Litigation Funding Agreements (Enforceability) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Sandhurst and Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd

Committee stage
Monday 29th April 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, like others here today, I support the Bill and the amendments which the Government have laid. Like others, certainly including the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, I am grateful for the Bingham Centre’s helpful briefing note. It sets out the issues clearly, in particular in respect of retrospectivity and the need for the Government to give good reasons for that, which I believe they have done.

What is important in this case is that before 19 July 2023, government policy endorsed the use of litigation funding agreements. There had been discussion about whether they should be regulated and how they should be managed, but the policy was absolutely clear. I referred to that at Second Reading. The Supreme Court, for good reason, did not have to address that issue of policy as it was not appropriate, but the effect of its decision is that litigants have lost much-needed support. If we are to ensure access to justice, particularly against monopolists, we now require a statute to undo that Supreme Court decision and do the best we can to restore the status quo ante. We have to hope that this legislation does not induce a spate of future litigation of the wrong satellite nature, but simply allows matters to proceed as they were until July last year.

For good constitutional reasons, retrospective provisions are not the norm, but when Parliament reaches a considered decision to pass legislation that is fully retroactive and does so for good reasons then, providing the legislation is drafted carefully, the Supreme Court has ruled that it is not contrary to our constitutional norms. In that respect, I refer to its decision in AXA General Insurance Limited and others v Lord Advocate and others, reported at [2011] UKSC 46.

I agree entirely with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that we should not fear challenge at some later date in the ECHR. The balancing reasons are absolutely clear: this is for access to justice. There may be no perfect answer, but this is the right route—or the least bad route. I am confident that the Government will look further at the detail of the retroactivity provisions and will not bring this Bill to finality without taking care to ensure that it is properly addressed. In doing so, they will have weighed the public interest in access to justice and in established positions that might be damaged by the Bill. It is pretty clear to me, and I think to others here, that the overwhelming public interest is in allowing matters to be restored to the general form of what everybody thought they were in the summer of 2023.

While I am sympathetic to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and his amendment, I am persuaded and now agree that the appropriate course is to leave this to the Civil Justice Council. It is now seized of the matter and will have the benefit shortly of the report from the European Law Institute—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, is a member—and will guide this country into making good regulations. Regulation will not be straightforward, but it has been managed with some trial and error in conditional fee agreements, and we are now without problems there. It has been managed in damages-based agreements, so I would be surprised if it could not be managed in litigation funding agreements, albeit that I am sure that some lawyers will do well out of satellite litigation in the early stages.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the Government again for bringing this matter with such expedition before this Committee. I wish to make two observations. First, I warmly welcome the Constitution Committee’s report, which is helpful and will no doubt help the Government further on the retrospectivity point.

Secondly, I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, put forward his amendment because it enables us to thank the Civil Justice Council and the Government for putting the terms of reference in such broad forms. As I mentioned at Second Reading, there is a lot of experience worldwide on that, but since then I have discovered more about the position in Australia and hope that the work done by the European Law Institute will in part reflect the substantial Australian experience. The Civil Justice Council will be able to look at that. Having heard what has been said in Australia, one has to take care, as not all are as responsible as the members of the litigation funders’ body. Others are tempted to enter into this area, so one might see that Australia has a lot of experience of how to deal with this, looking not to the creation of yet another regulatory body but to whether the courts themselves, through the Civil Procedure Rules, can be given the powers and guidance necessary to deal with the issues.

No doubt we will return to this in the autumn of 2025 for a very interesting debate.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Sandhurst and Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 320 and 328, which would repeal the Vagrancy Act. This 197 year-old Act does nothing to tackle and resolve homelessness, and nor does it prevent antisocial behaviour. In fact, by criminalising rough sleepers, it prevents them accessing vital services to support them to move off the streets. This is important in the context of people trafficking—modern slavery. Its victims are those likely to end up sleeping rough on the streets to escape danger. They need our help. Criminalising rough sleeping marginalises the most vulnerable and may mean that rough sleepers move away from, not towards vital support. It does not address the underlying causes.

The Act now has only two effective provisions. Section 3 makes it an offence in any public place to beg or cause a child to beg. An offender can be locked up for one month. Section 4 addresses what we call rough sleeping. It also encompasses those who are in enclosed premises for an unlawful purpose. This is used to deal with people who are thought to be “up to no good”. The fact is that there are perfectly good ways of dealing with all those people both within and without the criminal law. Indeed, on 9 March the then Secretary of State said in answer to a Parliamentary Question that the Act should be repealed. In this amendment, we offer a fully drafted way forward. If minor changes are needed, they can be made—there is no problem there.

The number of convictions for rough sleeping and begging have fallen consistently in the past 10 years. Indeed, in 2019—the most recent year for which figures are available—only one person received a custodial sentence for begging, and only 16 received a custodial sentence for being in enclosed premises for an unlawful purpose. The numbers are tiny. Let us throw away the sledgehammer. The police, local authorities and other agencies have ample powers.

Let me explain very briefly. The Highways Act 1980, Section 137, makes it an offence wilfully to block free passage along the highway. That is punishable by a fine. The Public Order Act 1986, Section 5, makes it an offence to use threatening or abusive words or behaviour. That, too, is punishable by a fine. Moving to civil measures, the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 introduced a wide range of measures to deal with the different types of anti-social behaviour. Recourse can properly be made to those measures for people who are repeat nuisances. They are all available under the 2014 Act.

Taking it very summarily in the short time available, there are civil injunctions to prevent nuisance and annoyance. Breach of those civil injunctions gives rise to civil contempt, with all the remedies available for that—up to 2 years’ imprisonment for the worst offenders, but it is done properly. Secondly, there are criminal behaviour orders. These can impose requirements as well as prohibit certain activities. Thirdly, there are community protection notices. These can be issued by the police, a social landlord or a local council if behaviour is detrimental to the quality of life of a local community. Fourthly, there are dispersal powers, under which a local council, following consultation with the police, may issue a public spaces protection order to place restrictions or impose conditions on activities that people may carry out in the designated area.

In respect of that, since 2014 the Home Office has issued statutory guidance under the 2014 Act, recently updated this January. Our amendment, as noble Lords will see from its terms, will strengthen that. We propose a co-ordinated package. Where something has to be done, the police and local authorities have the powers to do it. We ask the House to act now to put an end to this prehistoric, unjust and inappropriate law. I commend the amendments.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

Briefly, I entirely support the repeal of the Vagrancy Act, and there is no point in repeating what have been compelling, eloquent and, I believe, unanswerable points. Long experience has shown that arguments do not get better by repetition.

What I wanted to do, however, was to make four quick points from my experience in support of Amendment 292J in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath. First, the category of person dealt with is easy to identify. Therefore, that is not an answer. Secondly, the evidence of the risk of future offending is compelling. That in relation to Wales is set out—I need not repeat it—in the report of the Commission on Justice that I chaired and there is masses of such evidence. Thirdly, the proposal is plainly value for money. One has only to look at the cost of what it takes to deal with those who have gone wrong. Fourthly—surprisingly, some may think—the proposal would have enormous public support. When we canvassed views about it, and when I did so as a judge, one always found that the overwhelming majority felt that these people deserved a chance and support.