European Union Referendum Bill
Lord Scott of Foscote Excerpts(9 years, 1 month ago)
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Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)
My Lords, I rise to support the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer. We had a good debate about this in Committee and I think we established rather clearly that there is in fact no difference of principle on this matter between those who supported the amendment and the Minister who opposed it. His party has a manifesto commitment, which I am sure it is going to fulfil, to introduce legislation in this Parliament to give the vote to precisely the people we are talking about; that is, people who have been living abroad for more than 15 years. Admittedly, he is going to do that erga omnes and not just for those in the European Union, but there seems to me to be no difference of principle between us.
Nor does this amendment cross in any sense the line that has been frequently prayed in aid in previous debates—that this is a referendum which British people should be deciding. These people are British. They hold British passports and they are our citizens. The reason to give them the vote is that we are having a referendum which could fundamentally affect a large amount of the way in which they live. It could affect their healthcare arrangements, their ability to travel freely, their social coverage, their jobs and the way their children are treated. This is a huge range of things that could and will be affected if by any chance—mischance, in my view—the electorate votes to withdraw from the European Union. Yet the Government, who want these people to have the vote and believe that they are rightly going to be given the vote under their own proposals to be brought forward later in this Parliament, feel that they should not have it in the one vote which they really mind about. They are probably not all that interested in voting in our parliamentary, municipal and other elections, but they jolly well are interested in this referendum because their interests are at stake.
It would be really good if the Government could take a deep breath and say, “Yes, we agree that these people should have the vote because that is what our manifesto says, and we agree that this referendum vote matters more to them than anything else”. The Government have been saying for years now that the people must have their say. Did they really mean to exclude British citizens living elsewhere in the EU from having their say when their interests will be affected? I hope that we can move ahead with the amendment. Not only does it have logic and consistency on its side—two qualities which were given a rather hard time in the previous debate—it has common sense on its side as well.
Lord Scott of Foscote (CB)
My Lords, I rise to support this amendment as strenuously as I can, very much for the reasons already given by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay. I have a personal interest which I must declare. I have a daughter who lives in Spain with her English husband. Both were born in England and are English through and through. They have both always held English passports. They met in Spain, married and have two sons, both of whom hold British passports. All those members of my family are British, but they live in Spain under the arrangements made whereby the citizens of one EU country have the right to live anywhere in the EU. They have been in Spain for well over 15 years. The eldest of my grandsons is now 18 and at university, not in Spain but in the Netherlands, for reasons I do not quite understand. At any rate, they have been living in Spain for more than 15 years on the footing that they have the right to do so.
If the referendum required this country to leave the EU, that would create the problem that I am referring to, but to say that they should not have the right to vote in the referendum, given the interest and importance to them of this country remaining in the EU, seems quite unacceptable. I therefore wholeheartedly support this amendment.
Civil Proceedings and Family Proceedings Fees (Amendment) Order 2015
Lord Scott of Foscote Excerpts(9 years, 9 months ago)
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Lord Scott of Foscote (CB)
My Lords, I had prepared a speech in support of the amendment of my noble friend Lord Pannick. However, having regard to the speeches that your Lordships have already heard from not only the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, but from the noble Lords, Lord Beecham and Lord Marks, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, I will confine myself to asking four questions of the Minister.
First, does the Minister agree that respect for the rule of law by at least the majority of those living in this country is an essential requirement if this country is to continue to rank as a civilised country in which it is a pleasure and a privilege to live? Secondly, does he also agree that those who for reasons of lack of necessary funds are denied access to justice in our courts cannot expect to have or to retain respect for the rule of law? Thirdly, if the Minister agrees with those two previous questions, which seem to me self-evident, how can he justify increasing the cost of litigation to a level that will deny access to justice to a large number of people? The fourth question arises out of the terms of Section 92(3) of the Courts Act 2003, which states that in setting fee levels,
“the Lord Chancellor must have regard to the principle that access to the courts must not be denied”.
Does the Minister accept that principle? If he does, as I am sure is the case, how does he justify a fee of as much as £10,000 for the commencement of a civil action? If he does not accept that principle, how does he justify his retention as a Minister in the office of the Lord Chancellor?
Lord Phillips of Sudbury (LD)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for tabling this amendment, which I believe is very important—although I note that only those who are speaking are present tonight. I declare an interest as the founder and president of the Citizenship Foundation, a national charity which seeks to prepare young people in our schools for the life they are to lead beyond them by giving them a broad and very basic understanding of the laws of our land. I am also a co-founder of the Legal Action Group, which is to this day a tower of strength in seeking to advance and protect legal aid. The group is fairly desperate about this order, I have to say.
I accept that it is extremely difficult for my noble friend to have to move the Motion on this order tonight. I know him to be as concerned about equal justice as anybody. I also readily accept that the Government have a lousy task in seeking to balance the national books in a way that does not cause mayhem all round. But having said all that, like others I believe that if ever the word “fundamental” is justified, it is justified in regard to protection of the rule of law and equal justice. I maintain that we cannot claim to be a proud democracy which upholds the rule of law when we know that so many of our fellow countrymen cannot access the laws that we in Parliament legislate for them. Knowing that as we do—there is no lack of evidence on that—it strikes me as being almost a case of defrauding the public for us to go on as we do, enacting legislation for which we make all sorts of claims while knowing that so many of our countrymen will not get near to exercising those rights. That is why all of us have spoken so passionately. We all know that the law is now so voluminous, hypercomplex and intrusive that to pretend that poor or middling citizens do not have need of access to lawyers and the courts is just cloud-cuckoo-land. Indeed, quite a bit of research has been done recently into citizens’ need for legal services and access to justice. That comes up with a figure of about one-third of the population being in that bracket.
I must also agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, who very pertinently observed that we must all have been asleep when Clause 180 of the then Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill was enacted. This was an astonishing clause and I do not think that anyone in this House really had a go at it. Yet how can one conceivably agree to a principle that we make a profit out of justice? How can that have gone through this place? Indeed, I wonder whether it is a provision that could withstand oversight of the courts on human rights grounds, quite apart from those being advanced on behalf of the Law Society; I am very happy to see that my professional body is doing that.
Section 180 of the 2014 Act makes no reference to justice at all. Subsection (3) says that,
“the Lord Chancellor must have regard to … the financial position of the courts … and … the competitiveness of the legal services market”.
Subsection (6) says that the surplus made from increased fees—those parts of them that are intended to generate a profit—must go, as my noble friend Lord Marks said, to improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the system of our courts and tribunals. There is nothing to do with the justice of the system. At no point is there any reference to justice. It makes me wonder whether there might be some defect there in terms of basic law. I may have to reinstruct the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, as I used to about 40 years ago. I hope he will give me the same jolly opinion.
Reference has already been made to Magna Carta by a number of speakers. I do not propose to make further reference to it, but we must accept that the cuts in legal aid made last year have knocked one-quarter off the legal aid budget, I believe. The ones that we are dealing with now will affect huge numbers of claims. The scale of the problem is that there are currently 235,000 claims for possession every year; 370,000 money claims via the court are potentially caught by this order; and there are 160,000 general applications in other proceedings.
One aspect of the Government’s impact assessment really caught my eye. Other noble Lords have made reference to it, but not to this set of facts. In one of the consultation documents we learn that the consultation took place in December and January—over Christmas and the new year. Is that not well designed to have a maximum response? The first question in the questionnaire is:
“What do you consider to be the equality impacts of the proposed fee increases (when supported by a remissions system) … ?”.
How many people do noble Lords suppose answered that first, key question? Seventy-six. It is verging on the scandalous to undertake the measures in this order on the basis of 76 respondents. And how many of them thought that the equality issue was adequately dealt with? Less than half. So you have 30-odd people and organisations approving of the central measure which is the subject of this order tonight.
Legal Aid
Lord Scott of Foscote Excerpts(10 years ago)
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Lord Faulks
It is important to emphasise that nothing will change under the criminal legal aid provisions. Everyone who is accused of a crime is entitled to legal aid. I agree with the noble Lord that the way in which criminal lawyers practise, as was reflected in the report by Sir Bill Jeffrey, will mean a certain agility on their part to make sure that they can continue to provide their very high standard in a more economic way.
Lord Scott of Foscote
Does the Minister agree that access to justice by citizens, either to enforce their legal rights or to defend themselves against claims made by others, is an essential ingredient in promoting and maintaining in this country a healthy respect for the rule of law? Does the Minister also accept that if an individual is unable on account of his impecuniosity to assert his claims or properly defend himself against claims made by others, the consequence will be a diminution in the respect which that individual has for the rule of law and a damage to the cohesion of the rule of law in the country as a whole? It has sometimes been said that the Ritz hotel is open to all, but of course it is open only to those with deep enough pockets. Would it not be a disgrace if the same could be said of the civil justice system in this country?
Lord Faulks
I of course entirely accept that access to justice is an important and fundamental part of the rule of law. Nevertheless, the country has to assess where best to spend the limited amount of resources on legal aid—on which, as I have said, we still spend a considerable amount of money. We will continue to review whether improvements can be made to this, and we will continue to review the situation depending on the financial state of the country.
Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill [HL]
Lord Scott of Foscote Excerpts(10 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Scott of Foscote (CB)
My Lords, I address your Lordships as a lawyer who is interested in the Bill, although in practice I did nothing in this particular field. The interest for me is provided only by a general interest in the law.
The problem with this area of the law is that it tries to deal with a situation in which two individuals, who know one another very well and have probably lived together for some time, are in dispute because their relationship has broken down. They have to come to decisions about what is to happen to them and to their respective lives, to their children—if they have any—and to the assets they have accumulated, because they are almost bound to have accumulated some. That happens at a time when their personal relationship has broken down. There is everything to be said for encouraging the use of prenuptial—and, indeed, post-nuptial—agreements, and everything to be said for making them. However, if they are to be made binding, it is essential that they be put in writing. If they are left as oral agreements, they will simply be another bone to be chewed over by the two parties: “I agreed this—you agreed that”. Long ago in this country it was decided that contracts for the disposition of an interest in land had to be put in writing. I am sure that those sorts of considerations were the reason for that. We have all become very accustomed to contracts that relate to land being in writing, and the same reasoning should apply to prenuptial and post-nuptial agreements; otherwise, they will be just another basis for further litigation between the disputing parties.
It has to be recognised that there is always a tension in deciding what the statutory framework should be for the management of the affairs of the disputing couple post marriage. There is a tension between certainty on the one hand and fairness on the other. Certainty can be achieved by careful drafting of legislation, but fairness depends on the circumstances of the individual case. However, individual cases and people are different, and people have different problems. The greater the certainty, the more likely that the rigidity of whatever the certain system is that has been decided upon will produce, in some cases, unfairness for one or other of the spouses. That is the justification for giving the judges the huge amount of discretion they have under the present statutory framework. Maybe that leads to more dispute and litigation than is desirable; maybe the judges should not have so much discretion. To introduce more certainty or cut down on the discretion would be at the expense of fairness. That is a very difficult balance to strike. The advantages of certainty will not solve satisfactorily all the problems, because the same answer does not necessarily produce fairness for everybody. That is a matter to be considered when one comes to look at the wording of the provisions in the Bill. Perhaps that is not a point for Second Reading, but it should always be borne in mind.
On the Second Reading question, it is clear that the Bill should have one. I join noble Lords in congratulating the noble Baroness on putting the Bill forward. It will require a lot of thought and attention in Committee, but there should certainly be a Second Reading, and there should certainly be agreements in writing. There is another provision in the Bill where agreements are referred to; all the agreements that are referred to in the Bill need to be in writing, so that there can be no dispute between the parties as to what they agreed.
Judicial Appointments Commission Regulations 2013
Lord Scott of Foscote Excerpts(11 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord McNally
That the draft regulations laid before the House on 20 June be approved.
Relevant document: 6th Report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, considered in Grand Committee on 22 July.
Lord Scott of Foscote
Before your Lordships pronounce on the satisfactory or unsatisfactory quality of these regulations, I have a point which I endeavoured to make when these Motions were debated in the Moses Room a week or so ago. It relates to the provision regarding the appointment of members of selection committees, whose job it will be, once the committees have been established, to deal with the applications for appointments to senior judicial roles. The arrangement is that senior judges—the president, the Lord Chief Justice, the Masters of the Rolls or whoever it may be—will have the power to nominate the members of these commissions. However, the regulations go on to say that, in the event that the Lord Chancellor of the day is of the opinion that the senior judge in question suffers from an incapacity—presumably an incapacity to discharge the role of nominating members of the commissions—somebody else has that power.
I am bound to say that, when I first read these regulations, I thought it was thoroughly unsatisfactory for a senior member of the Executive to have the power to pronounce on his or her belief in the incapacity of a senior judge to discharge a statutory function that would otherwise be exercisable by that judge. I made this point in the course of the debate in the Moses Room and, since then, the noble Lord, Lord McNally, has been kind enough to write me a letter about these points. He drew my attention to similar provisions that can be found in primary legislation—in particular, the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 but there was another Act that he referred to where similar provisions are to be found. I was not aware of that. It is profoundly unsatisfactory that provisions of that sort allow a member of the Executive to remove powers from a senior judge on the Executive member’s belief in the incapacity of the judge to exercise those powers without any apparent necessity for the opinion to be backed up by medical evidence or psychiatric evidence. It is not consistent with the constitutional requirement of the separation of powers and I voice these objections now.
The sting is taken away by the fact that similar provisions have already found their way into primary legislation but, nonetheless, the existence of these provisions is unsatisfactory. I wish I had known that they were there in primary legislation. I would have taken the same objections at that stage. It is difficult to see why the opinion of a Lord Chancellor, who is not a medical person or necessarily even a lawyer, on the incapacity of a senior judge to exercise a particular statutory function should by itself be enough to relieve the individual of the power to exercise that function. The House should be aware of this matter before allowing these regulations into legislation. I am not proposing that the regulations should be voted down but the House should be aware of this. I regard it as unsatisfactory in principle and, up to a point, unconstitutional.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally)
My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott, goes even further than he did in Committee. These matters are not unconstitutional. Let me be clear that the role of the Lord Chancellor to determine the incapacity of the Lord Chief Justice and the President of the Supreme Court is not newly created by these regulations. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott, has acknowledged, this role is already set out in extant primary legislation. It is also true that these regulations come before the House after extensive discussions with the President of the Supreme Court and the Lord Chief Justice. The regulations have been examined in detail by the Justice Committee and I think by the Constitution Committee of this House—but I may be wrong on that. Certainly, they have gone through quite a thorough mincer of committees and they were discussed in Committee in the Moses Room.
The Lord Chancellor’s letter to the Scrutiny Committee set out in some detail why the normal procedure for determining incapacity of the Lord Chief Justice was not appropriate in these circumstances. In short, the heads of division who normally make this determination may themselves be applicants in the appointment process in question. Therefore, to ensure there is no perception of conflict of interest, they do not have a role. It may also be helpful if I explain why we consider it entirely appropriate for the Lord Chancellor to determine incapacity. The Lord Chancellor has a significant number of responsibilities through the process from requesting a panel is convened, determining the content of the panel’s report and, of course, making the final selection decision. The system is therefore reliant on the Lord Chancellor discharging a range of duties and powers appropriately. The Lord Chancellor, under Section 3 of the Constitutional Reform Act, also has a statutory duty to protect the independence of the judiciary. Therefore, if the Lord Chancellor were to determine incapacity where that was not in fact the case, this would be a breach of that duty. This means that in reality it is very likely that the Lord Chancellor would consult the relevant members of the judiciary to determine incapacity, but we do not consider it necessary to spell out the nature of that consultation in the regulations. That is particularly the case as relevant persons may be different in different circumstances.
As regards determining the Lord Chief Justice’s incapacity, it may be appropriate to consult him or her personally to determine whether, for example, the incapacity results from a planned operation; or it may be appropriate to consult the heads of division if they are not the subject of the appointments process in question. Alternatively, it may be appropriate to consult the President of the Supreme Court.
The role of the Lord Chancellor in determining incapacity is taken from extant primary legislation. We do not consider that the role gives rise to any risk of inappropriate behaviour, particularly as the Lord Chancellor could not, of course, do anything that would breach his overriding duty to protect the independence of the judiciary.
Judicial Appointments Commission Regulations 2013
Lord Scott of Foscote Excerpts(11 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Scott of Foscote
My Lords, perhaps I may express my agreement with the remarks made by my noble and learned friend Lord Hope of Craighead. I want to add a few words on the Supreme Court regulations relating to the manner in which believed incapacity is to be dealt with. As your Lordships will be aware, the regulations provide for the setting up of a selection commission, and various individuals are to be given the power to nominate other individuals for membership of that commission. One of the persons with the power to nominate such a person is the President of the Supreme Court. That is set out in Regulation 5:
“(1) The selection commission must consist of—(a) the Deputy President; (b) a senior UK judge nominated in accordance with regulation 7”.
Regulation 7 states that, unless paragraphs (2) or (3) of Regulation 5 apply, the President,
“must nominate a senior UK judge who is not disqualified under regulation 16”.
Paragraph (2) of Regulation 7 goes on to state that:
“Where—(a) the office of President is already vacant; or (b) it appears to the Lord Chancellor that the person holding the office of President is for the time being incapacitated, the Deputy President (unless the Deputy President is disqualified under regulation 16) must nominate a senior UK judge in accordance with paragraph (1) to sit on the selection commission”.
The believed incapacity puts out of the ring as a nominator the President and brings in the Deputy President. So far, so good, but the existence of the incapacity is simply dependent upon the opinion of the Lord Chancellor: it appears to the Lord Chancellor that the person holding the office of the President is, for the time being, incapacitated. One finds an echo of that in Regulation 14:
“(1) Unless paragraph (2) or (3) applies, the President— (a) must nominate a senior UK judge who is not disqualified under regulation 16”,
or,
“(2) Where—(a) the office of President is already vacant; or (b) it appears to the Lord Chancellor that the person holding the office of President is for the time being incapacitated, the Deputy President (unless the Deputy President is disqualified under regulation 16)”.
Under Regulation 16,
“A person is disqualified for the purposes of membership of a selection commission if it appears to the Lord Chancellor that that person is for the time being incapacitated from serving as a member of the selection commission”.
All these provisions depend on nothing other than the opinion of the Lord Chancellor “for the time being” that the individual is, using the language of the regulations, incapacitated. There appears to be no indication of whether the person concerned agrees with his or her believed incapacity, it is just the opinion of the Lord Chancellor that the incapacity exists and therefore someone else must be the nominator for the relevant purpose. I would suggest that that is profoundly unsatisfactory. There are provisions about incapacity in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. Section 16 provides that the Lord Chief Justice is incapacitated only if at least three of the four heads of division declare in writing that he is incapacitated. Section 36,
“applies if the Lord Chancellor is satisfied by means of a medical certificate that a person holding office as a judge of the Supreme Court—(a) is disabled by permanent infirmity from the performance of the duties of his office, and (b) is for the time being incapacitated from resigning his office”.
What does “incapacitated” mean? It depends on the opinion of the Lord Chancellor. One of the functions of the 2005 Act was to put an end to the believed impropriety inconsistent with the separation of powers of the highest court in the land being a part of the legislature—the Law Lords, as they then were. The impropriety of that was accepted by a number of people, and the Supreme Court was brought into existence to put an end to that conflict. However, this produces another conflict. So far as the regulation is concerned, the Executive, in the form of the Lord Chancellor, does not have to base his opinion on any medical evidence at all. The Lord Chancellor has the right to pronounce his belief in the incapacity of the President, the Deputy President or some other senior UK judge to act for the purposes of the selection commission that these regulations will set up. That itself seems to be inconsistent with the separation of powers—not, as before, the separation between the legislature and the judiciary but between the Executive and the judiciary. It appears to be a much more serious infringement of the doctrine of separation of powers than that which formerly existed when the Law Lords, as Members of this House, acted as the highest court of the land.
I wonder why relying on the opinion of the Lord Chancellor on these matters of incapacity, which must require somebody with a little medical or perhaps psychiatric knowledge to have a view, and without any indication that the individual who is thought incapacitated is having his or her opinion canvassed, should be thought to be an appropriate way of dealing with this situation. I would seriously suggest to the Government that it is a most improper way of dealing with the situation. The Lord Chancellor’s opinion should not be sufficient to declare somebody incapacitated, unless backed by a medical certificate—which would suffice—or by the concurrence of the heads of division or, so long as it was not the Lord Chief Justice’s position being considered, of the Lord Chief Justice. However, just relying on the opinion of the Lord Chancellor on a matter that would require some medical or psychiatric expertise seems to me to be offensive, unnecessary and something that should be remedied before these regulations are brought into effect.
Lord McNally
That is most certainly true. When I saw the noble and noble and learned Lords gathering, I should have known that this was not going to be an easy task. One of the great benefits of the House of Lords—those who know that I am an avid reformer should take note of this—is there are not many places where one could get such profound legal advice so cheaply. For that, I am extremely grateful to noble and noble and learned Lords. I would again ask that they pass these regulations, but with the firm promise that the points that have been raised will be drawn to the attention of the Lord Chancellor.
Lord Scott of Foscote
I hope that the noble Lord can clarify a matter for me. My understanding is that this has to go before the House, which must pass the affirmative resolution. The matter cannot be dealt with finally just by this Committee.
Lord McNally
It will go before the House where, I am sure, having listened to my explanations today, I will have at least a dozen strong supporters in favour of adopting these regulations.
Legal Aid
Lord Scott of Foscote Excerpts(11 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Scott of Foscote
My Lords, I join all noble Lords in thanking the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, for arranging this debate. I also thank noble Lords who have already spoken, because they have said virtually everything that could possibly be said. I support what they have said and have heard nothing with which I have disagreed.
The subplot to this debate about legal aid and proposed cuts is the rule of law and access to justice. Everyone in this Chamber would accept the importance of the rule of law in a civilised country. It depends on many features, one of which, of course, is access to justice for people who need to go to the courts. If they need to claim something they believe to be due to them, the courts are there for them—self-help is frowned on and criminalised in many cases. If they are defendants, the courts are there for them to reject the claims that they believe to be unjustified.
The rule of law requires that there be access to justice, but it has to be a reality and not just a constitutional theory. It used to be said that the Ritz was open to everyone, but of course it was not, as not everyone could afford to pay its charges. The courts theoretically at least are open to everyone, but to get in front of the courts now, whether as a claimant or as a defendant, you have to pay a fairly substantial sum up front.
I cannot remember how long ago it was—I think that it was when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, was Lord Chancellor—that the then Government introduced the notion that the civil justice system had to be self-financing, with substantial charges for commencing or defending an action or putting in a reply; practically any step you took in the action was subject to a fee. It was a relatively expensive matter to embark on litigation or to defend it. However, in those days, although the civil justice system had to be self-financing, it was not proposed that the fees paid by litigants should cover the cost of legal aid assistance. That was left alone. It is being introduced now as a feature. The Government need to save money to cut down on public expense, and the legal aid bill, whether for criminal or civil legal aid, is looked at as one of the means of reducing government expenditure to balance the books. The object is one with which one cannot possibly quarrel, but the Government have to bear in mind what this process may do to the justice system.
I want to concentrate my remarks on the civil justice system, because, as all my colleagues will know, I know precious little, or nothing, about the criminal justice system. In the civil justice system, individuals need to have access and, if they cannot have access to it to defend themselves or prosecute their claims, their respect for the justice system will be affected. Respect for the rule of law is a cultural advantage, which this country shares with many others, but there are many countries in the world where the rules and regulations that appear to provide for the rule of law lack reality, because the laws in question do not command respect.
In this country, individuals, of course, disapprove of some laws that they may be required to obey, but, broadly speaking, one of the features of living in this country is that the population and the public as a whole respect the rule of law. That respect is cultural, however; it is not to be found in every country and it is not necessarily immutable. Let us think of what may happen if there is a substantial number of people whose access to the courts to prosecute claims that they think they are owed, or to defend themselves against claims that they think are unjustified, is made impractical or impossible because of the difficulties of financing the entry into litigation or paying for lawyers to argue their case. Some may try to argue the case themselves, with all the difficulties that they must know that will involve because they are not lawyers—or at least in general circumstances they are not lawyers, and the law is not always something that appears simple to non-lawyers; sometimes it does not appear simple to lawyers, either.
Respect for the rule of law, which is so important, is capable of being forfeited and lost if excessive cuts are made affecting potential litigants. I wish that the Government would bear that in mind in considering how far to take the inroads into the legal aid bill for the purpose of cutting government expenditure. I hope that it will not happen to a point that the rule of law loses the respect that at present it commands. It cannot be taken for granted by the Government that that will not happen and I hope that they keep that in mind.
Defamation Bill
Lord Scott of Foscote Excerpts(12 years ago)
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Lord Browne of Ladyton
My Lords, the Committee will be pleased to hear that—broadly for the reasons articulated so well by the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, about the purpose of the clause—I do not intend to speak for very long on Clause 3. Our Benches support the clause, although we recognise that in doing so we are not saying that it cannot be improved. If any of the amendments in this group can improve or assist the purpose of this clause, we will be happy to support them.
I regret to tell the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, that while his proposed amendments raise an interesting aspect in the discussion about the difference between facts and opinions, I have to say that I am inclined to agree with the view of the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, which is that the only fact that must be established in the example of a restaurant review is that you can prove that you have eaten in the place. I cannot support his amendments, although I will be interested to hear what the Minister has to say about the degree of certainty that one can have now when operating in the area of opinion, so that one can avail oneself of the defence offered by this clause in the future, as opposed to in the area of fact. However, I suspect that one would not want to raise that issue in a room full of lawyers because the position is unlikely to be clearer at the end of the discussion than it was at the beginning. It may be better just to leave it to ordinary people to decide whether or not they are dealing with opinion. It is the sort of thing that one knows when one sees it.
On the amendments spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, I anticipate to a degree that the response will be that they are unnecessary. I hope that the Minister will be convincing in his explanation that they are, but the noble Lord has raised important issues around the adequacy of information that would allow people to take a view as to whether the opinions being expressed are supported by facts. If they are the reporting of other people’s opinions or statements, there has to be some information available to allow people, outwith court proceedings, to come to a view as to whether the opinions are justifiable in the circumstances of the facts that have informed them. The noble Lord has done the Committee a service by identifying this issue. I am not entirely sure that his amendments would improve the clause, but I shall leave it to the Minister to defend the drafting.
I turn to the very specific amendment tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick. We cannot say that we have not had notice that this amendment was likely to be brought forward because the noble and learned Lord raised this issue in a short contribution made on Second Reading, when he asked a series of very specific questions. My recollection is that he got a positive response from the Minister, who indicated that he agreed with his view. I thought that the noble and learned Lord explained the point compellingly in terms of the House of Lords’ decision in Telnikoff v Matusevitch, saying that it is not good law. However, I suspect that the noble and learned Lords who considered that decision did not think that it would be further appealed in the House of Lords some 20 years later. The question, of course, is whether the issue needs to be addressed. I think that the mood of the Committee suggests that this is not good law, but there is a question of whether it needs to be dealt with in the Bill or by the sort of device suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill.
Members on these Benches will listen carefully to the Minister’s response and we will test that against how the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, in turn responds to it. If we need to come back to this issue again, I think that the noble and learned Lord can rely on our continued support. This stain on the law of England should be removed at some stage by other processes.
Lord Scott of Foscote
My Lords, I rise simply to say that for the reasons given by my noble and learned friend Lord Lloyd of Berwick, to which I cannot usefully add, I entirely support his amendment.
Lord Woolf
My Lords, I rise to say the same thing because, of course, I was the other person who had his decision overruled by the House of Lords. I agreed with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, in the Court of Appeal and I agree with him again today. I must apologise to the Committee for my late arrival, which I can only blame on the queue at the gift shop.
Defamation Bill
Lord Scott of Foscote Excerpts(12 years ago)
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Lord Mawhinney
I think the truthful answer to my noble friend is that I cannot tell him that. However, my understanding from listening to hours of evidence is that pathways by which the Government can issue guidance already exist, and I assume that that would be covered by that arrangement. If this is not the case, I would encourage my noble friend, who knows more about these things than I do, to put down appropriate amendments on Report to clarify the issue that he has raised.
Therefore, it is question of new statute, not codification; of raising the bar; and of the judiciary making early judgments as to whether these cases before them should proceed. I stress that because—and I am not going to apologise to noble Lords—I fear I am going to return regularly through these sessions to one of the overwhelming judgments that we made. That was that the cost of defamation has risen to such an extent that it is driving way beyond the means of ordinary people their ability to seek the protection under the law to which they are entitled.
The committee occasionally, in trying to balance legal action against cost, came down on the side of cost. Legal niceties are good, important and proper but they are irrelevant if the ordinary man on the street cannot afford to go to law in the first place. Therefore cost is going to be a recurring theme. I encourage the Minister to take that point seriously so that he does not get irritated with me. He is presiding over a system that is out of the financial reach of most of our fellow citizens. This legislation ought, to some extent, to reverse that procedure—not wholly, we are all sensible and grown up and there is cost attached to these legal procedures. However, as many people as possible ought to be enabled to use the law to defend themselves and that is simply not the case at the moment.
What I have said indicates that I have sympathy with the first amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton. “Publication” and “the extent of publication”, “serious” and “and substantial”, fall in the same ball park and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s reply. I have pleasure on behalf of my committee as well as personally in speaking to both of the amendments in my name.
Lord Scott of Foscote
My Lords, Amendments 1 and 2 seem thoroughly sensible and I support them without hesitation. However, I am troubled by Amendment 3. If it is established that the alleged defamatory publication has caused serious and substantial harm to the claimant, that is an issue of fact and it will have to be made good by evidence. The judge cannot possibly come to a conclusion on an issue of fact of that sort until he has heard both sides. He must hear the claimant’s evidence that asserts that he has or is likely to suffer serious and substantial harm. If that is disputed, as it may be—if it is accepted, of course that is that—then he must hear evidence from the other side.
I do not see how one can have the statute telling the court how to deal with disputed issues of fact. Ordinary procedure of the court should deal with that. The parties can be required to give particulars of the case they rely on before the proceedings begin so that the matter is ventilated as fully as it may be. They can be ordered to exchange copies of their witness evidence so that that can be compared. However, at the end of the day, the judge must decide which of two sets of disputing evidence he is to prefer.
Lord Mawhinney
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. I quite understand the argument. If the guidance issued were to say, for example, that evidence had to be produced within a given—probably short—timeframe, which would have cost benefits, would that fall foul of the arrangement?
Lord Scott of Foscote
I do not think that would fall foul of it at all. If the parties are given sufficient time to collect and produce their evidence and provide copies of it to the other side, that is fine. However, once that has happened, the judge must come to a conclusion of fact. Once he has come to that conclusion, although it is unlikely to be appealed if it is on an issue of fact and he has heard the evidence, it is theoretically appealable and is not necessarily the end of the case.
Lord Browne of Ladyton
I am enormously grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Lester, but perhaps my powers of advocacy have failed me with him once more. I thought I made it clear that I do not support the amendment for many of the reasons he rehearsed by reference to the document he read from—I am not sure what it was, perhaps it was the report of the Neill committee.
For all the reasons I have evinced, I think that it would be impossible to make this work, and I suspect that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, also probably thinks that it would be incredibly difficult. I just want to repeat the point that we have some obligation not only to the Watson family but to many other people who have to live with the consequences of this sort of behaviour. We have to apply our minds to trying to find some way of giving them redress or at least a way of healing the damage that is done post mortem to the reputations of people who cannot defend themselves.
Lord Scott of Foscote
My Lords, perhaps I may add to what has been said. The inability to bring an action for defamation on behalf someone who is deceased does not prevent action being taken to prevent repetition of the untrue allegations that are being made if it can be shown that their repetition is likely to cause a breach of the peace. I came across such a case when I was a barrister and was once instructed to do something to stop lies, as I was told, being told about a deceased public figure. I said that defamation was not a runner but that one could get an injunction, not damages, to stop a repetition if there was a real likelihood of a breach of the peace. However, for that purpose, one had to get the consent of the Attorney-General. I applied to the Attorney-General, who refused to give his consent, and that was the end of the matter.
Lord McNally
My Lords, again we are indebted to my learned friends for enlightening this debate. Dealing with the reputation of the dead is a difficult matter. I recently had to answer a Question in the Lords about a pardon for Dr Alan Turing, and I answered by referring to the strict letter of the law as it now stands. I then found that someone had added a line to my entry in Wikipedia that stated that I was strongly opposed to giving a pardon to Alan Turing.
The issue is very difficult. As my noble friend Lord Hunt said, I saw Mr and Mrs Watson, and anyone who meets them cannot but be moved by the grief that they continue to feel. When I saw them in October 2010, the draft Bill was already starting its slow process down the slipway, and I suggested that they give evidence to the public consultation, which subsequently involved the pre-legislative scrutiny committee. Mr and Mrs Watson gave evidence and argued that the Government should allow proceedings to be brought in respect of defamed homicide victims. However, they were the only respondents who raised this issue, and neither the specific issue of defamation of homicide victims nor defamation of the dead more generally arose in evidence to the Joint Committee.
However, as has been said, the Watsons, who live in Glasgow, have raised this issue in Scotland, where it is a devolved matter subject to Scottish Law. The Scottish Government published in January 2011 a consultation paper, Death of a Good Name—Defamation and the Deceased. Analysis of that response has been published by the Scottish Government, but they have yet to indicate whether they are minded to propose any change to their law in this area.
I say again, as I said to Mr and Mrs Watson, that they should also cling to the judgment of the judge. That is the most sound and tested opinion of their daughter’s reputation, and it was clear and unequivocal in a way that I had hoped would have given them some of the comfort that they sought. However, I can imagine—and it does not apply just to famous people—that when things are said about loved ones after their death it must be extremely hurtful to those who have been close to them. Perhaps I should gently lob the ball back to my noble friend Lord Hunt in the hope that the handiwork he is undertaking in terms of a media response to Lord Justice Leveson and a regulatory body with teeth that bite might be an area where the teeth might bite if the media behave in the way that the Watson family suggested.
However, this amendment seeks to change the law in relation to the rights of representatives of deceased persons to bring defamation actions. It is not a provision for the avoidance of doubt. It is a long-established principle of common law that a deceased person cannot be defamed because reputation is personal. A defamatory statement about a deceased person accordingly does not give rise to a civil action for defamation on behalf of his or her estate. Relatives of the deceased also have no right of action unless the words used reflect on their own reputation. That reflects the central principle in civil proceedings generally that a claim for damages can be brought only by the person who has suffered the injury, loss or, in this case, damage to his or her reputation as a result of an act of omission of another person.
The Government believe that there will be significant difficulties with attempting to allow representatives to bring defamation actions on behalf of deceased persons. For example, in the event of defamation proceedings being brought by a representative of the deceased person, it would not be possible to bar that defendant from using the defences that exist to a defamation action. That would result in arguments over the truth of negative allegations about the deceased’s character, which inevitably would be distressing for their family and which could not be put to proof by questioning of the deceased.
Also significantly, this amendment does not propose to put any time limit on the period after death during which such an action would be brought. That potentially creates huge difficulties for historians wishing to engage in historical analysis and debate, especially given that there is no definition of representatives, which means that it would not necessarily need to be a close family member who brought the action on behalf of the deceased person. That could lead to a situation where a historian published a biography of a significant historical figure many years after that person’s death. He could be sued by a law firm or an individual with no close tie to the deceased person who was the subject of the potentially defamatory statement.
In the second subsection of the amendment, it is not clear to which individual the serious harm would have to be caused nor is it immediately apparent how a defamatory statement could cause a breach of the peace. However, it is because of the very serious legal and practical difficulties that I have already highlighted that the Government cannot support this amendment. For all those reasons, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw it.
Perhaps I may say to the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, that the BBC and the police are investigating the Savile matters, and I think that I should leave it there for the moment.
On the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Browne, I have said before that I am amazed how often when I ask about a certain thing in the Ministry of Justice, they say, “Well, they do this better in Scotland”. I do not know whether that is a tribute to the quality of Scottish law, but it will be interesting when it is faced with the very real dilemma of where you draw the line. The noble Lord suggested a year or so, but wherever the line is drawn, there will be those who are just on the other side of it. It is a difficult dilemma, and you cannot but feel sorrow for the grief of those who are affected by it. I think that the Government are right to hold the line where it is but, as ever, we will keep an eye on other examples.
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill
Lord Scott of Foscote Excerpts(12 years, 9 months ago)
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Lord Scott of Foscote
My Lords, I am fully supportive of the spirit behind these amendments. I rise simply to query a small point concerning the definition of abuse in Amendments 41 and 42, both of which are to the same effect. Amendment 41 states that,
“‘abuse’ means any incident or repeated incidents of threatening behaviour, violence or abuse (whether psychological, physical, sexual, financial or emotional”.
When one speaks of domestic violence, I imagine that, like me, most Members of the House have a fair idea in their minds of what is involved, and the speeches that your Lordships have heard this afternoon rather underline that: namely, that some party to a domestic partnership has been battered or threatened with violence in some way. If the only threat is a financial one, is it appropriate to describe it as domestic violence? I accept that financial threats might exacerbate other examples of domestic violence. However, I refer to financial pressure alone—nothing but financial pressure—whereby one of the parties to the domestic partnership is endeavouring to control the expenditure of the other party in one way or another. We have heard a great deal about cuts on a national basis and nations living beyond their income. However, parties to a domestic partnership can live beyond their income as well. One of the parties may seek to curb this, and that could be described as threatening behaviour of a financial character. Is that to be called domestic violence? For my part, I think that including the adjective “financial” as being sufficient by itself to constitute domestic violence rather diminishes the impact of “domestic violence”. I suggest that Amendments 41 and 42 would be better amendments if that adjective were removed from them.
Baroness Howe of Idlicote
My Lords, I support these amendments, as they show that noble Lords across the House recognise the appalling incidence of violence, particularly violence against women. The amendments seek to make clearer the way in which proceedings can be brought, but above all the fact that legal aid must be available to bring these proceedings in the circumstances outlined in the amendments.
I particularly support Amendment 43 in the name of the noble and learned Baronesses, Lady Scotland and Lady Butler-Sloss, both of whom have spoken to it. Above all, we need to realise that one of the reasons that action is not taken in areas where it should be is because the law on matters such as stalking is totally out of date. With the advent of new media, we are beginning to see abhorrent forms of abuse taking place against women, but the requisite law is not in place to deal with these situations. Amendment 43 emphasises who will be damaged by this abuse. Children will suffer in the long term. In many cases women subject to this abuse will not bring a case unless they have back-up and legal aid. The Minister has made good attempts to get the agreement of all parties to his proposal. Nevertheless, it would be very much better if he were to accept Amendments 41 and 43 in the names of the noble and learned Baronesses, Lady Butler-Sloss and Lady Scotland.