:

“If it is right that the current standard of proof is usable and fair, and I think it is, in a word, if it ain’t broke, why fix it?”—[Official Report, Commons, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill Committee, 25/6/20; col. 7.]


I invite noble Lords to support Amendments 15, 17 and 18 should the House divide on them.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for the time he has given to speak about this Bill and for government amendment 14 on the burden of proof. I welcome the change of heart in that respect.

As to the other area on the potential length of TPIMs, I very much hope that the Minister will accept what is essentially the compromise in Amendment 16 between indefinite periods for TPIMs and the current period. It seems to me that the gap that divides us is not that great. TPIMs can be imposed not merely because criminal conduct is suspected, but also because of activities that may not be criminal. It is imposed by the Executive. Although, of course, there is a right of review to the court, a right of review is very different from the decision of a court or independent tribunal in deciding whether the grounds exist.

It is therefore important to appreciate that the very significant restrictions on liberty are imposed by the Executive, something generally alien to our tradition. It would be even more alien to our tradition to go to the extent of enabling the Executive to impose such a restriction for an indefinite period of time. Such restrictions should only be available on people’s liberty where people are convicted of serious criminal offences. Quite apart from the humanitarian and liberty and traditional aspects of that argument, there is the further argument which I raised, and will not repeat, on Second Reading: namely, indefinite orders can, as experience has shown, give people a loss of hope, and in effect make them more dangerous and less susceptible to being reformed.

The compromise that we have put forward in this amendment is further emphasised by the fact that of course if there is new evidence of activity during the period, the four years is not an absolute cut off.

Finally, there is a great deal of sense in having a cut-off period. It is very easy for any decision-maker, particularly one who is worried about the consequences of not extending the TPIM, to go on extending and extending it. It is very wasteful of resources, because enforcing a TPIM is very expensive. It is also fundamentally unfair that someone should be subject to a decision that can go on being rolled over indefinitely rather than someone—to put it in the vernacular—having to put up and charge with an offence or to shut up.

I very much hope that the Minister will think again about the compromise offered in this amendment and accept it.

Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Strasburger

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 9th February 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]]

I want to add only one point to what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, has just said, because I agree with the entirety of it. That one point is derived from my own experience of dealing with people who were imprisoned indefinitely under the IPP regime. During the hearing of several appeals, it became apparent that indefinite detention often makes someone more dangerous because you take away hope. I very much anticipate that we would never get to the stage where we made TPIMs that lasted for a person’s entire lifetime. The TPIM would have to come to an end at some stage, and, to my mind, giving someone a clear expectation of when the period of restriction is to end helps in dealing with the individual and prevents making him more dangerous by depriving him of any hope.

[Lord Strasburger (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I wish to argue that Clause 38 should not stand part of the Bill. In my contribution on Clause 37, I mentioned my general worries about the TPIM regime and how it circumvents all the safeguards in the criminal justice system. Those safeguards are there for a very good reason: to ensure that our trials are fair and that we do not punish people without a high degree of certainty that they deserve it. However, for the purposes of this debate, I will focus on the process that the imposition of TPIMs follows in place of a proper criminal trial and how unsatisfactory that process is by comparison with the real thing.

For TPIMs, a criminal trial is replaced by civil proceedings before a High Court judge. The Government present evidence to support their case for the target person to have their liberty and their other rights curtailed. I have called them “the target person” rather than “the defendant” because they have not been charged with anything and they are completely unable to defend themselves. That is because the evidence against them is presented in private to the judge without the target person’s knowledge. They are unable to see, challenge or contradict the so-called evidence because neither they nor their lawyer is aware of it. This process, known as closed material proceedings, is a very poor substitute for a proper trial, where evidence is presented in open court and the defendant’s lawyer can challenge it, present other evidence that contradicts it and cross-examine the person who provided it.

I mention all this because Clause 38, if enacted, would mean that a person made the subject of a TPIM in such an unfair and unsafe manner and confined to their home and subjected to other losses of their rights could find themselves in this position indefinitely, for ever, even for the rest of their lives. That is extremely harsh treatment for someone who may be innocent and has not been convicted of any crime. This treatment is far harsher than if they had been convicted in a criminal court and been sentenced to a few years in prison. In the worlds of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, when he was the Independent Reviewer of Terrorist Legislation:

“TPIMs … are as stringent as anything available in a western democracy.”


He considered the case for lifting the two-year cap, as Clause 38 would do, in his report on TPIMs in 2012. He concluded that the two-year limit was an acceptable compromise because two years was a serious length of time in the life of an individual and TPIMs should not be allowed to become a shadow alternative to criminal prosecution. Indeed, the Government themselves endorsed the two-year limit and in 2015 cited the observation of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, that there was no need to “put the clock back”. The Government went further and said:

“The two-year limit is a reminder that executive constraints of this kind are no substitute for the criminal process, and no long-term solution”.


What has changed the Government’s mind such that they wish to turn it into a long-term process? I am hoping the Minister will enlighten the House when he responds, and I hope that this time he can come up with something better than a meaningless reference to flexibility or that there is no need for it now but who knows what we might need in the future. To abolish the two-year time limit and replace it with an indefinite period of successive extensions, without even troubling the court, there would need to be a compelling operational case, would there not? However, no such compelling case has been made. In fact, no case at all has been offered by the Government, so far as I am aware. Given that fact, and given, as I mentioned earlier, the flimsy and unsatisfactory nature of the TPIM process as an alternative to our proper and fair criminal justice system, we cannot countenance allowing TPIMs to be made indefinite by means of Clause 38. It must go.