Lord Shipley
Main Page: Lord Shipley (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Cities and Local Government Devolution Bill [HL]
Lord Shipley Excerpts
Lord Beecham (Lab)
My Lords, the amendments in this group relate to the delegation of functions to the deputy mayor who under Clause 2 would be appointed from the members of the authority by the mayor. They relate more generally to the sweeping powers contained in Clause 3 for the Secretary of State to render any function of the authority to be exercised only by the mayor or, even more remarkably, the deputy mayor or any other member or officer of the combined authority whom the mayor might choose. That represents a massive concentration of power in the hands of an elected mayor. It is an unacceptable vesting of power, which he can delegate to anybody, in effect, whom he chooses.
The very authorities that have blazed the trail of innovation that led to this Bill in the Greater Manchester area did so without this effectively unfettered power. The great local government leaders of the past—from Joseph Chamberlain to Herbert Morrison and others, some of whom adorn the Benches to this day—did not have such power. It is unnecessary for the Bill to include that measure.
Amendment 18 would require the consent of the combined authority to the appointment of the deputy mayor and Amendment 20 would require the consent of the authority to the delegation by the Secretary of State of the functions exercisable only by the mayor. Amendment 21 would require the mayor to consult the combined authority on the further delegation of general functions by the mayor to a deputy. Amendment 22 deals with the provision of Section 107D(5) under which:
“Any general function exercisable by the mayor”,
may be exercised,
“by the mayor individually, or … by a person acting under arrangements with the mayor”,
only with the consent of the combined authority. The purpose of this group of amendments is to ensure that the combined authority has some influence over the delegation of hugely important powers otherwise left in the hands entirely of the elected mayor. I beg to move.
Lord Shipley (LD)
My Lords, I support the main aim of Amendment 18, and will speak in particular to Amendments 19 and 37 in this group. As the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said, the Bill proposes a massive concentration of power in the hands of the mayor. In the context of the appointment of a deputy mayor, there has to be an appointments process that is understood publicly and has public consent. We cannot have a decision just emerging from a set of private decisions. Our Amendment 19 is designed to make the process more transparent. We do that by saying that the appointment by a mayor of a deputy mayor should be,
“subject to approval by the overview and scrutiny committee”,
and that approval can be secured,
“by a simple majority of members of the oversight and scrutiny committee”,
agreeing that the appointment should be made. We also say in proposed new subsection 1(D):
“An overview and scrutiny committee may”—
at its discretion—
“in pursuit of making a determination … hold a confirmation hearing for the deputy mayor”.
That is clearly defined in proposed new subsection 1(E) as meaning,
“a public meeting at which members of the overview and scrutiny committee may question witnesses and where the committee can compel—
(a) the mayor;
(b) the proposed deputy mayor; and
(c) any other persons that the committee considers relevant to attend”.
This is a much better way of proceeding. There are a number of examples around the world where such confirmation hearings are held, and it seems to me that it would be justifiable in this case, given the dangers that we addressed on Monday during our first day in Committee about the creation of a one-party state. So Amendment 37 would require the approval of the appointment of the deputy mayor by the overview and scrutiny committee.
This is an important issue of principle for us, and I hope that the Government will give due weight to the need to ensure that in a Bill which is proposing such a massive concentration of power, some protection of the public interest can be secured by means of our amendment.
Lord Adonis (Lab)
Perhaps I may ask the noble Lord to reflect on the clear problem that could arise, which is that you might well have a mayor and a deputy mayor who do not get on. The mayor of course is elected with a popular mandate and so has a clear mandate to take office under the provisions of the Bill. It is important that the executive of the combined authority should operate smoothly, efficiently and with a sense of common purpose. Given the limited number of members of a combined authority, how does the noble Lord propose that a mayor should seek to build relations with a deputy with whom they may have little in common?
Lord Shipley
It is possible that the mayor would not get on with the deputy mayor, but what the amendments are trying to secure is the approval of an overview and scrutiny committee of the mayor’s nomination. If the members of the committee refused, other people could be nominated by the mayor. It does not say much for local government if, among all the leaders of the councils which are members of the combined authority, there is not one who can get on with the elected mayor.
Lord Tyler (LD)
My Lords, I want to support the view which has just been expressed by my noble friend Lord Shipley and to make a particular point about the process that we are now engaged in. This is an important issue of principle; in this Bill we are being asked to support a very novel procedure for which there is no precedent. I do not have a problem with major reforms, and indeed sometimes I feel that your Lordships’ House is not sufficiently radical, as other Members may be aware. But on this occasion we should pause and think carefully about what we are doing. I draw the attention of noble Lords to the recommendations made by the Constitution Committee, which says at paragraph 15 of its report:
“Although these proposals are the development of an on-going process started in the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009, we note that they are being taken forward very quickly. There has been no green paper, white paper or draft bill for pre-legislative scrutiny”.
That lays upon us particular responsibilities. When, in the normal course of events, we have had a Green Paper, White Paper and even discussions between the two Houses in a Joint Committee of a draft Bill, obviously such important and valuable proposals that we have before us could be examined in considerable detail.
However, it is an unfortunate fact that shortly after a general election when there is a change of Administration, they want to get going on new legislation very quickly. That is understandable, but it lays upon this House a special responsibility, particularly when a Bill comes to us first. Again, these are new procedures and the Constitution Committee is echoing concerns that we dealt with on Monday when we were looking at the report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee.
Paragraph 14 of the Constitution Committee says:
“One result is that local government in England is likely to become more complicated, as different combined authorities receive different packages of powers. This is a significant departure from past practice which has operated on the basis of a finite number of different council models. The Bill, by contrast, creates the possibility of bespoke arrangements for each combined authority. It might be argued that the proposed system is a paradigm example of demand-and-supply devolution, responsive to local needs. On the other hand there are real concerns about the complexity of the system that may result, and the degree of asymmetry which these changes may bring about. In particular, there is a potential for a significant divergence between urban and rural local government arrangements”.
We on these Benches very much welcome the statement constantly made by the Minister that these are bespoke arrangements, but there are potential dangers of confusion, not least in terms of the way in which the people of the areas concerned will view these new authorities. How precisely the relationship between the combined authority and the mayor will work out in practice is critical to that confidence in the new system. It is extremely important that the deputy mayor should at least be seen to be representing the confidence of choice of the wider group in that area, which is currently represented by the constituent authorities.
I entirely endorse the general concern expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, and hope that the Government will think very carefully indeed about these arrangements before Report.
Lord Adonis
My Lords, I would have sympathy with my noble friend Lord Grocott if the mayor were able to act in an untrammelled way. Coming back to the reality of the Bill rather than grand constitutional fears about what might happen if circumstances took a different course, new Section 107C says:
“The mayor for the area of a combined authority must appoint one of the members of the authority to be the mayor’s deputy”.
In fact, the choice of deputy is very severely constrained. The deputy must be a member of the combined authority, which will limit the choice to a small number of people.
The issue before us is not a great constitutional principle of whether the choice of deputy should be constrained in a way that acknowledges the representative credentials of the combined authority—it is so constrained under the Bill—but whether there should be a further process, as proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, of consent by the scrutiny committee to the choice of one of those members as deputy. This is a practical issue, in my view, not a constitutional issue. The practical issue is that it is important that the mayor, who comes with a mandate, appoints a deputy with whom he or she gets on.
Those of us who have been engaged in these relationships all know that in practice a deputy mayor will not be appointed who significantly constrains the authority of the mayor, because the mayor is sitting there with a large mandate. There are checks and balances. The combined authority has significant powers to constrain the mayor and to agree the mayor’s actions. If the mayor does not get on with or have confidence in the deputy, what will happen in practice is that the mayor will rely on advisers rather than the deputy mayor. That is not a healthy state of affairs. The mayor has a mandate. The mayor is constrained in the choice of deputy to appoint only a member of the combined authority. It seems a constraint too far to require that choice to be agreed by the scrutiny committee. Of course, in the nature of the political relationship between the mayor and the scrutiny committee, the scrutiny committee itself may well be fairly hostile to the mayor. It is perfectly possible that that will be the position that the scrutiny committee takes.
Lord Shipley
My Lords, the noble Lord is referring to Amendment 19 but what does he think about his own party’s Amendment 18, which requires the combined authority to agree the appointment of the deputy?
Lord Adonis
I would have more sympathy with that because of course that will be the colleagues from the executive of the combined authority agreeing. But there will still be an issue if it is not possible to appoint a member of the combined authority in whom the mayor has confidence. There are some practical issues here. The choice is already constrained. If you constrain it still further, that will not enhance accountability and democracy but may just oblige the mayor to rely on informal rather than formal officeholders.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, this is a probing amendment in relation to the controversial proposal under new Section 107E to permit mayors to assume the role of police and crime commissioner. In fairness, this is not a case in which the Government are imposing that as a requirement—at this stage, at any rate—but it is an option on the table that the authorities in Greater Manchester have chosen to adopt, which is no doubt satisfactory at least to the police and crime commissioner in that area, since he has become the interim mayor of Greater Manchester. He is a very able person, and if we have to have somebody in that role I have no doubt he will do an excellent job.
However, the problem that may arise, and does arise in the case of the north-east, is that the boundaries of the combined authority include more than one police and crime commissioner area. In the north-east we have two police forces and two police and crime commissioners, one for Northumbria and one for Durham. The same difficulty may well arise in other areas, such as the West Midlands or the south-west. Not only may there be two or more distinct police forces with their own police and crime commissioners within the boundaries of a proposed combined authority; there may be police authorities and areas represented by police and crime commissioners which are only partially within a combined authority. There may be an overlap between the boundaries of a combined authority and police authority areas.
It seems that in that event, it would be inappropriate simply to consign all or part of an existing area to the responsibility of a combined authority mayor. Therefore, the amendment calls on the Secretary of State to propose alternative arrangements to meet these geographical difficulties, if I may put it in that way. I invite the Minister to explain how the Government intend to approach the issue and what kind of parliamentary approval would be sought. For example, would further amendment to the legislation which established the position of these police and crime commissioners be required? I hope the Minister can deal with that point today, but if not, perhaps it can be discussed before we reach Report. I beg to move.
Lord Shipley
My Lords, I agree with the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. I want to ask the Minister about the nature of a police and crime commissioner appointment. I recall that when we debated the terms of those appointments in your Lordships’ House not that long ago, these were clearly full-time appointments—substantial salaries were to be paid. Does the Minister agree with me that if a decision can be made that an elected mayor can undertake those functions along with all the other functions that may be devolved or delegated to them by the Secretary of State, it is very hard to see the basis on which a PCC appointment should be seen as full time? If it should not, what is the implication of that for other police and crime commissioners?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, Amendment 24 would insert a new provision within new Section 107E to require the Secretary of State to bring forward proposals to make alternative arrangements where the geographic boundary of a police and crime commissioner area does not correspond, as noble Lords have said, with the area of a combined authority.
New Section 107E would enable the Secretary of State to provide, by order, that the mayor of a combined authority area would exercise the functions of a police and crime commissioner, subject to the necessary consent from the appropriate authorities. If such an order were made, new Section 107E would also require the Secretary of State to provide that there is no separate police and crime commissioner for the area of the combined authority. The Bill also enables secondary legislation to be made which creates the position of mayor for the area of the combined authority, while retaining a separate position of the police and crime commissioner for the policing area.
The Bill does not prevent a mayor also being given police and crime commissioner functions where the relevant combined authority area does not correspond to a single police area. Should it be considered appropriate to transfer functions to a mayor in such a case, powers in existing legislation would enable police areas to be altered to facilitate such a scenario. On this basis, mechanisms are already available to enable alternative arrangements to be made. However, as we know, Greater Manchester’s devolution deal is the only one to date which will include a directly elected metro mayor also taking the police and crime commissioner function. We also know that in this area the police force boundary corresponds to that of the combined authority.
We will consider any future proposals to transfer police and crime commissioner functions to the mayor for a combined authority area on a case-by-case basis, and will transfer these functions where appropriate. Clearly, geographic issues will be an important consideration in this regard. With these explanations and assurances, I hope the noble Lord will feel content to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I do not know whether the noble Baroness has answered the question put by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley.
Lord Shipley
I am quite happy to have the question answered later. We will be going on to another set of amendments that deal with the nature of the appointment of a police and crime commissioner, and I would be very happy if the Minister wanted to reply at that point.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, as I indicated, we will not be pressing this matter at this stage. I therefore beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, my noble friend Lord McKenzie is resting temporarily but will occupy centre stage shortly, which will give me some relief and perhaps your Lordships as well.
This group of amendments deals not so much with the boundaries of the proposed arrangements for police and crime but with the functions of the police and crime commissioner that would be taken over by an elected mayor if a combined authority and its mayor chose to take that particular route. The amendments clearly address the controversial concept of transferring powers and functions. PCCs were created, as we have heard, with a great fanfare three years ago and were met by a public response of virtually total indifference.
The Government’s proposals in new Section 107E at least have the virtue of requiring the consent of the appropriate authorities. Amendment 27 makes it clear that this consent must be unanimous. However, the section does not deal with the issue raised in the debate on the previous amendment of where the boundaries do not coincide. That is why Amendment 24—to which we will return—requires the Secretary of State to,
“bring forward proposals to make alternative arrangements”.
It will be recalled that the turnout in the PCC elections plumbed the very depths of political engagement, barely exceeding the total share of the vote achieved by the Liberal Democrats in the recent general election. However, the notion that the mayoral role should encompass that of the police and crime commissioner gives a whole new meaning to the hallowed phrase “one man, one vote”, given the more extensive powers vested in the so-called metro mayors. One man’s vote would, as the Bill stands, effectively be the only vote that would count over a huge range of budgets, services and policies, and, if the Bill’s permissive proposal were activated, over a huge area of public policy and administration in relation to police and crime. That becomes part of the mayoral function, possibly carried out by the mayor himself or herself, or possibly delegated—and we have talked a little about delegation.
The question is: what is the Government’s long-term vision for the police service? Do they see a mix of mayoral and PCC models, and how sustainable would such a binary system be, especially in the light of hugely difficult financial pressures across all public services? Already the police service is suffering significant cuts, with more apparently to come as the Home Secretary airily dismisses concerns about what is happening to our police service.
Amendments 29 to 32 deal with a range of issues. Amendment 29 establishes the need for a proper appointment process where the PCC functions are to be exercised other than by the mayor himself. Apparently it will be for the mayor to choose whether that will be the case or not. Amendment 31 gives the Secretary of State power to allow the equivalent of the police and crime panel, which currently exists, to suspend any relevant person exercising PCC functions on behalf of the mayor. Amendment 32 applies the same disqualification procedure for a mayor’s appointee to a PCC function. There needs to be some mechanism to deal with that situation, which does not on the face of it appear to be dealt with in the Bill.
Finally—and, it might be thought, crucially—Amendment 30 requires the Secretary of State to provide for the protection of police budgets transferred to the mayor, should the mayor opt to take the police and crime commissioner functions into his functions and those of the combined authority. That would be an important safeguard, should that take place. It would effectively ring-fence the expenditure which hitherto had been the responsibility of police and crime commissioners and, before that, of the police authorities. I trust that the Minister will be able to give some assurances about that crucial financial issue. I beg to move.
Lord Shipley
My Lords, a number of issues arise from this group of amendments. I look forward to the Minister’s response to the point that I raised in the debate on Amendment 24. I am getting very confused about the Government’s proposals for the election or appointment of police and crime commissioners. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, raised a set of points that need to be very carefully examined and responded to. Therefore, in addition to the question that I have already posed about whether or not these are full-time appointments, I am really very concerned about the public interest. For example, will the general public know when a mayoral election is taking place that the person elected as mayor may, in due course, also become the police and crime commissioner? If there is a set of elections for these full-time posts now, what are the implications and how will it work for someone standing as elected mayor who may then become the police and crime commissioner?
Interestingly, in the Bill, the Government have proposals to suspend or disqualify a PCC, but, as I understand it, the Bill does not provide similar powers for the suspension or disqualification of the elected mayor. We have to tidy this up. At the moment, we have elections for a police and crime commissioner. Will the election of a mayor include clarity in advance of the ballot that they are also a candidate to become the police and crime commissioner? We seem to be giving the Secretary of State enormous power to change the terms under which an elected mayor has been elected, to enable them to do something else—become the PCC, which is, by its nature, a full-time post.
I am absolutely at one with the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, and the amendments that ask for an appointments process. If we do not have an electoral process for the PCC, surely there should be an appointments process if the person elected mayor is also to become the police and crime commissioner.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I entirely agree with the noble Lord. I apologise for omitting reference to two amendments in my name, which partially deal with the points that he has made—Amendments 31 and 32. The Bill permits the suspension of a mayor’s PCC role, and Amendment 31 would allow for any person who has had a PCC function delegated to them by the elected mayor to be suspended also. Similarly, where there is a disqualification of a mayor’s PCC role, the amendment would allow for the disqualification of any person who has had that function delegated to them. I apologise to your Lordships for not having referred to those points in my relatively brief opening remarks. I hope the Minister will be able to deal with them in due course.
Lord Grocott
My Lords, having listened to the debate so far on the various amendments, I am mightily glad that I am not the Minister. I hope that this does not sound patronising, but she has handled this Committee with good humour and has attempted to answer all the questions. However, my word, if she can square this particular circle of fitting the police and crime commissioners into directly elected mayors, that would be an achievement worthy of note and a chapter in Erskine May.
We have to have a history lesson for a moment. I do not know where the idea for police and crime commissioners came from— whether from the Liberal Democrat part or the Conservative part of the coalition.
Lord Grocott
It is always interesting to unravel these bits and pieces. We might test a few more policies on that basis. So it was a Conservative policy to have police and crime commissioners, but I think I am right in saying that it was Liberal Democrat policy to have the first election in November. I do not think we can remember that particular contribution with great affection and admiration, or wish to repeat it. But the system was set up with grand language surrounding its inception, stating that in this crucial area of policing there should be a democratically elected leader accountable to the public, so that the public know whom to go to for this defined area of public life—all police and crime activity and policy in a particular part of the country. At least that was a clear objective. It fell at the first hurdle, as some of us predicted it would, because of the appalling turnout of 15% overall—in an area I know very well, Stoke, it was 9%. But at least there was clarity about the objective and the function that was being addressed.
This is where there is complete confusion. I am sure the Minister will try to square this circle, but I fear she will find it extremely difficult. We have police and crime commissioners, which for all their faults and criticisms were about a defined, agreed policy and pattern common across England. However, the virtue, almost, of the devolution pattern that we have discussed at such length is that it will be in different areas, with different functions and different managerial styles, and arranged differently between groups of leaders and the Secretary of State. If it is not completely random, its whole strength and legitimacy is that it is enabling and there will be no common pattern.
Now an attempt is being made to graft an agreed common pattern about a specific and very important service on to the myriad different structures that are planned for devolution, largely regarding directly elected mayors. It simply cannot work for all the reasons that have already been spelled out. How on earth will people know when they are electing a directly elected mayor what pattern will be established as to when the elections will take place? I will not repeat all the questions that have already been asked, but I can at least spell this fundamental problem out. We are trying to graft a common pattern on to a randomly different pattern across Great Britain.
It is almost beyond the power of parliamentary counsel to answer all the questions that are being raised in this debate. I wish the Minister well, if just for the sheer fun of watching someone try to square this circle. But surely the time has come to acknowledge that, worthy though some of the objectives may be in having police and crime commissioners directly elected, somehow or other this needs to be started from scratch. If we are to have devolution, police and crime must be part of that devolution package and there must be some consistency in the service across the country as to the type of devolution structure that will be applied in different areas.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
If the noble Lord will indulge me, I will get on to that a bit later.
Amendment 27 seeks to amend new Section 107E, which enables the Secretary of State to provide by order that the mayor for an area of a combined authority may exercise the functions of a police and crime commissioner. Subsection (4) of this new section sets out that such an order can be made only with the consent of the appropriate authorities, as defined in new Section 107B(6). Noble Lords have asked that new subsection (4) be amended to make clear that all the appropriate authorities defined by new Section 107B(6) must consent before such an order can be made.
I reassure noble Lords that, under the current draft, all the appropriate authorities in the area would, indeed, have to give consent before an order to transfer police and crime commissioner functions could be made. As my noble friend Lord Eccles neatly said, it is part of the deal. Therefore, I do not believe that such an amendment is necessary. I would be concerned that, if adopted, the amendment might suggest that consent would be required from all the different kinds of authorities set out in new Section 107B(6), not all of which would necessarily be relevant in a given area.
Amendment 28 seeks to amend new Section 107E to place a requirement on the Secretary of State to outline, in a report to be laid before both Houses of Parliament, plans to develop policing and crime functions for mayors who take on the functions of a police and crime commissioner. The principle behind the Bill is to ensure broad consistency between existing police and crime commissioners and mayors who take on police and crime commissioner functions. On this basis, we have set out in the Bill specific functions that will be applied to every mayor for a combined authority area who takes on police and crime commissioner functions. We envisage that, generally, all remaining functions will transfer across. That is the point that the noble Lord, Lord Liddle—not “Lord Riddle”—made.
However, the Bill maintains a degree of flexibility at this stage, as there may be functions that would not be relevant in the context of a mayor exercising PCC functions, to enable transfer arrangements to be appropriately tailored to the local circumstances of the area concerned. I reassure noble Lords that there are no plans to develop the PCC functions transferred to mayors separately from the wider functions of PCCs. We will ensure that the level of accountability, transparency and service applied to a mayor taking on a PCC function will be the same as is the case for PCCs across the rest of England and Wales.
At this point, I will answer the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, on scrutiny. The mayor will be required to establish a scrutiny panel, which will perform the same task as the existing police and crime panels. The scrutiny panel will support the effective delivery of the mayor’s PCC functions, assess the police and crime plan, monitor the budgets and retain the ability to suspend a mayor from the policing functions in certain circumstances.
For the mayor of a combined authority area to take on PCC functions, the Secretary of State will be required to lay an order setting out the detail of how PCC functions will be transferred to the mayor. Parliament will have the opportunity to fully consider that.
Amendments 29, 31 and 32 would place a requirement on the mayor to implement an appointment process for any person exercising PCC functions on their behalf, and to extend the disqualification and suspension criteria to such persons. It is our policy that the arrangements for mayors with PCC functions mirror as closely as possible the arrangements for police and crime commissioners and those to whom a PCC delegates their functions, and that is what the Bill does. It ensures that the process for delegation of responsibilities from the mayor and any appointed deputy is consistent with that for the delegation of functions from a PCC and a deputy PCC.
Schedule 1 to the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 sets out the process of scrutiny for senior appointments made by a PCC. This scrutiny process, which covers the appointment of deputy PCCs, provides the relevant police and crime panel with an opportunity to scrutinise senior appointments and to make reports to the PCC. We consider that the current arrangements work well, and it is our intention to apply them by order in areas where the mayor for a combined authority is taking on PCC functions.
The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, asked about mayoral elections. It is not the case that a person will have two roles—both mayor and police and crime commissioner. The position is that a mayor can be given the policing powers so that among his other functions he exercises the functions of a police and crime commissioner. When people vote, they will know what the mayor’s functions are. They will vote for the mayor on this basis. Orders setting out the arrangements will be made so that this is clear before the mayoral election, and we will consider how, if necessary, to ensure that this is always the case.
On the issue of disqualification and suspension, I am aware that there are additional restrictions on deputy PCCs that are not set out in the Bill. However, I assure your Lordships that it is our intention to apply these provisions by order.
Finally, Amendment 30 would insert a new provision into new Schedule 5C to require the Secretary of State to make provision by order for the protection of police budgets where this responsibility is transferred to the mayor. To be clear, the transfer of functions from a PCC to a mayor will not directly change the way in which central government funding for the police is calculated. This will continue to be done in line with existing policies, with the funding transferred to the mayor rather than the PCC. It is also our intention that the mayor will set the level of the policing element of the precept, and we have ensured that, in line with PCCs, the Home Secretary retains the power to intervene if the police budget is set at a level that would put the safety of people in the area at risk. Additionally, the mayor will be required to set up and maintain a separate fund in relation to receipts arising and liabilities incurred in the exercise of their PCC functions, and to prepare a separate annual budget in relation to the exercise of such functions.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, asked about the continuity of areas and what would happen if, say, there was a combined authority with a mayor for part of a police force area and that mayor was given police and crime commissioner powers to exercise. The essential point is that if this were to happen, there would need to be an adjustment of force areas as necessary so that the mayor’s area and the surrounding force area made sense in policing terms. There would not be a messy arrangement in the way that she suggested. If a mayor’s area did not make sense in policing terms, the mayor would not be given policing powers.
On the basis of those explanations, I hope the noble Lord will feel content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Shipley
My Lords, perhaps I might pursue the Minister’s answer on the right of the general public to know in advance of a ballot for a mayor exactly what it is that they are voting for. I think she said that the public will know in advance of polling day what the duties of a mayor would be. Will she confirm that no responsibilities of a police and crime commissioner will be transferred following an election—in other words, a decision will not be made after an election by the Secretary of State, working with the combined authority—and that it will always be clear to the general public which responsibilities of the PCC will be part of the obligations of the mayor, and that they will not be changed afterwards?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I can confirm that when people vote they will know what the mayor’s functions are.
Lord Shipley
My Lords, I support Amendments 36A and 36B, moved by the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, and I do so in particular because of new subsection (1)(b) proposed in Amendment 36B. This concerns the associated borrowing powers of local authorities, about which we had a broader debate a little while ago. It is part of the issue of the powers that combined authorities and local authorities in turn will have.
I hope that in replying to these two amendments the Minister will confirm that strategic housing policy will always be part of the remit of a combined authority. However, perhaps she would also be clear about what combined authorities will have responsibility for when there are existing statutory obligations upon a local authority—not least, for example, around homelessness. In urban regions, where a number of local authorities will combine under a single combined authority, there are areas where joint working can help and add value. In terms of housing policy, homelessness policy and affordable housing, there is absolutely no doubt that working across the boundaries of current local authorities will matter a great deal.
We need to be clear—either now or at a later date if the Minister writes to the noble Earl—whether there is any plan to amend the existing powers of local authorities in relation to housing and whether the powers of the combined authority will relate to co-ordination or to leadership and policy formulation for the whole of the combined authority area. We will touch upon this when we come to Amendment 36F in the name of the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, but we are moving towards a need to be able to demonstrate clearly what the powers and responsibilities of combined authorities will be.
Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville (LD)
My Lords, I, too, support the amendment. As has been demonstrated by the noble Earl, it is really important that homeless children and their families have somewhere to live. If children are not able to have the safety and security of a home, they are not able to take advantage of education and therefore not able to make the best use of their lives. In terms of looked-after children and those in care, we have heard that a large proportion of these very disadvantaged children end up in the justice system in one way or another and are therefore doubly penalised for something which is not within their power to alter.
Therefore, I support the amendment on homelessness and housing need, and I obviously also support the supply of affordable housing, which is a real issue and not just in areas in the east and the north. While I am not expecting this Bill to solve all the ills of the housing market, I do not think that it should make them worse.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 36F. Let me say at the outset that the amendments are to an extent prescriptive. Amendment 36C would require the Secretary of State to publish a list of public authority functions which may be the subject of a transfer under the provisions of this Act. Amendment 36F goes further and would require the Secretary of State to consult combined authorities with a view to devolving certain functions and funding in certain areas. These are employment support, transport, housing, skills and business rates. We should be clear that the published list does not require any of the functions to be transferred in any particular situation; that will remain subject to whatever agreement, if any, is entered into in practice.
The amendment has been prompted in part by the first report of the Session of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which refers to the wide powers that new Section 105A would confer. It states at paragraph 10:
“But it says nothing about how in practice these powers might be used, or why it is not appropriate or practicable to include a description of the types of function covered by the power on the face of the Bill”.
We agree. If there are concerns about government at the centre trying to pull back the devolutionary process, putting down some markers must surely act as a counterweight. It might even help encourage and embolden some of those authorities that are not yet members of a combined authority and are not fully in the know.
Amendment 36F requires government to be proactive in the cause of devolution. In Committee on Monday, we got the line that the Government would wait to hear who comes knocking and then respond and engage in some fashion. The amendment requires the Government to themselves initiate consultation with combined authorities over areas of,
“employment support … transport … housing … skills … and … business rates”,
as matters that are important for driving growth and prosperity. It does not preclude consultation over other matters, and we have a separate amendment covering strategic planning.
It may well be that consultations are already going on in a number of areas with a number of combined authorities—indeed, we know that there are. That is fine, but adopting the requirements of the amendment would ensure that opportunities are being opened up for all combined authorities. From our debates in Committee on Monday, there was no indication from the Minister that there were any capacity constraints as far as the Government were concerned on moving forward on a wide front. This would force the pace of devolution—and on a broad front. I beg to move.
Lord Shipley
My Lords, I am pleased in principle to support Amendments 36C and 36F. However, in Amendment 36C, on publishing a list of public authority functions, why do we need to wait to within one month of the enacting of the Bill? Surely it is known now what the functions might be. Should the House not be informed what they are before the passing of the Bill? I would be grateful if the Minister could specifically explain why it is not possible to list the public authority functions before the Bill passes rather than afterwards.
Amendment 36F is fine as far as it goes—and of course we will have the opportunity in Amendment 36G to discuss strategic planning issues, as the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie of Luton, explained. But I have two points to make in relation to this amendment. First, this is not necessarily an exclusive list; other powers and funding could be thought about. One is careers advice. It may be seen to lie within the skills head, but probably it could be treated separately. There may well be others. We should have a discussion about whether there are other areas to add to the list of matters that the combined authorities should be consulted on.
My second point relates to the use of the word “powers”. At some point we need to think more in terms of responsibilities. Powers and funding are one thing, but what you do with them is another. There is now the prospect of a very large number of functions, powers and responsibilities coming into the remit of combined authorities. I am starting to get very worried about the capacity of the combined authorities to manage all of the things that they may be asked to undertake. As part of the consultation that is asked for in Amendment 36F, I hope that the issue of capacity and resources is also addressed.
Lord Warner
My Lords, I support my noble friend’s Amendment 36C. It is particularly important in relation to NHS responsibilities, which we will come to a little later. There is a considerable number of laggards in the NHS who are really nervous about getting into this territory. It is important that they start to engage their brains with this, because there is a growing number of failing health economies. Too many of them are sitting waiting to see what happens in Greater Manchester rather than engaging with this issue. I hope that the Minister will address this point—the sooner the better—and not be afraid to make it clear to the outside world, particularly the NHS, that these functions could be transferred down to the combined authorities.