Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Stockwood and Lord Altrincham

Committee stage
Wednesday 8th July 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Altrincham (Con)]

My Lords, I speak briefly to Amendments 155 to 158 and 160 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and hope that she will forgive me as a former banker with cultural contamination, perhaps. I notice a lot of quite warm language about banking in this debate, with references to the casino and the rest of it.

The concern behind these amendments is that a ring-fenced bank may depend on services, systems or facilities provided by other entities within its wider group. Those entities may be based outside the United Kingdom or supervised primarily by an overseas regulator. I very much hear what the noble Baroness says, but the PRA does look at intragroup services in protecting UK domestic businesses.

We of course have our own amendments on ring-fencing, which we have just discussed. However, as we have said before, our approach to this Bill is that it will regulate in the immediate term and, therefore, our wider policy ambitions can sit alongside proper scrutiny of the provisions before us. Even where we take a different long-term view of the future of ring-fencing, it is still right to test whether the regime, while it remains in place, operates properly and consistently. That said, I have some concerns about the effect of these amendments, even if they were to impose additional safeguards or burdens specifically on foreign-owned banks, as they could place those banks at a competitive disadvantage. That matters because foreign-owned banks contribute to competition in the UK market. If additional requirements make it harder or less attractive for them to operate here, the results could be less competition for deposits here and, ultimately, worse outcomes for consumers.

International supervisory co-operation has also been significantly strengthened since the financial crisis. Crisis management groups, co-operation agreements and regulator-to-regulator engagement are now central parts of the framework. Recent experience has shown that this co-operation can work in practice, including during the failures of Silicon Valley Bank, as referenced by the Minister, and perhaps also in the case of Credit Suisse, where co-ordination between overseas regulators and UK authorities helped to maintain continuity and manage risk. I just note that Credit Suisse was the fifth-largest bank by balance sheet in the UK at the time. I would therefore be grateful if the Minister could explain how the PRA currently assesses overseas group structures and whether he believes that any gap exists in its present powers. In particular, does the PRA already satisfy itself that critical services provided from outside the United Kingdom will remain available in stress or resolution?

We may differ from the noble Baroness on the broader future of ring-fencing, but the questions that she raises are important. My concern is that the proposed solution may be unnecessary and may risk reducing competition by placing foreign-owned banks at a disadvantage. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendments 155 to 158 and 160 all relate to Clause 40. As I set out in the previous debate, Clause 40 makes the ring-fencing regime more flexible and proportionate by allowing the PRA to take account of protections already delivered elsewhere in the prudential and resolution framework, when considering whether ring-fencing rules are required. The clause is intended to reduce unnecessary duplication, while maintaining the core protections and purposes of the ring-fencing regime. We have already debated this, and it was clear that there were a wide range of views.

The noble Baroness’s amendments focus principally on shared services arrangements, operational continuity and cross-border group structures. The Government recognise the importance of these issues and we have spoken to a couple of outside parties on this topic. Ensuring the continuity of critical services and managing operational dependencies are important objectives of the ring-fencing regime.

However, I am not persuaded that these amendments are the right route forward. They would introduce detailed statutory tests governing when the PRA may rely on protections delivered elsewhere in the prudential and resolution framework, particularly for shared services arrangements involving cross-border or non-consolidated groups. Their practical effect would be to make it harder for the PRA to rely on equivalent protections elsewhere in the framework, increasing the likelihood of additional ring-fencing rules, greater complexity and additional compliance burdens, even where the PRA considered that the relevant outcomes were already being achieved.

In contrast, Clause 40 is intended to make the regime more flexible, streamlined and proportionate by reducing unnecessary duplication while maintaining core protections. It does not allow the PRA simply to assume that protections provided elsewhere in the framework are sufficient. The PRA may rely on those protections only where it considers that there is sufficient provision to achieve the relevant ring-fencing purposes and ensure the effective provision of services and facilities to ring-fenced banks.

For example, the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, asked whether the OCIR framework can be replaced by the PRA’s rule 9.1. This is a matter for the PRA, but it has indicated that it intends to consider these issues through consultation. Where the PRA does not consider that sufficient provision exists, including in relation to shared services arrangements or cross-border groups, it must act, including through making ring-fencing rules where necessary. The clause therefore preserves key protections.

If further details are required, I am more than happy to follow up before Report, but, for those reasons, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

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[Lord Altrincham (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 162 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles—perhaps from the Liberal Democrat risk-transfer derivative desk. This amendment raises what seems to be a sensible and practical point about certainty in the treatment of insurance-linked securities and related risk-transformation arrangements. Insurance-linked securities can play an important role in allowing insurance risk to be transferred into capital markets. Catastrophe bonds and similar structures can help insurers and reinsurers manage exposure to major risks, including natural catastrophes, while providing investors with a different form of capital markets instrument.

The United Kingdom has quite rightly sought to develop itself as a competitive centre for these structures, but for that to happen, firms and investors need clarity, as my noble friend just explained. As I understand it, the amendment would require the Treasury, after consulting HMRC, to publish guidance clarifying the tax treatment of these arrangements. It would also provide that where an arrangement falls within that guidance and complies with the relevant regulatory authorisation and supervision requirements, it should be treated as a bona fide commercial insurance and capital markets transaction, rather than as one entered into for tax avoidance purposes. It does not appear to be an attempt to protect fraud, misrepresentation or non-disclosure. HMRC would still be able to challenge arrangements where the conditions are not met or where there has been improper conduct, but it would give legitimate market participants greater certainty where they are using properly regulated structures for genuine commercial purposes. That certainty matters: if the UK wants to attract insurance-linked securities business, investors and firms need to understand the tax position in advance. Uncertainty can deter activity, reduce confidence and make other jurisdictions more attractive.

I would therefore welcome clarity from the Minister on this point. Do the Government accept that greater tax certainty would help to support the development of the UK insurance-linked securities market? Are they aware of the concerns that uncertainty about HMRC treatment may be limiting the attractiveness of the UK regime? Will they consider whether further Treasury or HMRC guidance is needed to ensure that properly regulated ILS vehicles are treated consistently as genuine commercial arrangements. This seems to me to be a practical amendment aimed at supporting competitiveness and certainty in a specialist but important part of the financial services market. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, risk transformation is a key element of the UK’s insurance market, and the growth of this market is critical to the Government’s objective of making the UK the location of choice for specialist and complex insurance. The Government’s reforms in Clause 44 aim to support this market by increasing the attractiveness of the UK for establishing the legal vehicles used to undertake risk transformation. I am glad to hear the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the noble Lord, Lord Ashcombe, broadly welcome these reforms.

The Government recognise the role that the bespoke tax regime for transformer vehicles plays in ensuring that the UK is competitive in this area. We also recognise, as does this amendment, the role that robust anti-avoidance measures and clear guidance have in ensuring a well-functioning regime for transformer vehicles. These anti-avoidance requirements are set out in the bespoke tax regulations for transformer vehicles, the Risk Transformation (Tax) Regulations 2017. HMRC has worked extensively with industry to produce guidance on how anti-avoidance measures apply to transformer vehicles.

I appreciate that some people consider that this guidance could be clearer, but it is important that any guidance does not constrain the Government’s ability to apply anti-avoidance rules. It must be aligned with the broader approach taken by HMRC to anti-avoidance. The current guidance allows HMRC the flexibility effectively to pursue instances where vehicles are established for the purposes of avoiding tax. It is important that we preserve that ability. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

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[Lord Altrincham (Con)]

My Lords, this group is a snapshot, in a sense, of where we are now in digital regulation for financial services in the UK, as discussed by my noble friend Lord Holmes. This group somewhat dovetails with the amendments that we discussed in the previous group, which sought to probe the Government’s strategy for digital assets, tokenisation, access to banking and payment services and consumer redress. However, I am concerned that this package rather jumps the gun. The issue is more profound than the absence of individual regulatory provisions.

As my noble friends Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lord Ranger of Northwood, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, said, we do not yet have the basic architecture in place, and we do not yet have a clear digital assets strategy. We do not yet have a settled framework of engagement with the industry, and we do not have a proper industry forum through which the Government, regulators and market participants can work through these questions in a structured way. That matters because this is a fast-moving area: if we legislate too quickly, or in too much detail, without proper consultation and industry engagement, we risk creating a framework that is either obsolete before it is implemented, or misaligned with how the market is actually developing.

The point that we have been making throughout these debates is that the Government need to move from ambition, the Digital Markets Taskforce and their initiatives to strategy. It is not enough to say that the UK should be a global centre for digital assets or tokenisation: we need to know what that means in practice, who is responsible for delivering it, how the regulators are working together, what definitions will be used, and what sort of regime firms can expect. At present, the problem is not only a lack of regulation: in some respects, the problem is the way the regulatory system is operating, those overlaps between the Treasury, the FCA, the PRA, the Bank of England and other bodies. There are sometimes different emphases, different attitudes and different levels of appetite toward digital assets and tokenised finance. That creates uncertainty for firms.

Industry does not need more rules; it needs clarity, a coherent regulatory perimeter, regulators that are aligned with one another and confidence that the UK is developing a framework that supports responsible innovation, rather than simply adding new layers of process and permission. This is why we need to be careful before layering further statutory requirements on top of a system which has not yet been properly clarified. That said, the principle raised by my noble friend about looking to world leaders for inspiration is a good one. This is something we should be paying attention to if we wish to remain internationally competitive.

In addition, the principle for higher regulatory neutrality between traditional and tokenised assets is a sensible one. If two instruments have the same economic substance and risk profile, there is a strong case for treating them consistently. But before that principle can operate effectively, the Government and the regulators need to define clearly what counts as an additional asset—a tokenised security, a crypto asset, a stablecoin or a form of digital market infrastructure. That is why the industry forum proposed in the previous group seems so important. We need a better mechanism for engagement before we decide the detailed architecture, and we need to hear from banks, payment firms, digital asset businesses, market infrastructure providers, asset managers, lawyers, technologists and consumer representatives. Without that, we risk legislating for a market as we imagine it, rather than for a market as it is developing.

In summary, my noble friend Lord Holmes raises important issues and many of the ideas in this group may well form part of the future architecture for digital finance. The first task is to sort out the foundations. We need strategy, clarity, co-ordination and proper industry engagement before we start building further layers of regulations. For those reasons, I welcome the debate and the questions raised by these amendments. The Government must first address the more fundamental uncertainty at the heart of the UK’s approach to digital assets and tokenised finance.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, for tabling these amendments and for his contributions to this and the previous debate. I will not rehash the arguments I made previously. We believe that we have a strategy, and we believe that that has been executed. These amendments cover a wide range of issues. The noble Lord asked me to respond to all of them; I will try to do so but, if I miss any, we can follow up afterwards.

The amendments include proposals on shared digital identity, AML utilities, prudential treatment for tokenised assets, an additional digital financial markets sandbox, education and use-case libraries, issuer governance, common token and data standards, model contractual clauses, custody and bridge infrastructure, issuer pathways and payment rail neutrality. The Government agree that the development of tokenised markets depends on proportionate regulation, legal certainty and effective payment and settlement infrastructure. These are all important issues, and the Government are already taking extensive action to drive forward this agenda, which I set out in the last debate.

On Amendments 164E to 164H, the Government recognise the importance of trusted digital identity, effective AML processes, proportionate prudential treatment, testing environments and education. I am happy to assure noble Lords that these matters are already being progressed through existing frameworks, including the UK digital identity and attributes trust framework, guidance on the use of digital verification services under the money laundering regulations, the digital securities sandbox and wider government and regulator work on tokenisation and market digitalisation.

The Government also recognise the importance of market understanding. However, I have concerns about requiring in legislation for the FCA to maintain a detailed use-case library or to prescribe particular commercial models for the development of digital financial markets. The role of the Government and the regulators is to establish clear and proportionate frameworks that support innovation while protecting consumers, market integrity and financial stability. The development of specific use cases and business models is a matter for industry, operating within those frameworks. The wholesale digital markets champion, whom I mentioned previously, can look at these issues if this is raised with him.

Across all these areas, the Government’s approach has been to support innovation through enabling frameworks rather than prescribing particular models in legislation. The Government believe that it is preferable to continue building on these flexible frameworks rather than putting in place detailed statutory requirements.

Amendments 164J, 164K, 164L, 164N and 164P focus on the infrastructure needed to support tokenised markets. The Government recognise the importance of legal certainty, interoperability, custody arrangements and clear issuer pathways for tokenised financial instruments. These are precisely the issues currently being considered by the Government and regulators, including through a joint call for input published by the FCA and the Bank of England earlier this year on the future of tokenisation in UK wholesale financial markets. The regulators have made clear that this work will inform a joint road map of reforms developed in partnership with industry.

The digital securities sandbox was also specifically designed to provide that flexibility, allowing government, regulators and industry to test how legislative and regulatory frameworks may need to evolve before making more permanent changes.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Stockwood and Lord Altrincham

Committee stage
Monday 6th July 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Altrincham (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his comments today on AI and digital resilience and for his comments on previous days. I declare my interest as the director of South Molton Street Capital, which is regulated by the FCA.

These amendments raise an interesting point about emerging technologies, digital resilience and the use of artificial intelligence in financial services, to be covered, as we have discussed, by the Mills review and the FCA itself. We will return to this subject in a later group, when my noble friend Lord Ranger of Northwood and the Opposition Front Bench will speak to our own amendments, particularly in relation to digital assets. We will also comment on supervision in a later group.

Both digital resilience and the proper use of AI are important. However, I am not convinced that this is the right way or the right place to tackle these issues. Our concern is that this could add another layer of regulation on firms that are already subject to a substantial body of obligations in this area. Financial services firms already operate under a wide range of frameworks relevant to AI governance, digital resilience and technology risk. The consumer duty, which we have touched on already, requires firms to deliver good outcomes for retail customers. The senior managers and certification regime provides a framework for accountability and governance. The FCA senior management arrangements and controls already require firms to maintain appropriate systems, controls, governance and risk management. Firms are subject to data protection law, including rules around automated decision-making and profiling. They are subject to equality law where discriminatory outcomes arise. They are subject to operational resilience requirements, outsourcing and third-party risk expectations, and, in some contexts, more specific requirements around algorithmic trading and market conduct.

We should therefore be cautious before adding new statutory requirements on top. That is particularly important because technology develops quickly and a prescriptive regulatory framework can rapidly become out of date. It can also lead to duplication, uncertainty and compliance activity that is focused more on satisfying the form of the requirement than managing the underlying risk.

I would be grateful for reassurance from the Minister about how Amendment 130 would interact with existing operational resilience and outsourcing requirements, and whether the Government believe that further statutory provision is needed.

On Amendment 131, the issues of transparency, bias, human oversight, and redress are all important, but they also overlap with existing duties on fair treatment, governance, data protection, discrimination and consumer outcomes. I would be reluctant to support an approach which simply adds a new AI-specific regime without first demonstrating that the existing framework is inadequate.

On Amendment 168, I understand the attraction of having a named individual responsible for AI governance. Accountability matters, but in financial services we have the SMCR regime to address supervision, and that regime is already quite complex, as we will address in a later group. A mandatory AI officer would probably cut across existing accountability structures in conduct, compliance, operations, risk, data and product governance. It could, in fact, cut across all existing supervisory positions.

This group raises important questions about the future of financial regulation. We must be alert to new risks, but we must also be careful not to respond to every emerging technology by simply adding another layer of regulation. The better approach is to ensure that regulation is proportionate, technology-neutral where possible and focused on real outcomes. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[The Minister of State, Department for Business and Trade and HM Treasury (Lord Stockwood) (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government recognise that the pace and significance of the current wave of technological change is already having an effect on the whole of society. For the purposes of this discussion, I will state that it is clearly having a notable impact on the financial services sector, as mentioned, and that it is set only to continue to grow. The Chancellor set out in her Mais Lecture just a few months ago the importance of the UK grasping the opportunities presented by AI to ensure that we are at the forefront of safe adoption and innovation, so we are entirely in agreement on how important this topic is.

On Amendment 130, the Government are committed to ensuring the operational resilience of the UK’s financial sector. Operational disruptions harm consumers and markets and have the potential to affect financial stability. That is why the FCA and the PRA have powers to ensure that firms have robust plans in place to deliver important business services, no matter the disruption.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Stockwood and Lord Altrincham

Committee stage
Wednesday 1st July 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Altrincham (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and my noble friend Lady Noakes for bringing forward these amendments. I declare my interest as a director of South Molton Street Capital, which is regulated by the FCA.

The amendments in this group focus principally on Sections 165 and 166 of FSMA. It is worth recalling that the very expression “Section 166” has become part of the language of financial regulation. When the history of financial regulation is written, it will be the most famous item of regulation for this period. It is part of the common language, because there are dozens and dozens of these regulatory interventions.

Section 166 gives the regulators the power to require a firm to appoint or to pay for a skilled person—often a very expensive law firm—to produce a report on specified matters. These reviews can be burdensome, expensive and disruptive for the firms concerned. The concern we have heard from industry is that Section 166 notices have become more and more common in recent years. They were, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, pointed out, initially quite scarce and quite important—and quite quiet, incidentally. Now, they are talked about all the time, because they are as common as anything. The serious issue is that they can, in effect, be used by the regulator as a demonstration of the exercise of its supervisory function.

These notices are supposedly for an inquiry, but they look quite threatening: they can be written in bold and in caps and in different sized fonts. They arrive at the firm with a variety of different names—often the firm has not actually heard of the regulator—and the tone of the notices can be unintentionally discourteous. This, of course, touches on other amendments which reference the right profile for the UK in regulating international firms that may operate in this country.

A Section 166 review is not cost-free regulation; it can require substantial external expenditure, internal management time, legal advice, data gathering, citizens’ work and follow-on remediation. The direct cost of the skilled person report may be only one part of the total burden. This means that there is inevitably a presumption of guilt in these inquiries, without a balanced challenge to which the firm can fully respond. We must bear in mind that firms often do not even know what the inquiry is looking for, so the ability to seek legal protection or a balance in the inquiry is made impossible by this approach to regulation.

In the general insurance and protection sector, an FOI-based report suggested that firms paid around £2.7 million for FCA-mandated Section 166 reviews in the year to 31 March 2024. It noted that internal costs and remediation costs can exceed the external review cost itself. That illustrates the point clearly that the financial and operational impact on firms can be significant. There is also the problem that some firms are not clear on why they are being subject to Section 166 in the first place. The regulator may go on a “fishing trip”, as described by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, which really is a good expression for how these inquiries proceed—to find fault without disclosing precisely what they are looking for.

That is why these powers need guardrails. As my noble Friend Lady Noakes has argued, Section 166 notices should be reserved for serious circumstances. They should not become a routine supervisory practice; they should not be used where the same information could reasonably be obtained through less burdensome means; and they should not be imposed without proper consideration of proportionality.

Amendment 117, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, would require the regulator to be satisfied that there is a material risk of serious detriment to regulatory outcomes, and that using a skilled person report is a proportionate response. It would require the regulator to consider the scale and nature of the suspected issue, the burden on the firm and whether the matter could reasonably be addressed through existing supervisory tools.

That seems to be a sensible framework, as does that set out in Amendment 118, in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes. It would restrict Section 166 reports to circumstances where the regulator considers that there is likely to have been a significant contravention of a relevant requirement, and where the information or documents could not reasonably be obtained without the report. These amendments speak to the same underlying principle: Section 166 should be an exceptional tool for serious cases, not a default mechanism.

I welcome Amendment 123, in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles and Lady Altmann, which deals with Section 165 information-gathering powers and seeks to set sensible thresholds on access to information. If a regulator asks a firm for information or documents, it should be able to explain why that material is reasonably necessary, why the request is proportionate and why the information cannot be obtained from another source. Requests should not be duplicative and they should not be broader than necessary. Firms should not be left trying to satisfy vague or excessive demands without a clear understanding of the purpose behind them. That is a basic principle of good regulation, and it particularly matters for smaller firms.

The broader issue here is one we have returned to throughout the Committee: regulatory power must be matched by accountability and proportionality. The FCA and the PRA have significant supervisory tools at their disposal. Where those tools impose real costs on firms, there must be proper discipline in their use. These amendments raise important questions about the balance between effective supervision and regulatory burden. We will listen carefully to what the Minister has to say in response.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baronesses for these amendments, and I have listened carefully to the points made today. The principle of ensuring that the regulators take a proportionate approach to their work—in the case of these amendments, to skilled person reviews and regulatory information collecting—is one that the Government strongly agree with. We have previously debated that principle and how it applies more broadly to the work of the financial services regulators.

Amendments 117 and 118 relate to skilled person reviews under Section 166 of FSMA. It is an important supervisory tool, and the Government agree that it should be deployed proportionately. However, the Government are not persuaded that there is an issue here that requires us to further constrain the regulators’ ability to require these reviews when they consider it appropriate to effectively safeguard the markets and consumers. The regulators have existing procedures to ensure proportionality when considering whether to initiate a skilled person review. The FCA handbook sets out that it will first consider the circumstances of the firm, the costs involved and the availability of other supervisory tools to tackle the issue. The PRA has similar processes in place.

Layering additional statutory requirements on top of this risks creating burdensome delays over supervisory decisions. Skilled person reviews are often used precisely in circumstances where the regulator needs independent expert analysis. For example, requiring the regulator to satisfy a threshold test before commissioning a review could limit the regulator’s ability to direct a skilled person to investigate a potential consumer harm and implement a mitigation strategy.

The data does not suggest that the use of skilled person reviews has grown over time. I reassure noble Lords that the FCA’s use of them has been broadly consistent over the past 10 years, with an average of 48.5 commissioned a year. However, in 2025-26, only 31 were commissioned, down from a high of 83 in 2023-24. This increase reflected the FCA’s strengthened oversight in key areas, including financial crime and appointed representatives and, despite the increase in volume, overall costs to firms remained flat.

Amendment 117 would create statutory disclosure requirements relating to Section 166 skilled person reviews. The FCA and the PRA already provide transparency by publishing data on the reviews they have commissioned in their annual reports.

Amendment 123 seeks to raise the bar for regulators requesting information for the firms they oversee. The Government recognise the impact that regulation and supervision can have on firms, and agree that regulators’ supervisory activities, including information requests, must not create disproportionate burdens on firms. That is why the Government have committed to cutting the administrative burden of regulation by 25% by the end of this Parliament. The financial services regulators are activity contributing to this agenda. For example, the PRA is deleting redundant and duplicative data collections—its future banking data programme has reduced costs to firms by around £26 million annually so far—and the FCA has stripped out data requests for 36,000 firms. All this has been done without detracting from consumer protections or systemwide resilience.

Through the Bill, the Government are taking action to reduce the burden of regulation on businesses. This includes reforms to the senior managers and certification regime, which will enable the regulators to reduce the regulatory burden of the regime by 50% while maintaining its strong and effective framework for individual accountability. Imposing prescriptive statutory requirements on how the regulators gather information risks undermining effective supervision, which might bring serious risks. Regulators must be able to respond quickly to emerging risks, and sometimes that means requesting information in ways that cannot be neatly anticipated by legislation.

The Government agree that proportionality is hugely important, that unnecessary burdens should be avoided and that the regulators must be held properly to account for how they exercise the significant powers given to them by Parliament. But there is no evidence that these amendments are needed to ensure proportionality. They would risk constraining the regulators’ ability to do their jobs effectively, which would introduce risks into our financial system. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

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[Lord Altrincham (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have tabled amendments in this group, which all take broadly the same approach to the cost benefit analysis panels. The underlying point addressed here is simple: if we are serious about accountability, proportionality and reducing regulatory burden, the panels that already exist to scrutinise the costs and benefits of regulation should be able to look at the full practical impact of what regulators do.

Amendment 119, in the names of my noble friend Lady Noakes and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, raises the important issue of cumulative regulatory burden. Amendment 129, in the name of my noble friend Lord Holmes, would give the panels a broader and more visible role, including through regular impact assessments, stronger access to information and greater transparency. Amendment 132, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe, addresses a specific gap: the use of guidance and supervisory practices, which may have significant practical effects on firms, but which do not currently receive the same level of cost-benefit scrutiny as formal rule changes.

I start with the cumulative burden point, because it is extremely important. Regulation is not experienced by firms as a series of isolated events. New rules come on top of existing ones, including guidance, reporting requirements, supervisory expectations, data requests, “Dear CEO” letters and enforcement signals. Individually, each new intervention may appear manageable, but collectively they can become very burdensome. The effect is not only on cost but on management time, operational complexity, legal advice, compliance headcount, systems changes and a reduced capacity to focus on customers, innovation and growth.

Therefore, it seems ineffective that the cost-benefit process so often considers individual regulatory interventions, without proper reference to the wider impact of the regulatory environment as a whole. If the regulator is required only to ask whether one new proposal is proportionate in isolation, there is no real incentive to look back at legacy regulation and ask whether the total burden has become excessive. That is why there is real merit in allowing the cost-benefit analysis panels to look more strategically at the total regulatory load. If we want regulators to support growth and competitiveness, they must not only justify new burdens but have incentives to remove or reduce old ones.

Amendment 132 would extend the existing cost-benefit analysis and consultation framework so that it applies not only to formal rules but to materially significant general guidance and general supervisory practices or policies. That is important because, in practice, guidance and supervisory expectations can have effects that are very close to rules. If such a measure has a material effect on regulated firms, it should not be able to escape scrutiny simply because it is not formally described as a rule.

Our amendment would create a sensible check: it would require the regulator to notify the relevant cost-benefit analysis panel early where guidance or supervisory practice may be materially significant. The panel could then give an opinion on whether the proposal is likely to have a material effect and, where appropriate, request that a cost-benefit analysis be carried out. If the regulator disagreed, it would still be able to proceed, but it would have to publish a statement explaining why it did not accept the panel’s view alongside the panel’s opinion.

The purpose of this is to recognise that materially significant guidance and supervisory practices can impose real costs and that those costs should be scrutinised. This sort of reporting would provide valuable information to inform the work of our important committees, both in this House and in the other place. I do not see why the Government would resist this as a sensible expansion of the remit of the cost-benefit analysis panels, particularly where the regulators they are overseeing have had, and continue to have, a substantial increase in their remits. Indeed, the more power we give regulators, the more important these mechanisms become. If more of the regulatory framework is to be made through rules, guidance and supervisory judgment, rather than primary legislation, Parliament must be confident that there is proper scrutiny of the costs and proportionality of the cumulative burden. The cost-benefit analysis panels are already part of that architecture; these amendments do not create an entirely new body. They strengthen the role of an existing mechanism and make it better able to do the job for which it was created.

Could the Minister explain why, if firms experience regulation cumulatively and guidance or supervisory practices can have material effects, even where they are not formally binding, the cost-benefit analysis panels should not have a broader remit to examine those wider burdens? I hope the Minister will engage constructively with these amendments and particularly with the principle behind Amendment 132.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government agree that cost-benefit analysis sits at the heart of good regulation, and are committed to ensuring that the FCA and PRA are transparent and rigorous when they assess the impact of their rules on firms and consumers.

FSMA 2023 introduced requirements on the regulators to publish a statement of policy for their approach to cost-benefit analysis—or CBA—and to establish CBA panels, as your Lordships know. CBA panels play an important role in the regulators’ work, acting as a critical friend to provide advice to the regulators on their CBAs, with the aim of improving their methodology and approach to CBA. They are required to include experts working at authorised firms to ensure that the regulators benefit from the insights of firms as they develop CBAs, and particularly to improve awareness of the impacts of regulatory proposals on firms.

Amendments 119, 129 and 132 seek to build on these existing statutory requirements to prescribe, in primary legislation, the precise functions, working methods and outputs of the panels. The CBA panels are still relatively new institutions. Their value lies partly in their ability to independently develop their own optimal working practices, to identify where their scrutiny has the highest value and to evolve as the regulatory landscape changes. Locking in their mandate in such detailed statutory provisions removes the very flexibility and ability to evolve that makes them effective.

Many of the detailed requirements set out here are already achieved as a result of normal principles of public law. For example, for the FCA to comply with its statutory requirement to establish and maintain a CBA panel with specified functions, it must ensure that its panel has the appropriate information and data to perform those functions. A further explicit provision is unnecessary.

Amendments 119 and 129 also seek to require the CBA panels to keep the cumulative impact of rules under review. The Government understand the motivation behind this: no single CBA tells the whole story of the regulatory burden facing firms. The PRA’s CBA panel has itself noted that measuring cumulative costs is inherently challenging and would require substantial industry input and resource; it would be subject to constant revision, given the pace of policy development. This could, perversely, add to burdens on firms, by requiring an extensive data-gathering exercise to understand the cumulative impact. Further, focusing exclusively on the cumulative costs could lead to discounting the benefits associated with certain regulations, whether they accrue to consumers, wider society or firms themselves.

The FCA is already making progress by reporting its cumulative regulatory impact through its secondary international competitiveness and growth objective metrics. These include the total value of the equivalent annual net direct cost to business across all CBAs for policy statements published each year and the aggregate benefits of its policy work. The PRA’s CBA panel is already helping the PRA identify where costs may be disproportionate and could be reduced, which is targeted and effective. The Government’s view is that the right response is for the FCA and the PRA to build on these early steps by working with their expert CBA panels to further understand and assess the cumulative impact of regulation, not to mandate the work of the panels through legislation.

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[Lord Altrincham (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Holmes—and for his rather delicate comments on “pale and male”—for bringing forward these amendments. They raise an important set of questions about open finance, innovation, emerging technology and the extent to which the regulatory framework is preparing for the financial services market of the future.

We welcome the spirit of this group. My noble friend Lord Ranger of Northwood has tabled amendments in later groups which address digital assets specifically, so I will not pre-empt that debate now, but the broader question raised by this amendment is vital: how are we preparing for financial technologies which are on their way and, in many cases, already here? Regulation cannot be developed only for the market we have today. It must be developed with the market of tomorrow in mind. We need a forward-facing regulatory framework, not one that is constantly trying to catch up after innovation has already moved elsewhere. That means anticipating new technologies, understanding how firms are using them and creating a clear and proportionate regime before uncertainty drives businesses out of the United Kingdom.

It is worth reflecting, as we close this day in Committee, that this amendment touches on a very fundamental change that might be coming to financial regulation. All the earlier amendments really concern how credit is distributed within the UK in our current structure, which, let us remember, rests on fractional reserve banking and large customer deposits—Lloyds Bank currently holds £600 billion of customer deposits. This mixture of innovations, in open banking, open finance and digital currency, would completely upend the regulatory environment in which finance operates at the moment. While it might feel rather edgy to talk about an innovation unit, it is completely and fundamentally at the heart of where financial regulation is going. Many of the things we have been talking about might find themselves out of time quite quickly if some of these technologies were to advance.

If firms developing digital assets, tokenisation, AI-enabled financial services, open finance tools or new payment systems cannot get clarity in the UK, they will go to jurisdictions where the rules are clearer, faster and more supportive of innovation. We have already seen concerns that the UK risks falling behind in some of these areas. We want the United Kingdom to be a place where financial innovation can thrive, but that requires clarity, leadership and a regulatory framework that is designed for the future. I hope the Minister can provide a reassurance that this is the direction in which the Government are moving and the nature of drivers for innovation, as he sees it.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, for Amendments 126 and 127, and for raising the important issues of innovation, inclusion and the future shape of financial services. I spent 10 years building a business in this space for the insurance sector, so it is something that is dear to my heart. The Government recognise the importance of these themes and, as I said at Second Reading, the Bill is intended to modernise the way the sector is regulated, to help it grow and lend more to businesses, and to make consumer protections fit for the digital age.

On Amendment 126, the Government fully recognise the potential of smart data schemes, including open banking and open finance. The wide range of benefits from smart data was set out in the Government’s smart data strategy, published in March this year by the Department for Business and Trade. The FCA’s Open Finance road map, published in April this year, sets out steps for collaborating across industry and the wider ecosystem to explore extending the principles of open banking to a much broader range of products.

We have already made it clear that the long-term regulatory framework for open banking will help to secure the foundations for open finance, and that our ambition is for the UK to remain a world leader in this area. The Government will be consulting on the long-term regulatory framework for open banking in the coming weeks and intend to lay a statutory instrument by the end of this year. The FCA’s road map is an important step in exploring what is needed to support the development of open finance.

The noble Lord, Lord Holmes, has noted that the Government already have powers under the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025. This enables the Government to create a framework for open finance, including a wide range of financial data, not just current account data. It includes the power to require the FCA to regulate for open finance and make rules about the sharing of customer data with financial services providers through interoperable interfaces. The Government have already committed to set out further detail on their approach to open finance during the summer.

On Amendment 127, the Government agree that regulators must have access to the right expertise as financial services evolve, and that innovation and financial inclusion should be embedded in the approach that regulators take. The FCA’s innovation hub, which includes both the regulatory and digital sandbox, is designed to support firms to launch innovative products and services.

On payment systems, the Bill provides the FCA with objectives and powers that are generally equivalent to those of the Payment Systems Regulator, including innovation and competition objectives, alongside a broad service user objective. This will allow the FCA to respond to the interests of service users as markets and technologies evolve. The FCA is already well versed in considerations of competition, innovation and the interests of consumers and businesses due to its wider role as a regulator for financial services.

As the Committee discussed on Monday, financial inclusion is a key priority for the Government, and we continue to work closely with the FCA to ensure that individuals get the right support with their financial products and services. This includes working with the FCA on the delivery of the financial inclusion strategy.

The FCA already uses its innovation services to further innovation which supports financial inclusion. For example, the FCA ran a tech sprint which supported firms to develop innovative services, such as brand new apps to support people when they are declined for credit and AI tools to spot scams and to simplify terms and conditions.

The Government consider that the FCA must have the flexibility to determine how best to reflect expert input across its functions to deliver on its objectives in a fast-moving landscape. The Government are supportive of the broad objectives the noble Lord is pursuing—innovation, inclusion and a regulatory framework that keeps pace with change—but we do not consider these amendments to be the right mechanisms for achieving those aims. For the reasons I have set out, I therefore respectfully ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Stockwood and Lord Altrincham

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th June 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Altrincham (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to the government amendments in this group and declare my interest as a director of South Molton Street Capital, which is regulated by the FCA. I thank the Minister for explaining so clearly these amendments. He has described them as minor technical amendments and as descriptions around making language consistent with FSMA. Notwithstanding that, at the outset, we welcome these amendments in so far as they are intended to make the Bill clearer, correct cross-references, remove duplications and ensure that the legislation works as intended. The amendments before us are technical in character and, where they improve the coherence and operability of the Bill, we do not object to them.

However, following the words of my noble friend Lady Noakes, I want to raise a broader procedural point, because I think it matters for how this Committee is able to scrutinise the Bill properly. We understand that not all noble Lords who have taken a close interest in the Bill were engaged by the department on these government amendments. That is a concern. I would be grateful if the Minister could give us a clear commitment that, ahead of future stages, the Government will make every effort to engage with not only the Opposition Front Bench but noble Lords across the Committee who have raised substantive concerns, and to provide timely, written explanations of any further government amendments.

I understand that my noble friend Lady Noakes will be writing to the Minister about the way in which the Government have handled engagement and oversight around these amendments. Given the reservations of my noble friend and of her committee, it is right that we do not agree to these amendments today but rather see them reintroduced on Report, as a matter of principle.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, I am happy to apologise to the noble Baroness for any mix-up. It was my understanding that it was not necessary to do an all-Peers letter for only a handful of technical amendments. With that in mind, we believe that the amendments we have proposed are minor and technical in nature and were tabled in good time before the Committee’s first debate. They are on drafting errors and remove duplicate and obsolete provisions, ensuring that the relevant provisions in the Bill and FSMA operate clearly and consistently. I trust that my explanation has given the noble Baroness the information she needs, but I will withdraw the amendment for now and bring it back on Report.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Altrincham (Con)]

My Lords, this is a welcome amendment because it raises important questions about the structure of our regulatory framework and in particular about whether the regulatory principle set out in Section 3B of FSMA—the eight principles—remain coherent, useful and properly calibrated to the circumstances in which we now find ourselves.

Over time, FSMA has accumulated objectives, secondary objectives, regulatory principles, “have regard” duties, reporting requirements and consultation obligations. Some of those are individually sensible and many were introduced for good reasons, but taken together, there is a real risk of regulatory layering. Duties and principles are added and new obligations are placed on regulators, but very little is ever taken away. The result is a framework that is increasingly complex and it is not always clear which duties genuinely drive regulatory behaviour and which simply sit on the statute book without translating into meaningful change.

The amendment asks the Treasury to review whether those principles are duplicative or remain necessary, and whether the framework could be simplified or improved. There is also a wider question, which was raised by the Financial Services Regulation Committee in its report last year, about whether these sorts of duties actually translate into anything meaningful in practice. It is one thing for Parliament to place a duty on a regulator to have regard to a particular principle or consideration—as my noble friend Lady Noakes mentioned, that is exactly what the Leeds reforms are trying to streamline—but quite another for that duty to shape decisions in a clear, measurable and accountable way.

Needless complexity matters for firms as well as for regulators. A complicated regulatory framework does not stay confined to the regulator; it filters down into consultations, supervisory expectations, compliance systems, legal advice and business decisions. If the statutory framework is unclear or duplicative, the burden ultimately falls on the firms that have to comply with it. At a time when we are asking financial services to support growth, investment and competitiveness, we should be especially alert to unnecessary regulatory complexity. The UK’s high regulatory standards are not in question, but there is a question as to whether the framework through which those standards are delivered is as clear, efficient and proportionate as it can be.

I therefore hope that the Minister will engage constructively with the amendment. I would be grateful if he could explain how far the principles have already been reviewed in preparation for this Bill, in the light of the comments from the Financial Services Regulation Committee. Do the Government accept that the accumulation of regulatory principles and duties can create complexity, and do they believe that the existing Section 3B principles remain fit for purpose? This amendment raises a valuable point; I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for their thoughtful contributions to this debate. This clearly animates a lot of discussion. I particularly acknowledge the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the work of the Financial Services Regulation Committee in effectively scrutinising the work of the regulators. It is important work, and we intend through this process to support that and not diminish it in any way. As was clear from those contributions at Second Reading, noble Lords place a strong emphasis on getting the regulatory principles right. The Government also take this matter very seriously.

Amendment 77 would require the Treasury to carry out and lay before Parliament a review of the regulatory principles in Section 3B(1) of FSMA. I am sympathetic to efforts to streamline the process of making regulation and to giving regulators a clear and manageable set of issues on which to focus. However, the Government have already considered this question and have carried out a review of the regulatory principles, as well as the other “have regard” provisions mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. The Government committed to this review in the Regulation Action Plan published in March 2025, and carried out the review with a view to identifying opportunities to rationalise those principles.

As a result of that review, the Government concluded that each of the regulatory principles in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is individually important; that they do not materially overlap with each other or with other requirements set out in legislation; and that they play an important role in providing transparency and supporting the Government and Parliament’s oversight of the regulators. However, the Government also found that the “have regard” provisions can reduce regulators’ ability to act strategically and with a clear focus.

Currently, the way that the principles operate results in the production of large volumes of information that do little to support effective overall scrutiny of a regulator’s performance. The Government have drafted the measures in this Bill with a view to rationalising how the regulators take these regulatory principles into account, without amending the principles themselves. We recognise that this is an area where there is significant interest; issues related to this amendment will continue to be debated during the passage of the Bill, when there will be an opportunity to discuss this area in greater detail. A further statutory review, beginning after Royal Assent, would duplicate the work that the Government have already undertaken.

I will come back to noble Lords’ specific questions in writing if I do not cover them later in the debate. I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

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[Lord Altrincham (Con)]

My Lords, this amendment raises an important question around private credit and how our regulatory framework should respond to emerging risks in modern financial markets. I look forward to the Minister’s tactful comments on this amendment, given that the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, spoke so well in favour of private credit in our debate on the fifth group on our first day in Committee. Here we are with the problems of private credit on our second day in Committee. The Minister will be extraordinarily tactful in handling that.

We will have a wider debate on Clause 17 and the regulatory principles in future groups, but this amendment touches on some of those broader questions. The specific issue raised here—private credit—is an important and timely one. Private credit has grown considerably as a feature of modern financial markets; it has, in fact, grown partly as a consequence of regulation. We are dealing now with regulation of a consequence of regulation as the markets have evolved. It can provide an important source of finance outside traditional banking channels, supporting businesses that need capital to invest, develop and grow. For that reason, we should be careful not to respond to its expansion in a way that unnecessarily restricts access to safe and productive credit; indeed, the Financial Services Regulation Committee concluded in its report earlier this year that private credit has developed rapidly and plays a useful economic role.

That is particularly important at a time when we want firms to invest, expand and access the finance they need. We should not create a regulatory environment in which the answer to every emerging market development is simply more regulation without proper regard to the consequences. Indeed, the Government have been keen to support private equity through greater investment from assets such as pension funds in the UK. If they want this sector to continue developing, they must ensure that regulation supports, rather than restricts, access to credit for consumers who choose to use these products.

At the same time, it is right to recognise that financial markets do not stand still. The system changes over time, and the regulatory framework must remain alert to those changes. Areas such as private credit, non-bank finance, digital finance and other fast-moving parts of the system demonstrate the need for regulation that reflects the market as it is developing, not simply the market as it looked when earlier legislation was drafted.

The key point, therefore, is one of balance. We need a market that is dynamic, innovative and capable of providing finance to the businesses on which growth depends, but we also need a regulatory framework that is sufficiently up to date to understand and monitor emerging risks. We should keep in mind, though, that risk can never be eliminated entirely. The role of regulation should be not to remove all risk from the system but to ensure that risks are properly understood, proportionately managed and developed with an eye to supporting economic development and growth.

For those reasons, we will listen carefully to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome the focus of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, on the vulnerabilities in the private credit system.

Although the Government are clear that the growth of private credit has brought benefits to the real economy, we and the financial regulators are very conscious of the potential vulnerabilities in this sector. Just last month, the Chancellor and the Governor of the Bank of England joined their fellow G7 Finance Ministers and European Central Bank governors in agreeing that potential risks in the private credit ecosystem call for continued monitoring, including that of the interconnections with banks and insurers.

The amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, would require the PRA and the FCA to consider private credit’s interactions with the wider financial system in all cases where the regulatory principles are engaged, or else their decision-making could be unlawful. I assure her that the regulators are already working to understand these vulnerabilities deeply and to address them where necessary. This work does not require placing additional duties on the regulators.

I will highlight the existing work of those regulators. First, the Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee has been focused on the risks of private markets for many years, and the Chancellor’s most recent remit letter to the FPC asks that that work continues. I specifically note the Bank’s system-wide exploratory scenario on private markets, the SWES—as if we needed another acronym. It is examining how a stress scenario could affect the UK’s private markets ecosystem and interconnected banks, insurers and pension funds, with significant participation across the industry. The UK’s system-wide regulator, the Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee, is the right authority to carry out this work, and its findings will be laid before Parliament when it is complete.

For its part, the FCA also maintains a close focus on these risks, including in its firm-level supervision. Where specific issues are identified, targeted interventions follow. We also welcome the FCA’s work to improve the visibility of risks and data availability through its reviews of the alternative investment fund managers directive framework, and its efforts to raise standards on conflicts of interest, valuation practices and risk management.

I note the noble Baroness’s concerns about the FCA’s regulatory perimeter, but I emphasise that the marketing of funds in the UK is indeed subject to UK regulatory requirements, protecting UK investors. Further, the PRA continues to assess and mitigate risks from private markets to the banks and insurers it regulates. This includes its 2024 thematic review of private equity-related financing activities with banks.

Finally, given the cross-border nature of the private credit ecosystem, the Bank and the FCA are actively engaged in international work, including at the Financial Stability Board, which is chaired by the Governor of the Bank of England. The Government believe that, under our regulatory framework, vulnerabilities in private credit are being understood and addressed where needed, but there is of course much room to improve. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Stockwood and Lord Altrincham

Committee stage
Monday 22nd June 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Altrincham (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Bowles, for bringing these amendments—and to the right reverend Prelate for his reference to scripture. They raise important questions and will facilitate a useful debate about access to finance, the responsibilities of financial institutions and the right way to support small businesses and underserved communities.

I will begin with Amendments 28 and 29 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and in the case of Amendment 28 also in the name of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester. These amendments seek to require the FCA to establish and maintain a framework for assessing and rating banks’ and building societies’ performance in providing access to affordable credit, including for underserved groups. Amendment 29 would go further and require firms falling below a minimum performance threshold to take proportionate remedial action.

Access to financial services and appropriate credit is of course extremely important. That is particularly true for small and medium-sized businesses, micro-businesses and those parts of the country where access to finance can be more difficult. If we can improve the flow of capital to productive businesses, we can simulate growth, increase employment, allow firms to develop and generally improve the health of our economy. Many of the most successful businesses in this country began as small enterprises. They require confidence, access to working capital and a banking system willing to support their growth. When credit is unavailable or available only on unreasonable terms, good businesses can be held back, investment delayed and opportunities for employment and innovation lost.

However, my concern is with the mechanism proposed. I am not convinced that this can or should be done from a centrally mandated position. Banks and building societies have to make lending decisions on the basis of risk, affordability, regulatory capital, commercial judgment and the circumstances of the borrower. They are complex assessments, not straightforward public policy levers that can simply be pulled from the centre. If banks are going to make these decisions on the basis of their commercial interests, in many cases they will already have done so. Where lending is not happening to the extent that the noble Baroness would like, there is a reason for that. It may relate to risk appetite, capital requirements, information gaps, the lack of security, regulatory burdens, compliance costs or wider economic uncertainty, but the answer, it seems to me, is to work out why that is the case and then address those underlying barriers.

The answer should not be to move towards a system in which the Government through statute begin to direct the lending priorities of banks from the centre. Once we go down that road, we risk blurring the line between commercial banking and public policy allocation of credit. That is not a small step. It could have unintended consequences for financial stability, risk management, and ultimately for consumers and taxpayers. This would also send a worrying signal that the UK is a jurisdiction in which private interests are essentially subordinate to political objectives.

I support efforts to promote investment into SMEs, micro-businesses and underserved communities, but I do not think the right mechanism is one enforced by the Government in statute through ratings, thresholds and mandatory remedial action. I would therefore be grateful if the Minister could explain what work the Government are doing with banks and financial service providers to improve access to affordable credit, particularly for SMEs and underserved groups. I hope he can reassure the Committee that this work is being done with those organisations rather than over them.

I turn briefly to Amendment 30, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and follow the words of my noble friend Lady Noakes. This amendment would introduce a fiduciary duty requiring firms to act in the best interests of retail customers, including small businesses. It would include duties around avoiding exploitative practices, ensuring suitability and fairness and taking reasonable steps to prevent foreseeable harm.

I understand the concern that sits behind this amendment. We all want financial services to treat customers fairly, we all want to prevent exploitative practices and we all want suitable products, clear terms and proper regard to foreseeable harm. Those are important principles. However, I am against imposing a broad fiduciary duty of this kind across regulated financial services. The concept of fiduciary duty carries with it a particular legal character and a potentially very wide set of implications. If applied broadly to all retail customer relationships, including small business relationships, it could create significant uncertainty about the legal obligations of firms, the interaction with existing FCA rules and the extent to which ordinary commercial relationships are being recast as fiduciary ones.

We are also concerned that this step could lead to a serious increase in the regulatory and compliance burden, which would fall on firms that are already struggling. Indeed, there is already a substantial framework governing conduct, consumer protection, fairness, suitability and foreseeable harm. The question for the Government and the FCA should be whether that existing framework is operating properly and proportionately, not necessarily whether a new overarching fiduciary duty should be imposed on top of it.

My concern is that such a duty could invite litigation, uncertainty and defensive behaviour. It might also make firms more reluctant to serve marginal or higher-risk customers if they fear that any adverse outcome could later be characterised as a breach of fiduciary duty. That would be the opposite of what many of us want to achieve in this group, which is broader and better access to financial services. Indeed, it would make providers and regulators more risk-averse.

These amendments raise an important debate about access to credit, the treatment of customers and the role of financial institutions in supporting growth. I support the objective of improving access to finance for SMEs, micro-businesses and underserved communities and hope to hear support for this from the Minister, but we should not seek to achieve that by central direction of lending decisions or imposing broad new legal duties whose consequences would be uncertain and work against the Government’s broad objective of simplifying regulation and reducing burdens.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendments 28, 29 and 30 are aimed at increasing access to finance and ensuring that the customers of financial services firms are protected. I recognise the intention behind these amendments. However, I do not believe that either solution is workable.

On Amendments 28 and 29, I agree that data on access to finance and holding the sector to account are important. However, these proposals would introduce a new, prescriptive and burdensome framework on the FCA and firms that I am not persuaded would deliver the desired output.

Amendment 28 would require the FCA to establish a framework to monitor, assess and publicly report on certain banks’ and building societies’ performance in providing access to affordable credit. Amendment 29 would require the FCA to take action against firms that do not meet a minimum standard. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, said, this approach resembles the United States’ Community Reinvestment Act 1977, but we should not assume that it would have the same effect here. Our starting point is different: we are working nearly 50 years later, in a digital age, with a far more diversified credit market. In any case, lenders already publish significant data. Chapter 7 of the FCA’s Conduct of Business Sourcebook requires extensive disclosure on personal and business current accounts. We also have the FCA’s Financial Lives Survey, the SME Finance Monitor and the British Business Bank’s annual SME finance publications, among others.

Amendment 29 would require the FCA to act against firms that do not meet a minimum lending standard. Striking the right balance on access to credit has long been a challenge. We want consumers to be able to access credit where it supports financial resilience and businesses to secure the finance needed to grow, but inappropriate credit can lead to overindebtedness, with serious consequences. The amendment could, in effect, compel lending to more vulnerable groups or SMEs. Even a well-designed regime could be a blunt instrument, with a risk of unintended outcomes. It would also represent a significant intrusion into firms’ commercial decisions.

More fundamentally, it is difficult to see how firms could increase lending and take on greater risk without raising prices to reflect that greater risk. If firms do not price risk appropriately, it opens us up to financial stability risks. The FCA would be placed in the invidious position of having to mandate affordable credit, while the mechanism required to expand provision could increase costs and potentially increase risk for the borrower and the firm. That runs directly counter to the intended objective for vulnerable customers and SMEs.

Although I cannot accept these amendments, I stress to noble Lords that the Government are not complacent about financial inclusion or the availability of SME finance. The noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, asked me to set out what the Government are doing, and I am happy that noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, mentioned several of these interventions already. The Government published their Financial Inclusion Strategy last autumn, and we are supporting practical interventions for consumers, including a small sum credit pilot enabling mainstream lenders to test lending to customers outside their usual risk appetite. Monzo was announced as the first participant in the scheme earlier this month.

We have launched a transformation fund for credit unions, alongside common bond reforms in this Bill, to strengthen their lending capacity. We are also advancing targeted SME finance measures to improve competition and supply, including enhancing the consumer credit data sharing scheme through Clauses 41 and 43 of this Bill. We are supporting up to £150 million of lending through the Community ENABLE funding programme over the next two years. We are establishing a CDFI taskforce and working with industry to improve bank referrals. Indeed, tomorrow I am meeting several large asset managers as chair of the place-based impact investment scheme. We will set out next steps on open finance later this summer. This has significant potential to support SME lending across a wide range of providers, alongside broader work with the Bank of England on capital and ring-fencing.

I highlight community development finance institutions, which I know are a priority for the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. In addition to the CDFI taskforce and the Community ENABLE funding programme that this Government have funded, the sector benefits from Fair4All Finance’s affordable credit scale-up programme, which has committed more than £40 million in social investment in England to date. The financial inclusion strategy further includes measures to strengthen community finance, including promoting partnerships with mainstream lenders. Taken together, these measures support access to finance in the UK in an appropriate and responsible way.

Amendment 30 would introduce a new fiduciary duty on firms when carrying out FCA-regulated activities. It would place specific legally binding requirements on firms. I agree with the noble Baroness that it is vital for firms to act in a way that delivers good outcomes for consumers. However, I believe that FCA regulation is able to achieve this, and I am concerned that this new duty would risk creating overlapping requirements, causing confusion and reducing consumers’ access to finance.

The FCA’s consumer duty is designed to set a high standard of protection for retail customers by requiring firms to act to deliver good outcomes in line with the outcome sought by this amendment. It requires firms to put consumers’ needs at the heart of their business, including by acting in good faith, avoiding foreseeable harm and supporting consumers to pursue their financial objectives. In practice, this means that firms must design products and services that meet consumers’ needs, provide fair value, communicate clearly and offer effective support.

I am concerned that the requirements set out in this amendment would risk making more vulnerable customers more expensive and risky to serve, which would reduce their access to products such as credit and insurance. Introducing a novel statutory fiduciary duty, the precise scope of which would fall to be settled through litigation over a number of years, would create significant legal uncertainty. That uncertainty would carry a cost, which firms would be likely to manage by withdrawing from, or repricing, services for higher-risk customers. I recognise that there is some precedent for a fiduciary duty in trust-based pension schemes. However, the dynamics of the market are very different from wider consumer financial services. Typically, employer pension schemes do not choose which individual customers to serve, and the fiduciary duty applies at the membership level.

I genuinely understand the importance of lending for all parts of the economy, and I understand the need for borrowers to be protected, but I am convinced that the Government are taking the right set of actions, and I am afraid that Amendments 28, 29 and 30 would bring significant unintended consequences. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.