Elections Bill

Lord Scriven Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Monday 21st March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

Can the noble Baroness explain where the Electoral Commission by itself said that voter ID was required? Or was it responding to options that were put before it in terms of what it saw as the best form of voter ID? Does the noble Baroness have the evidence to say that the Electoral Commission has said of its own volition that voter ID is required?

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I am sorry that I do not have chapter and verse with me, but the Electoral Commission has called for voter ID since 2014. As I said, Northern Ireland has used it for nearly 40 years.

I find it quite extraordinary that polling station procedures in Great Britain are virtually the same today as they were when I started voting 50 years ago. It is quite remarkable.

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[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness says we are not comparing like with like, and I completely agree. I drew no parallels with the wearing of identity badges in this building or, indeed, many other buildings; many corporate organisations require this for their own internal security purposes. That is completely different from engaging in certain acts, whether it be going into certain buildings as an outsider or carrying out daily tasks such as collecting parcels. I am suggesting that it is perfectly ordinary to propose using it when going to election polling stations to cast one’s vote.

Northern Ireland has used photo ID for more than 20 years with no problems. Indeed, Northern Ireland electors are happier with their elections than the rest of the UK. To the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, I say that there has been no harm done in using voter ID in photo form in Northern Ireland at all—no recorded harm whatever. The issue that we should focus on is how to facilitate voting by those who do not already possess the kinds of photo ID that are allowed for in the Bill. The Government’s latest estimate—there are higher estimates from earlier studies—is that this applies to 2% of the population. That is roughly a million electors, which is a lot of people, but the Government have already successfully piloted a scheme of voter cards.

There is no evidence from the pilots of an impact on different communities, although there has been a lot of speculation throughout today and our previous Committee days on which particular groups will be affected. I am sure that there will be local issues in local areas, which is why—

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

The Electoral Commission’s analysis of the 2019 pilots showed that people in the compulsory voter ID pilot, after the ballot, had a 69% satisfaction rate with the poll, compared to 77% of those outside the photo ID pilot. Why, if it did not cause a problem, does the noble Baroness think that satisfaction was less in the pilot area than in the non-pilot areas?

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I cannot answer that question, but the purpose of pilots is to find out what practical problems there are with major policies, and it was good practice on the Government’s part to have various different pilots to find out the sorts of issues that might arise.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

But if the basis of this, as the Government keep saying, is to increase the public’s satisfaction and the ballot integrity, why is it that 69% versus 77% think that that did not happen?

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I do not think the only metric is how satisfied people were. The most important thing is how comfortable people are with the integrity of the voting system. Just being satisfied with the first rollout of something is not going to give you the final answer. It is right to let local authorities, who know about their local electorates, work out how to reach these hard-to-reach communities. It is right to enlist civil society groups to do the same, as well as political parties, which should know their local areas and know how best to do it.

We know there will be some teething problems, and some voters may not bring the right voter ID with them the first time they come. But according to both the Electoral Commission and the Association of Electoral Administrators, this happened to a very small degree during the pilots. As I said earlier, pilots are there to find problems so that they can be overcome. I hope that noble Lords will stand back and look at these reforms—

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[Lord Adonis (Lab)]

If I may intervene, I knew where the pilots had taken place, but they were not nearly proportionate to the scale of the reforms being introduced. We do not know anything about their likely impact on voter turnout or the administrative issues that will be raised by the nationwide introduction of this reform. The very small, selective pilots were not even in representative areas. The issue of piloting is still very much there. If this is to be a nationwide reform—we are talking about parliamentary elections—this should be piloted in many constituencies before we move in this direction.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

Is it not the case that this has not been piloted before a general election? The Electoral Commission specifically says that there should be a pilot before it is ruled out for a general election.

[Lord Adonis (Lab)]

That is a fundamental point. They were piloted in local elections. The scale of the pilots has not been nearly proportionate to the scale of the proposed reform.

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[Lord Scriven (LD)]

My Lords, at Second Reading, my noble friend Lord Rennard, who unfortunately cannot be here today, drew attention to the Government’s negligence in trying to assess the scale of the problem that they say they seek to address. He pointed out that anyone attending a polling station who finds that their vote may have been claimed by someone else is issued with a replacement, known as a tendered ballot paper. He has been pressing the Government for some years to collate and publish the information about how many of these ballot papers are issued, and tried again recently with a Written Question.

Unfortunately, the Government would not answer, even though they know the figures. Fortunately, the independent Electoral Commission publishes them. There are several reasons why such tendered ballot papers might be issued, apart from someone impersonating a voter. The most common reason is probably a clerical error in the polling station when the wrong name is crossed off by mistake. At the last general election, 32,014,110 ballot papers were issued across the UK in 38,812 polling stations. The total number of tendered ballot papers was just 1,341. That is 0.004% of the total number of ballot papers issued—just two tendered ballot papers for each of the 650 constituencies, or one for every 30 polling stations. Most are probably issued because of clerical error or for reasons other than personation.

Clause 1 is all about a supposed solution to a problem that simply does not exist, or that the Government have been unable to show exists. At Second Reading, the Minister clearly stated that this was not about the precautionary principle to prevent voting error. I asked the Minister to reiterate: is this not the precautionary principle? If not, where is the evidence that the problem is so big that the clause’s provision is proportionate to deal with the problem?

I have also looked back at the opening remarks of the noble Lord, Lord True, at Second Reading. He said:

“Voter ID is used across the world, including in most European countries and in Canada.”—[Official Report, 23/2/22; col. 2228.]


He did not say that those European countries had compulsory national ID cards, meaning that no additional ID is required other than that which citizens have to carry as part of being citizens of those countries. We do not have such national ID cards and the Government are opposed to them. In Canada, a photo ID card is issued to Canadians who do not have a driving licence, thereby serving as a national ID card, and in Canada you do not need that ID to vote if you do not have it to hand, provided someone with such ID is also present at the polling station and vouches for you.

The Government have pointed to Northern Ireland, which requires voter ID, although it has a significantly different political culture that made that necessary. Northern Ireland introduced mandatory ID in 1985 in response to what happened in the 1983 general election. Nearly 1,000 people arrived at polling stations there only to be told that a vote had already been cast in their name. Police made 149 arrests for personation, resulting in 104 prosecutions. In contrast, in Great Britain, in two national elections in 2019, there was only one conviction for personation and one caution, both of which related to the European Parliament election of that year.

It should also be noted that Northern Ireland did not move immediately to require photographic ID. Elections took place there for almost 20 years with a less stringent ID requirement. The first election there to require voter ID was the 2003 Northern Ireland Assembly election. Estimates have shown that about 25,000 voters did not vote because they did not have the required ID. That is more than 1,000 per constituency. Furthermore, almost 3,500 people, 2.3% of the electorate, were initially turned away for not presenting the required ID. It took more than 12 years—I repeat, 12 years—for turnouts to return to previous levels; other factors were, of course, involved relating to political controversy in Northern Ireland.

We have very limited information about the effects of introducing any form of voter ID from pilots in just 15 out of over 400 local council elections in England, but all the information suggests that many more legitimate voters were unable to cast votes than there were people who needed replacement ballot papers. Extrapolating from these 15 pilots to around 450 local authorities suggests that perhaps 30,000 legitimate voters could have been turned away from polling stations, to say nothing of the number of people who did not attempt to vote because of the requirements.

The proposals in Part 1 of the Bill are in response to one conviction and one caution in 2019, with hardly anyone finding that their vote could have been stolen and, in any event, all were compensated with a replacement ballot paper. After the voter ID pilots, the independent Electoral Commission said that more work was needed to make sure that an identification requirement did not stop people who are eligible and want to vote in future elections. That is why Clause 1 should not stand part of this Bill.

[Lord Adonis (Lab)]

My Lords, the speech that we have just heard from the noble Lord was utterly compelling. Indeed, he gave the House a detail that I was not aware of about the impacts of compulsory voter ID in Northern Ireland; I do not think that the House was aware either. In the case of Northern Ireland—I remember the discussions that took place in government at the time—the evidence of voter personation was at a level completely out of proportion to what we are dealing with here in the case of elections in Great Britain. But if, as the noble Lord says, it took 10 years to get voter participation up—

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

It was 12 years.

[Lord Adonis (Lab)]

That should be a matter of huge concern. In an extraordinarily un-Conservative statement earlier, the noble Baroness said that voting in the way that we used to vote 50 years ago is somehow bad and means that we are not keeping up with modern times. If we applied that principle to every other aspect of life that works well we would be seeking to change everything for the sake of it—something I imagined she thought this side of the House was seeking to do.

A combination of those two great Gladstonian reforms, the Ballot Act 1872 and the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act 1883, has maintained a level of integrity in the conduct of elections in this country that most of the rest of the world finds awe-inspiring. The idea that people look at the United Kingdom and say that, among all the democracies—let alone other regimes—there is great doubt about the integrity of our election outcomes and people are constantly concerned that ballots might be being stuffed and all that, is so far removed from reality that it is obviously a farcical proposition.

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[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, applications for the free card will be available up to 5 pm on the day before, as has been said. I note what the noble Lord has said, and I will take away what he and the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, have said but our submission is that the time to apply for the card is satisfactory at the moment and anyone who is turned away initially on the day of vote can return. As a matter of fact, at the last election in which I took part, which certainly was not a general election, I was turned away. The returning officer said: “We are too busy at the moment. We have a technical problem, can you come back later?” I went back later in the day. People can return, and I did.

It was also pointed out, and this is correct, that the provision is backed by leading international election observers such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. It has repeatedly called for its introduction, saying its absence is a security risk. Many people would question why it is not already the case. In fact, as my noble friend said last week, the 2021 Electoral Commission winter tracker report was clear that the majority of the public—66%—say that a requirement to show identification at polling stations would make them more confident in the security of the voting system.

The choice of photographic identification as the model has been questioned by noble Lords. Put simply, it is the most secure and familiar way of confirming that someone is who they say they are. It is true that a number of different models of voter identification were trialled as part of the pilots undertaken by the Government in 2018 and 2019. However, when evaluating the security strengths and weaknesses of each pilot model, the Electoral Commission found that

“the photo ID only model has the greatest security strengths compared with the other models.”

On the basis of those evaluations, it was clear that the most secure and appropriate approach was photographic identification.

Many noble Lords in the debate raised questions about the practical implications of selecting this model. Obviously, as we go forward in co-operation into the face of implementation, the Government will carefully consider all the points that have been raised. The Government understand this and want to prepare the system as well as possible. This is why we considered the absolute maximum range of identifications that could be accepted for the policy. Using the Government’s Verify security scale, we opted for level 2 and then considered this against the widest possible range of documents which would meet that assessment. Should other forms of photographic identification meet that level of security in the future, the Government will be able to add them through the power inserted into Rule 37 by paragraph 18 of Schedule 1 to the Bill. This will ensure that the list remains up to date and is as accessible as possible going forward.

We commissioned a nationally representative survey of over 8,500 electors in Great Britain. This found that 98% of people have access to an accepted form of photographic identification, including 99% of people from ethnic minorities and young people aged 18 to 29. We need to reach all those others, which is why a free card is being offered and the Electoral Commission will be entering into a publicity process to ensure, with the Government, that that is known. Some 94% of the people surveyed felt that having to present a photo identification at the polling station would either make it easier to vote or make no difference.

Voter identification is a proven approach and although I heard what the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, said, in addition to the provision made for Northern Ireland by the last Labour Government, it is in place in most European countries and also in countries such as Canada which do not have compulsory national identity cards. Whether noble Lords like it or not, Northern Ireland is a comprehensive empirical example of the introduction of photographic identification in the UK. We know that it operates there with ease. It has brought real benefit to the democratic process, and Northern Ireland consistently reports high rates of confidence in the outcome of elections. The 2019 Electoral Commission post-election questionnaire reported that 83% of voters in Northern Ireland found it

“very easy to participate in the elections”

as opposed to 78% in Great Britain.

I trust that that sets out some of the underlying principles, but when developing this policy we of course completed all the required impact and equality impact assessments. A team of analysts produced detailed cost and benefit modelling, published in the impact assessment, as is typical for such a government programme. They incorporated high and low ranges to account for uncertainty and conducted sensitivity analysis to test the most sensitive and impactful assumptions, such as the percentage of the electorate requiring a voter card. If any noble Lord would like to explore details of the impact assessment with officials who have been involved in doing it—I know the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, is interested in that—I would be very happy to arrange for them to meet the Bill team to discuss it.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

My Lords, I do not need to meet the Bill team. The impact assessment that the Minister signed off on 20 January this year says very clearly on page 30, paragraph 18, on this specific policy, on Clause 1 on mandatory photo ID:

“The analysis does not assess the impact of the policy on voter turnout.”


There has been no assessment in the impact assessment of the voter turnout and this clause.

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I am sorry that the noble Lord does not wish to meet members of the Bill team and I am very happy to repeat that offer.

So far as the noble Lord’s point is concerned, my noble friend answered that point explicitly—indeed, the noble Lord referred to it. An impact assessment is an economic assessment. It did not deal with turnout. As the noble Lord well knows—he has campaigned often enough, as I have—turnout is affected by a very large range of factors. I will give way once more to the noble Lord.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

I think it is important for the Committee to understand this because the noble Lord has said something at the Dispatch Box which they will find is slightly different when they look at the impact assessment. The impact assessment looks at non-monetary and non-economic issues to do with policies all over this Bill. It specifically says about this policy that it has not looked at voter turnout. This is not just an economic assessment—it is an assessment of the monetary and non-monetary effects of the Bill, including voter turnout.

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, it covers economic, equality and other assessments. If I misspoke, I apologise. I say for the third time what my noble friend said last week and I have said—the Government did not cover turnout. I have not sought to hide that fact because the factors that affect turnout are very wide and cannot be distinguished. Of course, analysis should not remain static, and I take that point. As we move towards implementation, I say to the Committee that we will continue to make sure that the evidence base remains up to date in terms of costings and will refine the modelling and assumptions. This is standard practice and will address the economic points.

I repeat that year-on-year turnout comparisons cannot be accurately estimated due to the volatility of the electoral cycle. As I have said, a huge variety of disparate factors play a part in whether someone chooses to vote in any particular election, from the appeal of candidates standing to personal circumstances on the day. An attempt to draw conclusions would be difficult.

In this vein, I note Amendment 142 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, on post-legislative scrutiny, which has not been addressed in this group yet. I appreciate that she has not had the opportunity to speak to it, but I will reply to the amendment. The Bill already provides for an evaluation of the impacts of voter identification at the first two general elections to which it applies and the first stand-alone set of local council elections. I am pleased to say that we intend to go further and produce a process and impact evaluation of the programme and its implementation across all policy measures. I hope that this reassures the noble Baroness that our aims on this are aligned. However, I repeat what I said in an earlier group: I remain open to further conversations on this point in relation to post-legislative scrutiny. I give that undertaking to the Committee.

Finally, in the same spirit of increasing participation in our democracy and empowering those eligible to vote to do so in a secure and effective way, Clause 2 introduces an online absent vote application service and an online voter card application service. As it stands, there is no facility for electors to make an online application to get a postal vote or proxy vote. Electors must have a paper form which they complete and submit to the electoral registration officer. Here the Government are seeking to encourage participation, because in an increasingly digital world, providing an online service for applications must increase accessibility. I assure the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, that his fears are unfounded. It will certainly be possible to apply for the voter card and the registration at the same time, just as one can in applying for a postal vote.

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[Lord True (Con)]

No—we do not believe that the amendment is necessary, but the noble Lord is anticipating the next group. I am replying to noble Lords and assuring the Committee that I am advised that the noble Lord’s fears are entirely unfounded and that voters will be able to apply for both at the same time.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

That is very well and good but coming back to the impact assessment, on applying for absent votes, paragraph 117 says:

“The requirement for identity verification as a part of the online application process for absent votes could deter some voters from voting … This may impact the integrity of the elections as it may lead to lower turnout”.


Why would such a policy be implemented, with that in the impact assessment?

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I repeat that we believe that, in an increasingly digital world, where the introduction of digital services can be done securely, providing an online service for applications increases accessibility. That is our submission, and I think that would be regarded as logically correct by most people who turn on their internet in the morning.

These powers will enable the identity of applicants using the new services to be verified, as well as identity checking for other absent voter applications.

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[Lord Scriven (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak first to my Amendment 66A and, in so doing, I draw the Committee’s attention to my entry in the register, particularly my interest as a vice-president of the Local Government Association. I see this as what I call a “two Ps” amendment: a probing amendment about the practicalities of what the Government are suggesting. I thank Solace, the Society of Local Authority Chief Executives, for the wide and helpful briefing that it sent about this. It is important that we consider this briefing, because many of those chief executives are the returning officers in constituencies up and down the country.

The briefing talks about the impracticality of suggesting that the voter ID card can be applied for and supplied if people apply by 5 pm on the day before the poll takes place, which, as it points out, is inconsistent with every other form of voter application—whether it be for a postal or a proxy vote—unless it is a medical emergency. We talked about the practicalities of Northern Ireland and it is also inconsistent with Northern Ireland, where this is not allowed to happen until 5 pm on the day before the poll.

It is impractical because it places extra burdens on those administering an election at their busiest time: the week before the election. Anybody who has seen what happens in an electoral office a week before an election will understand that the administrators are already under great pressure to ensure the security and integrity of the election. To suggest that people can turn up until 5 pm on the day before the poll to seek one of these voter ID cards is impractical. The Government’s impact assessment suggests that 50% of people will apply by post and 50% will apply in person. It states that the closer you get to an election, the more people will apply in person. So people could be trying to sort out postal votes and ensuring that the ballot boxes and everything else are in place with queues of people seeking this ID.

In this respect, the Government’s impact assessment is detailed. It suggests that the cards will take approximately five to 10 minutes to produce, assuming that everybody has the things that they need to produce one. It suggests that there be one machine per constituency, which I think works out at just over two on average per local authority.

It is inconceivable that this requirement is practical. So I ask the Minister: why was the stipulation of 5 pm on the day before the poll selected; why is it not consistent with Northern Ireland; and, specifically, what discussion took place with Solace and other returning officers, who would have pointed out that this was impractical? If the Government did consult those who administer elections, what advice came back on the practicalities of delivering this?

I will now speak to some of the other amendments, particularly weighing in with my support for those to which my noble friend Lord Rennard has put his name. I will talk specifically about Amendments 64, 68, 78 and 80.

On Amendment 64, as the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, has mentioned on a number of occasions, it is absolutely vital that when people register to vote, they should be able at the same time, as an automatic right laid down in the Bill, to apply for the voter ID card. I see no practical reason why that should not happen. There is no practical reason why returning officers, Solace or anybody else who administers elections would say that is not consistent. So what would stop the Government allowing that to happen as an automatic right and including it in the Bill?

Amendment 68 is important because it comes back to the powers of the Secretary of State, which we have talked about a lot. The Secretary of State could, by decree, by the stroke of their pen, decide what documentation is or is not available. I shall come in a second to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Willetts, which is really important. I see no reason for that provision.

Amendment 78 is also important. The noble Lord, Lord True, has on many occasions referenced Canada having voter ID. It is absolutely not true to say that to vote in Canada, you have to have voter ID. If you turn up without voter ID, there is a system called vouching. Somebody can vouch for you, if they have some ID, to say that you are the person who you say you are and they vouch for your identification.

I see no practical reason why that should not happen if this clause stands part of the Bill. It is sensible, it is not unknown across the world, it is practical and it happens. In Canada, it does not happen significantly, but it happens. As many people have said, if somebody turns up without their voter ID at 9.55 pm with their spouse, friend or loved one, I see no reason why that person could not vouch for them.

The Minister mentioned people turning up to a polling station and being asked to return, as he was. For some people, that is impractical. If you work 12-hour shifts and are going just before you start work, you cannot turn back. For people with childcare responsibilities, it may be impractical or impossible to do that. That is why, if you turn up without your ID but with somebody else who has some ID, vouching on the Canadian system should be allowed. I see no reason why it should not. It does not undermine the integrity of the ballot. Somebody who has the appropriate ID could vouch for somebody who has not whom they know. There is then a way of checking, if there is personation by the second person, who the person has vouched for—but there is no evidence in Canada that that actually happens.

I come to the most powerful and important intervention in the debate on this group, which was from the noble Lord, Lord Willetts. He made it very clear as a member of the Conservative Party who sits on the Conservative Benches exactly what was in both the 2017 and the 2019 Conservative manifestos: that voter ID would be required. Neither manifesto used the word “photographic”. That is key in terms of the Salisbury convention and the Conservatives being able to carry out their manifesto commitment. In terms of providing extra ID, the noble Lord, Lord Willetts, showed a practicality and pragmatism that I would expect his Front Bench to replicate. If not, the cat is out of the bag. The noble Lord, Lord Willetts, is trying to make it as easy as possible, if this provision comes in, for people to exercise their democratic right to vote.

If the Government, from the Front Bench, refuse to accept that mandatory photographic ID is not required to vote, then they will be saying that they will be making it as difficult as possible for people to exercise their vote. This is the litmus test. We must all listen to the answer to this particular set of amendments.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Willetts, not just for his amendment but for making it very clear that the Conservatives would be carrying out their manifesto commitment without introducing photo ID.

[Lord Desai (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I shall make a very short point about Amendment 80. The noble Lord should look carefully at whether many of these indicators are male-oriented. Women do not have their names on documents such as mortgage statements and utility bills. It would make more sense to have one particular card, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, suggested. It would be personal, in the name of the man or woman.

I want to add that I have my Freedom Pass in London. It is a very good thing. I could show it around.

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[Lord True (Con)]

Certainly, I would hope and intend for that to be the case. I am not writing the regulations personally. I am not the Minister in DLUHC which administers this. I shall certainly pass on the views of the Committee. I reassure the Committee that this is absolutely in the spirit of making life simpler for registration officers. It is certainly the Government’s wish that people should be able to do this. It is not necessarily their intention that everyone should get a voter card—only those who need one. All the other types of identification currently listed in the Bill will be accepted.

Of course, we have undertaken extensive engagement with the electoral sector about this, including with Solace, with civil society organisations, and with those representing the kind of groups to which the right reverend Prelate referred. This is a rolling engagement in order to inform them of the proposals, to gather feedback on the plans and to identify ways to ensure our implementation plans are clear, comprehensive and inclusive for all electors. This engagement continues as officials refine implementation plans. They will be listening to what is said in your Lordships’ House, with a focus on exploring many of the aspects that noble Lords have raised, such as the needs of particular groups and the best ways of communicating.

New Section 13BD is worded specifically so that a person does not have to wait until a registration application has been determined before applying for the card. They can do both at the same time, but they have to be on the register first. In practice, this means that the applications can be put in at the same time.

I turn to the specific amendments. I have partly addressed Amendment 64. I understand precisely where the noble Baroness is coming from. I fully accept that she was quite right to raise that point. I hope that I have been able to give some reassurance.

We do not believe that Amendments 65 to 69 are necessary. They provide for powers that are already in the Bill and make suggestions that are already part of the policy, although not ones requiring legislative definition. I set out some of the policy intentions earlier. They were clearly stated in the voter identification policy statement, published on 6 January.

On Amendment 65, new Section 13BD(10)(a) enables the Government to make provision about the form of a document, including digital. I note that this probing amendment says that it should be in digital form.

On Amendment 66, new Section 13BD(4)(b) enables the Government to make regulations about how cards will be issued, including by post and so on and so forth. We will make sure that this is in the record. I fully accept that these things need to be covered.

Amendment 67 asks about date of issue. The card would have a date. New Section 13BD(9) is about the power to make regulations on what information will be on the document. The noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, is not in her place. The additional kinds of information referred to in that section of the schedule is precisely to allow for something like the date or name of the issuing local authority. They will have different local authority names, so one cannot have a single card. These are the kinds of additional points. In reply to Amendment 68, spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, it is certainly envisaged that the date of issue of the card will be on it.

I thank the noble Baroness again for putting forward Amendments 70 to 73. For noble Lords who are not sure which amendments I am talking about, these are probing amendments concerning the arrangements that will be in place for anonymous electors. I can certainly confirm that officials have carried out extensive engagement with various civil society groups that highlighted their interest in anonymous voting arrangements. This is important. In developing the clauses, an extensive consultation has also been carried out with the AEA on how we could make the provision work effectively for anonymous voters.

I assure the noble Baroness that we share a joint aim. There may be a relatively small number of people here but they are very vulnerable, important people. We share a joint aim that those who rely on anonymity—including some people who have been subjected to the most vile abuse and violence imaginable—will not be negatively impacted by the changes. The Government recognise that there are electors who need to register and vote anonymously for a variety of reasons; I have referred to the kinds of circumstances in which other vulnerable electors may not wish for their name or location to be available on the register.

Anonymous electors who wish to vote in person at a polling station will be able to apply for an anonymous elector document, which will enable effective verification of identity while also protecting the voter’s anonymity. We believe that the changes proposed by Amendments 70 and 71 might undermine the objectives of the voter identification policy. Removing the photograph from the anonymous elector document, for instance, would make anonymous electors, often some of the most vulnerable members of society, potentially an easier target for anyone seeking to commit fraud.

Amendments 72 and 73 propose regulation-making powers relating to the application process for anonymous elector documents and to the exact materials used in the manufacture of those documents. The powers that Amendment 72 provides for are already in the Bill. I have not been advised on which particular clause but I will let the noble Baroness know; I did say to my faithful team, who are absolutely wonderful, that it would be helpful to the House if I were able to give details of clauses when responding. For the reason I have given, the Government do not think that taking an inflexible approach to the production of documents, as set out in Amendment 73, is desirable. With those assurances, I ask that those amendments are not pressed.

Amendment 78 would introduce an attestation process for those without necessary identification. This was given very considerable thought by my colleagues during policy development. However, there is a risk that, if someone brings another elector to the poll, these provisions could be exploited by unscrupulous individuals and might allow a ballot paper to be issued to a person who claims to be somebody else, or who is ineligible to vote in an election. The issues are balanced but we have concluded that any form of attestation would be an unacceptable avenue for this kind of fraud, undermining the core aim of promoting electoral integrity; so, after reflection, it is not something that the Government can support.

As I said earlier, photographic voter identification is, in our submission—and as agreed by the Electoral Commission—the most secure way to prove that someone is who they say they are. On Amendment 66A from the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, our aim is that electors without accepted photographic identification will, as he says, be able to apply for a voter card from their local authority until 5 pm the day before polling day. The noble Lord wishes to have a cut-off date four and a half days earlier. We do not, on the basis of our discussions, think that that is desirable or necessary. Given the great importance that the Committee rightly attaches to the ability to vote, we would like to be more liberal in our approach to making the voter card more readily available. Agreeing to restrict the amount of time for which it was available would not be a step forward; I therefore ask the noble Lord not to press that amendment.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

Will the Minister clarify one issue? Why is the provision to allow an application up until 5 pm on the day before the election considered to be consistent with Northern Ireland? It is not consistent with Northern Ireland. when speaking to electoral officers, what factors suggested that having those extra four days would make it practical to deliver this in the way that the Government are suggesting?

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, we believe on the basis of our discussions that it is, and should be, practical. Whether or not you agree with the policy, it should surely be desirable that the card be made available up to the latest possible moment.

Amendments 79 to 81 relate to the range of identity documents; my noble friend Lord Willetts came out with a very long list. As I said on the previous group, the list of acceptable documents in the Bill was drawn up against the widest possible range of documents that would meet strong standards of security. That is the conclusion that we have reached. The Electoral Commission said that photo-only identification had the greatest security value but, as I said on the previous group—and it is there on page 81, lines 24 and 25 of the Bill—other documents may be added. However, for the reasons of security that I gave on the previous group and give again, we do not believe that the list should be extended in the way that my noble friend suggests, and we therefore cannot support this amendment.

We also see little merit in Amendment 63—which I should have referred to—proposing an annual statement from the Secretary of State on numbers of documents issued. Only individual local authorities will have the complete set of cards issued, as they will not be issued centrally. When the Electoral Commission does the post-operative examination of what happened, I am sure that it will consider those figures.

On Amendments 83 and 84, I am pleased to say that, as set out in paragraph 22 of Schedule 1, we already intend that returning officers, through their polling station staff, will record and collate information on anyone who applies for the issue of a ballot paper and is refused. This will be set out in secondary legislation, and we are working on the details with the Electoral Commission and returning officers. Of course, the polling station will already have informed the person concerned that they have been refused a ballot paper and why, so we think that a letter is an unnecessary further step. As I said, secondary legislation will cover this point.

In the light of this, these amendments would ultimately either duplicate or extend processes which are provided for in the Bill—making them either unnecessary or unacceptable to the Government—while only increasing the administrative burden on the electoral sector; for example, an enormous list of documents might do that in itself. For this reason and the other reasons mentioned, I beg that these amendments are not pressed.

I gave a long response, as this is quite a large group. I hope that I have managed to address at least the main points that were made.