Passenger Railway Services (Public Ownership) Bill

Lord Sikka Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 23rd October 2024 Lords Chamber

In a nutshell, I am concerned about the gamble the Government are taking with the future of the railways by going back to the pre-privatisation system, where Ministers will have to compete against other spending departments for what the railways need. I beg to move.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 44 requires the Secretary of State, within 12 months of enacting the Bill, to publish an annual report on the relationship between the provisions of the Bill and the leasing of rolling stock to public sector companies. My preference would have been to end the private ownership of rolling stock, but the Bill officer suggested that such an amendment was beyond the scope of the Bill—hence this silly weak amendment that I am putting forward.

The background is that, during Second Reading, on 7 October, the noble Baroness, Lady Blake of Leeds, laid down the principles of the Bill. She said:

“This Bill will ensure that trains are run for the benefit of the British public, not for the profits of shareholders around the world”.


She added that, by ending the current franchise system for passenger railways,

“the taxpayer will save between £110 million and £150 million a year in fees”.—[Official Report, 7/10/24; cols. 1831, 1833.]

The Government have already said that they will not bring rolling stock back into public ownership. However, the new system, operated by a public company, will still need rolling stock, and the Government have not provided a great deal of clarity on that so far. By leaving the rolling stock in private hands, they will be negating their own principle, which was to deny profits to shareholders around the world.

The Bill will not facilitate public ownership of passenger railway services. Instead, it will facilitate what I call “rent a carriage”. That will guarantee massive profits for rolling stock companies—roscos—which do not build or commission trains but make huge profits. Last year, roscos charged £3.1 billion for leasing out rolling stock and had a profit margin of 41.6%. That is a profit of £1.29 billion in one year, extracted from customers and the public purse. The actual amount which the shareholders have extracted from roscos is likely to be much, much bigger—more of that in a moment.

I looked at the accounts of one of the roscos and it is full of financial engineering. The £1.29 billion profit which it declared for a year is far greater than the savings for the passenger services that the Minister said would be £110 million to £150 million a year. There is no justification for the profiteering of roscos, especially as the payments are guaranteed and in future will be guaranteed by the state—at worst, it can simply print the money—so the risk is very low. The return should be no higher than the yield on any government bond, which is technically called a risk-free rate of return.

The actual returns extracted by rosco shareholders are much bigger than the dividends. Let me illustrate that with quotes from the accounts of Porterbrook, which is one of these companies. It is owned by foreign shareholders: Canadian pension fund manager Alberta Investment Management; Luxembourg-based Allianz Capital Partners; EDF Invest, which is owned by the French Government; and Australian infrastructure investor Hastings Funds Management. Porterbrook’s 2023 accounts show a payment in dividends of £150 million. In 2022, it was £285 million. That is £435 million in dividends in just two years, which is far greater than the expected total saving of £110 million to £150 million for the publicly operated passenger service.

The company also shifts profits through intra-group transactions. In 2023, it paid £154 million interest on its debt, which included £153.5 million to other entities in the same group—not to an outsider, but within the same group. In 2022, it made interest payments of £162.4 million, which included £161.2 million to other group entities. In the absence of additional information, it is hard to know whether such payments are genuine. They are probably not.

Of course, profits are also shifted to avoid taxes. Interest payments give the company a tax-deductible expense, even though the transactions are not arm’s length and may lack economic substance. This company paid no corporation tax in the last two years, dividends are paid to foreign investors, and they did not pay any UK tax on those. This really is organised looting, permitted by the last Government, and I urge the Minister to ask HMRC to investigate these companies. Over the last two years, Porterbrook extracted at least £750 million in returns for its shareholders, or an average of £375 million a year. This is far greater than the £110 million to £150 million which the Government hope to save by ending passenger rail franchises.

I have referred to only one company, which is by no means the largest one, but I am sure the Minister gets the substance of my arguments. Billions of pounds can be saved by ending the role of current roscos in the railway industry. Leasing out rolling stock is effectively a licence to print money. I understand from rail company executives that the useful economic life of a carriage is around 30 years or more. The cost of a carriage is normally recovered through rental or leasing arrangements over a period of five to seven years. This being so, the rental charges of 23 to 25 years are pure profit, nothing else. There is absolutely no economic justification for this. The Government can help by stopping the use of current roscos. They can buy direct from manufacturers or set up a Great British Railways leasing company. All of these options are preferable to the current practice.

I hope that, as a first step towards ending profiteering, the Minister will agree to publish the annual report that this amendment calls for. It should provide data about the returns extracted by shareholders in dividends, intragroup transactions, related-party transactions and various profit-shifting techniques. Of course, my preference is to end this roscos circus altogether.

[Viscount Hanworth (Lab)]

My Lords, I offer my support to Amendment 44 and, beyond that, want to support and reiterate what my colleague has just asserted.

I agree that, consequent upon the Bill, the whole of the rail system needs to be kept under review during the period of transition. The privatisation of British Rail imposed costs on rail users and taxpayers. There were costs that resulted from the disorganisation of the system which might have been alleviated by rational central planning. There were also costs that arose from the profit-seeking and rent-seeking of the agents of privatisation.

Some of the main train operating companies have been paying large dividends to their ultimate owners. These include consortia of foreign banks and foreign national rail companies, as we have heard. The companies that own the rolling stock and lease it to the train operating companies have been deriving large and exorbitant rents. These companies are of course called the roscos.

The three largest companies, Porterbrook, Eversholt Rail Group and Angel Trains, own 84% of the UK’s rolling stock. They were established in 1994, at the time of the privatisation. They acquired their rolling stock at vastly undervalued prices and substantial profits were reaped when they were sold on to subsequent owners. These companies have complicated structures of foreign and domestic ownership. Between 2012 and 2018, the three largest roscos passed on a total of £1.2 billion to their parent companies in the form of dividends. We have heard that this sum has recently become even more exorbitant. The Government appear to have concluded that it would be far too expensive to bring these companies into public ownership.

It should be observed that the era of the roscos has coincided with the demise of our railway manufacturing industry, the remnants of which have now fallen into the hands of foreign owners. This demise has been due, in part, to the activities of the rolling stock companies. Instead of providing a steady flow of orders for new rolling stock, they have often opted to refurbish their existing stock. This has made it unprofitable to manufacture trains in the UK. The train manufacturers are now in foreign hands, and they may decide to retreat abroad.

To avert this, there needs to be a consistent stream of rolling stock replacements, subject to a centrally managed plan. The question is how this can be achieved. Others may have opinions to offer on this matter, but I believe that, when Great British Railways is properly established, it should undertake this task. Great British Railways would not be remitting exorbitant dividends to financial consortia, such as the owners of the existing roscos do, and it would not be paying eye-watering salaries to its executive staff. As a consequence of such savings, it would be able to offer attractive rates of return to funds borrowed from capital markets, which might assist investment in new rolling stock.

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[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, at this hour I would like to expand considerably on my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham’s remarks on his amendment, but I find there is nothing I can add, given how well expressed his argument was technically. I shall say only that I hope the Minister, by contrast to his response to the previous group, will recognise the serious balance sheet issues that arise in relation to lease obligations. I understand that, while the department currently recognises its obligations to the end of the current contracts, most of which are a matter of months or very few years away, when the responsibility transfers to the Government, they will be responsible for the lease payments for the whole of the life of the remaining contracts for the lease of the trains and these will therefore represent a balance sheet liability, not simply an ongoing cost, that may well need to be recognised. I am not, as I say, as proficient in these matters as my noble friend, but I hope very much that the Minister treats that seriously and gives us a proper and robust answer about how this is to be treated.

I shall save the bulk of my remarks for the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, with which, it may surprise noble Lords, I have a great deal more sympathy than they might expect, certainly as far as his analysis is concerned, though not necessarily with his solution of total nationalisation and so forth.

The fact is that there is a very large amount of capital in the world, and a capital is seeking a return. However, this capital is not buccaneering 19th-century capital of the sort that built the railways in the first place; this is not capital that is looking for investments at risk; and this is not capital that sees that it might win a large prize on one investment in its portfolio but is willing to tolerate the total loss of another investment in its portfolio. This is capital that is looking for risk-free returns—or returns that are close to being risk free—but at a rate of return that is considerably higher than it would achieve if it invested in government bonds.

Such capital is to be found throughout our economy—this is a criticism not of the current Government but of the previous Government and of the Labour Government as managed by Gordon Brown—because it is the basis on which funding is now provided to most of our utilities. That is why they all belong to large, foreign—although they are not necessarily foreign, and I do not object to the fact that they are foreign, so I will drop that word—investors who are looking for super returns and are achieving them because the Government are so accommodating towards them.

The noble Lord, Lord Sikka, asked why the Government do not do something about this and why they do not nationalise the roscos as well. That would be a true nationalisation. As I said at Second Reading, this Bill is not really a nationalisation of the railways; as I said in Committee on Monday, it is more like dismissing your chauffeur at the end of his contract. That is all that is really happening. If you are nationalising something, you normally have to pay for it and you normally acquire assets. That is not what is happening here, because the assets are all left in the private sector. The Bill’s headline claim of nationalising the railways—after all, that is the main purpose of this Bill: to get a headline out there quickly—is largely bogus. The main reason that the Government are not acquiring the roscos is that they cannot afford to do so.

There is a second reason that the Government are not acquiring the roscos or going even further—as I suspect the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, would—by seizing their super profits and acquiring them at a price that would reflect a reasonable rate of return closer to the risk-free rate of return for the rest of the period of their leases. That reason is that this Government, rather like the previous one, are wholly dependent on that source of funding for nearly every infrastructure project that they want to carry out, be it railways, environmental stuff, net zero and so forth.

In fact, there was a great conclave of these investors only a week or so ago, at which the Government told them what wonderful prospects they would have with their super, close-to-risk-free returns if only they would invest in Britain. It is not that we will get less of this sort of finance that is so objectionable to the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, under this Government; we will get a great deal more of it. That is the simple explanation, whatever the Government say, as to why they will not do what the noble Lord would like them to do, and which anybody who values true competitive capitalism would also consider to be moving towards terminating an outrage.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, I do not want to reply to the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, because I would be here all night picking holes in every point he made in reference to me.

Perhaps I may help the Minister out. The noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, talked about the liabilities of Network Rail. The composition of government debt published by the ONS includes the liabilities of Network Rail, but the assets acquired with that debt are excluded. That means that the government debt is overstated. In a balance sheet, you will have assets and liabilities. In the ONS approach, only Network Rail’s liabilities are included in the debt. I understand that, for quite a long while, the Treasury has been looking at reconfiguring the composition of public debt, and I very much hope that, soon, it will do the proper thing by either taking off the debt altogether from the ONS numbers or including Network Rail’s assets as well.

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who contributed to this discussion. First, I should say that the objective of this limited Bill before the Committee remains to unify track and train, to provide better services to passengers, to reduce the cost of the railway and to increase the railway’s income. The phrase I would use to start with is, “We are where we are”.

The noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, referred to Network Rail. I am very familiar with its arrangements post being put back on the Government’s balance sheet. All I can say to the noble Lord is that managing it is and has been a difficult job. However, it has still managed to make significant investment in the railway infrastructure of Great Britain. In some ways, its exposure to being in the public sector did it a great deal of good. I was paid significantly less to chair it than my predecessor was; its chief executive is paid significantly less than any of his predecessors and to my mind, he does a very good job. The organisation is a good deal more frugal than it used to be, yet it still does some very good things in operating the railway infrastructure.

The noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, knows that Chiltern was always an outlier. There was no other plausible large-scale investment in railway infrastructure by a train operating company; certainly, there has been no recent interest in it. If you looked at the owners of the train operating companies now, you would see that their balance sheets simply would not support it.

Of course, the noble Lord knows that I cannot predict what the Office for National Statistics will or will not say. Although the suggestion is that, after six years, LNER was still capable of being put back in the private sector, there was absolutely no evidence that it or Northern, which was in public ownership for four years, was being prepared at all. There was also no move in the previous Government’s department to do so. Nevertheless, there was no change in the status of the public accounts of those companies. The noble Lord may speculate that there might be in future, with these arrangements, but I could equally assert that experience suggests that there will not be.

My noble friend Lord Sikka made a further point about the treatment of the assets and liabilities of Network Rail. I will write to both him and the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, about that.

On the other hand, I recognise completely the passion with which my noble friends Lord Sikka and Lord Hanworth spoke about the rolling stock companies. Again, we are where we are. I heard my noble friends’ arguments with interest, but the Government will not buy back the rolling stock companies. Great British Railways will enable a longer-term view of the rolling stock market and it will reduce the margins it needs to make. Everybody is right to say that rolling stock lasts for 30 to 35 years, but a railway that is more accurately able to predict how long that rolling stock should last and where it should be used will reduce the uncertainty of relatively short-term leases. It will also significantly reduce the cost of those leases and will actually enhance competition in the market. We will see how that market evolves over time.

Having said all that, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

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Tabled by

[Lord Sikka]

44: Clause 2, page 3, line 32, at end insert—
“30D Review of relationship between provisions of section 30(1A) and the leasing of rolling stockThe Secretary of State must, within twelve months of the day on which the Passenger Railway Services (Public Ownership) Act 2024 comes into force, lay before Parliament a report on the relationship between public sector contracts awarded under section 30(1A) and the leasing of rolling stock to public sector companies.” Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish an annual report on the relationship between the provisions of the Bill and the leasing of rolling stock to public sector companies.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

I am very grateful to the Minister and all the other noble Lords who have participated in tonight’s debate. Let me make it clear that my proposal would not stymie competition among manufacturers. It seeks to eliminate the financial intermediaries that are making 41.6% profit on top of whatever the manufacturers are paid. These roscos do not make trains and they do not test them; they are there simply to make extra profits. Competition among manufacturers will remain.

The Minister has said that the Government do not wish to buy back rolling stock companies. I am not asking the Government to buy back rolling stock companies. I am suggesting setting up a Great British Railways leasing company, so that these intermediaries can be eliminated. That would wipe them out, and my estimate is that it would save probably around £2 billion a year. I refer only to one company, which had taken out £750 million over a two-year period. It would be beneficial to set up a Great British Railways leasing company. However, I hear the Minister’s arguments and will reflect upon them. For the time being, I will not move the amendment.

Amendment 44 not moved.