Housebuilders
Lord Taverne Excerpts(6 years, 10 months ago)
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Lord Taverne (LD)
My Lords, this is the first occasion that I have taken part in a debate on housing, which, with the NHS, is one of the two most serious social problems we face. They are both in deep crisis. First, I must declare an interest. One of my sons-in-law is the CEO of a company called Pocket—a private sector developer of intermediate, relatively cheap housing for sale in London, backed by both the Mayor of London and the HCA. It is not a major construction company, but, having won several awards, it is expanding fast.
The industry faces a demographic time bomb. Its workforce is ageing, with retirements greatly exceeding new recruits, who take some three years to be trained to the necessary quality. To meet government plans—building 1 million or more houses in a few years—the industry must expand by some 35%. Well, in the third quarter of last year it contracted by 0.5% and is still contracting. It has become heavily dependent on 200,000 EU immigrant workers, not only for the actual building of houses and factories, but for the pre-manufactured modules, use of which the Farmer review recommends. Some 92% of the workforce building the modular homes that Pocket specialises in are EU immigrants.
But now we face the prospect of Brexit. Many EU workers are going home, not only because of uncertainty about their longer-term future rights of residence, but because they no longer feel welcome. There are numerous reports of Poles, Lithuanians, Romanians, Bulgarians and their families who are being abused in public and told to go home if they speak in their own language. We are no longer a tolerant country.
What Brexit risks is what the industry tells us it needs: common recognition of EU standards and qualifications, common legal systems for contracts, and tariff-free flow of imports from the 27—in fact, frictionless trade with the EU. None of these will survive if we are not in the customs union and single market, yet the Government are adamant that we must leave both.
The implication of the excellent and very important House of Lords Committee report last December, Brexit: Deal or No Deal, is clear, even if not explicit: the only way to achieve the Government’s housing aims, and to promote prosperity of large sections of our industries, to preserve an open Irish border and, indeed, generally to avoid the impoverishment of the British people, is to reverse what almost everyone outside Britain regards as our extraordinary national act of self-harm—the decision to leave the EU. The people should have the final say now the facts of what Brexit means are becoming clear, to decide, if they wish, not to travel one more miserable inch along that path to national disaster—in fact, to stop Brexit.
Climate Change
Lord Taverne Excerpts(9 years, 5 months ago)
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Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, this is not going to work unless we all try to follow the conventions that we are all accustomed to. I indicated before that it seemed that the House was asking for the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, to have an opportunity to ask a question. Then, we will see what time we have left as to where we go next.
Estates of Deceased Persons (Forfeiture Rule and Law of Succession) Bill
Lord Taverne Excerpts(13 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Kerr of Kinlochard
My Lords, this is the Hemingway amendment—because the sun also rises. This amendment is really rather important. I wish to speak for it on constitutional grounds and on grounds of foreign policy. I shall make an argument about parliamentary sovereignty, and an argument about the national interest.
I begin with the constitutional argument. I see two of them. First, the provisions of this Bill are all otiose in this Parliament. The coalition has made it clear that there will in this Parliament be no treaty changes, no transfers of power and no extensions of qualified majority voting. Therefore, there will be no referenda and none of the matters which have engaged us through all these days and nights are of any relevance to this Parliament; they apply only in the next Parliament. I cannot think of any previous constitutional Bill which has had that effect. I can think of no precedent for a Bill that is designed solely to influence future Parliaments. Of course, the letter of the doctrine that one Parliament cannot bind its successor will remain the case, because a new Government could repeal the Act. In my contention, however, the spirit of the doctrine would be much better honoured if there were a requirement for an affirmative decision as a first act of each new Parliament that the provisions of this Act should continue.
My second constitutional argument concerns the fact that the referenda called for in the Bill would in every case be asking—whatever the substance of the issue —the question, “Do you wish to overrule your Government and your Parliament?”. Before the referendum stage was reached the Government must by definition be in favour of the measure, because they all require unanimity in Brussels and both Houses of Parliament would have voted for the measure before the referendum question. The result of the referendum, if it was no, would be that an Act of Parliament was thereby revoked. I can think of no precedent for that. It has not applied to any past referendum in this country. In my contention, a referendum called for in this Bill is a direct undercutting of parliamentary sovereignty.
I believe it entirely right that each successive Parliament should be asked whether it wished its sovereignty to be undercut in the way provided for in this Bill, and that is why I favour a sunrise clause. This is my second constitutional argument and I have not mentioned Edmund Burke.
On the foreign policy argument, I do not believe that we shall see many referendums. We know that we shall see none in this Parliament as a result of this Bill, and I do not think that we will see many in future Parliaments either. Some of the circumstances listed in the Bill that would trigger a referendum are wildly implausible. There are some which I cannot see many member states supporting, while there are others which I think it inconceivable that any Government would support. For example, there is a reference to the own resources decision. Unanimity on the own resources decision is absolutely crucial, and I cannot think that any British Government would be stupid enough to give it away, so I do not think we will have a referendum on that. There are other items which are minor matters of detail. No Government are going to be politically naive enough to go to the country on an obscure matter of procedural detail lost in the treaties.
However, as we saw in the debate touched off by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, on his Amendment 22A the other night, there are some matters where a change would undoubtedly be in the interests of the UK. The clause he referred to is one where British industry would greatly welcome the introduction of qualified majority voting. But there is no question of any British Government agreeing that the country should be asked, “Do you want to overrule Parliament on whether the list of military goods that are exempt from single market disciplines should be changed by qualified majority voting?”. Any Government who put that question to the country would be laughed to scorn, so none of them will. The British negotiator in Brussels will be unable to put forward the proposal or support it if it is made by anyone else because his Government back home will tell him, “Don’t be silly. That would trigger a referendum”.
Ministers have argued that my fears are exaggerated. They have also argued that the price is worth paying and a bit of rigidity is necessary in the interests of restoring confidence in successive Governments’ handling of European affairs and recreating trust. I do not agree, but they may be right and I accept that only time can tell. My fear is that other member states, seeing how much concrete we have poured over our feet, will be tempted or forced to bypass our perceived rigidity by excluding us from the debate and proceeding by what is known as “enhanced co-operation” or acting outside the treaties without us. I think that we may be at a Messina moment. Again, the Government think that I exaggerate, and they may be right because, as I have said, only time will tell. It took a long time for the penny to drop that we had made a terrible mistake in walking out of the Messina conference.
I accept that the Government are certainly right to say that our exclusion is not an imminent threat. So little is going on that there is not much risk of our excluding ourselves by way of institutional or constitutional developments. But as time passes, the risk that our self-exclusion will be damaging increases. In nature, any organism that does not change and renew itself is by definition dead. The Government are making a virtue of rigidity. The case for flexibility will become more evident over time. New challenges will arise. The European Union will want to change itself in some ways—I cannot predict what they will be; none of us can. We should not rule out the possibility that we might want a change and that, as with the Single European Act, we might on occasion want to say yes.
This debate, I accept, is a bit academic now because of the coalition’s decision that nothing which could trigger a referendum will be done in this Parliament. Since the provisions of the Bill that we are passing are otiose until after the next election, it is an academic issue. But it is an issue that we should come back to after the next election; it is an issue where regular reassessments of the costs and benefits of the position that we have put ourselves in would be appropriate.
That is the national interest case for the amendment. It is the softest conceivable sunset clause, because the subsequent sunrise is so simple to effect. It is appropriate because the Bill is constitutionally innovative, affecting the sovereignty of Parliament in at least two rather serious ways. It would permit regular reassessment of whether rigidity is working or whether the national interest would be better served by avoiding self-exclusion from key debates and future developments. I beg to move.
Lord Taverne
My Lords, I want to look, as the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, has done, at the constitutional implications of the Bill, which should concern all Members of the House irrespective of their views on Europe.
The Constitution Committee has recommended a very important principle; namely, that referendums should be confined to changes of fundamental constitutional importance. If that principle is respected and strictly observed, such a referendum may not seriously prejudice parliamentary government as we know it. But this Bill as it stands drives a coach and horses through that principle.
There is no dispute about a referendum on the euro, or on joining a common European army or a common European foreign policy. But how can it be argued that the 56 possible changes that would trigger a referendum under this Bill are fundamentally constitutional? The noble Lord, Lord Howell, has several times argued that these items are all important. Well, they may well be important. Lots of minor changes may be important, but that does not make them fundamental constitutional changes.
If there is a European public prosecutor's office, it will have an important role in dealing with certain kinds of European financial crime. But if we decide to participate in that office, will it fundamentally change the British constitution? Does the noble Lord seriously argue that? Of course it would not. Are changes in the way we vote on the appointment of an Advocate-General or on the protocol on the excessive deficit procedure a fundamental change in the British constitution? Of course they are not.
Lord Lamont of Lerwick
Is not one difference between having a referendum on an issue such as the National Health Service or local government reorganisation and a transfer of power and competence from the UK to the EU that in the case of the latter it is almost irreversible? It is extremely difficult to reverse.
Lord Taverne
The noble Lord has made a point which on the face of it is plausible. It very much ties up with the argument put by the Front Bench that the case of transfer of power in Europe is different because there is a special problem about British trust in the European Union, which can be restored only by giving people a say. Then by some extraordinary leap of logic, it is suggested that they should have a say on issues such as appointments to the European Court of Justice or the protocol on the excessive deficit procedure, because that would apparently restore trust—because in the pubs they talk of nothing else.
As the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, revealed in Monday's debate, the European Union is not the only body that has lost people's trust. Parliament is distrusted even more than Brussels—by 66 per cent, he revealed, as compared with only 64 per cent in the case of Brussels. The Government are mistrusted by 67 per cent. What is the answer to this mistrust of Parliament and Government? According to the Government's logic, the answer is more and more referendums—more power to the people. Who are the most mistrusted of all by miles, by 82 per cent? The political parties are. What should they do? Obviously, the answer is to promise more and more referendums in their election manifestos because people would have more say and, as Rousseau preached, the will of the people must prevail. I am amazed that speech after speech from Conservative supporters of the Bill echoed the cry of Rousseau; the inspiration of Robespierre and the Committee of Public Safety. They abandoned the philosophy of John Locke, one of the architects of parliamentary government, who also inspired the founders of the American constitution—and, of course, goodbye Edmund Burke.
The noble Lord, Lord Howell, and others have told us that we will not have referendums in this Parliament. If there is a referendum in a future Parliament it will not be a separate referendum on each individual item in the list of the 56 but on a whole batch of changes together. We will be given a choice of saying yes or no, in a single vote, to a licorice allsorts collection, including perhaps the decision on a new Advocate-General, on new tasks relating to prudential supervision by the European Central Bank, on a multiannual financial framework and so forth, as if any such choice of one yes or no vote to cover the lot could possibly make any sense.
The noble Lord, Lord Howell, said that it will be no different from voting for party manifestos in elections with their long list of promises. Personally, I do not subscribe to the general belief in the sanctity of the manifesto mandate. Parties should make fewer promises and grade their commitments at election, with some as aspirations and others as commitments that they can safely undertake irrespective of changed conditions. Manifestos are too detailed and they do not allow for events. As Macmillan said, “Events, dear boy, events”, affect you.
At least manifestos relate to issues with which voters are familiar. Nothing could be more remote from their experience of everyday concerns than most of the items in the list of 56 possible referendums in the Bill. Essentially, the vote at elections is for something that people understand: choosing a new Government. The analogy of the noble Lord, Lord Howell, does not stand up.
The Bill is highly dangerous for two reasons. First, as the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, and others with great experience of European negotiations have argued, it may lead to immobility and sclerosis on many occasions when what we need above all is flexibility. Just as serious—I would argue even more so—are the crucial constitutional issues in the Bill that undermine the system of parliamentary government and are a major move towards government by plebiscite, California-style.
Some of the Bill’s supporters seem positively to welcome this. With others, it seems that the hostility of Eurosceptics to Brussels is so strong that it outweighs concern for parliamentary government, which has served this country so well. I hope that some of them will recognise that our system of parliamentary government matters even more.
Lord Taverne
Presumably, not everything will be put to a referendum. As has been said, a future Parliament can repeal the Bill as an Act, but once an Act that gives rights to people to be consulted in a referendum has become entrenched, it is much more difficult to take those rights away than not to have provided the plebiscite in the first place. I echo the question of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr: is there any case in which a Government have said in a Bill, “We are not legislating for this Parliament. The referendum lock will never be triggered in this Parliament. We are legislating not to restrict our own actions but those of a future Parliament”? We are going to restrict the decisions which they might wish to take. I believe that that in itself is, as Professor Vernon Bogdanor, an eminent constitutional expert, has declared, fundamentally unconstitutional.
I add to those who are worried about the coalition agreement that nothing in that is infringed by the amendment. The amendment does not restrict this Parliament, to which the coalition agreement obtains. The coalition agreement is not for future Parliaments. Who knows what the coalition agreement for the next Parliament will be? Who knows who will win the election or who the coalition partners might be? As the amendment says, very well, let the Government have this Bill—probably mainly to appease their Eurosceptics—but for this Parliament only.
Lord Risby
My Lords, the whole House will recognise the magnificent work over many years that, as a great public servant, the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, has done for this country but at the heart of the amendment is the fact that he dislikes the Bill in its entirety. It may also be fair to say that his idea of a sunset clause is the very passionate hope that the sun will never rise on it again. I see him smiling.
The whole point about this Bill is that it is meant to provide an enduring framework or umbrella under which future important EU decisions can be made. It comes back to this fundamental question, which is one of trust. People need to feel that they have a longer term guarantee of that sense of ownership of these procedures if we are to give away powers to the European Union. That is simply at the heart of this Bill. A sunset clause would give a limited time frame—providing perhaps for a time when we do not expect a referendum, or taking that right away when there might be a treaty change. That is the possible danger. But I might use the analogy of saying to the noble Lord, “Here is £5, but you can spend it only between four o’clock and six o’clock in the afternoon, otherwise I am going to take it back”. That is the essence of what this is all about.
We all want to build trust, which has been absent in the relationship between the people of Britain, Governments and the European Union. As we have observed already in our debates and discussions, the Laeken treaty, which was meant to rebuild that trust, following through to the Lisbon treaty, has certainly failed to do that, and we are seeing the consequences right across the European Union. We do not want a future Government, who are to re-engage people, to be able to renege on a promise. This Bill does not seek to bind a future Government—that certainly could not be done anyway—but it binds a Government politically to ensure that the people of this country are involved. That is the key and heart of this particular legislation.
A sunset clause can be appropriate in certain circumstances. Most of your Lordships will agree that the Counter-Terrorism Bill was a case in point. There was perhaps, arguably, a temporary situation that had to be dealt with, although I certainly did not agree with it, and then our traditional liberal traditions needed to be returned to in due course after what some people regarded as an exceptional situation. But in practice this amendment would return ministerial discretion to decide whether to revive Part 1, which includes the whole issue of the referendum and parliamentary control provisions. There is a risk that a Government might revive the Bill only if they were confident that there was no chance of treaty change during that Parliament. Of course, should this Bill become an Act of Parliament, which I certainly hope it does, it could be repealed, as the noble Lord said. But it should be repealed on the same mechanism of equal importance as its introduction if a repeal is going to take place. In future, the Government will have to come back and explain themselves about major EU decisions, which is essentially what the Bill demands.
If the noble Lord’s amendment were to improve the Bill, we might consider it in a rather more dispassionate way. But what this is about really is taking the heart out of the Bill—and I am confident that the noble Lord knows that too well.