Inquiries Act 2005 (Select Committee Report)

Lord Soley Excerpts

Thursday 19th March 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Soley (Lab)]

My Lords, I begin by saying that it was a pleasure to be here when the noble Viscount, Lord Tenby, made his valedictory speech. I was very interested to hear that his first speech in this place was on non-custodial sentences. That led me to think to myself that he then went on to do 26 years of what might be described as a semi-custodial sentence. However, he has done it with great distinction and he will be missed.

I also congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Shutt, as well as all the staff of the committee, who often do not get the recognition they deserve. As a member of that committee, I can say that it was very informative, very well run and a pleasure to be on.

I echo what a number of speakers have said about the inadequacy of the Government’s response, which initially I thought was just down to Ministers’ incompetence and arrogance. I have come to the conclusion that it is actually more complicated than that: it is almost certainly about interdepartmental struggles over what to change and what not to change. No one can really believe that there is not a problem, not least in relation to the length and cost of inquiries. People often quote the Saville inquiry, which lasted 12 years at a cost of £191 million, but in fact others have overrun and been very costly. Therefore, there is a problem there.

However, I ask the Minister to put this matter in a wider perspective. My view—and this was said to us by a number of people giving evidence—is that inquiries are becoming increasingly important in winning the confidence of the public in our political and judicial systems. That point was made a number of times and I cannot stress it enough. At a time when we politicians are struggling to re-engage effectively with the public, and when that is very complicated because society is so much more complicated, these inquiries give the public a chance to have their voice heard, and not only in special circumstances if they are directly involved. They also enable the wider public to recognise that there are ways in which very complex topics can be explored in more detail, with good recommendations being made.

I entered the House of Commons back in 1979. When the riots started in 1981, I had in mind the Coldbath Fields riots of the 1830s. Then, the House of Commons set up a committee of inquiry composed of Members of Parliament, who took only two or three months to make their recommendations, including very major ones such as preventing the police being agents provocateurs. I thought that that was a very good system because it changed things after the Coldbath Fields riots, so why can we not do that again? However, when you saw the complexity of the inner-city riots and the Scarman inquiry began, you realised that it was too complex and too party-political to do it within the parliamentary system. Indeed, when I was at the Meadow Well Estate near Newcastle, where the riots had taken place, it occurred to me that the whole approach taken by Scarman was very impressive and needed to be taken forward. Since those days, we have had more and more inquiries in very appropriate circumstances.

What amazes me about this report is that one of the central recommendations—that we should presume to use the 2005 Act—is rejected in the government response through a list of statements, which do not give any clear reason why we should not do so. They could best be described as a painful elaboration of an attempt to find a field with very long grass into which to kick the recommendation. My noble friend Lord Richard made the point, as did others, that there will obviously be cases where, understandably, people will not want to use the 2005 Act, and security may well be one. I want to return to that in a moment. However, by and large, why is there not a presumption that the 2005 Act will be used? Although it received criticism, nobody said that it was a really bad Act.

Why is another of our recommendations—that a Minister should be expected to come before Parliament and say why they are not going to use the Act—rejected? In most cases, they would be able to do that. In cases which are difficult for security reasons, I have never generally found Ministers or MPs so shy or bashful that they cannot find a way of dealing with that. The Litvinenko affair was a classic example of where there was a need for an inquiry. However, for very real reasons—not just security reasons but reasons of relationships with a major power, Russia—it could not be done. Now, because relations with Russia are so much worse, the inquiry is taking place. However, initially it was resisted. If that is why the Government are reluctant to accept the recommendation of an assumption of using the 2005 Act, I say that that is not good enough. Reasons can be given in Parliament as to why they do not want to use the Act.

All the other points that have been made, which I do not wish to repeat in great detail, are absolutely right. It is absurd that we take so much time on insisting on letters being sent out with a warning when the chairman of the inquiry does not think it is necessary. Clearly, we have to give a considerable degree of leeway to the chairmen of inquiries in these circumstances. I also think that there are other points that we need to emphasise, such as the importance of involving the judiciary in the selection of the judge, if it is a judge-led inquiry, and issues of that kind.

Going through the report, the noble Lord, Lord Shutt, spelt out how many had been accepted, how many rejected and how many were conditional. The reality of reading the report in the round is that it is generally a case of avoidance. It is saying, “This is difficult; I can’t really do that; that’s too problematic; we’ll look at this again”, and so on. Reading the introduction by Simon Hughes MP, where he says that he welcomes the report, I thought that it would have been more accurate to say that he did not welcome the report and would rather it had never been written.

That is the thrust of the Government’s response. This is an important issue. If we look at recent public inquiries—the one on the hospital and the arguments around the inquiry that will take place on child sexual abuse—they are incredibly important to the public. They help to restore confidence in our political and judicial system, which has received some heavy knocks in recent years. We need to deal with that. It may be a bit late in the day, but perhaps not too late, to say to the Government that a bit of creative thinking would be useful. If the Government had approached their response to the report by picking up the evidence that a number of people have made about how important these inquiries are—Leveson is a classic example of one that attracted enormous interest—why are they so reluctant to make sure that they are well developed? The noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, made the point about the importance of some central unit that keeps the processes under review to ensure that we do not spend lots of money on reinventing the wheel.

Inquiries are important for the public. They give the public greater confidence in the administrative system of the UK and that our constitutional structures are working well. They are becoming, in my judgment, a very important tool with which to re-engage with the public. That is how the Government should have approached this, and I am very sorry that they did not. They have underestimated their opportunity to engage better with the public by using public inquiries, and at the same time recognising that many of the things that have been mentioned today could be done not only to make them work better but to save an awful lot of money. It would not take too many more Savilles—I hope there will not be any—for the public to begin to lose support for them when they know the costs and timescales. That undermines public confidence. What the report is trying to do is to give structure to the system so that people continue to find inquiries useful and interesting, and that people have confidence in the administration of the UK and its constitution.