Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Sharkey and Lord Faulkner of Worcester

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 12th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharkey]

My Lords, Amendments 32 and 39 return to the issue of cold calling, the problems of which we have debated on many occasions in this House. Our latest attempts to curb the menace of cold calling became law with the passing of the Financial Guidance and Claims Act, but, despite frequent debates and new laws, there remains significant uncertainty as to whether our current set of regulations is as effective as it should be. In particular, as we said in Committee, we are concerned at the extent to which cold calling will continue to drive fraudulent claims for RTA whiplash injuries. The Commons Justice Committee shares these concerns. Paragraph 133 of its 15 May report says:

“We conclude that the Government’s current package of reforms creates a risk of increasing cold calling by, or on behalf of, CMCs; we welcome the restrictions on cold calling in the Financial Guidance and Claims Act, but believe they do not go far enough and that an outright ban should be introduced. In the meantime, we recommend that the Government monitor the effectiveness of the proposed restrictions, particularly on calls from overseas, and that technical remedies are urgently explored to tackle any loopholes that might be exploited by overseas operators to circumvent the restrictions; we ask that the Government report to us on progress with this within a year of the proposed restrictions being implemented”.


In Committee we discussed amendments that would require an assessment of the real-world effect of all the current regulations trying to prevent cold calling. We also discussed the possibility of trying to cut off the revenue streams of cold callers by banning the commercial use of data so collected. I think that the Minister understood our concerns: he acknowledged, as he did again this afternoon, what he referred to as, “the problem of regulating the unregulated”. He mentioned that the Government were seeking to approach this problem by regulating the use of material gathered by cold calling, and we entirely support this approach. There is a widespread unease that we have not really cracked this problem yet—and I believe that the Minister shares at least some of this unease.

Our Amendments 32 and 39 do two things. First, they give the Minister the opportunity to address the House once again on the issue of whiplash and cold calling. Secondly, they propose yet another method of coming at the problem of cutting off the revenue stream of cold callers. Clause 4 sets out new rules against settlement of whiplash claims before medical report. Amendments 32 and 39 extend these rules to cover whiplash claims arising from cold calling. Amendment 32 does this by making it a breach to settle without seeing appropriate evidence that the claim does not arise from cold calling. Amendment 39 allows the Lord Chancellor to specify the form of any evidence required to demonstrate that the claim does not in fact arise from cold calling. Both amendments mirror the provisions in the Bill to ban pre-med settlements.

I realise, as I think we all do, that clamping down on cold calling is a difficult and complex business—but it is also vital. I hope that Amendments 32 and 39 will suggest to the Government a way forward in their attempts to cut off revenue streams and I very much look forward to the Minister’s reply. I beg to move.

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)]

I advise the House that if Amendment 32 is agreed I shall not be able to call Amendments 33 and 34 for reasons of pre-emption.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Sharkey and Lord Faulkner of Worcester

Report: 6th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 8th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)]

I advise the House that if Amendment 70 were agreed to, I would not be able to call Amendments 70A to 70BB because of pre-emption.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as chair of the Hansard Society, whose work on delegated legislation will be familiar to many of your Lordships. I will speak briefly in support of Amendment 70—the sifting amendment—to which I have added my name. I will also speak briefly to introduce Amendment 71. The noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, has set out very powerfully the case for Amendment 70—for the sifting committees’ decisions to be binding on Ministers—as has the Delegated Powers Committee in its reports.

When we debated an equivalent amendment in Committee, the Government’s argument against the proposal relied chiefly on their assertion that they were in any case likely to accept the sifting committees’ decisions and that, as the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, said, ignoring them would be, “hopefully, very rare”. This is a very weak argument. It is not based on principle. It is based on a suggestion of compliance, except in undefined, unexampled and no doubt exceptional circumstances. What it really means, of course, is that the Government, at their absolute discretion, will be able to impose the negative procedure on SIs, denying Parliament the more robust and intensive scrutiny provided by the affirmative procedure.

There is simply no case for allowing the Executive this unfettered and unqualified discretion. If Parliament is properly to exercise its scrutiny function in the face of the tsunami of SIs coming our way, it must be able to decide conclusively which SIs deserve higher levels of scrutiny and which do not. That is the whole raison d’être of the sifting committees: they allow Parliament itself to decide which SIs merit what level of scrutiny.

Not only have the Government demonstrated no real need for this override power, they have not even hinted at any harm that might be done by making the sifting committees’ decisions binding. In any case, throughout this Bill we must guard against the unnecessary transfer of power to the Executive. What the Government propose is such an unnecessary transfer of power. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, will press his amendment to a vote. If he does, we will support him.

I turn very briefly to Amendment 71, which is in my name and those of the noble Baroness, Lady Jay of Paddington, and the noble Lords, Lord Lisvane and Lord Norton of Louth. The Government expect this Bill to generate between 800 and 1,000 SIs. There will be many others generated by other Brexit Bills. As things stand, we have only two options for dealing with these SIs: we can accept them or we can reject them. A regret Motion has no practical effect.

In the past, this House has shown an understandable and very deep reluctance to reject affirmative SIs. We have rejected just six in the past 68 years. We have used our “nuclear option” very infrequently. This entirely understandable reluctance to reject will certainly continue for withdrawal SIs. But given the enormous volume of such SIs and the delicate and sensitive areas they will deal with, this proper reluctance to press the red button will almost certainly lead us to approve marginal cases or cases about which we retain serious misgivings. This would be an unsatisfactory outcome for the quality of created law and potentially damaging to the balance of power between the Executive and Parliament.

Amendment 71 proposes an additional method of dealing with affirmative SIs—and it is an additional method; it does not in any way affect our current powers. We would retain unaltered our powers to approve or reject, exactly as at present. Amendment 71 would simply allow us to do what we so frequently do: to ask the Commons to think again. Where we believe that asking the Commons to think again would be desirable, we simply co-ordinate scrutiny so that the Commons can pronounce first. If it rejects the SI, that is the end of the matter. If it approves, Amendment 71 would allow us to ask the Commons, with reasons, to think again. This mechanism would not frustrate the will of the Commons. If it chose not to reconsider within 10 days, the Lords would be deemed to have approved the instrument.

Amendment 71 would give Parliament more flexibility and room for more discussion in dealing with those SIs where real concern exists but where we are properly reluctant to reject. It simply allows a conversation with the Commons, after which the Commons will decide the matter. I commend it to the House.