European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Lord Teverson Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & 2nd reading (Hansard)
Monday 13th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Teverson (LD)]

My Lords, I will make some short comments on a number of issues but, first, I must congratulate the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, and the staff of the EU Committee on having put together an extremely authoritative and objective report on the withdrawal agreement and the future relationship. I urge noble Lords who have not read it to do so.

One thing that came out of it really struck me. I have not been much involved in the Northern Ireland aspects of withdrawal, but it is quite clear that Northern Ireland will be separate from the rest of Great Britain. I hear the Minister say that the manifesto says, and the Prime Minister has assured us, that that is not the case—but he has already signed the deal and the division down the Irish Sea is there. I was there when the civil servants corrected the Secretary of State and said that paperwork would be necessary. No wonder the Northern Ireland parties are particularly upset about that. Having said that—I always try to be positive—I very much welcome the fact that there will continue to be a single energy market within the island of Ireland, which I understand is in the agreement.

What really surprises me about this agreement is something that we have debated a number of times—that we will put into legislation the fact that we will not extend the interim period. It is quite obvious that we are putting ourselves in exactly the same situation as we did when we invoked Article 50 without a plan. We immediately put the power into the other party, the European Union. At that time, they must have said, “Yippee, everything is on our side”—and that will be the case this time. We have given away our flexibility and set a deadline that can only work against us. I do not understand that. I was interested to hear the noble Lord, Lord Butler, praise the Prime Minister for having got a new deal when it was predicted that he would not get one so quickly. The reason was that he accepted a deal that was already on the table from the European Union some years before—with its preferences. So are we going to have another repeat of history?

One area that particularly concerns me is fisheries—an area that I have been involved in both through committee work and in relation to regulation when I was in the European Parliament. I come from the south-west; big promises have been made to the fishing industry. The noble Lord, Lord Hain, and others have mentioned this subject. Yet, to me, the fact that we are expected to conclude a fisheries agreement in July this year, with a deadline for overall agreement not long after, means that the two are absolutely and inevitably entwined. There will be either trade-off or submission. I suspect that my fisheries colleagues down in the south-west already expect to be sold out, as they have been in the past. How will the Government ensure that that will not happen to the industry this time?

I will say one thing quickly about the chemicals industry. My committee, the EU Environment and Energy Sub-Committee, looked at REACH and all of that side. Given the Minister’s bird’s-eye view of the silos that sometimes occur in Whitehall, will he make sure through Defra and BEIS, which both have responsibility for the industry—Defra in terms of regulations and the REACH chemical regulations—that that industry, the second-largest manufacturing industry in the United Kingdom, is treated very carefully in terms of regulation? There is still great concern in that area.

Lastly, I will refer to Part 3 of the withdrawal Bill, which is around citizens. But there is not one clause in there about UK citizens; it is all about EU 27 citizens. I welcome most of that, but one of the biggest failures of the Government is that UK citizens in the 27 do not have freedom of movement. That right is kept within individual member states, and to me that is a major failure of negotiation. I want to see UK citizens recognised in this Bill, and not sold out as they have been so far.

Brexit: Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration

Lord Teverson Excerpts

Monday 14th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Teverson (LD)]

My Lords, soon after the referendum, a number of my colleagues from across the House and the other place and I received a courteous and timely invitation to a lecture at the Norwegian embassy. Delivered by a young professor, it was about the lessons learned by Norway in negotiating with the European Union as a third party. The professor talked about around eight principles, but I remember this one best: he said very clearly that European Union member states were never unified on what they discussed and agreed among themselves, but when it came to dealing with third parties, there was always total unity, which never changed. Among many others, that seems a lesson that the Government should have learned during the past two years of negotiations.

A key lesson is that 16,141,241 people voted to remain but were written out of history and out of any interest from the Government almost immediately. Today, that is still the rhetoric of the Government. They have done absolutely nothing over the past two years to bring this country together. It required a private citizen and the Supreme Court, not Parliament, to get us all involved in the Article 50 process. We saw highly questionable ministerial appointments to the Foreign Office and DExEU, both individuals having now resigned and given up on the course on the way through. We know that when we used Article 50 to serve notice to the European Council, we had no plan whatever, just a number of red lines written down, which very much restricted future negotiations. We agreed immediately the schedule of proceedings for the agenda during that Article 50 period, which we are still in; without question, that put us at an immediate disadvantage. We still hear loose language, the most recent example of which described EU citizens of this country as “queue-jumpers”; I find that inexcusable and disgraceful. We have had two years of an elite EU team, as seen on the world stage, versus a shambles of amateurs. That is how this is seen across the globe. It gives me great grief as a proud European citizen of this country.

I want to get on to the question of where we go from here if this agreement is successful. We hear a great deal from industry about certainty. My unshakeable view is that, as we move into a transitional period—if we do so—there will be even greater uncertainty. We originally had 21 months, which the Government agreed with no question whatever, even though there is no chance of an agreement on that timescale—it could be 33 or 45 months under the withdrawal agreement. Let us remember: the Korean agreement took eight years; the Canadian agreement took eight years; the Japanese agreement started in 2013 and has still not been implemented; the United States deal could not be agreed. Only Greenland’s withdrawal from the EEC was agreed in a period of some three years, and was far less complex than anything we are going to enter into.

It will be complex because our agreements will include, I hope, services, security, data and a number of other areas not included in many of these deals. We also have a whole host of other issues that will be brought up by EU member states when we are a third country—not least by Spain on Gibraltar, which we have been warned about. There will be further issues around the Irish border and fisheries, which interests me particularly. It is certain that our fishermen and that industry will be sold out, as the European Union has made it quite clear that it will not agree trade terms of any sort—on fisheries and elsewhere—unless access and quota arrangements are maintained.

It is also clear that there will be the same red lines from the European Union on the single market and the four freedoms. We are certain that those issues will still be there. We also have to reach agreement with some 36 legislative Assemblies, not least the European Parliament, which will take considerable time.

This agreement seems to me not one that provides certainty to industry or to the political community, but one that provides another period of uncertainty where we do not know where we are going and where we cannot agree deals elsewhere in the globe until we know our relationship with Europe. What we do know is that there will be very few trade deals done until we resolve our relationship with Europe, that there will be no freedom of movement for British citizens within Europe, and that this country will be impoverished.

Brexit: UK-EU Relations (EUC Report)

Lord Teverson Excerpts

Monday 2nd July 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Teverson (LD)]

My Lords, I again thank the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, for chairing the committee so well. It is perhaps not unreasonable to mention that we had a debate within the committee on whether to shelve the report until after the White Paper came out, because it was so imminent when we first considered our report, or whether we should continue. Of course, we have just been taken in so often: it was quite obvious that the White Paper was not going to be produced, and that it would be another month or two months until it was available—and we are already here at a debate on our report, so it must be well behind.

It is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Quin, and all that she has said, but I also agree entirely with the noble Lord, Lord Risby, that issues such as Nord Stream 2 are key and on the importance of the financial services industry in the UK. However, I have to say to him that, after Brexit, we will be just like a third country as far as the EU 27 will be concerned —we will be the same as Singapore and New York. Although other EU capitals will probably benefit relatively marginally, certainly in Paris that marginal benefit will be important to them, and it is a foundation of building up their capability. That is how they see it. I do not think it is appreciated how important the City is, and that is a great loss because it is important not just to us but to the broader world.

I may disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Risby, in that I will probably be slightly more polemical than he would like in this debate. We are two years on—two years. We have eight months to go, and we will no longer be a member of the European Union. It is unlikely that this can be solved at five to midnight—sorry, five to 11 o’clock, British time—on 29 March, because the EU has to go down legal processes and, apart from anything else, it needs a vote of assent from the European Parliament. Therefore, the usual rules of stopping the clock will not work, because we are working within a strict legal framework.

So where have we got to in these two years that we have had? Of course, nothing is agreed because, as we are told by our EU 27 partners, nothing is agreed till everything is agreed and so we have nothing agreed. However, we sort of have a formula for payment: we have negotiated down to, I think, £35 billion to £39 billion in compensation, except that the National Audit Office has pointed out that, to taxpayers, it is actually some £10 billion worse than that—there is the £7 billion in refund that goes straight to the private sector and the £2.5 billion that we will owe the European Development Fund is not included in that figure because it is not technically part of the EU. So we are £10 billion worse off on that.

On citizens’ rights, I endorse the Government’s strong welcome to EU citizens to remain here but, strangely enough, it is the European Parliament that has criticised the EU 27 for not being able to safeguard the rights of UK citizens within the EU 27. The European Parliament and its rapporteur seem to have been stronger in this area than the UK Government themselves. We are clearly not there yet, and on Northern Ireland we are obviously nowhere at all. We are somewhere on those three areas of the withdrawal agreement, but not where we expected to be and nowhere on Northern Ireland.

We have agreed a transition deal in principle, but it is for 21 months. I cannot imagine that the future relationship, whatever it is, will not be a mixed agreement. We not only have to negotiate that agreement, and the UK Government have not yet decided what we want, but we have to agree it with the EU 27. It then has to go out to all the Parliaments—and one or two regional ones as well—to be ratified. It is an impossibility that this can be completed within 21 months. That means British business will go over at least two, maybe three, cliff edges and changes to regulations. The other side has already told us that we can forget areas such as the European arrest warrant and Galileo.

We hope to get the White Paper on the future relationship next week, but we are nowhere on it at the moment. We have no British ask whatever, but we have the red lines. The Prime Minister outlined these at the Conservative Party conference in 2016, when I am sure she got a huge round of applause for them from her party members. However, as a result of declaring them we effectively dug ourselves, and the EU, into the trenches from which we have not been able to move since. I do not commend the EU’s response either. We have—if Led Zeppelin were dead they would turn in their graves—a “Stairway to Brexit” from the EU side, which goes through all the different options. Against our red lines we are, at best, looking at a Canadian or a South Korean deal, which does not suit the UK in any way. The question is: how do we break out of this trench warfare? That is how our two MEP witnesses said it.

Following the theme of the noble Baroness, Lady Quin, the only way we can break out of this and come to some sort of sensible negotiation and agreement is by an association agreement. We have an excuse to go down that route, in that the European Parliament has mentioned it and written about it as a sensible option. We should use the European Parliament’s not inconsiderable leverage with the EU 27 to go down that route and start talking about an association agreement. The EU currently has those agreements with countries such as Moldova, Israel, various north African countries and some eastern European ones. They are not exactly the sort of agreements that we would necessarily want. Many of them, particularly in eastern Europe, are with countries aspiring to future membership rather than retreating from it. However, that is how this can be unlocked and we should move forward with it. I suggest that we get Guy Verhofstadt to intermediate for us. He seems to get on very well with David Davis, the Secretary of State. Perhaps he is the person to broker some movement on this.

As we have seen from the Statement this afternoon, Brexit is about number five on the EU’s priority list. We have lost leverage with the EU because of the lackadaisical and divided approach that the Conservative Government have taken. Immigration, the eurozone and the rule of law in eastern Europe are all more important issues to the EU 27 than our going, which they have already banked. It is a very sad situation, but that is where we are. Once the Conservative Party and the Government had lit the blue touch paper, we could have asked for—and got—a Brexit with dignity. It is such a shame that we could not even manage that.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Teverson Excerpts

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 16th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan]

Because there will be separate legislation to consider the implications of the implementation period as part of the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill that we have already announced. We are trying to confine the purposes of this Bill to the originally announced process. I realise that lots of noble Lords want to use this legislation as a way to both influence the legislation and in some cases to prevent the process of Brexit. But we are trying to put forward revisions to the statute that will ensure that European regulations will continue to have effect in British law after the end of the period.

[Lord Teverson (LD)]

Can I point out to the Minister that we have no agreement that there will be an implementation period? Indeed, many government departments are preparing, rightly, for there not to be one—because nothing is agreed until all is agreed. That is why this amendment is even more important in terms of that potential gap.

[Lord Callanan]

I am afraid that the noble Lord is simply wrong: we do have agreement on an implementation period. It was announced at the March European Council, agreed by the Government and the European Union.

Brexit: Logistics Industry

Lord Teverson Excerpts

Tuesday 8th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan]

I have no idea.

[Lord Teverson (LD)]

My Lords, returning to supply chains and logistics, currently it is estimated that a non-EU vehicle entering one of our ports takes 45 minutes to get through customs and all the procedures, whereas for EU vehicles it is a few seconds. The FTA—Freight Transport Association—has said that an extra two minutes means 17 miles more of queue. What is the Government’s estimate of the extra time that it will take a vehicle to cross the border post Brexit?

[Lord Callanan]

As the noble Lord is aware, we are negotiating to have as frictionless customs arrangements as possible. We do not want any delays and we want whatever delays there might be kept to a minimum. That is the purpose of the discussions we are having and of the agreement we hope to come to.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Teverson Excerpts

Report: 6th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 8th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Teverson (LD)]

My Lords, I was very pleased to add my name to this amendment, and I congratulate the right reverend Prelate on his introduction to it. As he says, what is not to like about it? It reflects the Prime Minister’s policy and intent, and it provides an opportunity for the Government to negotiate with Brussels with the good will and strength of Parliament behind them. So why not accept it? It seems to me an excellent amendment.

Whether we are talking about the Brexit debate or about the people dealing with Europe, I am struck that the European institutions that citizens generally know about most are the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. However, it is an absolute fact that these agencies, which are relatively new in the evolution of the European Union, are among the key instruments under which Europe works. They are among the most efficient, benefiting from huge economies of scale in expertise and costs to industry and other organisations within the Union; they are very successful; and they are highly regarded not just within the European Union but internationally. That is why it is so important that we as a country, whether we leave or not—although we are on a trajectory to leave—should stay in strong contact with these agencies. Many of them are major determinants in British industry being able to access and work with the European single market in the future.

I am the chair of your Lordships’ European Union Energy and Environment Sub-Committee. When we looked at Brexit and the environment, 100% of the witnesses from UK industry who appeared before us or sent us written evidence were very clear that we should stay as close as possible to EU chemicals policy regulation and the REACH regime. They did not want to have to manufacture a third set of rules and regulations—not just for North America and the EU but our own as well. That was a fundamental aim of the industry.

One of our more recent reports concerned the internal energy market. The Prime Minister also mentioned this in her speech as something we need to stay near to, and it is an enterprise that Britain has led. I doubt that even Members of your Lordships’ House have heard of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, but it will be an important element of, and part of the jigsaw of, our energy security and energy prices in the future.

We have already mentioned Europol and the European Medicines Agency. Just like REACH for the chemicals industry, it is very important for the pharmaceutical industry that we stay part of the EMA and avoid huge duplication in development and approval costs.

For all those reasons, we need, if we can, to stay part of and be a participant in those agencies. Many of them currently have observers from the EEA states. The European Space Agency is not a European agency as such but Canada and other members are associates of it. Maybe that is a model we could persuade the EU 27 to follow. We also need to take into account the “soft” area. This is not just about being an associate member; the knowledge and work inside the European Union institutions determine markets and how industry needs to work in the future. By retaining involvement in those institutions, we will have that information, contact and networking, which otherwise we will forsake. For that reason, I believe it is very important to support the amendment.

[Lord Baker of Dorking (Con)]

My Lords, as someone who voted leave, I have always envisaged that what is being debate here will actually happen. I have always assumed that, when Britain is outside the European Union, it will want to co-operate extensively with Europe on a whole range of matters, such as environmental matters, which have been mentioned. I cannot conceive of any future Government of our country, whether they be Labour, Conservative or coalition, wanting to reduce the environmental quality of life. The trend is all the other way: to make it even better as it goes on. That is what will happen when we are out of the European Union, just as ever it did when we were in the European Union.

Similarly, as an ex-Home Secretary, I see the value of Interpol. I am quite sure that we will continue to work very closely with Interpol and continue the exchange of information that is so vital to arrests and to the reduction of crime, not only in our own country but in Europe.

One item not mentioned today is the Erasmus programme. I was the Education Secretary who started Erasmus and I think it has brought inevitable great benefits, both for students of our own country and students of other countries. Indeed, I discovered that one American university has decided that, during one year, all its students have to go and study in another city for three months. Erasmus allows that to happen and I am quite sure that it will continue in the future.

Having said all that, I do not think it requires a parliamentary fiat, if I may say so to the right reverend Prelate. It is clearly the Government’s policy to do that because it is a policy based upon common sense. It is essentially part of our negotiations, as has been made clear by the Prime Minister, and I hope that the negotiations are successful.

Brexit: Transition Period

Lord Teverson Excerpts

Monday 16th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan]

The problem with the EU negotiating trade deals is that it does it on behalf of 28 countries, shortly to become 27, which all have different priorities and different things that they want to agree within that deal, and of course that makes them difficult to agree for the bloc as a whole. As a country that believes in free trade, we will be able to do it in a swifter and more efficient manner.

[Lord Teverson (LD)]

My Lords—

[Noble Lords]

Cross Benches!

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Callanan]

The noble Baroness makes a good point. We are continuing the discussions with the EU to see what the precise formulation of our involvement in the various agencies will be. We are clear that we want to remain involved and participate in the work of those agencies, which are so essential for many businesses in the UK, but we are currently discussing how precisely that will work during the implementation period.

[Lord Teverson]

My Lords, the Government were looking for a two-year transition period, which they themselves said was a short period of time.

[Noble Lords]

Conservatives!

[Lord Callanan]

We have undertaken extensive consultations with industry and businesses. We are doing it all the time. I do it myself. We have undertaken more than 500 recorded DExEU organised engagements with businesses and civil society to find out what the concerns of businesses are. We are of course taking the feedback that we have received from them to the negotiations with the EU.

[Lord Teverson]

My Lords, I shall have my third attempt, and I thank the House for letting me. The Government were looking for a two-year transition deal, which they themselves understood was short. The EU said “21 months, that’s it”, and we just said yes. Why was that? Was that not selling out Britain and British industry?

[Lord Callanan]

No, I do not think it was. The Prime Minister made it clear that she was looking at an implementation period of around two years, which of course even the Liberal Democrats will know is 24 months. We eventually agreed that 21 months would be the period. We did not think that three months was a huge difference. These things are of course always subject to negotiations. We had to reach agreement, and we did. It is important that the implementation period is time-limited, and 31 December 2020 is a good time to end it because that is the end of the current multiannual financial framework.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Teverson Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 21st February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Trenchard]

I am not familiar with the amendment which was voted down in the Commons. I believe it is perfectly possible for the UK to develop its own IAEA-accredited safeguards regime within the next few months, and I understand that a lot of work is being done on that already. I understand that Euratom’s treaties are mixed up with the EU treaties; therefore, is it not natural that, if there is an implementation period for putting into practice what comes afterward with the EU, the same will apply for Euratom?

[Lord Teverson (LD)]

My Lords, I am also a signatory to this amendment, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, for having brought it before the House today. There is another explanation about why this has happened. Soon after the referendum, I submitted a Written Question to the Government to ask whether it was intending to leave Euratom. The answer I got back, after a little bit of foreplay, was that the people of Britain voted to come out of the European Union. It was quite clear that the Government did not realise that Euratom was not part of the European Union. They had not even thought about it. That is the answer that came back. I had to go back and ask the question again, at which point the Government answered that they were still thinking about it. Indeed, during ministerial conversations, there was a full admission that we should be able to remain part of the Euratom organisation. However, at that point it was legally impossible, for some reason which I do not understand at all. Euratom has its own separate Article 50 system, Article 106a; it is an entirely separate treaty, which did not come together during the Maastricht process when the other treaties came together, partly because there was a concern that Austria and Germany, which were anti-nuclear nations at that time—Austria still very much is—would not agree for that treaty to be integrated into the rest of the system.

I think that the Government agree that it is a good organisation. Coming out of it will certainly cost taxpayers a lot more money in terms of safeguarding and, as the noble Lord, Lord Warner, said, we have a real problem regarding the timescale. As I understand it, it is the Government who are saying that they want Euratom standards. That is their position; it is not ours. It is one that I agree with but the Government’s position is that we need Euratom standards, not purely International Atomic Energy Agency standards. We have a very difficult timetable here.

Brexit: Deal or No Deal (European Union Committee Report)

Lord Teverson Excerpts

Tuesday 16th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Teverson (LD)]

My Lords, perhaps I could point out that neither Mr Juncker nor Mr Barnier write the script; it is written by 27 member states’ Heads of Government. They are the people who decide what is right or wrong, and they are chosen by their electorates.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton of Epsom, that the EU committee should look at the other side of this argument as well. That would be a very useful report. He also said that perhaps we should speak to one of the European Commissioners. However, he is probably aware that, particularly during phase 1 of the negotiations, neither the Commission nor national Governments would enter into any discussion because they were maintaining their one-channel negotiation through the Commission representative. However, I agree with him entirely that perhaps the EU committee could look at the other side of this argument.

Where I disagree with the noble Lord completely is on negotiation strategy and leverage. The clear thing in my mind and in my analysis is that our Government gave away their position, their negotiating plan and all their advantages at the very beginning of this process because they declared all their red lines. They said to the EU, before it even asked, “We’re not going to be in the single market; we’re not going to be in the customs union; we’re not going to ask for any help from the European Court of Justice; and we are going to be out by 29 March 2019 whether you like it or not. We are setting our own deadline for coming out of this organisation”. I ask myself what the European Union would have said to us if it really wanted to punish us. It would have said straight after the referendum, “You’re not going to be in the single market; you’re not going to be in the customs union; we’re not going to give you any resort to the European Court of Justice; we’re going to have a deadline of 29 March 2019; and by the way, if you don’t co-operate, we’re not going to give you any deal at all”. That would have been the punishment that the EU would have inflicted on us.

It is those red lines and declaring that strategy at the beginning that has caused us to self-mutilate in the negotiations that have taken place since. Of course, the EU’s response is, “Okay, guys, if that is what you want, that equals a Canada deal. Done”. In fact, I disagree with my colleagues. The Government have not been in any way vague about the outcome that they want. They have been completely clear: they want a Canada deal, which includes a deal on free trade but no services. That is what we have gone for.

But what have we done in the negotiations? I suggest that we have agreed to everything. First, we have agreed the phased agenda, which we said we did not want. We have agreed that the timetable has to be completed by October this year. We have effectively agreed the financial payments. We have given a completely open agreement on the Irish border—that if we cannot solve it, we will stay in the single market and the customs union ever after. And we have said that we will probably agree to end transition by December 2020 at the end of the multiannual financial framework, rather than give ourselves even two years. I have tried to think of another negotiation that has been more one-sided and the only example that I can think of in history is the Delaware native Americans selling Manhattan island to the Dutch, although at least in that instance they got $24 in goods in return, which is more than we have.

To be quite honest, the most important thing has been the time pressures. On the day after the referendum, we might as well have sent an email to Mr Barnier saying, “We agree everything. Let’s get on to phase 2 of the negotiations around the final deal”. If we carry on with this level of performance, then once we go out into the real outside world and start negotiating with the hard-nosed trade negotiators of the United States, Australia and China, let alone India, we will be like lambs to the slaughter. We have had an atrocious negotiation in which we have given away our strategy and all our cards and have agreed to everything that the Commission has asked of us so far. I do not see that as acceptable, and it has not done our reputation internationally a great deal of good.

In terms of there being no deal, I am privileged to chair the House’s EU Energy and Environment Sub-Committee, which looks at agriculture. I remember that when we produced our report on agriculture, we had as a witness one of the main representatives of one of the farmers’ unions, although not the NUF. One of the first things that he said to us was that there is no deal that is worse that no deal. He went on to give a strong justification for saying that, particularly in relation to the agricultural industry. As the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, rightly said, if we get no deal, that will not mean going back to the status quo, as would be the case in most other areas of our life; it would mean something far less than that.

I was also privileged to lead the House’s delegation last year to meet Mr Barnier and Mr Verhofstadt—the first such occasion for this House. One thing that came over to me very strongly was that Mr Barnier is the sort of person who wants a deal, partly because that is his remit but also for the sake of his reputation of being able to do such deals. Particularly in December at the end of the phase 1 negotiations, one thing that was illustrated was that perhaps the Brexiteers were right—that the EU was desperate to get phase 1 sorted out. Despite the shambles of the DUP torpedoing the Prime Minister earlier that week, the EU found a way of dragging the Prime Minister over the finishing line to make sure that we could move on to transition and an overall deal. That is how it seemed to me to work.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, that there is now a lesser risk of no deal, but there are potential roadblocks out there. One could be the DUP. Will the DUP support the process all the way through? If it does not like the Irish outcome, will it vote with the Government when the time comes? Will the Cabinet be able to agree on the details into the future? I wonder. However, the issue that I really do question is the Irish deal as decided thus far. As I conclude, perhaps I may remind the House what the agreement on Ireland says:

“The United Kingdom remains committed to protecting North-South cooperation and to its guarantee of avoiding a hard border. Any future arrangements must be compatible with these overarching requirements”.


It goes on to say:

“In the absence of agreed solutions, the United Kingdom will maintain full alignment with those rules of the Internal Market and the Customs Union which, now or in the future, support North-South cooperation, the all-island economy and the protection of the 1998 Agreement”—


effectively an open cheque. As I can see no short-term solution technically to the Irish border issue, that agreement seems to lock us into the single market and the customs union until we can sort it out.

This has been a shambolic negotiation—a disgrace to this country. A Government who I do not think even understand how to do negotiations gave away all their cards at the beginning of the process, and I can only hope that they can recover. However, as I said, may the Lord help us once we try to negotiate further free trade agreements outside the Union in the wider, real world.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Deech (CB)]

My Lords, I am rather pleased to join the small band of dissenters in this House. As a lawyer, I believe that the adversarial process gets to the truth and it is often the case that the dissenting judgment in a case is the one that echoes down the years. Obviously, one hopes for a good deal, but the report was predictably gloomy, reflecting the majority of its selected witnesses. It was surprising that there was no reliance on the significant body of economists and commentators who are analysing no deal and who have come up with constructive views. The committee assumed that being outside the EU was de facto disastrous, taking no note of the situation of other countries outside the EU which have good quality of life and good regulation and which trade successfully. As a result, the report could have been written by Eeyore. Today, I present the Tigger response.

The only goalpost placed before the UK by the 27 is that the UK must not be seen to gain by leaving, lest others follow suit. What sort of organisation is this whose only purpose is to maintain itself in its present position by threats? How unacceptable is the reported attempt by President Macron to use the Calais refugees as the price of a deal? Where is the statesman or stateswoman in Europe who can draw a portrait of what the organisation will be in a few years’ time, what its attractions and benefits might be? Nothing except “more Europe”. A great leader, which it manifestly lacks, would not want to inflict harm on European citizens, including the British, for the sake of it, which is the tenor of the discussions now, but would have sufficient confidence in the EU’s future to be able to say goodbye to one of its partners handsomely and generously. The attitude of the EU does not bode well for its future, and it has given us no idea what that is. It uses fright tactics—apocalyptic views of being out of the single market, punishing the renegade—rather than focusing on the well-being and prosperity of its citizens.

The EU’s intransigence over its own citizens’ rights, apparently unconcerned about what might happen to its own 3 million, and its intransigence over the divorce bill and the Irish border amount to self-harm. If the EU were reasonable or acted in the best interests of its citizens it would seek a free trade deal and give a degree of certainty to the troubled and unhappy economies of the 27. If in the end there is no deal, it will be the EU’s doing.

[Lord Teverson]

To set the record straight, the EU is about to offer a free trade deal. That is where it is desperately trying to get to. It is not preventing it; it is trying to get it, and it is offering Canada, which is a free trade deal.

[Baroness Deech]

My Lords, it does not sound like it.

When we contemplate no deal, it means a default position of reverting to WTO rules. It does not mean that, in the event of a vote in Parliament on the final deal going against it, we would then seek to revoke Article 50 and be readmitted to the Union. That latter scenario is obviously what is sought by those who table elephant-trap amendments about a final vote. They want to stop Brexit by rejection of the deal. We should be clear about that. The EU, by putting forward a bad deal to provoke rejection by such a vote, would get what it wanted: a return by the UK, with its tail between its legs, and possibly Schengen and the euro to boot. It would be an affront to democracy and a permanent stain on this House.

The UK was a founder member of the WTO. Lots of countries trade with the EU under WTO rules; others have dealt with that. We might be free to set low or zero tariffs on what we import from the rest of the world and from the EU, with a consequent benefit to UK consumers, who would pay less in many instances. This would not stop trade—far from it. All nations have access to the single market provided that regulatory standards are met, which we do. The US and China conduct billions of dollars of trade with the EU without a free trade agreement. We could accompany that with massive deregulation, and there are lawyers who can reshape our laws and regulations in that event.

As for the dreaded scenario of grounded flights, many European airlines use our airports. They need a deal or their tourist trades would collapse. Memoranda of understanding could hold the position until new agreements are reached. The use of phrases such as “cliff edge” and “crashing out” are not merely inaccurate but designed to scare and confuse. Predictions made recently about losses that might occur in 2030 if we are not in the single market do not seem to be any more reliable than the inaccurate predictions for finances right after the referendum.

Set against the positive view of no deal is the refusenik approach:

“And always keep a-hold of Nurse

For fear of finding something worse”.

But clinging on will risk paying a great deal of money for an arrangement worse than the present one, stuck in the prison of the customs union and the single market without a say in them, and still under the ECJ. It is a mistake to pay a great deal to gain access to the single market, let alone for an extended transition period—like a couple who are divorced but remain together because they cannot afford to sell the house. Countries all round the world have that access without paying for it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Ridley]

Surely the answer to the question of the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, is that the EU is a single market but it is also a fortress. It is a tariff-protected zone which prevents free trade from outside, to a surprisingly large extent.

[Lord Teverson]

My Lords—

[Baroness Deech]

No, I am not giving way. I have only a few minutes. I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Ridley, for putting it better than I could.

Leaving with no deal will not be a disaster, as many have said. So how can it be used as a negotiating tactic? We should say sincerely that we will manage very well if there is no deal. Our confidence in that would weaken the likelihood of the EU pressing a really bad deal on us, because it would know that we had a future elsewhere without its approval. I do not believe that the EU will want us to leave with no deal, unless its penchant for self-harm is even more marked than I can envisage. It would leave it with a financial gap to fill, problems with exports to us, and the loss of our defence and security assistance, which are so very valuable to it. After all, we are its biggest single export market, and European industries are under threat. Self-interest points overwhelmingly to a good deal being offered. It is just the priority that the EU gives to punishing us for ulterior reasons that is holding it back.

Brexit: EU Citizenship

Lord Teverson Excerpts

Monday 11th December 2017 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Teverson]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what discussions they are having with the European Union concerning whether those United Kingdom citizens who wish to retain their European citizenship post-Brexit may do so.

[The Minister of State, Department for Exiting the European Union (Lord Callanan) (Con)]

My Lords, EU treaty provisions state that only citizens of EU member states are able to hold EU citizenship. Therefore, when the UK ceases to be a member of the European Union, British nationals will no longer hold EU citizenship unless they hold dual nationality with another EU member state. We are content to listen to proposals, but this is not a matter within the scope of the current negotiations with the EU.

[Lord Teverson (LD)]

I thank the Minister for that extensive reply, although I find it disappointing. It is really important to many people in this country to retain the rights of their European citizenship—so, given the new and cordial relationship between the Government and the European Commission and institutions, would it be possible to open up this discussion to find a mutually beneficial way to move this agenda forward? We have a friend also in the European Parliament in this regard.

[Lord Callanan]

We are content to listen to proposals on this; we are not ruling it out. The problem is, as the noble Lord will know very well, that you can only be an EU citizen if you are the citizen of an EU member state. To get what he wants would involve changing treaties—and he will know how difficult that is in the European Union. The other side has shown no interest whatever in doing it. I am aware of the proposals from the European Parliament, and we will look at any proposals, but our EU negotiating partners so far have not expressed any interest in it. It would be a long, difficult and complicated process and, I suspect, would set a precedent that they do not wish to set.