(1 year, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberCould the Minister confirm whether he agrees with the analysis of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, from which I cited extracts, on the various EU asylum directives that would continue to apply in Northern Ireland? I am afraid I have not checked what the noble Lord, Lord Murray, said in response to the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, the other day, but the trafficking directive and the victims directive also apply in Northern Ireland. What are the Government doing to make sure that all those directives are going to be respected in practice in Northern Ireland?
The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, from the Cross Benches, submitted my use of the verb “require” to a degree of philological scrutiny, which I had not taken into account when preparing my answer. I take the noble Lord’s point in relation to empowerment as opposed to obligation.
I regret to say that, in relation to the complex interrelating commitments to which the noble Baroness sought my views from the Dispatch Box, I will have to undertake to correspond with the noble Baroness and the noble Lord.
I sum up what has been a short debate by thanking noble Lords for their informed scrutiny of what has been said, not only by me but by others participating in earlier parts of the debate. From the perspective of this Committee, at this stage, the issues have been given a good airing. Noble Lords have referred to the inevitability that we will consider the matter at a later stage but, at present, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
(1 year, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord asks a highly detailed numerical question, and he will not be surprised to know that I am unable to answer it from the Dispatch Box.
We will do our best to provide one in short order in writing to the noble Lord, if that would be acceptable to the noble Baroness.
(2 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in any case, there will be parties that are disappointed to a greater extent than others. The point is that one party proposes. That party does not determine the question; the determination of that question falls to someone else.
In relation to the point made by my noble friend Lady Altmann, our preference for negotiation clearly remains. As the Committee has heard, that negotiation is not interrupted or affected by the Bill moving through your Lordships’ House.
My Lords, the Minister said that the four-page document we saw in July was designed to assuage our concern. Unfortunately, it did not. In one sense, I am impressed that the Government are prepared to receive criticism of their legal assertions in that document from people of the stature of Sir Jonathan Jones, Professor Mark Elliott, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and my noble friend Lord Campbell of Pittenweem, and still say, “Well, the four-page document adequately sets out our case”. I am sort of impressed but also surprised that the Government are not provoked by the level and depth of that criticism to make a bit more of an effort.
One of my noble friends—I cannot remember which—highlighted the difference between the assertion made at Second Reading that the problem lies in the protocol and the emphasis this evening that the problem lies in its implementation. That would imply that there is no need to rip up the protocol, which is what the Bill is designed to achieve, and that negotiations or dispute resolution up to the ECJ would fit the bill as the problem is in the implementation. The Government keep switching their ground depending on, it seems to me, who most recently raised a point as to whether the real problem is the protocol or its implementation. The Minister said that invoking Article 16 would deal only with the symptoms not the protocol, but surely “symptoms” are the same thing as “implementation” in this context. Again, there is inconsistency here over whether the problem lies with the text of the protocol or its implementation.
The Minister rather confused me with his references to the CJEU being part of the problem. Again, that was known three years ago. The Government agreed and signed up to what the EU would not have otherwise agreed to—Northern Ireland being effectively part of the single market—without the CJEU being the ultimate arbiter of legal disputes. However, I have frankly never taken the point from the right that court adjudication creates a democratic deficit. We do not expect courts to be democratic. They are part of a liberal democracy but are not themselves supposed to be an epicentre of democracy. They rule on the application of the law.
I do not think that it says much for the Government’s knowledge, understanding, foresight or policies that they are now seeking to diverge from the single market, not least in the Bill—I cannot remember its full title; it is something like the revocation of retained law Bill, otherwise known as the Brexit freedoms Bill—that had its Second Reading in the other place today; I do not know whether that is still going on. Diverging from single market legislation makes the implementation of the protocol more difficult so there does not seem to be any coherence in the Government’s policy. They criticise the implementation of the protocol but are going to make that implementation more problematic; indeed, the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, talked about how maintenance of regulatory alignment would help east-west trade. A UK return to the single market, if not the EU, would do so even more.
(2 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the intention of the Government is to restore the situation envisaged at the framing of the protocol whereby equal importance was given to east-west and to north-south transactions.
My Lords, the Minister referred to the absence of the Executive. It was expected that the publication of the Bill would be an incentive to create the Executive, but I understand it is being reported that the DUP has said that the publication of the Bill will not make any difference; it wants to see it implemented. How many steps have to be taken?
My Lords, we are in contact with all shades of opinion in Northern Ireland, trying to move forward the position whereby the institutions of devolved government can be restored and the process of normalising relations between communities and between the United Kingdom and its international partners can proceed.
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberCan I join the maskless crew? Surely international law, and certainly EU directives, are usually a minimum requirement, so if we wanted 45 days and a European instrument said 30, that is brilliant; it is better. It at least complies, so what is the problem?
I hear from all sides of the Chamber, including from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti—
I am grateful to the noble Lord for that intervention. I was proposing to deal later with the expression “bad faith” and its source, but, to help him at this stage, it is not drawn from any comparable legislation, nor from the authority of the courts. We do not hark back to that. Rather, the nature of the problems that must be confronted in relation to this is sufficiently protean and diverse that a need was identified to arrive at a broad expression in the Bill, and “bad faith” was the language selected after consideration among Ministers and officials to represent that.
I am sorry to interrupt the Minister, but I now realise that he has now moved on from Clause 61 and is talking about Clause 62. I was wondering whether he was going to answer my point about incompatibility with the ECHR memorandum. That says that
“where the person’s previous conclusive grounds decision was negative, the Secretary of State will be required to make a new conclusive grounds decision on the new referral, and the person will be protected from removal in the meantime, ensuring compliance with Article 10(2) of ECAT.”
However, you are not protecting them from removal in the meantime under Article 61, as far as I can see, so how is the Bill compatible with the ECHR memorandum?
The point I was seeking to make by that expression is, I think, the same one that my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar made earlier, when he spoke about this—it is as familiar to the noble Baroness as a practising barrister as it is to me, and I think it was referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. If we have a list that sets out heads A to E, and then counsel attempts to rely on point F which is not otherwise comprehended, or not specifically enumerated but which may be comprehended within the expression “or any other circumstance”, that always—as my noble friend Lord Wolfson said—places counsel at a disadvantage.
On the threats, or potential threats, and the potential scope for abuse which lie within the power of a person seeking to exploit and make a false application under these circumstances, what we are seeking to do is to identify a phrase or term which is sufficiently wide to encompass all those potential points. Noble Lords in the Committee have identified, under reference to the traffickers and criminals whom it is the intention of the entire Committee to thwart, their cunning, resilience and resourcefulness in finding ways to slip between the cracks of aspects of legislation.
Amendment 169 does not provide a definition of “public order”. I reassure the Committee that we adhere to relevant provisions in our international obligations but it is unnecessary to specify that in legislation, and we are satisfied that the current definition of public order complies with ECAT.
My noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering proposes that we replace the “bad faith” provision with one of “improper claims”. That proposal can be addressed in conjunction with Amendment 163, which seeks to remove the bad faith provision entirely. Another reason for the expression “bad faith”, and its breadth, is to avoid inadvertently excluding administrative mistakes made when submitting claims, which may be interpreted as falling under “improper claims”. We believe that “bad faith” is the appropriate language.
In answer to submissions made by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, under Amendments 169, 161 and 164, which seek to exclude children from this clause, ECAT does not specify an age limit. We deem it important that the United Kingdom maintains the full scope while ensuring that all decisions to withhold the protections of the NRM are balanced against our priority to safeguard children. The proposal set out in these amendments would create, in effect, a two-tiered system that could encourage those looking to misuse the NRM protections to provide falsified information regarding their age. We all sat late enough the other night in relation to the age amendment provisions elsewhere in the Bill for me not to wish to go into that area again, but we are concerned lest the proposals in the amendment provide an opportunity for persons to provide falsified information.
In relation to Amendment 168, the Government are aware that potential and confirmed victims of modern slavery may already have been convicted of serious offences or be involved in terrorism-related activity. I make it clear that neither the additional recovery period nor the public order disqualifications can be taken as being a blanket disqualification. Any decisions relating to disqualifications will be taken on an individual basis, taking into account the individual’s circumstances and vulnerabilities. This includes consideration as to the nature of any criminal exploitation that may have been made of them and the need to safeguard individuals. We think it is right that further details of how to apply this discretionary element should be set out in guidance for decision-makers rather than being placed in the Bill. That will give the Government the flexibility to meet the needs of victims and respond to changing patterns of criminal activity that may seek opportunities to misuse the NRM.
We do not consider that Clause 62 will present a barrier to people who have had convictions and prevent them coming forward, because of that discretionary approach and because there will not be a blanket disqualification on the basis of public order. All of us—the whole Committee, I am sure—want victims of modern slavery to continue to come forward for identification and support, irrespective of their personal circumstances or the circumstances in which they came to be exploited. However, we maintain that it is right that the Government can remove individuals who pose a threat to public order from the protections and support that the NRM affords.
Together with the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, was concerned lest such victims did not come forward if they had criminal convictions. First responders should still always refer victims into the national referral mechanism, in line with modern slavery statutory guidance, even where the individual has had a previous recovery period or has a criminal conviction. Decision-makers trained in the field will then carefully consider each individual case and take into account specific vulnerabilities and the needs of each individual, again on a case-by-case basis.
The recovery period may be withheld following a reasonable grounds decision, and the rights that flow from a conclusive grounds decision may also be withheld at that stage if relevant disqualifications apply. I emphasise that we will carefully consider each individual case to ensure that people who genuinely need protection and support will receive it. I reiterate that it is right that we should be able to withhold rights from individuals where appropriate—for example, from those who pose a national security risk to the United Kingdom.
I return to the matter raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, in relation to compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights. The protections of the NRM will be withheld in accordance with Clause 61 only when so to do would be compliant with our international obligations—
I am glad to hear that the Government want to comply with our international obligations—some of us feel that that is not entirely evident from the Bill—but I was asking about compatibility with the European convention against trafficking. Clause 61 allows “a competent authority” to remove someone even when a conclusive grounds decision is pending. I am sorry to repeat myself, but the European Convention on Human Rights memorandum, produced presumably by the Home Office for the Bill, says at paragraph 76.d:
“the Secretary of State will be required to make a new conclusive grounds decision on the new referral, and the person will be protected from removal in the meantime, ensuring compliance with Article 10(2)”.
That is not what Clause 61 does; it allows the Government to remove the person. They are not “protected from removal” pending a new conclusive grounds decision, so the ECHR memorandum and the Bill are in direct contradiction. Can the Minister take further advice and answer that point? If he cannot do so today, I am sure that he will be able to write to me. I am pretty sure that this was identified by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which is why we wanted to change “must” determine the person’s removal to “may”, so that there is wiggle room that might be in compliance with ECAT. On the face of it, I cannot see that this provision is compliant, notwithstanding the assertion in the memorandum that it is.
The noble Baroness graciously affords me the possibility of replying perhaps in more detail and later. Unless I have further information to provide to her, I propose to take that course. I am obliged to her for her consideration.
In relation to how to assess whether a person is involved in terrorism-related activity or is otherwise a national security concern, the Government have extensive experience of assessing these things, together with our operational partners, and using these assessments to inform executive decision-making.
Whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a person is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity is a crucial part of consideration for public order disqualification. Amendment 165 would weaken the United Kingdom’s ability to withhold protections from people of terrorism concern, and we therefore consider that it would increase the risk to the national security of the UK.
Regarding Amendment 166, NRM referrals for foreign national offenders and foreign nationals held on remand are rising, with an average of 85 per month for the first five months of 2021, compared to 19 per month in 2018. It is right that foreign nationals who have been convicted of the serious offences referred to in Section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007 should be included within scope for consideration of the public order disqualification. This ensures that we will have a clear definition provided for in legislation to support decisions.
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I repeat the answer given previously: the department does not collect specific data on the level of offending by defendants on court bail. However, as the noble Lord is aware—and as Members present may not be aware—the commission of a crime on bail is itself an aggravation, which will be reflected in the sentence.
My Lords, the recent Constitution Committee report pointed out that, because of delays to the courts reform programme, improvements to IT systems had not been sufficiently implemented by the time of the pandemic, meaning that remote hearings relied on antiquated systems and participants in the criminal and family courts in particular struggled with virtual hearings. How do the Government intend to supply adequate investment in training in IT while also guaranteeing fairness for all through physical participation for those for whom remote hearings are not a solution?
My Lords, we acknowledge that, in many cases, participation by way of remote hearings is valuable for people in such positions. None the less, we also appreciate that it is not appropriate for all such people, whether they be witnesses or complainers in cases.