My Lords, let me start by paying just a moment of tribute to Lord Lyell, who died yesterday. He was the secretary of the All-Party Defence Group and a formidable and energetic supporter of Britain’s Armed Forces. He will be greatly missed by the House and by many of those whom he met.
This is a very timely debate—never more so to those of us who watched yesterday’s press conference in New York. On a distinguished panel last year, I was asked what I believed was the greatest threat to the safety and security of our country. I considered some of the immediate and looming challenges and threats, some of which are pretty formidable: the migration flows that have suddenly ended up on our shores; the spread of religious experience extremism and jihadi violence plumbing new depths of savagery; a restive and resurgent Russia; a rising China; and the disruption by North Korea. Add to that fragile and failed states spreading mayhem across borders, international conflicts, climate change, cyber warfare and the global proliferation of lethal technology and weapons. On top of all that, there is the rise and dominance of organised crime, population growth, pandemics and financial instability.
That is a pretty formidable cocktail of trouble for us to face. However, my answer to the question of what was the greatest threat is actually different: it is ourselves. We are our own worst enemies. We are short-sighted, penny-pinching, naively optimistic, complacent and ostrich-like to the way in which the world has become interconnected and more fragile, unpredictable and incendiary. We are grossly unprepared and underresourced to meet the challenges of the coming years. These threats are potent and deadly, and some of them are very urgent.
At the end of the Cold War, I made a speech at Chatham House in which I coined what was to be a much-quoted phrase when I said that there had been a “bonfire of the certainties”. The fall of the Berlin Wall had unleashed a flood of optimism that had made Kremlinologists redundant overnight and robbed us of the albeit dangerous manageability of the Soviet/West confrontation. Some were even rash enough to say that it was the “end of history”. All of us took a substantial peace dividend and defence budgets were cut radically over the next five years. I believe we are now seeing another bonfire, this time of the post-Cold War certainties. In doing so, we have left ourselves vulnerable and, in many ways, unready. If we look at the way in which we have responded to this new world of regional conflicts, violent civil wars and other violent manifestations of the turmoil that I have already listed, we see that it hardly measures up to the scale of what faces us.
If anyone doubts my contention that we are our own worst enemy, just let them look at the debate in both Houses of this Parliament on 29 August 2013. The President of the United States had drawn a red line on President Assad using chemical weapons on his own people in a conflict that was already tearing his country apart and spreading to every part of the Middle East and beyond. Consequently, when the sarin gas attacks on civilians were confirmed, President Obama rightly decided that a military attack should be mounted to degrade President Assad’s war machine. Our Prime Minister at the time agreed, said he wanted to join this wholly justified action and recalled Parliament in order to put it to the House of Commons. The Commons, with my own party playing an opportunistic and disgraceful part, refused to give permission for the UK to join the response to the hideous chemical attacks on civilians.
The Prime Minister, having been defeated on an issue of grave military consequence, not only did not resign, which you would have thought in all honour he should have done, but instead swiftly closed off the possibility of even reconsidering the decision. It did not need John Kerry, the outgoing US Secretary of State, to remind us of this last week and lay the blame for President Obama’s retreat from his red lines on the British House of Commons on that August day. We all already knew it and we must all share the responsibility, even those of us who supported the government position, for the carnage that followed. Tears for Aleppo will never be enough. I love my country. I care about its future and the safety of our people in a very troubled world. That is why I am ashamed that that night this Parliament, where I have served for 38 years, did what it did. As events have spiralled into horror since then, with a line coming directly from that vote, my shame turns to anger.
Now, in eight days’ time, we will have President Donald Trump as the leader of the western world—the Donald, with his Mexican wall, with new protectionism and isolationism, with his serious questioning of NATO solidarity, with a belief in torture and with Lieutenant-General Michael Flynn as his key security adviser. Perhaps we do not actually need more enemies in the world today.
We in this country have Brexit. Going against the grain of history, our country is about to embark on a tortuous journey, with no known destination, that will absorb people, time and talent and will suck the energy out of our political system just as the challenges to Europe come crashing in on us. Our influence on our European neighbours will dramatically and inevitably diminish. Although they will still need our military, as Europe finds Trump’s America turning away we will find it difficult to take the lead that we usually claim. Reports this week that Britain’s claim to the Deputy SACEUR position has been challenged by France are just the latest evidence of that slipping influence. Our Foreign Office, the soft-power arm of government, at the same time as bearing the burden of maintaining our influence in the rest of the world, will be eclipsed by the Brexit vortex as its budget, already smaller than the budget for the US Embassy in Baghdad, will come under renewed pressure.
In our crazy complacency we seem quite oblivious to the fact that the relative peacefulness of the world today, as we look over a new precipice, has been achieved by our nuclear deterrent and by our institutions and processes, which require diplomacy, intelligence, involvement and, crucially—when it is required and at the end of the line—decisive interventions. Where will the space be left for all that as we paddle through the treacle of dismantling 40 years of integration?
What confirms again that we are our own worst enemy is the attitude to spending on defence and security. Yes, I agree with and welcome the fact that we are spending the NATO target of 2%; we are right in many ways to crow that we are among the few who do. That is good so far as it goes, but we should wait for a moment. After all, have we stretched the definition of 2% to get there? Are we not confusing percentages with capabilities? Who can doubt, as well, that the Brexit devaluation of the pound will now have a serious effect on the defence budget? I hope that the noble Earl the Minister will tell us how much it is estimated that blow will cost his department.
In 1997-98, as Secretary of State for Defence, I led the strategic defence review with, among others, my noble friend Lord Reid. It radically remodelled and modernised our post-Cold War forces. In the preface to the review, I said that post-Cold War problems,
“pose a real threat to our security, whether in the Balkans, the Middle East or in some trouble spot yet to ignite. If we are to discharge our international responsibilities in such areas, we must retain the power to act. Our Armed Forces are Britain’s insurance against a huge variety of risks”.
That is as true today as it was when I wrote it. The question is whether we in this country have properly retained that power to act. Some doubt will be cast on that by the distinguished speakers who will speak after me in this debate.
The Minister will undoubtedly tell us at the end of the debate that there is formidable hardware in the pipeline, from Trident to the carriers that were the centrepiece of my 1998 review. The question remains, though: is it enough to meet the challenges we are facing when so many of them are urgent and so potent?
My worry is that we are sleepwalking into a potential calamity. My depressing catalogue of threats, after all, does not even take account of what I said in 1998 of trouble spots yet to ignite. As I wrote those words, we could not have foreseen the conflict the very next year in Kosovo, the attacks of 9/11, the implosion of Syria, the whole of the Arab spring and, indeed, the rise of Daesh/ISIS. We have today a crisis of optimism—hoping for the best and failing to prepare for the worst.
You might legitimately ask, having heard my gloomy assessment and warning, what we should be doing. Here are just a few of my thoughts. First, we must retain and protect our own defence industrial base. That alone gives us some real control in the UK. At the same time, we must encourage and participate in joint projects with our European NATO allies. European contributions to NATO are not just limited by financial shortcomings but by wasteful duplication, and we must continue to press our NATO allies to boost spending and capabilities. If they—and we—did that, we might help expand the growth in our economies.
Secondly, we must continue to promote our values and principles on the world stage. We must defend NATO as the cornerstone of our national and collective defence and tell the people of this country, and indeed the wider world, how essential the alliance remains. Article 5, where an attack on one is an attack on all, is not a choice; it is a solemn obligation. Anybody who questions it questions the whole basis of collective security. Our communication policy on this whole issue is, frankly, pathetic.
Thirdly, we must be aware of and act on the dangers inherent in the present confrontation between Russia and the West. Without the tripwires and warning arrangements of the Cold War, we are in grave danger of making a mistake or a miscalculation with potentially catastrophic results.
Our much-reduced military is still among the very best in the world. Our diplomats have few peers internationally. Our intelligence services are relied on by most of the free world. It is now time for our Government to recognise the dangers to Britain and to live up to their high standards. Never in my lifetime was bold and courageous leadership more necessary and more urgent.
My Lords, before we hear from my noble friend Lord King, I remind the House that this is a time-limited date with Back-Bench speeches limited to four minutes. Timing is particularly tight, so I entreat Peers to wind up immediately when the clock displays four minutes.
My Lords, I join with others in thanking my noble friend Lord Robertson for this debate today and for introducing such wide-ranging coverage of the issues that we face. I was not at all surprised that he included personnel in that. As the very new chairman of the Armed Forces’ Pay Review Body, I was called in by the first Defence Secretary of the new Labour Government to be told that the staging of the pay award by the Tory Government that had caused so much demoralisation in the Armed Forces for several years was going to stop. Whatever the review body recommended, our Armed Forces would get—and the Labour Government honoured that agreement right the way through.
On the personnel that we have and the capability of our Armed Forces, we can have the best policies in the world, get a real 2% defence budget, make the changes and invest, but unless we have the continuation of professional Armed Forces personnel, backed and supported by their families, we will not succeed. Part of the worldwide reputation our Armed Forces have for their professionalism, talent and whatever they bring wherever they go is because we have this concordat.
The Armed Forces have their covenant, which is welcome and has been improved over the past few years, and they have the Armed Forces’ Pay Review Body, which is independent. There is a report due out shortly but I looked at its report from last year and it makes worrying reading. I looked at the previous three as well and they make incrementally worrying reading.
What do Armed Forces personnel and their families see? They—and I—see a Prime Minister who has been in office for nearly a year and has not made one major speech on international security or defence. How are they supposed to feel about that when so much of our security as a nation depends on them and their ability? Many of them see the 2% as smoke and mirrors. They do not understand why pensions should be included in defence spending. An accountant may be able to argue that but you will never convince our people, or many of us in the Chamber today, that that is spending on defence equipment and personnel. They saw last year the announcement by the Government that from 2016, for four years, the maximum pay award they will get year on year will be 1%. Our Armed Forces people are not slow off the mark; they know what is going on and in evidence to the review body they asked why that should be imposed on them when the very people who are imposing it—MPs—are getting more than 1%. Yet we expect our Armed Forces to continue to give the commitment that they have given.
The review body is independent. It has been respected by Governments across the piece. Yet in 2010, and again last year, the Treasury quite arbitrarily, without reference to the review body, cut the commitment bonuses—the commitment to go and do the job. It is in the report. It makes worrying reading indeed. Just 14% of our Armed Forces think that morale is high. If that were a company, it would be looking at itself and at what it could do to improve it. Just 36% were satisfied with their lifestyle and remuneration package. Just under half of them were dissatisfied with the impact on their partner’s career. Many partners have to put their career in abeyance when their Armed Forces partner is serving.
Paragraph 2.14 of the report was one of the most worrying aspects. The review body said:
“One of the most powerful messages … was that personnel were losing trust in their employer”—
the MoD, the Government. So I ask the Minister: do the Government intend to maintain the 1% for the next four years? If they do, do they not agree that that will affect recruitment and retention? Will the impact that the drop in the value of the pound—£1.50 the night of Brexit; £1.20 last night—will have on the MoD budget have to be met out of the MoD budget?
My Lords, as I am in charge of time management, I make a further strong entreaty that remaining speeches must conclude as the clock reaches four minutes.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, for tabling this Motion, and appreciate the obvious wisdom that he brought to it. I also warmly thank all noble Lords and noble and gallant Lords who have contributed to this important debate so powerfully.
It has been said repeatedly in this House in recent times, and it is undoubtedly true, that the world is a more dangerous and uncertain place today than it has been for many years. Despite encouraging advances, the threat from Daesh remains substantial. Russia, as noble Lords have said, continues to show its force through both conventional and novel means. New theatres of conflict, most notably cyber, demand new and complex capability. The transition to a new US Administration has been seen by some as an opportunity to question, perhaps even attempt to undermine, the role of the rules-based international order.
In the 2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review, we wrote:
“The world is changing rapidly and fundamentally”.
We cannot claim to have foreseen the seismic political events of the past 12 months, but we recognised the uncertainty and volatility characterising our current era and we conducted our analysis and reached our conclusions accordingly. I align myself with the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, in this area: no Government can predict the future, but we can prepare for the unpredictable. The SDSR presents a clear plan for doing precisely that.
I remind the House of the four most pressing challenges to UK defence and security, as identified in 2015: first, the increasing threat posed by terrorism, extremism and instability; secondly, the resurgence of state-based threats and intensifying wider state competition; thirdly, the impact of technology, especially cyber threats; and finally, the erosion of the rules-based international order, making it harder to build consensus and tackle global threats. The noble Lord, Lord Robertson, rightly warned us against complacency. We cannot be complacent about recent developments in our strategic context, but I am confident that this list of challenges is as accurate today as it was just over a year ago, and that the plan we have constructed to respond to them stands up to scrutiny.
In the context of enduring change and uncertainty, two principles must be central to our response. First, we must plan to be adaptable: the threats we face are varied and diffuse, and we must be ready to respond rapidly and effectively however and wherever they become manifest. Secondly, we must strengthen and deepen our international partnerships and alliances: now more than ever we must place an international approach at the heart of all of our defence and security plans. I will address both of these in turn.
Noble Lords will by now be familiar with the vision set out in the SDSR for Joint Force 2025. We start from the firm foundation of already world-leading Armed Forces. In 2010, however, the Government rightly optimised our forces around the ability to conduct a single, medium-sized, enduring operation, of the sort we were familiar with from Iraq and Afghanistan. Today we face a wider range of more complex tasks and more sophisticated potential adversaries. Joint Force 2025 has therefore set us on a path towards Armed Forces that are more agile, versatile and deployable than ever before.
We cannot plan with certainty for a discrete type and size of operation, so we must plan for flexibility. Joint Force 2025 will have the capability and skill mix required to conduct a wide range of complex operations concurrently, from deployments on the scale of the current counter-Daesh mission to more specialist operations, support for humanitarian assistance, and training and capacity-building with international partners. Furthermore, at the heart of Joint Force 2025 is the ability to deploy a highly capable expeditionary force of around 50,000. That is a step change in our ambition from the “best effort” deployment of 30,000 planned for in the 2010 SDSR. It will fully prepare us for the most substantial challenges to our national security, including a call to war fighting under NATO Article 5.
Increased agility and versatility increases our security. It sends a powerful message of deterrence to our adversaries, and lets our allies and partners know that we are willing and able to tackle our shared problems side by side. This point cannot be over-emphasised in the wake of last year’s referendum. We may be exiting the European Union, but—as I made clear in our defence debate before Christmas—we are neither withdrawing from Europe nor turning our back on the world. On the contrary, I assure my noble friend Lord King, the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, that NATO will continue to be at the heart of UK defence policy, and we will remain a strong and influential European voice on the world stage.
That leads me to our second strategic imperative: the need to strengthen and deepen our international partnerships and alliances. In the SDSR, we wrote that our defence policy and plans will be “international by design”. Our interests are inextricably linked to global security and prosperity, and we will continue to play a leading role in protecting global stability. We cannot, and do not, hope to do this alone. It is not just a policy choice but a necessity that we become more deliberate in our international approach across all defence activity. We will build an international dimension into defence planning from the outset.
In practice, that means strong, strategic bilateral and multilateral relationships. The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, was right. This begins with our closest allies—the United States, France and Germany. The US remains our pre-eminent partner for defence and security, and interoperability is at the heart of our relationship. Building on the Lancaster House treaty, we will further deepen our collaboration with France on capability, operations, science and technology, and counterterrorism. Germany shares our aspiration to expand our partnership on defence and security, and we will do so across all areas of defence.
But that is not where it ends. The UK will work to strengthen bilateral and multilateral relationships across the globe. We will build and sustain alliances and partnerships through a more comprehensive approach to defence engagement, which is now a funded core task for the Ministry of Defence. We will build and strengthen combined international military formations, whether with NATO or with partners and allies further afield.
I mentioned interoperability. That is being developed all the time. NATO remains the key vehicle for maintaining an integrated and interoperable military force, and we will work with alliance members to train and exercise together, and to share doctrine, tactics and procedures. We will also continue to develop collaborative capabilities with our key allies wherever there is an opportunity to share expertise and cost in the development of new defence technology. Taken together, and supported by the Government’s global defence and diplomatic network, this will allow us to build coalitions throughout the world in the pursuit of shared interests and in support of the rules-based international order.
Strengthening our Armed Forces and employing a comprehensive international approach to defence is the plan set out in SDSR 2015, and the Government stand by it. However, a plan is nothing without action, so I shall just outline briefly the significant progress that has been made. First, the ambitious plans for Joint Force 2025 are in train. The innovative 77th Brigade has reached initial operating capability; work has now begun on the first Dreadnought-class submarine; the first of our new aircraft carriers, HMS “Queen Elizabeth”, will begin sea trials this year; design and manufacture will begin on Crowsnest, the early-warning system for the helicopters that will protect the new carriers; RFA “Tidespring” will arrive in the UK in the spring for customisation; the contract has been signed to purchase nine P8 maritime patrol aircraft; and July 2016 saw the delivery of the RAF’s 14th and final Voyager aircraft for air tanking and transport. We are already delivering.
Internationally, we have also done a lot to demonstrate our commitment to working with allies and partners. My noble friend Lord King referred to the vulnerability of the Baltic states, as did my noble friend Lord Jopling and the noble Viscount, Lord Hanworth. That is exactly why we have agreed to deploy a battalion to Estonia in the spring and an infantry company to Poland in support of the United States, strengthening NATO’s enhanced forward presence. We are also deploying UK fighter aircraft to contribute to the NATO southern air policing task in Romania.
I understand my noble friend Lord Jopling proposing that we should try to hasten the deployment of UK forces to the Baltics. I was at the ARRC headquarters at Innsworth yesterday and can reassure him that plans for the deployment are well advanced. A careful judgment has been made and it is felt to be well worth ensuring that our forces are comprehensively trained and equipped prior to deployment. I am sure that my noble friend would agree with that.
It is not surprising that defence spending has formed a major theme of this debate. A number of noble Lords referred to the Government’s commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defence in every year of this Parliament. We should not downplay that; nor should we draw what appear to be very easy comparisons. Comparing like with like is, I suggest, flawed reasoning because the nature of defence spending inevitably changes over time. In the past, we have reported significantly more operational spend, such as during operations in Afghanistan. That has changed. New threats also require new spending. We have not historically included any spend on cyber. Therefore, it is right that, from time to time, like all NATO allies, we ensure that we are capturing all appropriate spend, and I emphasise that all adjustments are fully in accordance with NATO guidelines.
The noble Lord, Lord Robertson, warned that we should not confuse percentages with capability—and he is absolutely right. He asked the right question: have we retained the power to act? The SDSR laid out a clear and affordable strategy for delivering one of the most capable armed forces in the world, including an expeditionary force, as I have said, of 50,000 by 2025; £1.9 billion in cyber investment; new capabilities for special forces; and a commitment to spending more than £178 billion on equipment and equipment support—more than in previous plans.
I do not accept the accusation of creative accounting. I will just say to the noble Lord, Lord West, that defence spending is going up. When defence spending will increase by £5 billion over this Parliament, it is nonsense for anyone to suggest that there is no new funding. I hope that my noble friend Lord Sterling, the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, and others will be at least somewhat reassured to be reminded of that figure.
The noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, and other noble Lords spoke about manpower, particularly that of the Army. It is true that ensuring efficiency was a driver in force design in 2010, as it was in 2015. However, strategic rationale was the primary basis for the figure of 82,000 regular Army personnel. The figure was based on an assessment of the type, frequency and concurrency of tasks that the Army will be required to conduct. Future Force 2020 described a move away from enduring stabilisation and towards a more adaptable posture. Joint Force 2025 builds on that principle, increasing the adaptability of all the services, including the Army.
The noble Lord, Lord Touhig, rightly emphasised the threat from Russia. We are not complacent about Russian behaviour or capabilities. We remain fully committed to NATO, as I have emphasised, and to our European partners, with whom we will deter threats across a wide spectrum in order to protect our people. NATO has developed a readiness action plan that gives it the tools needed to respond to short-notice or no-notice incidents in order to protect and defend alliance territory.
I understand the call by the noble Lords, Lord West and Lord Hutton, for more platforms for the Royal Navy. The Government share that desire. Not only is our fleet set to grow for the first time since World War II, but its high-end technological capabilities will allow it to provide a better contribution and to retain a first-class navy up to 2040 and beyond. We will maintain a destroyer and frigate fleet of at least 19 ships and look to increase that number by the 2030s, as has been mentioned; and I am sure that we can all take pride in the fact that the Queen Elizabeth aircraft carriers will be coming into service.
The fleet will also be supported by a very capable and renewed tanker fleet. A fleet of up to six offshore patrol vessels will support our destroyers and frigates in delivering routine tasks and will enhance our contribution to maritime security and fisheries protection. I can reassure the noble Lord, Lord West, that the in-service date of the Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier has not slipped, and nor are there any plans for the Prince of Wales, the second carrier, to be mothballed.
The noble Baroness, Lady Dean, criticised my right honourable friend the Prime Minister and questioned her interest in defence. I respectfully reject that criticism. The Prime Minister has a close and abiding interest in defence. Indeed, one of the visits she made as Prime Minister was to the MoD headquarters to speak with the service chiefs. She has also visited our service personnel around the world, including recently on board HMS Ocean in the Gulf.
My right honourable friend is also well aware of the need to invest in security across the piece. That brings me to the subject of cyber, which was rightly emphasised by the noble Baroness, Lady Liddell, among others. Cybersecurity is vital to defence. As she said, our adversaries present a real and rapidly developing threat to our networks, systems and platforms. We are enhancing our cyber defence capabilities through the development of the Cyber Security Operations Centre. As I also mentioned, £1.9 billion will be invested in cyber across government over five years. We are ensuring that our Armed Forces are able to project power in cyberspace, are ready to assist in the event of a significant cyber incident and can respond to a cyberattack as they would to any other attack using whichever capability is most appropriate. We are building a dedicated capability to counterattack in cyberspace as part of our full-spectrum capability. Defence is delivering this capability in partnership with GCHQ through the national offensive cyber programme.
The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Walker, rightly criticised the concept of an EU army. I hope that I can reassure him by saying that no one is seriously proposing that idea. Despite the rhetoric and speculation that we have all read, we have seen nothing to suggest that any major European country wants an EU army. The joint letter published by the ministries of defence of Germany, France, Italy and Spain explicitly ruled that out, and we will continue to resist any EU initiative that risks undermining or duplicating NATO’s central role in European defence.
The noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, called for greater collaboration with universities. I understand and agree with his point. Our innovation initiative has included the horizon-scanning unit known as IRIS, which will forge close ties with the academic community.
My noble friend Lord Attlee asked about the robustness and resilience of our logistics systems, the importance of which he rightly stressed. I can reassure him that we have the strategic base and associated enablers to underpin SDSR 25 and its wide capabilities. I will write him with an answer to his question on exercise Saif Sareea.
The noble Lord, Lord Burnett, raised several issues relating to the Royal Navy. In terms of investment and manpower, the Royal Navy attracted significant investment as a result of the SDSR, as he well knows. With regard to new assault ships, we currently have no plans to commission any. On the matter of our use of landing craft, HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark provide the capability needed to deploy and sustain the lead commando group ashore, by air and sea. They will remain in service until the end of the next decade.
The noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, raised issues of conflict prevention and peacekeeping. I have mentioned the Government’s intention to be international by design. That is in no small part motivated by the principle of conflict prevention: by working more closely with allies and partners we strengthen our shared ability to prevent conflict and ensure our own security. I can tell the noble Earl that we are increasing our contribution to UN peacekeeping operations in South Sudan, Somalia and Kosovo, we are continuing to support CSDP missions, and we are fully committed to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
My time is up. I shall write to those noble Lords whose questions I have not addressed. I hope that it is clear that the Government fully recognise the breadth and severity of threats that face our country today. We know that in this era of uncertainty we can take nothing for granted. The approach that we have taken in the SDSR is the right one for strengthening our defence and security, and it is the one to which this Government are fully committed.