Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Scriven
Main Page: Lord Scriven (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Scriven's debates with the Scotland Office
(9 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this part of the Committee’s deliberation is on Clause 5, “Interim measures of the European Court of Human Rights”. I will speak to a number of amendments in this group, but it is worth starting by looking at the Government’s ECHR memorandum provided with the Bill. On Clause 5, in paragraph 29 of the memorandum, the Government are very sparse in their view about their determination on interim measures. The memorandum says:
“The Government considers that the provision is capable of being operated compatibly with Convention rights”.
It does not say how the Government consider that to be the case. When the Minister responds to this debate, I am sure many noble Lords in the Committee will look forward to hearing how the Government consider that the provision can be compatible.
It is probably worth putting what we are talking about in context because, listening to some of the debate regarding interim measures, you would think that hundreds and hundreds of these are scattered around denying—as some would say—the UK courts having sovereignty in determining cases. Since 2017, there have been 660 requests against the UK for an interim injunction and only 15 have been granted—that is 2%—by the European Court of Human Rights.
It is interesting to note that, in 2023 regarding the UK, the court received 61 requests for an emergency intervention and only one was granted. We are potentially talking about only small numbers—on average, between five and six interim measures per year. We are not talking about hundreds of interim measures being ruled on and granted by the European Court of Human Rights against the UK. Of course, interim injunctions are only issued by the European Court of Human Rights pending a full judgment where the applicant faces an exceptional and immediate risk of irreparable harm in the meantime.
In Clause 5 of this Bill, it is for the Minister and the Minister alone to decide whether a person could be removed to Rwanda while their case is being decided by the European Court of Human Rights. My first question to the Minister is: in what circumstances would a Minister not wish to comply with an interim measure from the European Court of Human Rights? Are there any cases within the last four years in which the Government would have presumed not to have abided by an interim measure by the European Court of Human Rights?
Case law on the European Court of Human Rights has been clear for 20 years: failure to comply with interim measures is a violation of Article 34 of the convention, under which states undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of the rights of the applicants to bring their claims before the court. Some noble Lords at Second Reading said they disagreed with the court’s view that failing to comply with interim measures was a breach of the European Convention on Human Rights.
However, Article 32 of the convention, which the UK voluntarily signed up to—it was not forced to do so—says that:
“The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention”.
In that sense, the final arbitrator of whether a state should invoke and carry out interim measures is down to the European Court of Human Rights and not a Parliament of one of its states. That is the convention to which we signed up.
I am grateful to my noble friend but the answer “it depends” renders the matter, to a certain extent, even more complicated and emphasises the number of considerations that I will have to take into account in writing to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. While I am grateful to my noble friend for his contribution, my undertaking to write to the noble Lord remains in place.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this predominantly technical debate on the view of the UK’s legal position if it were to ignore an interim measure from the European Court of Human Rights. The final intervention from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and the Minister’s answer leave me just as confused as when we started the debate. It reminds me why, after I graduated 40 years ago, when I was offered the chance of becoming an NHS manager or going to law school, I chose to become an NHS manager. That was hard enough.
Clearly, noble and noble and learned Lords have raised several issues, but because of the lateness of the hour, I will not repeat them all. There is the issue of judicial review, which is quite bizarre. If a Minister’s sole decision on such an important issue cannot be judicially reviewed, particularly if the position is completely irrational, I think most noble Lords would agree that it would be easy for international law to be broken and for the individual to have no recourse even to our own domestic courts. As many noble Lords have said, the perverseness of Clause 5 as it stands is that it is preposterous that even our own domestic courts are ruled out from making any interim judgments. The Minister has not been able to give any convincing answer as to why that is.
A number of noble and noble and learned Lords asked this question in different ways, which the Minister, in answering, still ignored: if an interim decision is of such a serious nature, why would a Minister of the Crown wish to ignore it? It is hard to conceive why a Minister would wish to do that, particularly if there is no judicial review. It makes the individual completely reliant on a rational Minister making a decision devoid of the policy of the Government, which is absolutely central to stop the boats. It gets the Minister in a political and legal position that is highly suspect both for the individual on the receiving end of the decision and for the Minister having to make it. I am absolutely convinced of that, based on the views that have been raised.
Of all those views raised, the explanation of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, about the judgment and Articles 32 and 34 is one that I felt was definitive, as, I think, did many other noble Lords. However, the Government refused to accept that and continue to insist that Clause 5 is not in breach of international law and is not in any way a dilution of the separation of powers. I believe that this issue will come back on Report, and quite rightly so. Depending on what the Government say, I am sure that it will be a bone of contention for the House. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
The provision in the treaty is reserved for the most serious crimes—one punishable by five years or more imprisonment.
The amendment would necessitate, in the rare event of such returns to the United Kingdom, parliamentary consideration as to whether the Rwanda treaty should be suspended. However, it does not follow that, because an individual is returned from Rwanda to the United Kingdom because of serious criminality, the whole treaty is called into question. The return of individuals to the United Kingdom, including in these circumstances, is envisaged expressly by the treaty. It would be an example of the treaty functioning as it should, not a reason for its suspension.
The Minister quite rightly says that it is in the treaty—under Article 11, I assume. But that article says that the person will come back to the United Kingdom only with the relocated individual’s consent. If that consent is not given, what happens in this instance?
I will have to revert to the noble Lord with an answer to that question, which is a hypothetical situation I had not considered.
The Government have set out the expense caused to the British taxpayer of billions of pounds in relation to illegal migration. As my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom has pointed out on more than one occasion, our primary concern is the dreadful cost in life that it is inflicting. That is why we need bold and novel solutions towards ending it. Deterrence is a key element of the Rwanda partnership. Ultimately, we need to stop people making dangerous and illegal journeys across the channel. It is vital that we can show those who enter the United Kingdom illegally that they will not be permitted to remain here, thus breaking the model of the people smugglers and helping us to put an end to their vile trade. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I strongly support the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford in moving the amendment. We have gone through, in some detail, the question of when this Bill is going to become law and whether it will become law before the changes are effected as a result of the new treaty.
Noble Lords will remember that the Home Secretary is asking us to bear in mind the key part of his evidence that the position has changed since the Supreme Court judgment: namely, the treaty for the provision of an asylum partnership, which was laid before this House in December. Obviously, it is only when the provisions of that treaty are implemented that the position will have moved on from what the Supreme Court found, because the Home Secretary quite rightly is not challenging the finding of the Supreme Court; he is saying the position will change when the treaty is given effect to.
Obviously, this House is very sceptical of what Ministers are saying about when the treaty changes take place. Earlier in the afternoon, Ministers were unable to identify when the law in Rwanda would be changed to give effect to it. Ministers were not able to tell the Committee at all when the monitoring committee was going to recruit a support team, independent experts were going to be appointed to advise the first instance body, and all the other things set out in paragraph 19 of the International Agreements Committee report. We have no idea at the moment whether this Bill will be brought into force before the changes envisaged by the agreement and therefore the place will then become safe, so I am very surprised the Government are willing to go ahead with it before the changes are implemented.
That is the beginning. As far as the end is concerned —as this amendment is concerned with—Ministers will be aware that the agreement that gives effect to the changes, which remedies the problems identified by the Supreme Court and accepted as problems by the Government, ends on 13 April 2027, unless the agreement is renewed. I assume, though I invite Ministers to confirm, that if the agreement with Rwanda is not extended beyond 13 April 2027, it is the Government’s intention that the Rwanda Bill will come to an end. If that is not the position, how on earth could the Government contend that Rwanda continued to be a safe country after 13 April 2027?
In any event, the possibility of changes of circumstances are something that Parliament should be able to debate. The two-year sunset clause the right reverend Prelate is proposing is a means by which that debate could take place. Everybody who has debated the Bill in this House agrees it is a very grave thing that the Government are seeking to do by promoting the Bill. The idea that it is a permanent state of affairs that can never be looked at again without the consent of the Executive promoting another Bill is an inappropriate way to deal with it.
For all those reasons, I submit that this Committee should agree to the amendment proposed by the right reverend Prelate. However, I am extremely interested to know what the answer is to the position if this agreement with Rwanda is not extended beyond 13 April 2027.
My Lords, I have added my name to this amendment. Because of the lateness of the hour, I will not repeat any of the arguments for why the amendment is needed. I will add an extra point, again looking at the treaty. It was partly alluded to by my noble friend Lord Purvis of Tweed. Amendments to the agreement are by executive order. This Parliament is being asked to say that Rwanda is safe. Rwanda is safe on the basis of this treaty; that is the basis on which this Parliament is being asked to say that Rwanda is safe.
However, Article 20 on amendments to the agreement states:
“This agreement may be amended at any time by mutual agreement between the Parties”.
Therefore, tenets that are deemed to make Rwanda safe based on the judgment of the Supreme Court could, by executive order, be amended. This Parliament would not be able to change its view that Rwanda is safe. The treaty could be changed.
Therefore, when this treaty falls on the date that has been said in two years’ time, it is quite right that this Parliament should therefore be able to look at everything in the round, including any amendments to this treaty, to determine whether Rwanda is still safe. That is why this amendment is needed.
Once again, I thank noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. As we have heard throughout today’s debate, we have to do more to break the criminal gangs’ business model, and to deter illegal migrants. These journeys are extremely dangerous. People have lost their lives attempting to cross the channel, as is well reported. These journeys are also unnecessary, as those making these crossings are coming from safe countries, such as France, where they could have claimed asylum. I say respectfully to the right reverend Prelate that that is surely the fundamental issue.
While the Government have made progress towards stopping the boats—with small boat crossings down by a third in 2023, while the numbers of illegal migrants entering some European countries have risen by 80%—we still need to do more. By delivering our key partnership, relocating people to Rwanda and not allowing them to stay in the UK, we will prevent people making these dangerous crossings, and we will save lives.
I thank the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford for tabling Amendment 91, but we do not think it is necessary. It is clear from the evidence pack that the Government published on Thursday 11 January, and from the treaty itself, that Article 15 of the treaty enhances the role of the independent monitoring committee, ensuring that obligations under the treaty are adhered to in practice. I am sorry that I will be going over some old ground, but, as my noble friend Lord Howard pointed out, this is not dissimilar to some earlier amendments.
We have repeatedly made clear that the monitoring committee will have the power to set its own priority areas for monitoring, unfettered access for the purposes of completing assessments and reports, and the ability to publish these reports as it sees fit. Crucially, the monitoring committee will undertake real-time monitoring of the partnership for at least the first three months. This period of monitoring can be extended if required. The monitoring committee will be able to urgently escalate issues prior to any shortcomings or breaches placing a relocated individual at real risk of harm. This will include reporting directly to the joint committee co-chairs within 24 hours in emergency or urgent situations.
To expand on the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, I also refer the right reverend Prelate to my remarks earlier. Article 4.1 of the treaty sets out clearly that it is for the UK to determine the timing of a request for relocation of individuals under the terms of the agreement, and the number of such requests made. This means that the Government would not be obligated to remove individuals under the terms of the treaty if there had been, for example, an unexpected change to the in-country situation in Rwanda. As is the case in many scenarios, the Government would be able to respond and adapt as necessary and there is therefore no need to include a sunset provision as suggested.
Rwanda has a long history of supporting and integrating asylum seekers and refugees in the region; for example, through its work with the UNHCR to host the emergency transit mechanism. A specific example of Rwanda’s successful work with the UNHCR is the memorandum of understanding between Rwanda and the UNHCR to host a transit facility in Gashora for asylum seekers fleeing civil war in Libya, which has operated since 2019.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, is correct: if the agreement is not extended beyond the date he mentioned, in effect, it dies. Rwanda has a strong history—