Lord Stirrup
Main Page: Lord Stirrup (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Stirrup's debates with the Department for Education
(7 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, speaking as I do towards the end of a long list of wise and knowledgeable contributors to this debate, I run the risk of having little new to add and merely repeating what has already been said with such eloquence by others. But there is one important point that bears additional emphasis because it is all too often forgotten—or, if remembered, it is usually paid only lip service. Throughout the history of warfare, surprise has been one of the most critical factors in achieving success. This may seem a statement of the obvious, but we should bear in mind that our opponents and potential enemies also recognise the importance of this dictum and, not unnaturally, they will usually seek to surprise us. They will also, if they are sensible, try to attack us where we are weakest. We should therefore not expect to be able to predict the location, timing or nature of any future conflict.
Most past wars have surprised us to some degree, and we have found ourselves inadequately prepared for the demands that they make on us. This is not, or at least not entirely, because of a lack of planning or foresight. The future is to a degree not only unknown but unknowable, and no amount of horizon scanning or scenario planning can make up for that. I am not suggesting that such activities are unnecessary; there are after all many facets of future conflict that can and should be subjected to careful analysis and for which we should prepare. One such example is the increasing importance of the cyber domain, to which several speakers have already referred, and on which I will merely say I entirely agree with them.
However, we run the risk of persuading ourselves that because we have new challenges we can forget about old ones. Just because the cyber domain is such a promising field for our enemies does not mean that we will never again face a violent attack in the physical world. It does not mean that our use of airspace above the battlefield will never again be contested or that antisubmarine warfare is a thing of the past. None of these, or similar, propositions is safe. We must prepare for the future as best we can, but we must also prepare to be surprised.
There is, however, an answer to this conundrum. The most important capabilities that we will need in our Armed Forces in the years ahead are the ones that have served us so well in the past: agility and adaptability. In this context, agility is our ability to use existing systems in new and innovative ways, and adaptability refers to the process of altering those systems quickly in order to meet the unexpected and unforeseen.
The design and production lead times for weapon platforms are long, and we have to do our best to match them with future needs. At the same time, we must recognise that something will come along that will surprise us, and make allowances for this. We therefore need a broad spectrum of capabilities that can be adapted rapidly to meet new challenges as they arise and as they are recognised, and the agility of mind, of doctrine and of training to employ our capabilities as the situation demands, not just as we have done in the past.
Finally, and as has been said frequently during this debate, all of this requires investment—in equipment, in research and development, in industries on which we rely for our adaptability, and in our people. We are currently doing a little better in this regard, but still not well enough; there are danger signs on the horizon. The noble Earl the Minister will no doubt point rightly to the quality of our forces. Quality is indeed more important than quantity, provided that we have lots of it. In this uncertain and dangerous world there can be no greater priority for the Government than matching our defence investment to the high level of risk that we face.