Baroness Williams of Trafford
Main Page: Baroness Williams of Trafford (Conservative - Life peer)Cities and Local Government Devolution Bill [HL]
Baroness Williams of Trafford Excerpts
Lord Adonis
I would have more sympathy with that because of course that will be the colleagues from the executive of the combined authority agreeing. But there will still be an issue if it is not possible to appoint a member of the combined authority in whom the mayor has confidence. There are some practical issues here. The choice is already constrained. If you constrain it still further, that will not enhance accountability and democracy but may just oblige the mayor to rely on informal rather than formal officeholders.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Communities and Local Government (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)
My Lords, I will deal first with Amendments 18, 20, 21 and 22.
Amendment 18 would require the mayor to obtain the consent of the combined authority before appointing the deputy mayor. As the Bill stands, the deputy mayor is appointed by the mayor from the members of the combined authority, as the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, said. The mayor may, if she or he thinks fit, remove the deputy mayor from office and appoint a new deputy mayor. The Bill’s provisions align with a local authority mayor’s current powers to appoint a deputy mayor. In practice, a mayor will consult some or all of the members of a combined authority about a deputy mayor appointment. At the very least, the mayor will consult the person she or he is minded to appoint, and may well take the views of other members of the authority about this.
For mayoral governance to be effective the mayor and the deputy mayor must be able to work together and the mayor must have confidence in her or his deputy, as again the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, said. More significantly, the mayor has been directly elected by the people of the combined authority area and has a clear mandate, a mandate which the deputy mayor will have a role in helping the mayor to fulfil. It would be wrong in both principle and practice for the members of the combined authority to have an ultimate say over who is the deputy mayor, which would be the case if this amendment were made. It is wrong in principle since the mayor, with his or her mandate, needs to be able to have a say over who is the deputy who will assist the mayor to deliver what he or she has promised the voters. It is wrong in practice, since giving the members of a combined authority the ultimate say as to whether a person can or cannot be deputy opens up the possibility of appointments being made which would frustrate or hinder the mayor and create division almost from the outset, as the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, said.
We need to remember the purpose of all this. It is not about forms of governance for their own sake. It is about putting in place the governance needed to support that devolution of powers which is now so urgently needed, as my noble friend Lord Deben said, if this country is to achieve the economic competitiveness and productivity on which the prosperity of all depends. Requiring the combined authority to consent to the deputy mayor’s appointment is not a sensible check or balance on the exercise of executive functions. It risks creating arrangements which frustrate the exercise of these powers, and hence I invite noble Lords not to press this amendment.
Amendments 21 and 22 would likewise simply risk frustrating the exercise of the mayor’s executive functions, and hence frustrate the very purpose of a devolution deal. These amendments would require a mayor to consult the combined authority whenever the mayor wishes to delegate a general function to the deputy mayor, another member or, indeed, an officer. As the Bill stands, the provisions relating to delegation align with the policy for a local authority mayor or leader, who may arrange for the discharge of functions by members of the executive or officers of the authority. Although the mayor may delegate functions, the mayor remains accountable for any actions taken. The mayor is accountable directly to the electorate.
I understand the motivation behind these amendments, which is to ensure that a mayor is indeed effectively held to account, that the executive actions of the mayor are transparent and that people can have confidence that the mayor will properly exercise his or her functions; in short, that while there is the capacity and scope for strong executive action, there are equally the right checks and balances to give that confidence, to ensure accountability and to deliver transparency. However, confusing executive and non-executive actions by involving members of the combined authority in decisions such as how the mayor decides to do his or her job is not providing these checks and balances. These are provided by strong and effective scrutiny, as we will discuss.
I turn back to Amendment 20, which would require the Secretary of State to obtain the consent of the combined authority before making an order providing for a function to be exercisable only by the mayor. I must make clear again that a devolution deal will be agreed only where there is consent from the combined authority or, in the case where the deal also creates the combined authority, the constituent councils. The devolution deal would set out the functions to be exercised by the mayor—the mayoral functions—and those that are to be exercised by the combined authority. The details of the deal will be implemented through an affirmative order, so the arrangements regarding the scope of the mayoral functions will also be fully scrutinised and approved by each House of Parliament, and any order creating or modifying a combined authority is made with the consent of the constituent councils. Hence, we are very clear that the combined authority and/or its constituent councils must agree which functions are mayoral functions and which functions are to be exercised by the combined authority. I am ready to look to ensure that the Bill makes this clear in every circumstance that can arise.
I turn to Amendments 19 and 37. As the Bill stands, the mayor appoints a deputy mayor from the members of the combined authority. This is an action that properly belongs to the mayor and aligns with a local authority mayor’s power to appoint a deputy. The mayor has been directly appointed by the electors, with clear responsibilities and the accountability that goes along with them, and a deputy mayor will have a role in supporting the mayor to fulfil these responsibilities. For an effective partnership and the successful devolution of powers, the relationship between the mayor and deputy needs to work. The requirement for an overview and scrutiny committee to approve the appointment, and to have the power to void it, may frustrate and very much damage this relationship. In practice, a mayor will consult some or all of the members of a combined authority about a deputy mayor appointment, and may well take the views of other members of the authority about this. Adding an extra requirement of consent for a deputy mayor’s appointment is to add an extra layer of bureaucracy, which we are so keen to avoid, and may obstruct the successful devolution of powers that we are trying to achieve.
The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, asked about confirmatory hearings. Those hearings are used but their place is usually where the executive is making an appointment to a public office. The appointment of a deputy mayor is not in this process; rather, it is part of the process for creating the executive.
My noble friend Lord Deben made the point about the clarity of the Bill, on which I commend the Government, and the need for individual areas to do exactly what fits their area; hence the bespoke nature of each deal. With these assurances and the explanations that I have given, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, will agree to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hollis of Heigham (Lab)
My Lords, maybe I should know this, and I do not, but what provision is there without going via the courts for the public removal of a mayor who is regarded as underperforming in their duties? A lot of the Minister’s comments were about transparency, accountability and the authority and legitimacy that they get from direct election, and therefore that they must have a deputy who is aligned with their own views. I understand that argument, although I do not necessarily accept it. But at the moment, within Parliament and certainly within local government, most leaders—apart from having to win their elections every four years—may be required to stand for re-election annually for votes of confidence by their group. They can be removed if they are not regarded as performing appropriately.
On the assumption that a mayor may be elected only every four years or every five—we do not yet know, as we have not had that discussion—how is the accountability to the electorate to be exercised unless the Minister is willing to consider some sort of recall motion? It is clear that the combined authority does not appear to have any leverage over the mayor, in the way that a group would at the moment over the leader of their local authority. Maybe I should know this and it is in some subset of the briefing on the Bill but I cannot find out how, short of going through the courts, you could hold the mayor to account for their actions until that mayor stands for re-election, which may be four, five or six years down the line.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, the noble Baroness has answered the first part of that question herself because it is indeed through the ballot box that the mayor could be removed. I do not know whether she is aware that there is an assumption now in local government that leaders have four-year terms, unless they are indeed removed at the ballot box through election.
Baroness Hollis of Heigham
But does the Minister agree that the leaders would have four-year terms unless their group decided that they were not appropriately fulfilling the functions for which they were chosen, in which case there would be either quiet or less-quiet discussions, and that person would stand down?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, authorities which fail to fulfil the duty of best value go into statutory intervention. If things were that bad, that would be the process but there is now an in-built assumption in local authorities that a leader has a four-year term, unless removed by full resolution of the council. However, for the mayor it would be via the ballot box. On the recall mechanism, there is no such mechanism within local authorities and this provision multiplies the local authority provisions up. If a mayor is corrupt we are on to a different level, as I think the noble Baroness understands.
Baroness Hollis of Heigham
I understand absolutely that it is a different ball game when corruption is involved, as with some of the issues associated with Tower Hamlets. I am not talking about that. My experience of both district councils and county councils is that there may be a regular turnover of leaders within the four years if they are not driving through the agenda on which their group fought the election and they have failed to deliver the manifesto. Leaders on Norfolk County Council, in that case from the opposition party, have been overturned. In my city council, the leader has to be re-elected each and every year and there is occasionally, if not regularly, a change of leadership in the course of that because the leader has lost the confidence of their group. That is perfectly proper and usually happens because the ward councillors, one-third of whom may have had elections each year, are getting that feedback on the door-step from their constituents.
In other words, there are quite effective, if subtle, ways of ensuring that the current leaders of local authorities continue to deliver their manifesto and carry the consent of their group, who are also regularly standing for election. However, as far as I can see, once a mayor has been elected, he or she is free from any such scrutiny, let alone from recall, by his or her electorate. The leader of a group is indirectly elected, and can be recalled by that group; the mayor is directly elected but apparently cannot be recalled by the electorate. Could the Minister help me on this?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I certainly can. With other mayoral systems—for example, the Mayor of London and mayors elsewhere—accountability and the way to change the status quo is via the ballot box. There is no provision for recall within local authorities that I know of. Unless something has recently been introduced, there is no mechanism of recall. In the discussion that the noble Baroness is having with me—I am sure she will tell me if I am wrong—there is perhaps an additional suspicion around a mayor which there is not around local authority leaders. I take her point that local authority leaders are removed in subtle or not so subtle ways, depending on where you are, but for mayors the ultimate accountability is via the ballot box.
Lord Woolmer of Leeds (Lab)
Can the Minister enlighten me on one point and agree with me on a second? First, when it is said that the deputy mayor must be a member of the combined authority, does that mean a councillor on one of the local authorities that comprise the combined authority rather than someone on the board, as it were, of the combined authority? Secondly, would she agree with me that, in practice, once one moves away from London, the number of local authorities that comprise the combined authorities is relatively small? We are not talking about 30 or more—in South Yorkshire it is four and in West Yorkshire five or six. It is inconceivable that an elected mayor could make an appointment without careful consultation and discussion with the leaders of that small number of constituent local authorities. In practical terms, the mayor would have to consult carefully, as he or she would consult carefully on any policy issues, because without that the mayor could not govern effectively. There is a degree, I think, of suspicion about the mayor. If a mayor is appointed, that person is not going to be dealing, in most parts of the country, with 30 or 40 local authorities. The proposal being put forward is unnecessarily cumbersome and flies in the face of the reality of how the mayor would have to work.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I thank the noble Lord for that very useful intervention. First, he asked whether choosing a deputy mayor from the combined authority would mean choosing a councillor. Yes, it would, and that councillor would in fact be a council leader. Could the mayor make an unpopular appointment? He could, but it would be a very foolish mayor who made an unpopular appointment or chose someone who did not resonate and engage with the other members of the combined authority.
Lord Woolmer of Leeds
I am grateful to the noble Baroness. Am I right in understanding that it must be not simply an elected councillor but a leader of one of the constituent authorities? In practical terms, that means that a mayor would look extremely foolish if he or she selected somebody as a deputy who was not accepted by the leaders of a small number of local authorities.
Lord Storey (LD)
My Lords, I have a slight correction on this. In those cities with elected mayors—that is, Liverpool—those elected mayors are not councillors. They have to give up their local council position when they become the elected mayor.
Lord Stoddart of Swindon (Ind Lab)
My Lords, we must take into account and deal with the important point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, which would mean that an elected mayor, whatever he or she does, cannot be dismissed. That could be a very serious problem. After all, the House of Commons in the last Parliament decided that Members of Parliament could be recalled if they do not produce the goods or do their jobs properly. Surely an elected mayor with enormous responsibilities ought to be able to be removed under certain circumstances in the same way as Members of Parliament.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, Members of Parliament can be dismissed via the ballot box. If Members of Parliament behave in a way that brings Parliament into disrepute by their actions, they can have the Whip withdrawn from them. In the same way, a mayor who behaved in a disreputable manner could see intervention by government and be dealt with in that way. There are checks and balances. We are talking about levels of unpopularity, bad behaviour or behaviour ill-fitting the position of mayor.
Lord Stoddart of Swindon
The point I was making was that in the last Parliament new legislation enabled electors to get rid of their MP by a certain process if they did not come up to scratch. That was something new and never done before. I cannot see why Members of Parliament should be able to be recalled but not a directly elected mayor.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, there is not a process for local authority councillors to be recalled—or for local authority leaders or any other local authority mayors. This would be an anomaly were it to be introduced.
Baroness Hollis of Heigham
I will stop pushing on this point, but I have one last question that I am still not clear on. That may be because we have not yet got to the point about the length of the mayor’s term of office and the co-terminosity or otherwise of other elections. However, one could easily see a combined authority with, say, five bodies where one or two might be NOC while the other three, because their elections do not occur at the same time as the mayoral elections, might have leaders of different political persuasions so that none of the leaders was of the same political persuasion as the directly elected mayor. I assure the Minister that, as I am sure she is aware, that will happen. We have seen it between elections for local government and elections for MPs where we get very different results. Indeed, some people quite deliberately cross-vote to get precisely that outcome. I have seen that in Norwich on many occasions. What then happens if the mayor has no leaders politically sympathetic to the views on which he was elected?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, the noble Baroness makes a very interesting point. Other points have been made at length in this House about single-party states, but in terms of election periods or cycles being out of kilter because of different types of elections, I would imagine—although I will confirm this with the noble Baroness—that they are the sorts of things that would need to be ironed out when a devolution deal was done on how that combined authority’s elections would pan out. I am thinking of the Greater Manchester situation, where we are in thirds and all synchronise nicely. But I can foresee that process.
Lord McKenzie of Luton (Lab)
My Lords, I am not sure whether I am going to be helpful to the Minister, but would it be possible that, between elections, the Secretary of State could remove all the functions from the mayor, so that they would stay with the combined authority members?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, if that were to happen, the Secretary of State would have to disband the combined authority and something in its place would have to be set up.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
Perhaps the Minister would reflect and write on that point.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I would like to correct the comment that I have just made and come back to it in a future group, because I have clearly got it wrong.
Lord Beecham
That just illustrates the complexity of the matters that we are discussing. I refer to one matter that the Minister mentioned, when she said that the deputy mayor must be the leader of a council which is part of the combined authority. I am not sure whence that arises, as it is not in the Bill. It may or may not be the case that combined authorities consist purely of council leaders.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
The noble Lord is correct, in fact—it would usually be a local authority leader, but would not necessarily always be. It has to be a member of the combined authority, but it would in usual circumstances be a leader.
Lord Woolmer of Leeds
That comes back to the clarification that we asked for—and we are getting a little lost in it. Is an elected councillor in one of the constituent authorities who is not a leader a member of the combined authority in the sense that it is being used? In other words, could a mayor choose somebody as a deputy who was a back-bencher in any of the local authorities, to put it simply, and not a decision-maker on the board of the combined authority? Would that be possible?
Baroness Hollis of Heigham
That is a good question—particularly if there were no leaders in political sympathy with the mayor and therefore he or she had to scrabble around to find a deputy and had to go to a minority party, which might be very minority indeed.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, the deputy mayor has to be a member of the combined authority, not just a councillor in one of the councils.
Lord Beecham
So the shape and construction of combined authorities may vary, but there will be a distinct membership, as the Minister has just confirmed, of the body defined in whatever way ultimately emerges as the combined authority. That much is clear to me —it may not be clear to others, but then so much of this debate is, I suspect, not going to be entirely clear to all of us. I think we can move on from that point, unless the Minister wants to come back.
Lord Beecham
Well, we have agreed on something. Whether there will be any more agreement before the afternoon is over remains to be seen.
Much of the discussion that has taken place has been about the appointment of deputies. The noble Lord, Lord Deben, and my noble friend Lord Adonis have spoken particularly about the question of the choice of deputies. That is an important issue, but by no means the only issue.
Lord Shipley
My Lords, I agree with the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. I want to ask the Minister about the nature of a police and crime commissioner appointment. I recall that when we debated the terms of those appointments in your Lordships’ House not that long ago, these were clearly full-time appointments—substantial salaries were to be paid. Does the Minister agree with me that if a decision can be made that an elected mayor can undertake those functions along with all the other functions that may be devolved or delegated to them by the Secretary of State, it is very hard to see the basis on which a PCC appointment should be seen as full time? If it should not, what is the implication of that for other police and crime commissioners?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, Amendment 24 would insert a new provision within new Section 107E to require the Secretary of State to bring forward proposals to make alternative arrangements where the geographic boundary of a police and crime commissioner area does not correspond, as noble Lords have said, with the area of a combined authority.
New Section 107E would enable the Secretary of State to provide, by order, that the mayor of a combined authority area would exercise the functions of a police and crime commissioner, subject to the necessary consent from the appropriate authorities. If such an order were made, new Section 107E would also require the Secretary of State to provide that there is no separate police and crime commissioner for the area of the combined authority. The Bill also enables secondary legislation to be made which creates the position of mayor for the area of the combined authority, while retaining a separate position of the police and crime commissioner for the policing area.
The Bill does not prevent a mayor also being given police and crime commissioner functions where the relevant combined authority area does not correspond to a single police area. Should it be considered appropriate to transfer functions to a mayor in such a case, powers in existing legislation would enable police areas to be altered to facilitate such a scenario. On this basis, mechanisms are already available to enable alternative arrangements to be made. However, as we know, Greater Manchester’s devolution deal is the only one to date which will include a directly elected metro mayor also taking the police and crime commissioner function. We also know that in this area the police force boundary corresponds to that of the combined authority.
We will consider any future proposals to transfer police and crime commissioner functions to the mayor for a combined authority area on a case-by-case basis, and will transfer these functions where appropriate. Clearly, geographic issues will be an important consideration in this regard. With these explanations and assurances, I hope the noble Lord will feel content to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I do not know whether the noble Baroness has answered the question put by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley.
Viscount Eccles
My Lords, I had concluded, perhaps wrongly, that we would not see very many combined authority mayors in any great hurry. Since the deal that will be negotiated in order for there to be a mayor of a combined authority and a transfer of powers is a complicated matter, and since this is an enabling Bill to enable those deals to take place, the question of whether the commissioner’s authority is passed to the mayor will be one of the subjects of negotiation when the deal is being struck. If a combined authority—let me take the north-east—decided that it would like to see whether it could negotiate “yes” to become a mayoral combined authority but “no” to taking over the powers of the police commissioner, it would not be outside the bounds of negotiation. Some of what we are discussing comes to the point at which one would say, “Surely if a mayor is to take over the powers of the police and crime commissioner, it should happen from the start”. It should not be something which, as the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, suggested, could be done at any time in the future; it should be part of the deal.
One problem we have in debating the Bill in Committee is that from our point of view it is starting from the wrong end. It is starting from local authorities putting up their suggestions as to how their area of the country might be better governed as a matter of local government. This is not where we usually find ourselves. We are usually in the position of saying, “This is what will happen and you will obey the rules”. That is not the situation here, for better or for worse. Certainly for my part I am trying to think through as carefully as I can the implications of this change in direction. They are very complicated but I hope that we will find a way of supporting the endeavour for the devolution of much more power to local authorities.
It has been said several times in our proceedings that the problem may then become a fiscal one: where is the money coming from? I am certainly very conscious of the fact that he who pays the piper calls the tune. Perhaps I could suggest that if this whole system becomes successful in one or two places, maybe some fiscal changes will follow upon that success.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I, too, start with an apology, having not answered the point of the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, earlier. The noble Lord, Lord Riddle—Liddle, sorry—brought up the same point, which was about how police areas would be changed. Power to change police force boundaries exist in Section 32 of the Police Act 1996. I referred to that mechanism in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, a moment ago.
The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, also asked a question, which I shall answer now because he asked it previously as well, about the full-time nature of the PCC role and how we will ensure capacity to cover PCC matters. It will be for the mayor to ensure that there are sufficient resources to fulfil all PCC functions and we have included the ability for a mayor to delegate these functions to a deputy PCC mayor. We anticipate that there will also be a wider police governance administration structure taking over the role of the PCC’s office.
Lord Beecham
If it is convenient, could the Minister indicate whether there is any intention to make arrangements equivalent to that of the police and crime panel, as well as the two points that she has already made?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
If the noble Lord will indulge me, I will get on to that a bit later.
Amendment 27 seeks to amend new Section 107E, which enables the Secretary of State to provide by order that the mayor for an area of a combined authority may exercise the functions of a police and crime commissioner. Subsection (4) of this new section sets out that such an order can be made only with the consent of the appropriate authorities, as defined in new Section 107B(6). Noble Lords have asked that new subsection (4) be amended to make clear that all the appropriate authorities defined by new Section 107B(6) must consent before such an order can be made.
I reassure noble Lords that, under the current draft, all the appropriate authorities in the area would, indeed, have to give consent before an order to transfer police and crime commissioner functions could be made. As my noble friend Lord Eccles neatly said, it is part of the deal. Therefore, I do not believe that such an amendment is necessary. I would be concerned that, if adopted, the amendment might suggest that consent would be required from all the different kinds of authorities set out in new Section 107B(6), not all of which would necessarily be relevant in a given area.
Amendment 28 seeks to amend new Section 107E to place a requirement on the Secretary of State to outline, in a report to be laid before both Houses of Parliament, plans to develop policing and crime functions for mayors who take on the functions of a police and crime commissioner. The principle behind the Bill is to ensure broad consistency between existing police and crime commissioners and mayors who take on police and crime commissioner functions. On this basis, we have set out in the Bill specific functions that will be applied to every mayor for a combined authority area who takes on police and crime commissioner functions. We envisage that, generally, all remaining functions will transfer across. That is the point that the noble Lord, Lord Liddle—not “Lord Riddle”—made.
However, the Bill maintains a degree of flexibility at this stage, as there may be functions that would not be relevant in the context of a mayor exercising PCC functions, to enable transfer arrangements to be appropriately tailored to the local circumstances of the area concerned. I reassure noble Lords that there are no plans to develop the PCC functions transferred to mayors separately from the wider functions of PCCs. We will ensure that the level of accountability, transparency and service applied to a mayor taking on a PCC function will be the same as is the case for PCCs across the rest of England and Wales.
At this point, I will answer the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, on scrutiny. The mayor will be required to establish a scrutiny panel, which will perform the same task as the existing police and crime panels. The scrutiny panel will support the effective delivery of the mayor’s PCC functions, assess the police and crime plan, monitor the budgets and retain the ability to suspend a mayor from the policing functions in certain circumstances.
For the mayor of a combined authority area to take on PCC functions, the Secretary of State will be required to lay an order setting out the detail of how PCC functions will be transferred to the mayor. Parliament will have the opportunity to fully consider that.
Amendments 29, 31 and 32 would place a requirement on the mayor to implement an appointment process for any person exercising PCC functions on their behalf, and to extend the disqualification and suspension criteria to such persons. It is our policy that the arrangements for mayors with PCC functions mirror as closely as possible the arrangements for police and crime commissioners and those to whom a PCC delegates their functions, and that is what the Bill does. It ensures that the process for delegation of responsibilities from the mayor and any appointed deputy is consistent with that for the delegation of functions from a PCC and a deputy PCC.
Schedule 1 to the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 sets out the process of scrutiny for senior appointments made by a PCC. This scrutiny process, which covers the appointment of deputy PCCs, provides the relevant police and crime panel with an opportunity to scrutinise senior appointments and to make reports to the PCC. We consider that the current arrangements work well, and it is our intention to apply them by order in areas where the mayor for a combined authority is taking on PCC functions.
The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, asked about mayoral elections. It is not the case that a person will have two roles—both mayor and police and crime commissioner. The position is that a mayor can be given the policing powers so that among his other functions he exercises the functions of a police and crime commissioner. When people vote, they will know what the mayor’s functions are. They will vote for the mayor on this basis. Orders setting out the arrangements will be made so that this is clear before the mayoral election, and we will consider how, if necessary, to ensure that this is always the case.
On the issue of disqualification and suspension, I am aware that there are additional restrictions on deputy PCCs that are not set out in the Bill. However, I assure your Lordships that it is our intention to apply these provisions by order.
Finally, Amendment 30 would insert a new provision into new Schedule 5C to require the Secretary of State to make provision by order for the protection of police budgets where this responsibility is transferred to the mayor. To be clear, the transfer of functions from a PCC to a mayor will not directly change the way in which central government funding for the police is calculated. This will continue to be done in line with existing policies, with the funding transferred to the mayor rather than the PCC. It is also our intention that the mayor will set the level of the policing element of the precept, and we have ensured that, in line with PCCs, the Home Secretary retains the power to intervene if the police budget is set at a level that would put the safety of people in the area at risk. Additionally, the mayor will be required to set up and maintain a separate fund in relation to receipts arising and liabilities incurred in the exercise of their PCC functions, and to prepare a separate annual budget in relation to the exercise of such functions.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, asked about the continuity of areas and what would happen if, say, there was a combined authority with a mayor for part of a police force area and that mayor was given police and crime commissioner powers to exercise. The essential point is that if this were to happen, there would need to be an adjustment of force areas as necessary so that the mayor’s area and the surrounding force area made sense in policing terms. There would not be a messy arrangement in the way that she suggested. If a mayor’s area did not make sense in policing terms, the mayor would not be given policing powers.
On the basis of those explanations, I hope the noble Lord will feel content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Shipley
My Lords, perhaps I might pursue the Minister’s answer on the right of the general public to know in advance of a ballot for a mayor exactly what it is that they are voting for. I think she said that the public will know in advance of polling day what the duties of a mayor would be. Will she confirm that no responsibilities of a police and crime commissioner will be transferred following an election—in other words, a decision will not be made after an election by the Secretary of State, working with the combined authority—and that it will always be clear to the general public which responsibilities of the PCC will be part of the obligations of the mayor, and that they will not be changed afterwards?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I can confirm that when people vote they will know what the mayor’s functions are.
Lord Tyler
My Lords, will the noble Baroness clear up one other point for me? She referred to the panel in new Schedule 5C. The panel has one extremely important role. Under paragraph 6—headed “Suspension”—of new Schedule 5C:
“The Secretary of State must by order provide for the panel mentioned in paragraph 4 to have power to suspend the mayor, so far as acting in the exercise of PCC functions, in circumstances corresponding to those mentioned in section 30(1) of the 2011 Act in relation to a police and crime commissioner”.
This relates back to the question raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, because, of course, there is a very interesting discrepancy here. As far as the police functions are concerned, there is a body that has the right to suspend the mayor. However, will the Minister confirm that that is not, of course, the case in relation to all the other functions that the elected mayor may have? Perhaps she could clarify that at this stage as it will affect later amendments.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I can confirm what the noble Lord says. I go back to a previous question that relates to this issue which was asked by the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, and which I did not answer, about the powers that the mayor has being prescribed by order made by the Secretary of State. We have said we will ensure that in all circumstances such an order will be made only with the consent of the local authorities. What can be done—I was not clear on this earlier—is for such an order to be revoked or amended, changing or withdrawing the functions that a mayor has. What cannot be done without abolishing the combined authority is to end the authority’s having a mayor. Abolishing a combined authority requires the consent of the councils concerned. I think that the noble Lord made that point earlier.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I begin by taking up the penultimate point that the noble Baroness made in relation to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, about the mandate, as it were, for police functions being transferred. She said that the electorate in a mayoral election for a combined authority area would know whether or not the police powers were to be transferred. However, I do not see how that fits with new subsection (1) of new Section 107E in the Bill, which states:
“The Secretary of State may by order provide for the mayor for the area of a combined authority to exercise functions of a police and crime commissioner in relation to that area”.
That looks as though the Secretary of State will take that decision before a mayoral election. If that is the position, it does not become an optional matter at all on the face of it, does it? The mayoral candidates will be stuck with a decision that has already been made and will have no choice over whether they wish to take on that role. Therefore, I am puzzled by the position which the noble Baroness described.
I am also still not entirely clear about the police and crime panel position. Is it intended that within a mayoral authority which, one way or another, ends up with the police and crime commissioner role, there should be a separate police and crime panel, as is now the case, or will that role be exercised by members of the combined authority, which is a rather different scenario? Perhaps we need that to be elucidated but, again, if the noble Baroness cannot do that tonight there will no doubt be time before Report to determine the issue.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, before discussing Amendment 35, perhaps first I could speak briefly to Amendments 34 and 36 in the name of my noble friend Lord Smith of Leigh, who cannot speak to them himself. They are self-explanatory, in that Amendment 34 makes reference to a,
“local authority member of a combined authority”,
having,
“responsibility for finance and resource management”.
Amendment 36 calls for the Bill to specify,
“the number of local authority members within a combined authority area who can veto the draft budget”.
We would happily support each of those amendments.
The Bill enables a power of veto over the mayor’s budget, and Amendment 35 would enable the combined authority also to change that budget in circumstances that would clearly need to be spelt out in the order. That opportunity seems to be provided for in the Manchester agreement. The Bill itself makes reference to changing the budget, but it implies that that is as a result of the initial scrutiny process, not following on from the combined authority’s approval or otherwise of the draft budget. Could the Minister confirm that?
Just to recap, the Bill talks about a mayor preparing a budget; a draft to be scrutinised by other members of the combined authority and the committee, dealt with in Schedule 5A; the making of changes to the draft as a result of the scrutiny—presumably with the approval of the mayor; and the approval of the draft by a combined authority, including a power to veto the draft circumstances specified in the order and the consequences of such a veto. Our amendment proposes simply that we have not only a right to veto but a right to change the budget. There would need to be a threshold of those supporting that proposition, which is again the case in Manchester. A veto is a power, and it can be quite a weak power in certain circumstances. You could simply end up with a ping-pong type arrangement between the mayor and the other members of the combined authority, which would be unfortunate and inconsistent with the effective operation of a combined authority.
We support the thrust of Amendment 33. As some noble Lords have touched on, it raises a number of issues that need clarification. In part, those of us who can remember municipal bonds support it with a sense of nostalgia. I am sorry to hear that my noble friend did not buy any Luton bonds in her previous investment, but perhaps next time. I am interested to understand quite how this will work when it will be available only to residents of an area. I think that that is easily dealt with at the point at which it is issued, but what happens thereafter? As my noble friend Lord Liddle said, whether that has an impact on marketability is an important issue.
As I understand the Bill as it stands, the Secretary of State can by order enable an authority to borrow for specified functions, provided that it has the consent of the constituent councils, but I do not think that that extends to mayoral functions. That could be changed, but we would like better to understand how this all fits together and how the total funding and borrowing opportunities of the combined authority sit with the existing position of those separate authorities. How does that impact on prudential borrowing and, therefore, the scope for the type of bond the Minister is talking about?
We can certainly see the benefit of raising funds for specific projects but, even if you can borrow for mayoral functions within a combined authority, it seems to me that you do not want that borrowing power to drive the functions the mayor gets; that is the wrong way round. You have to see what functions the mayor would have under these arrangements and see how they should be financed.
My understanding is that if there were associated costs—if my noble friend is right and this measure did not wash its face in all circumstances, particularly on infrastructure projects where there can be long lead times and not necessarily early returns—those would be picked up and met by a precept, not a levy, on the constituent authorities. Given the constraints that central government have hitherto imposed on increases in precepts, it could unwittingly impact on all that.
This measure needs to be unpicked so that we can better understand it. It seems to be a very helpful suggestion, and you can see the benefits that could flow from it, but it would need to sit together with the intended funding arrangements or the likely opportunities for the combined authority as a whole, quite apart from the wider issue of fiscal devolution, which we will come to in subsequent amendments, probably on Monday. We are on the side of those who would like to make this work, but it needs to fit with what we have before us.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, it is refreshing to hear innovative ideas coming from your Lordships’ House. I commend my noble friends Lady Wheatcroft and Lord Moynihan on some of the suggestions that they have put forward. Amendment 33 seeks to amend new Section 107F of the 2009 Act to allow the Secretary of State by order to enable the mayor to raise funds for the carrying out of specified development projects, by the issue of bonds to be made available only to those residents within the combined authority area. I was interested to hear about the experiences of the noble Baroness, Lady Janke, in Bristol. As I have said, the intentions behind the amendment are to be commended. The Secretary of State can by order confer a power on a mayoral combined authority to borrow. The mayor individually cannot borrow because, as the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, said, he or she is not a corporate body. Borrowing by a combined authority where it is given the powers to borrow is secured on the revenue that that authority will receive, as the noble Lord, Lord Woolmer, pointed out. Accordingly, any borrowing by a combined authority will be under the same prudential borrowing regime that applies to local authorities. This means that the level of borrowing must reflect the level of its likely reserves.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, asked what could be funded by bonds. In any case it would be a matter for the discussions leading to the bespoke devolution deal as to what might, in the art of the possible, be borrowed. As I have said, any borrowing must conform to the principles of prudential borrowing, which apply to all borrowing by local authorities.
My noble friend Lord Moynihan asked about the functions to benefit by municipal bonds. The functions that might be supported by investment and funded by prudential borrowing, which could be in the form of bonds, are a matter for the conversations with that area which lead to its bespoke devolution deal. As my noble friend Lady Wheatcroft said, this is an enabling Bill. Clause 8(3) allows the Secretary of State to specify which functions of a combined authority may come within the scope of borrowing powers given by the Local Government Act 2003. The sources of borrowing available to combined authorities include issuing bonds as well as taking out loans. The devolution deal will determine which functions the combined authority can borrow for. Decisions over whom an authority obtains their financing from are a matter for the authority.
Amendments 34 to 36 seek to alter the powers of the Secretary of State to provide for scrutiny of the mayor’s draft budget. Amendment 34 would insert a new Section 107F(3)(c), which would allow the Secretary of State by order to make provision to appoint a local authority member of a combined authority to have responsibility for finance and resource management. In effect, were such provision made, it would prescribe that there must be a member of the mayoral combined authority who had finance responsibilities, and that the member with these responsibilities would be a councillor from one of the constituent councils. It is rightly the mayor who should decide to whom he or she wishes to delegate his or her responsibilities, and this includes responsibilities for finance. To return to a point that I made earlier, it is consistent with local authorities operating their cabinet arrangements at present, with the mayor deciding which member of his cabinet should hold certain portfolios with certain responsibilities. We are clear that this should also be the case for metro mayors. For mayoral governance to be effective, the mayor must have discretion to assign portfolios and delegate responsibilities to enable the effective delivery of their promises to their electorate.
I understand that the intention of this amendment may be to place checks and balances on the mayor’s powers. There is of course a chief finance officer for the combined authority, also known as a Section 151 officer, whose role is to ensure compliance with all statutory requirements for accounting and internal audit and to manage the authority’s resources. The chief finance officer is under a duty to make a public report if they consider that there is, or is likely to be, any item of unlawful expenditure. An additional proscription on the creation and assigning of member portfolios is an unnecessary check or balance, and risks frustrating the exercise of the mayor’s functions.
Amendments 35 and 36 seek to provide additional checks and balances on the approval of the mayor’s draft budget. Amendment 36 would insert a power for the Secretary of State to provide for a specific number of local authority members within a combined authority area to be able to veto the mayor’s draft budget. The Bill as it stands allows for the Secretary of State by order to make provision about the preparation of the mayor’s annual budget which, in particular, may provide for the constituent council members of the combined authority to scrutinise the draft budget, to make changes to it and to have a power of veto. The circumstances in which a veto may be used, and the consequences of any such veto, would be proposed locally and provided for in the order creating the mayoral combined authority. The Bill also allows for the overview and scrutiny committee, a politically balanced committee made up of councillors from the constituent authorities, to scrutinise the draft budget and recommend changes to it.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, this is a small and narrow amendment. In fact, I contemplated whether I should move it at all, but as I have written it I might as well. It is intended as a probing amendment to understand the circumstances in which the schemes for transfer of property et cetera provided for in the Bill are contemplated and whether any are on the cards in the discussions that are taking place.
I was particularly prompted to think about this because of debates we had on the Localism Bill when some of its provisions were put in place, particularly Section 17, which is referred to and imported, in part, into the provisions of this Bill. Can the Minister tell us anything about experience to date on the operation of those provisions, which very much mirror what is in this Bill? There is a particular issue around the operation of the intent to comply with TUPE arrangements. Some of the provisions in Clause 17 touch upon this and refer to the fact that the order in relation to schemes can include circumstances where the same or similar effect as the TUPE regulations so far as those regulations do not apply in relation to the transfer are taken up. As a general point, is it the Government’s intention, in so far as they are a participant in this, that where TUPE regulations for some reason do not apply, they would seek to ensure that provisions with the same or similar effect as those regulations would be imported into any scheme of which they would be a party?
As an aside, when the Child Support Agency was being restructured, a key issue was not so much to do with entitlement to pensions, because there was access, but to do with loss of Civil Service status when somebody was going to go into an NDPB. That is an issue. I do not propose an amendment in relation to the Bill, but it was probably the big issue when we were talking about restructuring the Child Support Agency and it could rear its head in these circumstances. I beg to move.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, Amendments 36ZA and 36ZB seek to amend the provisions in the Bill that relate to the making of a scheme to transfer property, rights and liabilities from public authorities to combined authorities. The Bill specifies that where a function of a public authority is to be a function of a combined authority, the property, rights and liabilities of the public authority can be transferred to the combined authority. These amendments seek to change this by removing from the Bill the provisions that allow for the transfer of public authority liabilities.
These amendments would prevent liabilities from being transferred from a public authority to a combined authority. Clause 6 enables the Secretary of State, by order, to confer on a combined authority powers exercised by a public authority. If functions are transferred, there may be some instances where assets, property, rights and liabilities should also be transferred to the combined authority in order for it to be able to exercise these functions.
As we have discussed, the whole Bill is enabling legislation. No combined authority will be forced to take on powers it does not wish to have, nor will a combined authority be forced to take on a public authority’s property, rights or liabilities. An existing combined authority must consent before such transfer can take place, and in the case of a new combined authority, the appropriate local authorities seeking to take on public body functions must have consented to the transfer of the property, rights and liabilities of the public authority. However, there may be times where such a transfer is necessary to give full effect to devolution deals.
Similar transfers of property, rights and liabilities from a local authority to a combined authority are already possible under Section 115 of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009. Such transfers have already happened when establishing combined authorities; for example, when the West Yorkshire combined authority was established the integrated transport authority and the passenger transport executive were both closed, and their functions, assets, liabilities et cetera transferred to the combined authority. This provision purely mirrors the existing provisions by applying the same principles to transfers from public authorities.
The noble Lord asked about TUPE. The tradition and past practice is that when transferring functions within the public sector, TUPE applies, and it always has up to now. I hope that with this explanation the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation. As I explained, the technical wording was simply to get a debate on this issue. I am grateful for that response, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, we have considerable sympathy with the thinking behind both amendments from the noble Earl, Lord Listowel. They touch upon one of the most serious issues that confront our society—our housing crisis— which must engage the action of central government and local authorities. It is also prescient, given concerns expressed in the press this morning about the figures for child poverty rising for the first time in a decade. We know that the lack of affordable housing is a key driver of homelessness and that homelessness inevitably sits at the centre of disadvantage and deprivation. The major influences on a child’s life—family income, effective parenting and a secure environment—are all directly or indirectly influenced by a family’s housing conditions.
The question posed by these two amendments is what the role of a combined authority should be in addressing our housing crisis and reducing homelessness. There certainly could and should be a role, and the Greater Manchester Combined Authority has shown the way. In its case, the elected mayor has control of a £300 million housing investment fund and powers over strategic planning, including the power to create a statutory spatial strategy for the CA area. There are somewhat convoluted arrangements for administration of the housing investment fund, but it has the prospect of delivering 10,000 to 15,000 homes over the period—a real contribution. Powers to create a spatial strategy for the area are particularly useful, given the demise, as my noble friend Lord Beecham said, of the former regional spatial strategies and the weakness of the duty to co-operate.
There are two issues, however, with the noble Earl’s amendments. Indeed, all noble Lords who have spoken today have, in one way or another, touched upon those issues. We should be mindful of the current requirement for local authorities to ensure that local plans meet the assessed needs for both affordable and market housing and that neighbourhood plans can supplement this. Further, important legislation is already in force that places a general duty on housing authorities to tackle homelessness, however difficult that is in the current circumstances. We would not wish to undermine these important responsibilities and local priorities, but it might well be appropriate to build on these requirements at an overarching strategic level. One way or another, those points were made by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, and my noble friends Lord Beecham and Lady Hollis.
Certainly the prospect of a combined authority having spatial planning powers across an area could be a considerable advantage in creating a coherent housing framework. However—I am sure that the Minister will make this point—the approach suggested is prescriptive. Doubtless it will be said that there is nothing to prevent a combined authority seeking these powers by agreement, and I hope that the Minister will confirm that the Government would not be shy of agreeing such arrangements.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, Amendments 36A and 36B would insert two new clauses into the Bill that place statutory duties on the Secretary of State to undertake reviews of the advantages and disadvantages of placing a duty on combined authorities to reduce the numbers of homeless children and families in housing need, and give combined authorities responsibility for affordable housing in their area and associated borrowing powers. These amendments would also require the Secretary of State to lay the report of these reviews under the clauses before both Houses of Parliament.
At the outset, I must say that housing is a priority for this Government. In our manifesto, we committed to building 200,000 starter homes and more affordable housing. We are putting in place £38 billion of public and private sector investment to help ensure that 275,000 new affordable homes are provided between 2015 and 2020. This means that we will build more new affordable homes than during any equivalent period in the last twenty years.
A couple of noble Lords asked about the definition of “affordable”. The detail is set out in the national policy planning framework, and it is, broadly:
“social rented … and intermediate housing, provided to eligible households whose needs are not met by the market”.
However, within that, there is broad scope around what affordability means in different places to different people.
Baroness Hollis of Heigham
I am surprised that the Minister has adduced that definition of “affordable”, because for those of us involved in the sector—I declare an interest as chair of a housing association—affordable housing rents are very different from social housing rents. Social housing rents are running at about 40% to 50% of the market rent, while affordable rents are running at about 80%. We are required in any new building, whether funded by HCA grant or not, to charge affordable rents, which merely drives up the HB bill without any addition to the stock. It is therefore disingenuous, if I may say so, to suggest that social housing is a subset of affordable housing; it is a very different category.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, because I appreciate that I have not given an acceptable definition today, perhaps I may write to noble Lords before our next day in Committee. There are a number of definitions of “affordable”. I will do that in the next few days if that is okay.
We have a good track record on preventing homelessness. Since 2010, we have sustained our investment in homelessness prevention, resulting in local authorities preventing just over 730,000 households becoming homeless. Investment since 2010 has exceeded £500 million to help local authorities prevent and tackle homelessness. This has included an £8 million Help for Single Homeless Fund, which will improve council services for 22,000 single people facing the prospect of homelessness, and a £15 million Fair Chance Fund to provide accommodation, education, training and employment opportunities for around 1,600 of our most vulnerable young, homeless people.
The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, asked whether combined authorities would be under the same duties as local authorities in relation to functions such as homelessness. If the combined authorities wish to take on housing functions, the functions will be the same as they would have been had they remained within the constituent councils. He also asked whether strategic housing policy is always part of combined authority responsibilities. What responsibilities a combined authority will have depends on the individual deal agreed with an area. That deal may include the constituent councils agreeing that certain of their powers and duties will be undertaken by the combined authority either on their behalf or concurrently with them.
I turn to an example of a devolution deal in which housing is an important element: that in Greater Manchester. It includes Greater Manchester having a housing investment fund worth £300 million over 10 years, to be administered by the mayor. The fund will support the delivery of at least 10,000 houses, some of which will be affordable, and will be subject to stringent evaluation before, during and after the 10 years come to an end. I think that it was either the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, or the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie—in fact, it might have been the noble Lord, Lord Shipley; I did not write down the name of the noble Lord—who asked whether there were any plans to alter the powers of local authorities in the Bill. The answer is no.
This Bill is an enabling Bill, creating the primary legislative framework for implementing bespoke devolution deals. It is not for the Bill to assume what might be included in a deal. Indeed, it is not for the Government to assume what might be in a deal. We are ready to have conversations with any area about what it wishes to see included in a deal for it to be able to meet its needs, develop its economy and increase the competitiveness, productivity and prosperity of the place —be it a city, a county or a town.
Including the amendments in the Bill would imply that a particular view was being taken centrally about homelessness and housing and about how those issues might be addressed in any particular area. It is not for the Secretary of State to prejudge, in advance of any conversations with areas, whether homelessness or providing affordable housing in a particular area is best dealt with by combined authorities or by local authorities, either generally or of a particular class or category.
The Earl of Listowel
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her careful reply and particularly for her last comment about how secondary legislation subsequent to the Bill might be helpful. I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in the debate and taken care to consider the detail of the amendment.
In writing to noble Lords following this debate, might the Minister include a little about the Government’s plans in respect of support that can be offered for social housing? That would be helpful in meeting concerns about family homelessness and housing need.
A question was asked about local authorities’ capacity for borrowing which perhaps the Minister did not answer, but I understand that there was an earlier debate in which she did. Perhaps she might like to comment again on that. Did I miss her comments on what borrowing capacity new groupings might have? While I do not want to put words in her mouth, she might say that it is a matter for discussion and negotiation.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I thank the noble Earl for that question because I did not pick up on that point. I spoke earlier on about prudential borrowing, but I will write to him about the Government’s general policy on the points that he raised—I meant to say that at the outset.
The Earl of Listowel
I thank the Minister. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Earl of Listowel
My Lords, I wish to echo a concern expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, if I understood him correctly This brings to mind the Queen’s Speech of 2010 in which the Government said that their ambition was to move power back to doctors, teachers and front-line professionals and let whoever is closest to the patient, the pupil and so on, make the decisions. One has seen following on from that the academy schools programme, powers for head teachers, and changes in social work with more responsibility being given to social workers. The delegation of power is moving downwards to those who are closest to the particular client. I see a similarity here.
The big question that one needs to be reassured about is that, for instance, a social worker—this is of concern to me—is sufficiently experienced and supported to make the right decisions about children and families. Perhaps what the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, is saying is that in giving these responsibilities, we must make sure that the new authorities have the capacity to make the right judgments. We do not want to tie their hands and we want them to be free, as long as they have the capacity to make the right decisions. I realise that this is bit of a chicken-and-egg situation: the more freedom one gives, the more people of the right calibre one may attract to take up those posts. But given that these are such important decisions for the lives of families in our society, it is quite fair to ask that reasonable checks be made on the quality of what is produced. I hope that that makes sense.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, these amendments seek in one way or another to provide that in advance of the devolutions being implemented, some form of statement should be published by the Secretary of State or put in the Bill about the range of powers which might be devolved to areas. These are examples of the quite centralist and prescriptive approach so beloved of Governments over the last 150 years, and that is what this Bill precisely seeks to reverse. There will be no prescribed list for local authorities or combined authorities to follow. We want to hear from them; we do not want to tell them what they want or what their plans for growth are. Our approach has been to start a conversation with the areas if they want to talk to us about their aspirations and the powers and budgets they want to have devolved to them to improve their area’s economy, deliver better local public services and build sustainable prosperity.
We want areas to be as ambitious as possible and we want to hear what they want, not what they think we are looking for. That is the whole point of the Bill. We do not have some preordained list of powers which we might devolve, and we do not wish to have in advance any conversations that would set limits or parameters about what may or may not be devolved or what might be an initial priority for devolution.
Noble Lords will be aware of the Manchester deal, and we have talked at length about some of the powers that Manchester wishes to see devolved. Perhaps that provides ideas for other authorities to move forward and the plans might offer them some inspiration, but we do not wish to impose the Manchester plan for growth on the Cornwall plan for growth or, indeed, the one for Norwich. We are very clear about that.
I am afraid that these amendments are simply out of step with the whole approach that this Bill is designed to deliver: agreeing bespoke devolution deals which enable individual areas to realise their potential and make the greatest possible contribution to the success of the UK as it responds to global economic opportunities and the challenges we all face.
I want to make two points. The noble Lord, Lord Woolmer, or the noble Lord, Lord Warner, made a point about local authorities being frightened that services they deliver as local authorities could be taken away—the difference between the strategic direction and the local direction of a council. That is a very important point to make because when combined authorities are thinking about their ambitions and plans, they must be focused on the big strategic issues that will benefit from the opportunity of scale across a number of local authorities.
The other point I want to deal with is that of capacity, alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, and by the noble Earl, Lord Listowel. In a sense we are already dealing with combined authorities because we are having conversations, and obviously the Greater Manchester devolution deal took place last November, so we will continue with that. But when consulting the combined authorities on powers, their capacity to take on functions will also need to be addressed. A critical issue in the conversation with combined authorities will be to ensure that they have the capacity to deal with the matters that they wish to take on. If they are ambitious for powers to be devolved to them, they will need to be clear in the proposal they bring to us on the governance arrangements for managing and handling the power they want and how they will have the capacity to do so. With that, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this short debate. Every noble Lord has supported these amendments with the exception, unsurprisingly, of the Minister. I should say to the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, that there is no fix on the timing of Amendment 36C if there are benefits in being flexible, or indeed on expanding the list. I would be happy to talk about that when we return to this matter, as we certainly will.
My noble friend Lord Warner made an important point about engaging health economies where they are holding back at the moment—being proactive and prodding them into focusing and engaging. The amendments have had the strong support of my noble friend Lord Woolmer, who stressed the importance of skills and the need to be strategic in these things.
I should say to the Minister that I am not surprised at the response because it is what we have been given throughout our consideration of the Bill: “This is a broad framework and we are not going to tell anyone to do anything; we are happy to sit back and have conversations”. In a sense that is government by vacuum, with no lists, preconceptions or limits being set. That cannot be good enough. If the Government are not themselves now planning how to deal with the consequences of what might happen after devolution, it would seem that they are being derelict. None of this forces anyone to do any particular thing, apart from the Government saying, “Actually, get off your backsides and make this work. Do something proactive to engage with combined authorities so that they know what is on offer and encourage them into deals”. Otherwise, there will simply be cosy conversations on an unplanned basis, and a favoured few authorities may well get the nod of approval from the Government. But the general thrust of our position is that we want devolution to work across the board in England on a proactive basis. That is what our amendments are designed to help achieve.
I will withdraw the amendments today, but I have absolutely no doubt that we are going to return to this issue in one form or another because it is at the heart of whether we believe that devolution should work across the board and we should want it to happen, or whether we think that it is a question of waiting to see what washes over us in due course. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.