Illegal Migration Act: Northern Ireland

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Purvis of Tweed

Wednesday 15th May 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

That may be the case, but, as I have repeatedly said, the Government intend to appeal the decision. Until that appeal is heard, I do not know that there is much else to say on this.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, the Illegal Migration Act gives Ministers the power to detain those who have arrived in small boats. My understanding is that that is still not yet in force after a number of months—since last July. What prevents anybody who has arrived on a small boat since last July then travelling to Northern Ireland?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, we do not believe that this will induce people to go to Northern Ireland. The cohort we are detaining has been considered under existing legislation, so those who are part of that cohort can and will be removed to Rwanda. There would be no benefit to their going to Northern Ireland to avoid this removal. The NABA cohort is anyone who arrived in the UK on or after 1 January 2022 and who received a notice of intent prior to 29 June 2023, which informed them that their asylum claim may be considered inadmissible and that they may be removed to Rwanda.

Russia

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Purvis of Tweed

Tuesday 14th May 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I associate myself with many of the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. I agree with what he said. These Benches also welcome the Statement repeat and support the Government’s actions. I too pay tribute to the security and intelligence services, which remain vigilant in keeping us safe from foreign malign activity. It is of course a very serious matter when we have to take action against so-called diplomats—those who are abusing not only the protections that diplomatic conventions afford them but their position within the United Kingdom—but actions have been necessary.

I note that the Home Secretary indicated in the Statement that this was the first legislation under the National Security Act on which the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and I, along with my noble friend and others, worked closely with the Minister. He was very open and worked on a cross-party basis. When it comes to national security and keeping our country safe, we are of the view—I think the Minister agrees—that this is not a partisan issue, no matter what the Prime Minister may have said this week. I pay tribute to the Minister for his work on that, and it is rewarding to see that the measures we put in place on a cross-party basis have been activated. That demonstrates to any country around the world that government and Parliament are united in ensuring that our people will be safe.

As the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, indicated, we should of course expect a tit-for-tat response. What advice are His Majesty’s Government giving to the wide network of UK journalists and other nationals still operating in Russia in the genuine field of culture, trade and people-to-people relations? I have said repeatedly that our concern is not with the people-to-people relations between the UK and Russia but with the Putin regime. What vigilance will they therefore have to have, and what advice are the Government giving?

Concerning the wider issues on sanctions and assets, as indicated in the Statement, I think I have spoken to almost all the sanctions that Parliament has approved and that the Government have put in place. We support them all, of course, but unfortunately there are certain areas that are vulnerable to sanctions circumvention. What actions will the Government now take on those who are actively circumventing the sanctions cited within the Statement? This includes, for example, shadow fleets that ship the oil exports from Russia, which means that Russia is continuing to make a profit out of the war. It means those within metal trading and within the financial relationships that the UK has with the Gulf. When it comes to the assets, the Statement indicated that the £22 billion of assets that we have frozen is from October. That is six months ago so, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked, what is the live figure of the assets?

The Home Secretary said in response to questions in the House of Commons that

“no one has seized or liquidated Russian assets”.—[Official Report, Commons, 8/5/24; col. 588.]

But we know that that is not the case, and not just within those that Ukraine has. What is the exact legal blockage to the UK seizing assets that we have frozen? The Foreign Secretary replied to me in this Chamber a number of weeks ago that he was frustrated with the delays. What are the delays and why have the Government not presented legislation? If legislation is required to be passed, I am certain that the Front Benches will be supportive of that move and that it can be expedited through Parliament.

I was reading this week that the EU now has mechanisms in place to charge the interest of those frozen assets, with an estimate of up to €8 billion. One estimate of the £20 billion frozen by the UK Government could mean, depending on how it is invested, that it could accrue interest of up to £1 billion over this year. Why is that not being seized for immediate use?

Can the Minister confirm to me that the mechanisms the Government have put in place to allow for frozen assets to be sold to UK businesses or individuals can never be used for them to make a profit out of any frozen assets? I understand that the mechanisms will allow bodies to buy a frozen asset but not to sell it until it is unfrozen. But it could accrue interest, so I would be grateful if the Minister could indicate that that could never be the case.

Finally, given that we are likely to see further actions from the Putin regime—we see today’s very worrying news from the Georgian Parliament and we see it in the Balkans—and, as the noble Lord said, from the China regime, now is the time for the Government to give proactive briefings to Opposition Front Benches on likely or possible future threats. We had that when we were tackling the Daesh problem but we need it now when it comes to China and Russia, and I hope the Minister can respond positively to that point.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

I thank both noble Lords for their remarks. I will briefly outline a few highlights, as it were, from the Statement given by the Home Secretary last week, because it has been a few days and we need to tease out and probe a few important points. My right honourable friend the Home Secretary pointed out in the other place that the Prime Minister said in Poland last month that we are at a “turning point” for European security. With our allies, we will stand firm in the face of the Russian threat to the UK and our way of life—it is worth restating that for the record.

On the actions we have taken, as is well understood, we have expelled the Russian defence attaché, who was an undeclared military intelligence officer. We will remove diplomatic premises status from several Russian properties in the UK, including Seacox Heath, which is a Russian-owned property in Sussex, and the trade and defence section in Highgate. We believe they have been used for intelligence purposes. We are imposing new restrictions on Russian diplomatic visas, including capping the length of time Russian diplomats can spend in the UK.

As reported on Friday 26 April, five individuals have been charged in connection with an investigation into alleged offences under the National Security Act, which both noble Lords referred to. They rather pre-empted what I was going to say, because I obviously want to thank all noble Lords who were involved in the successful passage of what is proving to be critical legislation. It is a good example of working together, and it gives me an opportunity to thank the security services. This rather proves the point that there is co-ordinating action on behalf of the security services, the police, other government agencies and of course the Home Office, in dealing with the threats we all face. I am grateful to all the people who work so hard on our behalf in those various organisations.

I will go into the sanctions in a moment, but first I will repeat the headlines that my right honourable friend the Home Secretary mentioned in his speech. We have sanctioned over 1,700 individuals, over 90% of the Russian banking sector and over 130 oligarchs and family members, with a combined net worth of around £147 billion at the time of the invasion. As of October— I am not sure I can improve on an October figure at this point—over £22 billion of Russian assets were reported frozen as a result of UK sanctions. Those assets can no longer be taken back to Russia to fund the Putin war machine. Obviously, we consider Russia’s campaign to undermine our support unacceptable and destined to fail.

On the individuals who have been charged in connection with the investigation, and with others related to other countries that have subsequently occurred, the Crown Prosecution Service, in relation to the 26 April individuals, has confirmed that the charges relate to alleged hostile activity in the UK in order to benefit a foreign state—namely, Russia. Beyond that, I obviously cannot say very much, particularly as regards ongoing investigations.

Both noble Lords asked about illicit finance. We have swiftly implemented the strongest set of economic sanctions ever imposed against a G20 country. We have frozen over £22 billion of Russian assets under the sanctions regime, as I said, and the UK alone has sanctioned 2,000 individuals and entities under the Russian sanctions regime, over 1,700 of which have been sanctioned since Putin’s invasion. We have set up the combating kleptocracy cell in the National Crime Agency to target corrupt elites and their assets in the UK, ensuring that there is nowhere for this dirty Russian money to hide. The combating kleptocracy cell—CKC—can account for over 150 disruptions since the invasion of Ukraine, all of which demonstrably removed or reduced a criminal threat facing the UK.

I will digress briefly. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked about golden visas. That scheme was closed in February 2022, following the recommendation of the Intelligence and Security Committee to review our approach to it. I have no further information about publication or anything else yet.

Returning to sanctions and what we are doing to enforce them in the UK, we are obviously committed to ensuring that they are robustly enforced and that potential breaches are investigated. Illustrating the co-ordinated approach, departments from across HMG—including the FCDO, the Treasury, OFSI, HMRC, the Home Office, DfT and the National Crime Agency—work together and with UK companies to ensure that sanctions are enforced. In August 2023, for example, HMRC fined a UK company £1 million in relation to the unlicensed trade of goods in breach of Russia sanctions. OFSI published an enforcement notice against Wise Payments Ltd, an FCA-regulated company, for breaching Russia sanctions by making funds available to a company owned or controlled by a designated person. So, firms should carefully consider what steps are appropriate to manage their sanctions risk exposure and take steps fully to address that risk. The Government have committed £50 million to support a new economic deterrence initiative to further boost our diplomatic and economic tools and improve sanctions implementation enforcement, as well as tackling sanctions evasion across the trade, transport and financial sectors.

On our collaboration with our international partners, we work closely with the G7, particularly the EU and the US, and we have stepped up our engagement with a range of third countries to highlight circumvention risk—the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, alluded to this—and support them to tackle this issue. That includes joint diplomatic outreach to countries where we see spikes in the trade of sanctioned goods with Russia. We are particularly focused on the goods published in the CHP list.

In recent months, we have sent joint delegations to the UAE, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia and Armenia, as well as having senior bilateral engagement with Turkey and Serbia, to highlight these risks and offer technical support. We have funded technical support sessions delivered by UK legal experts to business and government contacts in Armenia, Georgia, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to improve understanding of and compliance with the UK sanctions measures and regime. These efforts are paying off: a number of countries have announced concrete measures to reduce the risk of sanctioned goods reaching Russia. The latest trade data indicates a downward trend in direct exports of these items to Russia from countries of interest, including some that I mentioned.

On why we have yet to seize Russia’s assets, we remain committed to exploring all lawful routes to using Russian sovereign assets in support of Ukraine. We continue to drive ambition within the G7, which has agreed to consider this issue collectively. We continue to work at pace ahead of the G7 leaders’ summit. I commit to keeping the House updated on significant developments as appropriate. While G7 discussions continue, the UK has taken a number of steps domestically. We were the first to introduce legislation explicitly enabling us to keep sanctions in place until Russia pays for the damage it has caused. We are establishing a route by which sanctioned individuals can donate frozen funds for Ukrainian reconstruction, and we have introduced new powers to compel sanctioned individuals and entities to disclose assets they hold in the UK.

With noble Lords’ indulgence, I will address a slightly broader question which I have perhaps not been asked entirely: how we are combating Russia’s war economy. We have banned all known items found on the battlefield in Ukraine. We have banned dual-use and critical industry, aviation, defence and security goods. We have published a common high-priority items list—a list of 50 battlefield items that are important for Russia’s war effort—helping businesses identify the most critical items to focus their efforts on. This is degrading Russia’s military and high-tech industries. Production of the next-generation airborne early-warning and control aircraft has stalled due to a lack of foreign components, including semiconductors. Russia is therefore turning to other countries to supply these goods. We see reports of that in the newspapers, but I reassure noble Lords that the UK is very much leading on this work and delivering results.

On the tit-for-tat arrangement mentioned by both noble Lords, I of course cannot account for what Russia may or may not do. Regarding advice to UK residents, journalists and other interested parties in Russia, I have not looked at the recent Foreign Office advice, but I am sure it has been kept very much up to date on a regular basis. But obviously, I caution all journalists operating in Russia to be aware of the case of Evan Gershkovich, whom the Russians really should have released by now.

I think I have answered all the questions. I cannot commit to proactive briefings now, but I will certainly bear in mind what the noble Lord said and make sure it is understood in the department.

Family Reunion Visas: Gaza

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Purvis of Tweed

Wednesday 24th April 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid that I am not terribly familiar with the internet in Gaza.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Is the Minister aware that the immigration tribunal judges found the Home Office’s decision on this to be “irrational”? The concern is even deeper: the Home Office found itself able to expand the situation for those in Hong Kong who were under fear of persecution, but those who are in Gaza, who are in fear for their lives, the Home Office seems to be completely silent about. Therefore, there is a concern about double standards. Given the requirement on the occupying power, the Government of Israel, to ensure facilitation of the very documentation that the Minister said is necessary, what discussions has the Home Office had with its interlocutors in the Israeli Government to ensure that the visa process for documentation is facilitated?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I might dispute the noble Lord’s premise there: I am not sure that I would characterise it as an occupying power. I reiterate what I said earlier: British nationals and those family members can obviously apply using normal routes.

Asylum Seekers: Rwanda

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Purvis of Tweed

Thursday 21st March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, as I said earlier, this is separate from the Bill and the treaty. I cannot answer the question, as I do not know when Parliament will see the agreement.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, in the proceedings of the Illegal Migration Bill—now the Act—that was passed last July, the Minister told us that the Act was necessary as a disincentive for people who would cross the channel. The Government have not brought the Act into force yet, eight months after it was passed by Parliament. Can the Minister confirm that those people who have arrived by boat since the passage of the Act until today have been able to claim asylum? How many have been doing so and what are the financial consequences?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am afraid that I do not have the numbers to hand, because the Question that I am answering is of a very different nature. I will have to come back to the noble Lord.

Former Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration: Reports

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Purvis of Tweed

Wednesday 6th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord has made that point before. Of course, we are unable to detain anybody, so when he characterises them as being lost, they have left as much as anything else. When they go missing from hotels, a multiagency missing persons protocol is mobilised, alongside the police and local authorities, to establish their whereabouts and ensure they are safe. Many of those who go missing are subsequently traced and located. The Home Office continues to review and improve practices around preventing children going missing, including work with the National Police Chiefs’ Council, which is publishing, and has published, guidance on missing migrant children. I say again: the vast majority of these were aged 16 and 17. Only 18 are still aged under 18.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

The Government’s Rwanda Bill will now contain measures that will allow unaccompanied children to be relocated to Rwanda, and the Government have published a country note for Rwanda stating that it is a safe country. Normally, country notes are reviewed by the independent commissioner, but David Neal’s office confirmed to me on 17 January that the Government had not yet asked for an independent review of their country note statement that Rwanda is a safe country. Now that there is no independent reviewer, how will Parliament know that that statement has been reviewed by an independent commissioner?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

To start with, the noble Lord is incorrect in saying that unaccompanied children will be sent to Rwanda; as he is well aware, that is prohibited under Article 3 of the treaty. On the review, the ICIBI started on the country-of-origin information but that has not yet been sent to the Home Secretary. That is one of the ongoing pieces of ICIBI work that cannot be finalised until a new or interim ICIBI has been appointed, and I cannot comment on that process yet.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Purvis of Tweed

Committee stage
Monday 19th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I do not believe I have, my Lords. What I am trying to say here is that the joint committee has to make reports to Parliament in order for Parliament to keep it under review. That is what is under discussion at the meeting this week. So it does answer the question—perhaps not in the way that the noble and learned Lord would like, for which, obviously, I apologise.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful for that comment. Just for the record, it is 11.13 pm on the last day of Committee, and it might be that the Government are thinking about something that we have been talking about. I thank the Minister for that. We will have an update with regard to how the joint committee operates. However, in order for Parliament to make its judgment, it must have access to independent information. The joint committee is the two Governments, so it does not really meet the criteria of Parliament making a judgment on the basis of Rwanda being safe, if the only information that we can use to make that judgment is that of the Government of Rwanda.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, we have gone into the operation of the joint committee and various other bodies in considerable detail today, so I am not going to rehash those now. I am sure we can refer back to the record.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked me about the timetable. Obviously, I would say this, but the treaties need to be ratified and laws need to be passed, so I am afraid I cannot give a timetable at the moment.

With regard to numbers, as we have discussed many times before, the scheme is uncapped so I cannot provide a commentary on the possible likely numbers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I understand it, yes.

Rwanda has a strong history of providing protection to those who need it, and it currently hosts more than 135,000 refugees and asylum seekers who have found safety and sanctuary there. The terms of the treaty we have negotiated with Rwanda address the findings of the UK domestic courts and make specific provision for the treatment of relocated individuals, guaranteeing their safety and protection. I invite the right reverend Prelate to withdraw her amendment.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Before the Minister concludes, I would be grateful if he could say what the mechanism will be for ending this legislation, if the treaty is not extended. Could he also answer my noble friend’s question on amendments to the treaty? It is long-standing practice that amendments to a treaty must come before Parliament through the CRaG process. Can he confirm that that would be the case?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am not expert on treaty law but, as far as I understand it, that is the case. I am afraid that I do not know the process behind the noble Lord’s question; I will have to find out.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Purvis of Tweed

Committee stage
Monday 19th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I cannot say that at the moment, but, as I have said, they will be published on a regular basis.

The monitoring committee will be supported in all its work by a new support team, as set out in Article 15.(8) of the treaty. The new support team will consist of individuals who do not work for either the UK Government or the Government of Rwanda. The monitoring committee has already met three times since its inception and has agreed to the publication of its terms of reference and enhanced monitoring plan, which are both available online as part of the supporting evidence document that the Government have published. Therefore, we consider that Amendment 86, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, is unnecessary.

Amendments 81 and 82 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and my noble friend Lord Hailsham seek to ensure that the Act does not come into force upon ratification of the treaty but instead requires secondary legislation to be laid before commencement requiring a JCHR report on the safety of Rwanda and agreement on this point from the House of Commons and the House of Lords. Amendment 71 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord German, would introduce a new clause whereby the Secretary of State must lay a statutory instrument before Parliament every six months stating that their assessment is that Rwanda is a safe country. This Bill reflects the strength of the Government of Rwanda’s protections and commitments given in the treaty to people transferred to Rwanda in accordance with the treaty. The treaty, alongside the evidence of changes in Rwanda since summer 2022, already enables Parliament to reach the conclusion that Rwanda is a safe country. There is therefore no requirement for any further legislation or additional reporting prior to commencement.

The UK-Rwanda partnership is a long-term policy and forms part of a wider set of measures to tackle illegal migration. A review of the policy every six months or two years would be an inefficient use of both government and parliamentary time. Furthermore, as I have set out, this is not needed, as the functions of the independent monitoring committee have been enhanced to ensure that obligations under the treaty are adhered to in practice. These arrangements, which have been carefully agreed with the Government of Rwanda and will be binding in international law, will ensure continued compliance with all the terms of the treaty.

It is also worth noting that Article 4.(1) of the treaty sets out clearly that it is for the UK to determine the timing of a request for relocation of individuals under the terms of the agreement and the number of such requests made. The treaty does not place on the UK an obligation to make any such request. This means that the Government would not be obligated to remove individuals under the terms of the treaty if there had been, for example, an unexpected change to the in-country situation in Rwanda that required further consideration. As is the case in many scenarios, the Government would be able to respond and adapt as necessary.

I turn to Amendments 69 and 87 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and Amendment 74 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed. This legislation does not impact the financial agreement with Rwanda which was reached in 2022 through the memorandum of understanding for the migration and economic development partnership. Noble Lords will be aware that we have provided Rwanda with £220 million as part of the economic transformation fund and £20 million as an advance credit to pay for operational costs in advance of flights commencing. The spend on the MEDP with Rwanda so far is £240 million. In response to a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, the £100 million is not a credit line, as he indicated last week.

There was an initial investment of £120 million in 2022 as part of a new economic transformation and integration fund, ETIF, created as part of the MEDP. The ETIF is for the economic growth and development of Rwanda. Investment has been focused in areas such as education, healthcare, agriculture, infrastructure and job creation. A further payment of £100 million was made in 2023 through the ETIF as part of the partnership. We anticipate providing another £50 million in the next financial year. This is not new but follows the same arrangement from 2022. We also made a separate payment of £20 million to the Government of Rwanda in 2022 in advance of flights to support initial set-up costs of the asylum and processing arrangements under the MEDP.

With regard to the question of whether there will be another tranche of funding for the Hope hostel in the next financial year, procurement of accommodation is for the Government of Rwanda. Accommodation costs are covered by the funding stream for operationalisation, and it is then up to the Government of Rwanda as to which accommodation they procure. This legislation also does not impact the process for removals to a safe third country, so the appraisal set out in the illegal migration impact assessment remains unaffected. The published economic note on this legislation explained that the exact cost will depend on the details of the implementation and the level of deterrence. The Government are already committed to disclosing further payments made as part of the economic transformation fund and the per-person relocation costs as part of the department’s annual accounts in the normal way.

Your Lordships will also be aware that the National Audit Office will be producing a factual report on the costs of this partnership. Officials have been working closely with the National Audit Office to ensure that they have the relevant information required for this. I cannot give any opinion on the date of publication, but it will likely be in the near future.

Finally, with the—

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for outlining the elements of the ETIF and the MEDP, but could he place in the Library a more detailed breakdown? The £20 million credit line for operational does seem to be one part of a credit line. The Minister says that I was incorrect in stating that there was a total of £100 million. I will happily take him at his word if that is the case, but a more detailed breakdown of how much of the expenditure of the Rwandan Government will be UK taxpayers’ money would be helpful. Also, can he confirm whether this is being scored as overseas official development assistance or not?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am happy to commit to providing as much detail as I can in the letter that the noble Lord requests. I am afraid that I do not know the answer to the foreign development aid question, so I will have to look into that and come back to him.

With regard to Amendments 35 and 90 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord German, it is right that this Bill should apply to anyone arriving after the Rwanda treaty enters into force. It is the treaty, working together with the provisions in this Bill, that underpins the safety of Rwanda. As such, once the treaty is in force the basis for removal under this Bill is established. Clause 9(1) ensures that the Bill and the treaty come into force on the same day. This legislation builds on the Illegal Migration Act 2023, the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 and other immigration Acts. To the extent that those Acts have retrospective effect, this Bill does nothing to change that.

Accommodating migrants in hotels is costing us £8 million each day. That is billions per year, which is clearly not sustainable. If people know that there is no way for them to stay in the UK, they will not leave safe countries such as France to risk their lives and pay criminals thousands of pounds to arrive here illegally. It is therefore only right that we stop the boats and break the business model of the criminal gangs who exploit vulnerable people. The Government consider this partnership to be a vital investment and therefore I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Purvis of Tweed

Committee stage
Wednesday 14th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Regarding the applications to the ARAP scheme, clearly, I am not qualified to comment on individual circumstances as described by the noble Lord. I am afraid I do not know the precise details of who is qualified to apply under the ARAP scheme, so I will find that out and come back to the noble Baroness in due course. I cannot give any further comment at this point.

I have heard what has been said, and I will now turn to Amendments 70, 73 and 85, proposed by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and Amendments 18, 23, and 47, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord German. The UK has a proactive duty to identify victims of modern slavery, and we remain committed to ensuring that where indicators that someone is a victim of modern slavery are identified by first responders, they continue to be referred into the national referral mechanism for consideration by the competent authorities. Steps will be taken in all cases to identify whether a person may be a victim of modern slavery, and if a person is referred into the national referral mechanism, a reasonable grounds decision will be made.

Amendment 70 would act to impede the provisions already passed in the Nationality and Borders Act and the Illegal Migration Act that introduced the means to disqualify certain individuals from the national referral mechanism on grounds of public order before a conclusive grounds decision is considered. The amendment is also unnecessary—it is important to be clear on this point—as the Government of Rwanda have systems in place to safeguard relocated individuals with a range of vulnerabilities, including those concerning mental health and gender-based violence.

Regarding victims of modern slavery, Article 5(2)(d) of the treaty obliges the UK to provide Rwanda with

“the outcome of any decision in the United Kingdom as to whether the Relocated Individual is a victim of trafficking”,

and this includes positive reasonable grounds decisions, as well as positive conclusive grounds decisions. Article 13 of the treaty makes specific provision that Rwanda will have regard to information provided by the UK

“about a Relocated Individual relating to any special needs that may arise as a result of them being a victim of modern slavery or human trafficking, and shall take all necessary steps to ensure that these needs are accommodated”.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

This is the point I made at Second Reading. Section 22 of the Illegal Migration Act disapplies all of what the Minister just said when someone arrives by an irregular route. It disapplies the process of someone claiming that they are a victim of trafficking; it disapplies their ability to be referred to the NRM; and it disapplies the Home Office or the receiving officer taking this information. How are they interacting?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I will repeat the point: the first responders will be expected to refer individuals into the NRM where there are indicators of modern slavery. One of those indicators is whether they claim to be victims of modern slavery.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am still waiting on the letter. Section 22 of the Illegal Migration Act, on modern slavery, disapplies that. It is not possible for that to happen under the Illegal Migration Act.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I repeat the points that I have made. I will write the letter to the noble Lord. I have the information, but it is incredibly lengthy and I do not want to repeat it all now. I will make sure it is put down in a letter to the noble Lord.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for that and will of course make sure that he is copied in to the letter. I heard very clearly what he said, and I speak on behalf of my noble and learned friend. Clearly, we would not wish to argue for a lack of morality in the safeguards that we are putting in place for vulnerable people.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I have a specific question to ask. I do not doubt the Minister’s motives or morality; I think that doing this is just wrong. On 12 July—I checked the record—the Minister’s predecessor, the noble Lord, Lord Murray, told the House when we were voting on the trafficking amendments to the Illegal Migration Bill that only British nationals could be referred to the NRM. The Minister needs to be very clear in confirming that any national who arrives on a small boat can now be referred to the NRM. That is the clarification that I am seeking from the Minister; it is a very simple question.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Purvis of Tweed

2nd reading
Monday 29th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, each individual case is different. I do not know the particular circumstances.

It is important to stress that people from many different nationalities apply for asylum in the UK. This includes nationals from some of our closest European neighbours and other safe countries around the world. That is why there are a small number of cases where we have granted asylum to individuals from countries that we would otherwise consider safe. This is a reflection of our system working. An individual claim is not a reflection of the country as a whole. This process also reflects the safeguards which the Bill provides to individuals in Clause 4, which I have just read out. Each case will be considered on its individual merits by caseworkers who receive extensive training. All available evidence is carefully and sensitively considered in the light of published country information, but I cannot comment on the specifics of individual cases.

The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London and the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, asked what support will be available for those who are particularly vulnerable. Rwandan officials will have due regard to the psychological and physical signs of vulnerability of all relocated persons at any stage of the application and integration process. Screening interviews to identify vulnerabilities will be conducted by protection officers in Rwanda who have received the relevant training and are equipped to handle competently safeguarding referrals. Interpreters will be available as required to ensure that relocated individuals can make their needs known. All interviews will be conducted with sensitivity for the individual’s well-being.

The Government of Rwanda have processes in place to safeguard relocated individuals with a range of vulnerabilities, including those concerning mental health, gender-based violence and addiction. All relocated individuals will receive appropriate protection and assistance according to their needs, including referral to specialist services, as appropriate, to protect their welfare.

Article 13 of the treaty makes specific provision that Rwanda will have regard to information provided about a relocated individual relating to any special needs that may arise as a result of their being a victim of modern slavery or human trafficking and shall take all necessary steps to ensure that these needs are accommodated.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

How will they know? The Illegal Migration Act prevents someone who may well have been trafficked from even starting the process of claiming that they have been trafficked here, so how will the Rwandans know? We are not collecting that information.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, as I have just said, the treaty makes specific provision that Rwanda will have regard to information provided about a relocated individual by the United Kingdom.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful, but that is prohibited in the Illegal Migration Act.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I will have to write to the noble Lord on that very specific point.

These are also detailed in the standard operating procedures as part of the evidence pack released on 11 January in support of the Bill. Furthermore, the UK is providing additional expertise to support the development of Rwanda’s capacity to safeguard vulnerable persons.

The noble Lord, Lord Cashman, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, asked about the treatment of LGBT persons, if sent to Rwanda. Rwandan legal protection for LGBT rights is generally considered more progressive than that of neighbouring countries. The constitution of Rwanda includes a broad prohibition of discrimination and does not criminalise or discriminate against sexual orientation in law or policy. As set out in paragraph 36 of the Government’s published policy statement, the constitution of Rwanda prohibits, at article 16, discrimination of any kind based on, among other things, ethnic origin, family or ancestry, clan, skin colour or race, sex, region, economic categories, religion or faith, opinion, fortune, cultural differences, language, economic status, and physical or mental disability.

The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, asked about unaccompanied children deemed to be adults being relocated to Rwanda. As the treaty sets out in Article 3(4), we will not seek to relocate unaccompanied individuals who are deemed to be under 18 to Rwanda. Any unaccompanied individual who, subsequent to relocation, is deemed by a court or tribunal in the UK to either be under 18 or to be treated temporarily as being under 18, shall be returned to the UK.

Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2023

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Purvis of Tweed

Thursday 14th September 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to all who have contributed to this debate. A lot of ground has been covered, and I am encouraged by the supportive atmosphere in which the discussion has taken place. Members of the Wagner Group are terrorists, plain and simple, and am I confident that the House recognises, as do the British people, that we have a moral responsibility to act. We must and will confront terrorism wherever and however it occurs, and that is why we are taking this action.

I turn to the specific points raised. I start by reassuring, I hope, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, that, in addition to our continued training offer to the national police of Ukraine to support Ukraine’s collection of evidence of Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine, the Home Office is currently providing short-term funding to the war crimes documentation centre, run by a Ukrainian NGO in Warsaw. It ensures that first-hand testimony from Ukrainian refugees in Poland is recorded. The UK is also providing £2.5 million to the Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group to support Ukraine’s domestic investigations and prosecution of international crimes. We are also working extremely closely with the ICC in support of its investigations. That is a very comprehensive package of support, and I hope it continues and is enhanced.

A number of noble Lords asked what would happen if the Wagner Group merges with the Russian MoD or Redut. HMG keep the list of proscribed organisations under very careful review. It is not government policy to comment on whether an organisation is under consideration for proscription or whether the Government will consider a specific organisation, but proscription sends a strong message about the UK’s commitment to tackling terrorism globally and calling out terrorist activity wherever it is committed. The turmoil currently facing the Wagner Group presents opportunities for impactful disruption of its activities, and I will come back to that later.

A number of noble Lords, including the noble Lords, Lord Purvis and Lord Coaker, and my noble friend Lord Polak asked why it has taken so long. The decision has not been taken in isolation. It builds on a strong response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and the Wagner Group’s wider destabilising activities, including extensive sanctions. The Government sanctioned the Wagner Group in February 2022, imposing asset freezes on any funds identified as belonging to Wagner in the UK and travel bans on any of its members. The Foreign Secretary expanded these sanctions in July this year, with 30 new UK sanctions targeting a range of individuals and businesses linked to the actions of the Wagner Group in Africa. The House will be aware of the recent significant events surrounding the Wagner Group, so it was right for the Home Secretary to consider the impact of those key events when taking the proscription decision.

Now is the time to proscribe. The turmoil currently facing the Wagner Group, as I have just said, presents opportunities to disrupt its activities. Proscription sends a strong message of the UK’s commitment to tackling terrorism globally and calling out terrorist activity wherever it is committed. This proscription reiterates the UK’s unwavering support to Ukraine and condemns Russia’s aggression, Wagner’s role in the war in Ukraine and its wider activities, which have consistently been linked to human rights violations, as others have noted.

The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, asked what the impact of proscription is. It sends a very clear message and will enable us to disrupt significantly. In addition to the proscription offences, proscription can support other disruptive activity, including the use of immigration powers, encouraging the removal of online material, EU asset freezes and so on. The resources of a proscribed organisation are terrorist property and therefore liable to be seized.

The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, also asked why Prigozhin was able to circumvent sanctions to sue a journalist in this country. I refer the House to the statement made on this matter by my noble friend Lady Penn on 30 March this year. Following a review of how these licences are granted, it is now the Government’s view that in most cases the use of funds frozen due to sanctions for the payment of legal professional fees for defamation cases is not an appropriate use of funds and, in many cases, will be against the public interest. OFSI will in future take a presumption that legal fees relating to defamation and similar cases will be rejected.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked for clarification of the application of proscription offences. The membership offence under Section 11 of the Terrorism Act 2000—TACT—has extraterritorial jurisdiction, applying to anyone, wherever they are in the world. The support offence applies to any UK citizen or resident. Terrorist financing offences could also apply outside the UK. Once Wagner is proscribed, we will expect social media companies to identify and remove content that promotes or supports the Wagner Group.

I anticipated the question by my noble friend Lord Polak on the IRGC and I understand it, because there is obviously significant parliamentary, media and public interest in a potential proscription decision. Both the House of Commons and the House of Lords have discussed IRGC proscription, with the House of Commons unanimously passing a Motion in January to urge the Government to proscribe. As Ministers have previously made clear to the House, the IRGC’s destabilising and hostile activity is unacceptable, and we will use all tools at our disposal to protect the UK and our interests at home and abroad. That includes considering proscription where appropriate.

The UK Government have sanctioned the IRGC in its entirety. While the department keeps the list of proscribed organisations under review, as I have said, our policy is not to comment on the specifics of individual proscription cases, and I am unable to provide further details on this issue. Ministers have previously confirmed to the House that this decision was under active consideration, but they will not provide a running commentary. I say to my noble friend that there is one difference: the IRGC is an Iranian military body answerable to Iran’s Supreme Leader. The Home Secretary’s role, as discussed in relation to Wagner, is to consider all available evidence before arriving at a decision.

A number of noble Lords asked what efforts have been made to persuade international allies to take co-ordinated action against the Wagner Group. His Majesty’s Government continue to work with key international partners to ensure that the Wagner Group is held to account on the world stage and to promote global efforts to curtail Wagner’s destabilising activity. When it comes to proscription decisions, the Home Secretary will consider the position of key international partners and, where appropriate, departments will undertake proactive engagement to explore the benefits of concerted multilateral action to increase the effect of proscription. The Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence have been very supportive of international engagement over this particular decision. I would also like to reassure the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, that this is very comprehensive and there is no way for Wagner or its offshoots to hide.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked about Contest. I refer to the Government’s recent refresh of the integrated review, which set out that the UK will use all tools at our disposal to protect the UK against the modern threats we face.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I will be happy if the Minister wishes to write to me on this, but I raised a point regarding entities that have contracted the Wagner Group as private security. This can include joint ventures with commercial organisations and countries we have friendly diplomatic relations with, including in the Gulf. Can the Minister write to me about how we will apply the extraterritorial aspects of this with regard to that component? That is very important to ensure that there is no avoidance of the very valid reasons we are doing this.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord makes a good point. He reminds me that I should have commented on his comments about a very specific country, which of course I am not really able to do in detail. I am sure that diplomatic efforts and overtures are ongoing. I am certainly happy to write to the noble Lord in as much detail as I am able to.

National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Purvis of Tweed

Report stage
Wednesday 1st March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

The Minister knows that, in Committee, I quoted quite a lot from the OSJA human rights guidance, which I have before me. It also addresses the fundamental point of my noble friend Lord Beith. Both the security service guidelines—which are not published, but about which we know because of judicial processes—which categorise the means by which authorisations have to be secured, and the OSJA Guidance outline the risk assessments that officers must go through. They conclude that, if there is high risk, ministerial approval is necessary. The Government’s amendments do not state categorically that authorisations and ministerial approvals will be necessary for breaches of the SCA offences. Can the Minister confirm that it will be the case that, if there are breaches of the SCA which are forecast through risk assessments and during the processes, ministerial authorisations will have to be provided?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I cannot confirm that from the Dispatch Box, but I will write to the noble Lord with the appropriate clarification. I do not actually have a copy of the OSJA Guidance in front of me, but I appreciate the points he is making.

I return to the third concern raised by the noble Lord, Lord West. I can confirm that, where a member of the intelligence services or the Armed Forces conducted activity that did not comply with the arrangements—namely, the rigorous safeguards, standards and internal processes that I described earlier—this breach of the arrangements could be scrutinised by the proper oversight mechanisms; for example, an error would be reported to IPCO for a breach of the Fulford principles. It could be considered by the prosecution and would impact the availability of the defence. I also assure the noble Lord that the introduction of this new defence, in and of itself, will not lead to fewer ministerial authorisations sought by the intelligence services or to less daily oversight from Ministers and/or judicial commissioners over intelligence activity. I know that he asked me for an explicit reassurance on that point.

I conclude by saying that, for the reasons I have outlined, the Government cannot support the amendments tabled by noble Lords against Clause 30, and therefore ask noble Lords not to press their amendments. I also ask the House to support the new SCA defence amendment tabled by the Government.

National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Purvis of Tweed

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, this is an amendment which I really did not think it should be necessary to debate, on ministerial appointments by a Prime Minister, where that appointment may raise issues to do with the safety, security and interests of the United Kingdom. The amendment seeks clarification from the Government on the ability for there to be transparency in the operation of the Ministerial Code, but also where there is concern about ministerial appointments.

This is not a partisan point, because we know as a matter of fact that a Home Secretary was sacked because of a significant security breach. The guidance on security of government business was breached considerably, and Liz Truss sacked Suella Braverman, who admitted a breach of government security guidelines. I recognise that none of the material that was shared on a private email system was marked “secret”, so with regard to national security considerations, on the face of what was sent to an incorrect recipient but also what was intended to be sent, it was not secret or top secret. They were not classified documents, and I respect that fact. However, the recipient’s employer—because one of the emails was sent to a member of staff of an MP—replied to Suella Braverman saying:

“Simply asking my team to delete this email and ignore it is not an acceptable response to what appears, on the face of it, to be a potentially serious breach of security … You are nominally in charge of the security of this nation, we have received many warnings even as lowly backbenchers about cyber security.”


The fact that that Minister was then reappointed for political purposes within a matter of days has been well rehearsed. The Minister has responded to this issue in Questions in the Chamber, and the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, also responded, saying:

“Everyone deserves a second chance.”—[Official Report, 22/10/22; col. 1558.]


I know for a fact that not everybody who will fall foul of some of the significant offences under this Bill will receive a second chance—or that some officials will receive it. But it would be useful to know whether there are security concerns about the appointments of Ministers.

The second thing I say concerns something that did not happen but could easily have happened. A Member of this House, the noble Lord, Lord Lebedev, was appointed under considerable concern about security situations. He was appointed to Parliament by Boris Johnson. He could very easily have been asked to be a Government Whip or a Minister: that is not a stretch of the imagination. What is the situation then, when security concerns have been raised about the appointment of a Member to Parliament but there is no mechanism for transparency about concerns about ministerial appointments? I do not besmirch any existing Ministers: these are two factual situations; one is regrettable, of course; and the other has not happened but could easily have happened. Therefore, my amendment seeks clarification as to what mechanisms are in place for it to be transparent when there have been concerns about an individual being appointed to a ministerial position, so that those concerns can be made public. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for speaking to Amendment 114, which seeks to require the Cabinet Secretary to publish information concerning ministerial appointments in scenarios where officials have indicated that the appointment of a particular individual

“may be counter to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom including because of potential influence from a foreign power”.

The Government cannot accept this amendment because the appointment of Ministers is a matter solely for the Prime Minister, in line with his role as the sovereign’s principal adviser. It is critical to the functioning of government that any conversations that occur around appointments are able to take place in confidence. There is a long-standing practice to protect that confidentiality. Without the ability to speak freely on matters that will be personal and sometimes sensitive, particularly where they may include matters of security, the ability of officials to provide meaningful advice ahead of an appointment will be critically undermined. The National Security Bill is concerned principally with the conduct of state actors working for foreign powers or with an intention to benefit a foreign power. Not only is the Bill not the appropriate vehicle for such a change but the Government also firmly believe that any information relating to ministerial appointments and procedures is not appropriate for publication. The Government therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister, and I am not entirely surprised by his response. I think the Government’s concerns regarding confidentiality and protecting Civil Service advice were addressed in the amendment. In fact, it explicitly states that information would not be provided within the memorandum, but that security considerations had been raised should be in the public domain. I hear what the Minister said; we will explore this in the other avenues. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 124 creates the power to extend any provision in the Bill with or without modification to the sovereign base areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus by way of Order in Council. The provisions of the Official Secrets Acts 1911 and 1920 extend to the sovereign base areas, and this amendment will allow provisions of the Bill to be extended to the law of the sovereign base areas. This would ensure that harmful activity that the Bill addresses can be prosecuted in sovereign base areas when conducted there.

Clause 20, which provides for the aggravating factor to apply to some service offences in the Armed Forces Act 2006, has been excluded from this power given that it is already being extended to the sovereign base areas though Clause 95(1)(b).

I end by putting on record that the Government consider that any references in this Bill to the sovereign base areas will not in any way undermine the provisions of the 1960 treaty concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus between the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. I therefore ask the Committee to support the inclusion of this amendment.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I have very little to say with regard to the government amendment. I recognise the Government’s sensitivity to the ongoing issue of the politics within Cyprus.

As this is the last group in Committee, I thank the Ministers today, the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Murray, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, for their willingness to engage. As my noble friend Lord Wallace indicated, there is a lot of work to be done in persuading the Committee that the measures in the Bill will meet the Government’s intent. There are some key areas of the Bill where we are looking for more information. I think the noble Lord, Lord Murray, indicated on an earlier group that he is reflecting and that there is more to follow. We await the correspondence from the Ministers. We are very happy to meet Ministers before Report. I say from these Benches that it might be advisable for the Government not to be in a rush to schedule Report, so that there can be proper thinking on the many aspects of the Bill about which we have highlighted problems.

National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Purvis of Tweed

Committee stage
Monday 16th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I will come back to the noble Lord on that shortly.

I will go on to the commercial sensitivity aspects—in effect commercial confidentiality, mentioned just now by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. We believe that ensuring that information can be publicised where it relates to the carrying out of political influence activities will help to strengthen the resilience of the political system, but Clause 77(2) allows the Secretary of State to specify or describe information or material that is not to be published. We intend this to include where publishing the information would, for example, threaten the interests of national security, put an individual’s safety at risk, or result in the disclosure of commercially sensitive information. The registration system will allow a person to flag where they think they meet such an exemption, which will not be considered by the scheme management unit.

In accordance with our data protection obligations, we intend for the information to be published to be limited to what is necessary to achieve the transparency aims of the scheme, particularly where that information is personal. I have heard all the concerns and, as I said, the Government will give further consideration to these points ahead of Report.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

That commitment is welcome. The Minister referred to the lack of a regulatory burden; I am following the point that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, raised. However, the Government’s impact assessment says, in effect, that everybody needs to be familiarised with it because they will not know whether they are in scope. It says at paragraph 37, which I quoted earlier:

“Due to the offences and penalties associated with non-compliance with the scheme, organisations that are ultimately out of scope will still need to be aware of the FIRS”.


When it comes to domestic charities and NGOs, the impact assessment’s higher estimate of how many people will have to familiarise themselves with FIRS is 105,000 people. It will be an enormous regulatory burden on the domestic charity sector as to whether it knows to comply with it. Simply stating that it is a small online form is insufficient. On that point, I wonder why the Government have no estimate at all of how many small and medium-sized businesses will be captured by this.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord has pre-empted the remainder of my speech to some extent, which I am afraid goes on for rather a long time; I apologise in advance for that. I will come on to the charities aspect in a moment. On the regulatory burden, I think I have been reasonably clear as to the simplicity we intend when it comes to complying.

The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, would extend my noble friend Lady Noakes’s amendment to charitable activities, as was just described again by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. I once more thank the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, for his scrutiny of the scheme. In essence, the question is: why is there not a charity exemption in the scheme and will this not make it harder for charities to carry out legitimate activity here in the United Kingdom? We believe that the ability of charities to campaign on issues relevant to their charitable mission is very important and crucial to our democracy. The scheme will not prevent this. It will ensure that the public are informed about the role played by overseas entities in this work, however.

We have also taken steps to minimise the potential burden on charities conducting legitimate activity as a result of FIRS. For example, making a public communication, campaign information or requests for support by a charity will be registerable only if it is not reasonably clear from the communication that it is made at the direction of a foreign power or entity. If such a communication is published for or on behalf of a foreign charity in its own name, it would not need to be registered. If it is published by a UK charity or PR firm at the direction of a foreign charity, it would not need to be registered if it is reasonably clear from the communication that it has been made at the direction of the foreign charity. I hope that is reasonably clear and has given some reassurance to the charitable sector.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I was about to attempt to address the question from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, but unfortunately he is not going to like the answer, which is that I do not know. I will have to look into this and come back to him.

I appreciate the concerns that have been expressed by all noble Lords, and I thank all those who participated in what was clearly a very healthy and important debate. We will reflect carefully on the comments raised prior to Report. For the moment, and to that end, I ask noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Since the Minister said he would go away and reflect on this debate, which may bring about substantial changes to what the Government are doing, what would be the point of his moving his amendments for the remainder of this part? It would save the Committee quite a bit of time if he did not move these amendments to the rest of the part that he said he is now going to consider.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am not sure it would save a huge amount of time, would it?

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

It depends how long the Minister takes to move his own amendments. When he sums up his own amendments that he will be moving, he will be saying, “I am now going away to reflect on these and come back before Report”, so there is very little point in doing that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

What about the corporation? I am grateful to the Minister, but there is a quite considerable amount of executive authority in the City of London Corporation when it comes to what could well interact with the interests of the United Kingdom. So perhaps the Minister might reflect on that.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I will absolutely reflect on that but, as I say, they are not politically elected persons, as the noble Lord will know. As regards his example of a foreign defence contractor talking to somebody of the rank of brigadier, having had our lengthy discussions earlier I would have thought that they would be captured under the corporate side of the Bill. The effect of this amendment would be that foreign principals, or those in arrangements with them, would be required to register communication with these postholders, as well as those in the existing list, if it were conducted for the purpose of influencing one of those persons listed in Clause 68.

In answer to the other question about senior members of the security services, I believe that is captured under “senior civil servants”, but I will confirm that and come back to the noble Lord. For now, I ask that the House agrees this amendment.

National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Purvis of Tweed

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid that I do not have those figures to hand. I am not sure that I will be able to get them, but I will do my very best to find out and come back to the noble Lord on that question.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way, and I look forward to that reply when it comes in writing. If I have this right, the Minister said that it makes no difference—there is no change—to the approach on unlawful killing, torture or cruel or inhuman treatment. Is he saying that this clause does not provide immunity in offering assistance to others who would be committing unlawful killing, torture or cruel or inhuman treatment?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I said earlier, I think this is confined very much to the intelligence support by the Armed Forces—is that what the noble Lord is referring to?

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful. No, it is not. The Minister said that there was no change to the approach on unlawful killing and torture. My reading of this clause is that there would now be immunity for offering assistance to others to carry out unlawful killing or torture.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I do not believe that there is immunity for that, but I will clarify that if I am incorrect.

Moving on, caution when considering the legality of support to our partners is of course correct and will continue. However, the current impact of the SCA offences means that vital intelligence-sharing opportunities have been delayed or missed, even when UKIC and the Armed Forces are fully compliant with other legal and policy requirements, such as the Fulford principles and the overseas security and justice assistance guidance, which ensure, for example, that support to international partners is in line with our human rights obligations. I have the principles and guidance to hand. If anybody would like me to go through them in detail, I will, but they are long so it will delay proceedings. I will await an intervention, if any noble Lord wishes me to do that.

UKIC’s and the Armed Forces’ adherence to and compliance with the principles are monitored by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office—IPCO—via regular inspections, and they are also routinely scrutinised by the Intelligence and Security Committee. Ministers are directly accountable for the work of the agencies and the legality of their operations. When things go wrong, it is entirely right that there is scrutiny of and accountability for the organisations’ activities, and I commend the important work that the ISC and IPCO undertake in this space. Meanwhile, any individual found to be working beyond the proper functions of the security and intelligence agencies or the Armed Forces will remain personally liable for those actions. This is right and fair.

However, I have heard the views of the House about this clause. The Government are in close consultation with the Intelligence and Security Committee, UKIC and the Armed Forces, and we are carefully reflecting on the views expressed and considering whether a change in approach is appropriate. It is important to note that those who have seen the very sensitive information which is relevant to this issue have agreed that there is a problem to solve—including the ISC, which has seen specific examples—and I am committed to us reaching a consensus on this matter.

Turning directly to the amendment in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile, Section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act allows the Secretary of State to give authorisations for acts outside the British Isles, provided that the acts are done as necessary for the proper function of SIS or GCHQ—though not MI5 or the Armed Forces—and that the nature and consequence of the acts will be reasonable. These authorisations are clearly not currently available in all the circumstances in which SCA risks arise. I understand that this amendment seeks to address that gap and provide a solution to the application of the SCA offences. It also seeks to utilise an existing power for ministerial authorisation which is overseen by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. These are obviously legitimate and valuable objectives. Section 7 authorisations provide a carefully used route by which the agencies can seek ministerial approval in advance of planned activities. They require Ministers to consider, in relation to specific acts, whether they are necessary and whether the consequences are reasonable. Once authorised, they can remove criminal and civil liability for those acts.

There will invariably be instances where the SCA risk does not manifest itself initially and becomes apparent only much later. Where a risk is not identified in advance, a Section 7 authorisation would not be sought to cover it. In these cases, those acting for UKIC or the Armed Forces would not be adequately protected should concerns about SCA offences arise later. Further, this scenario could lead to an unintended consequence of seeking to use Section 7 authorisations for hypothetical risks, creating an unhealthy reality in which more conduct is approved than would be otherwise without providing meaningful consideration of those risks. I am sure the House shares our desire to find a targeted solution to that problem. It would be a perverse outcome indeed if this well-intended amendment were to lead to less consideration of the SCA risks rather than more. Whether it is a class authorisation or a targeted one, as referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, the reasons why Section 7 authorisations are inappropriate remain the same.

In short, the Government do not believe that Section 7 authorisation is the best solution to the specific operational issue and do not believe it would improve the clarity of the application of the SCA offences to all the complex operational scenarios that arise in ongoing, carefully considered but agile international collaboration. It is more desirable to remove this risk in a targeted way as per Clause 28, avoiding the burden of potentially missing, and/or the overuse of, Section 7 authorisations for SCA risks.

The noble Lords, Lord Purvis and Lord Beith, talked about criminal conduct and authorisation of this for covert human intelligence sources. I think they may have conflated this with the issue at hand. No amendment is being proposed to the criminal conduct authorisation regime which governs the action of agents. We are concerned here with support for our international partners’ activities, so I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Evans, and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, who articulated this point very well.

I now turn to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, which aims to table provisions which explicitly state that Clause 28 does not cover torture, murder or sexual offences. Again, it is a legitimate attempt to clarify Clause 28. However, it is one which the Government deem unnecessary for reasons that I have partly outlined already but will continue to set out.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am going to do it right now: there is no immunity for inciting or assisting others to kill or torture.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Could the Minister give a little more information as to why there is no immunity?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord does not want there to be immunity.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

No. Why, under this clause, would there continue to be no immunity?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Perhaps I could get to the end and then clarify this. As I said earlier in relation to the SCA, I can confirm that the examples that the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, asked about have been provided to the ISC. As the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, pointed out, it has agreed that this is a problem that requires a solution.

It is vital to acknowledge that Clause 28 will not create blanket criminal law immunity or change the application of all other criminal law offences, including those criminalising torture anywhere in the world, as I have said a number of times. The UK remains committed and subject to international legal obligations, including under the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and international obligations on assisting an unlawful act under Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s articles on state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. The amendment to the SCA offences applies only when persons acting for UKIC or the Armed Forces are acting within the proper exercise of their functions. We do not consider that the activities that are of concern and the focus of this amendment would amount to the proper exercise of those functions. I hope that is clear.

I want to be clear that any individual found to be working outside the proper functions of the intelligence agencies or Armed Forces will remain personally liable for those actions under the SCA offences, as well as other applicable laws. Meanwhile, it will still be possible for legal challenges to be brought against the intelligence agencies and Armed Forces in relation to allegations of unlawful behaviour, whether in the form of judicial review, civil damages claims or through a referral to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. That is exactly as it should be.

In response to the point from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, I say that the Government’s position is that this amendment is not intended to, nor would it have the effect of, removing the role of the relevant Secretary of State from the oversight of the intelligence and security services.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, spoke about the current reasonableness defence and effectively why it is not enough. There is an existing reasonableness defence in Section 50 of the SCA, as has been noted, which was included in recognition that there may be occasions when it could be shown that an individual’s actions were justified in the circumstances.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

That is what I am saying. I will come back to whether it should be on the face of the Bill in due course.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am very grateful for that last interaction between the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the Minister. I am also grateful for the Minister continuing to have a degree of open-mindedness. I do not know where I sit on the cascade of legal hierarchy, but I think it is lower order. I do not know if it is just me, but a frisson of nervousness went through my spine when the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, asked for a quick word outside. If I could avoid that, it would be better.

I am well aware of the distinction between SIS officers working under a CHIS authorisation and what is covered under the ISA. I am also well aware of MI5 officers running agents who carry out criminal activity. The point I was trying to make is that there are clear distinctions and that we have procedures with regard to MI5 officers running agents who carry out criminal activity, but there is no immunity for them to do so. The point I made in my opening remarks is that the processes that MI5 has are effectively the defence. The concern with the breadth of this immunity is that those processes will no longer be the case.

I am also well aware of our international obligations, but it is under domestic law that we would realise what those natures are. Because of the extraterritorial nature of the schedule in the SCA, I am still not convinced in the reading of it that our intelligence services and Armed Forces would be able to operate under domestic law in offering assistance to others carrying out criminal acts. Those criminal acts may well also be breaches of international law. I am grateful for what the Minister said, but I am also grateful for his willingness to engage further on that.

I hope the Minister took on board the consensus with regard to concerns about the Armed Forces. The point I made at the start of this debate is that, unique among the SIS and GCHQ included within this, the Armed Forces have powers of detention. Therefore, the processes under way under the MoD doctrine for risk assessments on torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, extraordinary rendition or rendition, and unacceptable standards of arrest and detention are all areas of considerable concern, if there is immunity for our Armed Forces when working with others.

Of course, the guidance that exists also includes the receiving of unsolicited information or providing or sharing information on collaboration. These risk assessment processes are in place—they are in published principles and guidelines—and the considerable concern is that they will be washed away by the extent of the immunity.

I am grateful to the Minister for being open. I still think that he has not sufficiently addressed all the areas of concern, not least that there would be a considerable diminution of independent oversight in the operation of this. I will withdraw my amendment at this stage. I accept the Minister’s word that he will engage fully before Report, and I hope he will be able to put in writing responses to all the issues that have been raised on this so that we can study it carefully before Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Purvis of Tweed

Committee stage
Wednesday 21st December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 62 is a minor amendment to Schedule 6 which covers detention following an arrest for foreign power threat activity. Included in the schedule are powers for the police to take fingerprints and samples—biometric data—from an individual in detention. Biometric data can be retained for three years, with the police able to apply to the court for that period to be extended. The police and the individual can appeal the decision on extension to a relevant appeal court. This amendment corrects a reference to the relevant appeal court in Scotland, which is currently defined as the sheriff principal. Sections 109 and 110 of the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 abolished appeals to the sheriff principal in civil proceedings, with appeals now made to the Sheriff Appeal Court. This amendment corrects this.

Amendment 73 is a consequential change to take account of the new offence at Clause 15: obtaining a material benefit from a foreign intelligence service. This was introduced in Committee in the other place, at which point the Committee had surpassed Clause 15. Clause 15(6) makes its own provision about when offences are committed outside the UK. I beg to move, thank you very much and wish you a happy Christmas.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I wish the Minister and all other members of the Committee a merry Christmas and, in keeping with this Bill, a safe new year.

National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Purvis of Tweed

Committee stage
Wednesday 21st December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, that is more properly a DLUHC area, in the light of the Act passed recently, but I will certainly have the conversation with my counterpart there and see what that Act says. I am not an expert on that Act, as the noble Lord will probably appreciate.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

We obviously have a difference of opinion as to whether the current system is stringent. I am curious why, if the trading arm of a political party was operating with a business that had any interest in one of the 26 countries in the money laundering and terrorist financing regulations, it would have to do due diligence, but if it received money that originated from such a country, it would not. Why does the Minister think that is acceptable?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I outlined in my answer earlier, I believe this is a stringent regime. I am afraid there is a significant difference of opinion. It specifies that only those with a genuine interest in UK electoral events can make political donations. Any donations that are not permissible and not reported will constitute an offence.

I am afraid I will not address the comments by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, about support for Mr Orbán over the Dutch and French; that certainly does not apply here. His Amendment 45A seeks to add requirements relating to proxy voting. It would be odd and somewhat undemocratic to seek to apply such measures solely to overseas electors, when the same issue could arise for domestic electors. In any event, proxy voters and those seeking to use a proxy are not in a position to determine whether someone is seeking to support a foreign power. It is an impossible ask of them. Adding such requirements risks disfranchising individuals by blocking their ability to find a proxy and undermining the very point of a proxy voting system.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I think I have already answered in significant detail why that clause has gone into the Bill. I have also answered the specific points that the noble Viscount raised at the start of the debate.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

This is really important. As the noble Viscount pointed out, this is not about coercion of an individual but about putting into law “causing spiritual injury” to any person, ill-defined as that is, and not just the person to whom the effect of the interference relates. It is of significance that we would be putting in a very considerable offence of causing an undefined spiritual injury to any person. Can the Minister reflect on that and maybe come back to us in writing?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I have heard the feelings about this around the Committee, so of course I commit to do that.

National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Purvis of Tweed

Committee stage
Monday 19th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the noble and learned Lord for that clarification. I do not think the clause is imputing that but I will read Hansard very carefully and, if I may, I will come back to him in writing on this point.

The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, will pick me up if I do not address the Official Secrets Act 1989, but that is due to be discussed in group 33 on a subsequent Committee day, so I ask if we can come back to that detail then, if that is acceptable.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Of course, as long as it is on the basis of the point that my noble friend raised—that we will have two pieces of legislation. The 1989 Act will cover serving or former members of the intelligence services, but this Bill means that there will now be two competing pieces of legislation. I do not know which the Government intend will trump the other.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I understand where the noble Lord is coming from. I commit to making sure that we explain that in considerable detail at the appropriate time, if that is acceptable.

For the reasons I have given, the Government cannot accept the tabled amendments and I ask the noble Lord to withdraw.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, once again, this was a helpful debate, as noted by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. I thank all those who participated. These amendments seek to limit the “interests” element of the “safety or interests of the United Kingdom” test which applies to many of the clauses in Part 1. As noted by many noble Lords, this concept was explored extensively in the other place.

The majority of these amendments change the “interests” element to cover only security or defence interests. This moves away from the safety or interests of the UK test that already exists and is understood in current espionage legislation. Indeed, the Law Commission noted its support of the Government’s decision to retain this term. At the oral evidence session to the Public Bill Committee, it noted that

“safety or interest of the state is consistent with a lot of the wording that already exists within the Official Secrets Act”—

those of 1911 and 1920—and

“avoids what might risk being an unduly narrow focus on national security”,—[Official Report, Commons, National Security Bill Committee, 7/7/22; col. 52.]

as the noble Lord, Lord Evans, noted.

The experience of the Government and the Governments of allied states is that espionage is frequently targeted at and can result in significant damage to all sorts of national interests, some of which may fall outside the scope of security or defence interests. Indeed, any attempt to narrow or define the interests to the UK risks creating a test that is quickly outdated, as the UK’s interests naturally and properly evolve.

A number of noble Lords referred to the Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions case that was heard in this House in 1964. It concluded that the interests of the state meant the objects of state policy, determined by the Crown on the advice of Ministers. That is noticeably distinct from protecting the particular interests of those in office. I heard what the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, and others said in relation to the 2001 case. However, in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, the Government do not think it can be defined in legislation. It needs to retain flexibility for future threats as they evolve.

For this reason, it would also not be appropriate for the Secretary of State to attempt to define the UK’s interests in a Statement to Parliament, as in the proposed amendment to Clause 1. Notably, these amendments do not include economic interests, interests related to public health, as the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, noted, or interests related to preserving our democracy—to name just a few areas that would be overlooked by them. We know that these areas are targeted by hostile actors, and they should rightly be protected.

I was asked what safeguards are in place to prevent the Government using this legislation inappropriately—

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I want to test the issue with regard to economic activity. If the Minister is saying that the Bill will be broad and go beyond national security economic activity, then presumably that brings into its remit all significant areas of major trade disputes where we have mechanisms for reciprocal action for penalising, having punitive tariff responses, et cetera, when effectively there is economic warfare. If the noble Lord, Lord Evans, and the Minister are correct, anyone involved in any trade competitor which is engaged in dumping or activity that may lead to reciprocal trade actions will now be under the remit of the Bill. It is criminalising an offence with potentially 14 years’ or life imprisonment, rather than going through the approach of what other economic trade activity is concerned. Part of the concern is that the Government will be able to decide that all these different areas would now come under the remit of the Bill.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

If noble Lords will bear with me, I am going to address that point.

I was saying what safeguards are in place to prevent the Government using the legislation inappropriately—for example, by deciding that someone is acting against government policy but where there is no national security impact. Each offence under this legislation includes tests that must be met in order for the offences to be committed. For example, for a person to commit the Clause 1 offence, they must obtain or disclose information that is “protected” for a purpose that they know, or ought reasonably to know, is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom, and the activity must be conducted for, or on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit, a foreign power. The limits to the type of conduct that is capable of being caught under this offence, in particular the foreign power condition, ensure that there is a state link. Designing the offence in this way clearly focuses the offence on harmful state threats activity.

Additionally, Attorney-General consent must also be obtained before prosecution can be pursued for the majority of offences under Part 1—in the case of Northern Ireland that is the Advocate-General for Northern Ireland—and the Crown Prosecution Service must apply the public interest test.

I understand the intention of these amendments. I would say to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, that obviously individuals and groups might not agree with government policies, and the noble Baroness makes it very clear that she falls into that category on a regular basis, but they nevertheless represent the policy of the Government who have been elected to act for the country, and disclosing information to a foreign power can never be the right response to that.

As I say, I understand the intention of these amendments, but the Government cannot support them and respectfully ask for them not to be pressed.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 13 seeks to narrow the scope of the offence provided for in Clause 3(2). For brevity, I will refer to a foreign intelligence service as a FIS.

The Government reject this amendment because we do not consider it to be necessary. Clause 3(2) provides for an offence where a person engages in conduct which it is reasonably possible may materially assist a FIS in carrying out UK-related activities. Amendment 13 seeks to change this to “likely materially to” assist a FIS. We do not consider there to be a difference between the two terms. I recognise the spirit in which this amendment has been made, to raise the bar for this offence being conducted, but I assure noble Lords that for this offence to apply, a person not only needs to engage in the conduct that it is reasonably possible may assist a FIS but must know, or ought reasonably to know, that it will assist a FIS in carrying out UK-related activities.

To ensure that we do not capture legitimate activity, there are defences in Clause 3(7). Not only will we not criminalise activity conducted in accordance with an agreement to which we are a party—such as agreements with our Five Eyes partners based in the UK—but we will exclude law enforcement and others who are legally obliged under UK law to assist a FIS. That goes some way to answering the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. Additionally, where someone with public functions—

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My reading of it is that, taking the defence in Clause 3(7)(b) as an example, if I was providing Special Forces training—unlikely though that might seem—because I have functions of a public nature, I would be fine, although I do not think anyone would wish to receive Special Forces training from me. I was asking specifically about UK private sector bodies—consultancies and those that carry out those functions. I am happy for the Minister to write to me if he does not have an answer now, but I do not think that private sector enterprises are covered by any of the defences in Clause 3(7).

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, my reading of it is not the same as the noble Lord’s, but I will seek clarification and happily write to him on that.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, raised a hypothetical about assisting foreign intelligence services. I am happy to provide a few more which may clarify the scope of this clause. Hypothetical examples of a person assisting a foreign intelligence service in carrying out its activities could include aiding intelligence-gathering operations or providing a financial benefit to a foreign intelligence service, or someone working for a foreign intelligence service to entice an individual into working for them. I hope that clarifies it to some extent.

It is important to note that the threat posed by espionage, as we have said in previous groupings, is constantly evolving. It is important that our legislative provisions withstand the test of time. We must safeguard against a rapidly changing and complex threat landscape in which foreign powers and their intelligence services use a whole-of-society approach to conduct hostile activity against the UK. That is why Clause 3 is such an important part of the Bill. We therefore reject this amendment and respectfully ask that it be withdrawn.

Rwanda Asylum Partnership

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Purvis of Tweed

Wednesday 19th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful to the Government Chief Whip. I visited the reception centre in Kigali in June, and I asked about the legal basis of that centre, which is on a private contract on an annual basis that will run out in April. I saw no facilities for people who will be vulnerable or at suicide risk, and I have asked repeatedly in this House about the legal underpinning of the MoU. This House’s International Agreements Committee has today reported to say that it is unacceptable for measures such as this to be under an MoU rather than being under a treaty. Will the Government think again and allow Parliament to vote on, scrutinise and ratify this agreement if they believe that it is sound?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for his two questions. First, he mentioned the risk of suicide. It is worth pointing out that the health and welfare of those in immigration detention is of the utmost importance. We have a dedicated welfare team on site at each immigration removal centre which is responsible for identifying vulnerable individuals and providing assistance to support an individual’s needs. I remind noble Lords that decisions will be taken on a case-by-case basis and nobody will be relocated if it is unsafe or inappropriate for them. With regard to the terms governing this, which was his second question, he will not be surprised to hear me answer that this is slightly above my pay grade, but I will happily take it back to the department.

American War of Independence: Semiquincentennial Commemorations

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Purvis of Tweed

Thursday 14th July 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for his question, and also for a rare opportunity to use the word “semiquincentennial” in conversation. US planning for the 250th anniversary of independence in 2026 is still in its early stages, so plans are not yet fully formed. He makes some very good suggestions which I will happily take back, because I particularly like the battlefield idea. There are no immediate plans for a state visit, but I am sure that is something that will be considered. I should declare an interest as I lived in the US for five years, both my children are dual nationals and I am member of the Pilgrim Society.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, the magisterial biography of the Border reivers by George MacDonald Fraser starts with the inauguration of President Nixon taking over from President Johnson, with Billy Graham giving the eulogy. The Minister references the Pilgrim Society. There was an outward emigration group of Border reiver families after the pilgrims, of less strong character perhaps, from whom so many in America are descended. The story of the Borders, and the story of Scotland, and America is so linked, including Trump’s mother being Scottish—which we overlook. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, the Minister could perhaps think about an aged bottle of whisky, which I know the Minister and I both enjoy, but it is also an opportunity for America to withdraw its ban on haggis. The story of Scotland and America is very strong, so can the Minister make sure it is linked to any of the preparations?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I have read The Steel Bonnets, which is a very fine book, and I agree with his strong character remarks, which he phrased very artfully. I will certainly take the haggis suggestion back, although I am not sure that I can make any promises.

Jim Fitton: Detention in Iraq

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Purvis of Tweed

Wednesday 11th May 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I can confirm that high-level conversations are going on between the FCDO and the ambassador in Iraq. The ambassador has raised the case with the Iraqi authorities on four occasions, including by sending a note verbale. As regards ministerial engagement, my right honourable friend the Minister of State for Asia and the Middle East, Amanda Milling, has been kept very much up to date on Mr Fitton’s situation. Officials have lobbied at a high level in Iraq and will continue to consider what lobbying is most effective.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, this is a worrying case, not least because under Iraqi law it is a capital crime. I am glad that the Minister has conveyed to the House that representations have been made about the death penalty, but Ministers have refused to engage with my colleague Wera Hobhouse MP, who represents Mr Fitton. On 27 April I wrote to the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, in his capacity as Human Rights Minister, about the death sentence for this British citizen. I have yet to receive a reply, which is of significant concern given the urgency of this case. I know that the Minister engages with the Front Benches in this House. Will he please meet me and Wera Hobhouse, who represents Mr Fitton? The trial is days away and ministerial representations for the elected representative of Mr Fitton are highly appropriate.

Ukraine: Visa Restrictions for Refugees

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Purvis of Tweed

Monday 28th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Baroness asks me to stray into territory we will be visiting later, and I am afraid I cannot do that.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

One of the answers the Minister struggled with before was confirming that it is relatively easy to get from Poland to the United Kingdom at the moment. There are more than 670 flights a week from Poland to the UK; a simple check on Skyscanner can confirm that. Will he please confirm one thing: that Ukrainian people fleeing—even to join their family, as my noble friend said—will not be charged £95 and will not have to wait in a long process? Please can he confirm that there will be an expedited process and it will not cost a penny?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord has obviously had better access to Google in the past few minutes then I have, so I apologise for being unable to answer the earlier question on flights because I did not know the answer, but I have said that under the family reunion rules, that will be fee-free for this cohort.

Covid-19: Vaccination in Developing Countries

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Purvis of Tweed

Thursday 2nd December 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I do not know the answer to the noble Lord’s second question. As regards the expiry date issue, decisions on donations are driven by the availability of vaccines from domestic supply. Once the Health Secretary is confident that vaccines are available to donate directly to partners, the Foreign Secretary prioritises how they are shared. Obviously, avoiding vaccine expiry and wastage is a UK core objective, determining when and where we share or deploy doses, and we strive to observe WHO guidelines on that. No vaccines will be shared without an agreement with recipients that there is sufficient time for distribution and deployment before expiry. To expand a little: obviously, it would be much more sensible to manufacture in Africa, and the UK is working with the new Partnership for African Vaccine Manufacturing to develop its road map for African vaccine manufacturing over the next year.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I welcome the Minister to his position; it is the first time I have been able to do so. But does he not understand that at the very time our Government are asking our health networks to work together for a third jab, the Government’s cuts to health networks in developing countries—40% at a minimum, wiping out programmes across many countries—are inhibiting the distribution of the first and second jabs to those countries? The Independent Commission for Aid Impact said that this was a direct impact on the world’s ability to vaccinate. Can the Government at the very least review and reverse the shameful cuts to the health networks for the very people who need them most at this time?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord will appreciate that I cannot commit the Government to all those things, but I can tell him a bit about some of the things we are doing, which I hope will reassure him a little. He will also understand that this is not necessarily my specialist subject so I ask him to bear with me. We have deployed UK emergency medical teams to 11 African countries to provide training and clinical advice. We have also deployed a UK public health rapid support team to provide specialist technical assistance to public health agencies in Nigeria, the Gambia, Tunisia and the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention. We are continuing to provide technical support to build genomic sequencing and country capability through the UK’s new variant assessment platform, including in African countries. We are doing a lot.