Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd
Main Page: Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(5 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the subject of IPPs is so well known to you all, and indeed to many outside this House, that it is unnecessary to speak at any length about it, save for one remark and one set of common grounds.
When the Minister said that this Bill was about victims, he was in every sense right. In some senses, those who received the sentence of IPP are in fact victims, as I will endeavour to explain by reference to what I think are four areas of common ground, which I think ought to guide what I wish to say.
The first area of common ground is that the 2003 Act which implemented these was a mistake and should never have been enacted. There is now no dispute about that. I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, for the candour, statesmanship and exemplary conduct he has shown—which so few do—in admitting error. He is to be warmly commended for that, and my only regret is that he is not here in person for him to hear what we all feel.
The second point of common ground is that the operation and the effect of the IPP system has been a stain on the administration of justice in England and Wales. Again, I do not think that is disputed.
Thirdly, the outcome of imposing sentences of IPP has been problematic in very many ways, and a particular problem has been the effect on the mental health of those who received this form of sentence, particularly those in the initial period from 2005 to 2008.
The fourth area of common ground is the old phrase, “Something must be done!” The real question is: what should be done? These problems have to be addressed; we cannot leave them unaddressed.
In the groups of amendments to be considered this afternoon, the real issue relates to that fourth point of common ground: what is to be done? One should begin by welcoming the leadership shown by the Lord Chancellor—this Lord Chancellor, I underline—in the Bill. He has accepted that there are problems and that they need to be addressed. We have to recognise that he is in some senses constrained by circumstances and by events which may happen later in the year. However, I very much hope that in the course of this debate we can achieve more under his leadership, which has been outstanding in this respect, and see what we can do to try either to solve the problems now or at least to make certain that the basis is there for their solution in the future.
Having said I would say very little by way of introduction, I may have spoken for too long; I now turn to the amendments in the first group. These are amendments to Clause 48 and there are four sets of them. I am extremely grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Moylan and Lord Blunkett, and the noble Baroness, Lady Burt of Solihull, for their support by co-signing these amendments, which all relate to the provisions for release on licence.
I am not sure how well appreciated it is that the licence period after release from an IPP is one of the most draconian aspects of the sentence. After release, the offender is on licence and subject to licence conditions—and, most importantly, subject to recall if they breach them—for an indefinite period presently, unless the Parole Board decides to release or reduce the licence period. At present, it cannot do so until 10 years have elapsed. It is that 10-year period which this clause seeks to address. At the moment, all cases are referred to the Parole Board for consideration—but 10 years is a very long time.
One of the things that is clear on the evidence—and it is always important to proceed on the evidence—is that the indeterminate nature of IPP sentences has created many very serious mental health issues and these are exacerbated by the licence period. It is very difficult for someone who has been in custody for such an indeterminate period, not knowing when they are going to released, to maintain his or her mental stability—and then being subject to 10 years on licence is almost impossible.
So we must warmly welcome the basis of this recall in reducing that period from 10 years to three years, because then the Parole Board can look at the licence period and decide whether it should be terminated then and there. If it is not terminated and if the person is successful and remains on licence, out of custody, for two years, there is a sunset or automatic termination. So, before I turn to the amendments, I think it is right to say that this is a huge achievement and, on almost everyone’s behalf, I thank the Lord Chancellor and the Secretary of State for doing this.
My amendments make changes to this new regime which are minor but important. I hope they are of a kind about which there will be little dispute—because, if there are disputes about these, I dread to think where we shall get to when we go down the list. Four areas are covered by these amendments. The first of these sets of amendments are Amendments 149, 150 and 151, which try to set out a more flexible and just way of terminating the licence period if it is not terminated at the three-year point.
I do not want to go into the technicalities of this too much, because this is typically awful sentencing legislation—most sentencing legislation is awful, as is shown by the fact that the Sentencing Code is about this thick—and I do not think a debate on the language is a good way for us to spend our time. But, in essence, this provides that, if the Parole Board does not at the three-year period terminate the licence, we have to address whether it is right that the person has to wait to have their licence terminated by spending two years without the risk of having their licence revoked and returning to prison.
The essence of this amendment is accepting the mental health problems that this form of imprisonment has caused and for which ultimately the state is responsible, as a result of the enactment of this legislation. This amendment seeks to restore a right of annual review. This would give the Parole Board the opportunity each year to look at the position of the individual and see whether, in all the circumstances, we can terminate.
My Lords, I thank everyone who has participated in this debate. It has proved useful: first, it is very important to set the scene, and I deliberately did not say a great deal. However, it is right to say that we owe a huge debt of gratitude to the Prison Reform Trust, to the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, to the late Lord Brown and the late Lord Judge, who campaigned fiercely on this, and to Lord Lloyd of Berwick, who fortunately is still alive and who has campaigned tirelessly. I just find a sense of deep disappointment—a matter to which I will return at a later stage—at the reluctance to be bold.
We have focused on four little points, and even on reducing the answer was not very strong. It is absurd—and I use that word advisedly—to think any Government would want to take the licence period back up. I very much hope that that amendment can in due course be agreed.
The problem really relates to the way in which the licence period operates. We need to discuss that further to see what the conditions are, and we shall come to that in due course, and to ensure that we bring the licence period to as satisfactory a termination as possible, bearing in mind—as the Minister fails to recognise—that the state has a very substantial degree of responsibility for the mental health problems that have been caused. When you talk of one year or two years, making someone stick to conditions which may not be entirely appropriate for a period of two years is a substantial burden, which can be mitigated by going to one year. But I am glad that the Government have an open mind. We shall see how open it is when we discuss the matter further.
I see the force of the points being made by the noble Lord, Lord Clarke. I respectfully suggest that the fear of the media is not the driving force in the case of this Lord Chancellor or, if I may say so, his Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State currently at the Dispatch Box. We are looking at the real question of public safety.
If I may ask it rhetorically, who speaks for Pauline Quinn? Admittedly, that was not an IPP case. Pauline Quinn was aged 73, was disabled and could not protect herself. She was brutally murdered by a convicted killer released on licence. I respectfully suggest that these risks are very difficult for any responsible Government to take, irrespective of what the media might say.
This raises another point. At the moment the Government are not convinced that this would make a significant difference, because the Parole Board, even under the revised test suggested by my noble friend Lord Moylan, would still have to be satisfied on the issue of the protection of the public. It is perfectly likely that one is simply raising false hopes. It does not change the process that the Parole Board has to go through to look at these very difficult individuals, who are very much at risk of harm and very difficult to manage in the community.
If you read the 2023 report from the Chief Inspector of Probation, you see how difficult it is to manage these individuals—those who have already been released, not the unreleased cohort. This is a very difficult area. At the moment the Government are not persuaded rightly or wrongly that it is a correct approach to make it easier to release dangerous people. That is the Government’s position, and I have explained it as best I can.
I want to ask the noble and learned Lord about the word “proportionate”. Is there an objection to that word? It is key, because it enables you, in judging safety, to take into account the responsibility of the state for what we have done to these people.