(1 year, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this Bill was always about political signals, not sensible policy. Finally, even signals must change. I respect the Minister, but others in the Home Office have been slow to respond to the concerns of the British public about abuses of broad police powers.
Much has happened and even more has been exposed since this Bill began its passage last May. Last July Wayne Couzens lost an appeal against a whole life sentence for the abduction, rape and murder of Sarah Everard while he was a serving police officer, after a purported stop and arrest for breach of lockdown laws in March 2021. Last month David Carrick was imprisoned for 30 years for an unrestrained 18-year campaign of rape and abuse while he was a serving police officer.
Also last month, YouGov reported that 51% of Londoners do not trust the Metropolitan Police very much or at all. Last week, as we have heard, the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, called for a “fundamental reset” of the use of stop and search, which she said is
“currently deployed by the Met at the cost of legitimacy, trust and, therefore, consent.”
Just yesterday the Children’s Commissioner, Dame Rachel de Souza, found that nearly 3,000 children aged between eight and 17 had been strip-searched under stop and search powers between 2018 and 2022. Nearly 40% of them were black. Half of those strip searches had no appropriate adult present.
All this relates to the use and abuse of current police powers. Still, today we are being asked yet again to green-light new powers to stop and search peaceful protesters without even a reasonable suspicion of criminality. When trust in policing and the rule of law is in jeopardy, if this House does not exercise its constitutional duty to say “enough”—no more power without at least the modest statutory responsibilities set out in Motion A1 in the name of my noble friend Lord Coaker—what are we for?
My Lords, I had not planned to speak, but it is important to remember that we are not dealing simply with peaceful protests. I remind the House of what I said on a previous occasion in respect of these amendments. We are dealing with organised, large-scale disruption, using implements. The purpose of the disruption, as the disrupters make plain, is not simply to protest but to stop citizens going about their lawful business for a disproportionate length of time. As I reminded the House previously, the European Court of Justice in Strasbourg has said more than once that such activity is unlawful and that protests that go beyond merely protesting can legitimately be stopped by government.
(1 year, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord, Lord Deben, has made some very important points, particularly in relation to the police. It is worth elaborating for a couple more sentences. The fact is that the police already have great powers to deal with demonstrations and simply do not use them, as he suggested—partly because the police do not carry a huge amount of trust. The fact is also that these demonstrations reflect a huge amount of feeling among the public, and the police do not wish to stand out against those very strong feelings. Adding further powers for the police is not going to be helpful because the police will simply not use them for the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Deben, very brilliantly—as always—pointed out. My main argument against these powers is that there is no point in them. They are designed to frighten people not to go out on protests. The police do not want these powers; they know that they would not use them. Therefore, they should not be introduced by Parliament.
My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 55. I am grateful to follow the speech of my noble friend Lord Faulks. My amendment addresses the legal difficulties caused by the judgment of the Supreme Court in 2021 in the case of Ziegler, in respect of offences in which it will be, and will remain, a defence for a person charged to prove that they had a lawful or reasonable excuse for the act in question.
The judgment in Ziegler concerned Section 137 of the Highways Act 1980, which makes it an offence for a person
“without lawful authority or excuse”
wilfully to obstruct
“free passage along a highway”.
The Supreme Court ruled that the exercise of the convention rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association—which might loosely be summarised as the right to protest—constituted a lawful excuse. This has the effect that, before a person may be convicted of obstructing the highway, the prosecution must prove that a conviction would be a proportionate and thus justified interference with that person’s convention rights. In practice, this has caused real difficulties for the police, who at times have appeared paralysed. It has made it difficult for judges to run trials fairly and for magistrates to reach decisions.
My amendment leaves in the word “reasonable”. It does not make it a strict offence to obstruct the highway. You can still do it if you have a “lawful authority or excuse”. What is to be judged in future would be the duration and nature of what is done, not the fact that you have what you consider to be a high motive—whether it is flat-earth or anti-abortion protesters, it does not matter. It is not about whether you are a good person, or you think you are a good person; it is about what you are actually doing and whether you are stopping ambulances and people going about their daily lives unreasonably and for too long.
The amendment means that conduct being intended or designed to influence government or public opinion will not, of itself, make it reasonable or lawful. That is consistent with the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court. I stress that the court has said:
“In a democratic society based on the rule of law, the ideas which challenge the existing order and whose realisation is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression”.
However, the law protects only the right to peaceful assembly. Articles 10 and 11 of the convention establish that public authorities are entitled to interfere with the right to protest for legitimate purposes such as the prevention of disorder, the prevention of crime and—importantly—the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. It is not about stopping every march, but about stopping prolonged obstruction. That is what we are about.
The Strasbourg court has gone on to rule that the rights of the public include the right to move freely on public roads without restriction, so there are two rights here; you have a right to protest, but the general public also have a right to move freely on public roads without restriction. It is a balancing exercise. The court has further recognised that states have a wide margin of appreciation in determining necessity when it comes to taking action against those who deliberately disrupt traffic or other aspects of normal life.
The right to protest in a public place exists, but it is not unfettered. It must be balanced against the rights of your fellow citizens. If the public are to be protected in the face of these novel types of protest we have not seen before, which in their duration and nature go far beyond what is fair and reasonable, the police must be able to intervene and not be paralysed by anxiety. Peaceful assembly and ordinary marches will still be protected. The public will still have to suffer and tolerate a measure of inconvenience and delay, but that will be within bounds.
My amendment would end the state of affairs in which persons who obstruct the highway, damage property or seek to avoid arrest can distort and upset the proper balance by asserting their motive. Peaceful protest will be permitted, but the balance will be restored. That is why, at the end of the amendment, it makes it plain that
“this section must be treated as necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.
Henceforth, if my amendment is adopted, your assertion of a high motive will not suffice. You will be judged by what you did, how long it went on for, and the effect on other people.
My Lords, as the House has just heard from my noble friend Lord Sandhurst, the area of law we are dealing with is the proportionate interference with convention rights. I respectfully agree with him that the decision of the Supreme Court in Ziegler raises the question of the correct balance and makes it important for the House to legislate in this area. However, it is my misfortune to disagree with him that we should take this opportunity to overturn the decision in Ziegler. Rather, I respectfully commend the approach of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, which has been set out for us this evening by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks.
Critically, the presumption of innocence is at the heart of our judicial process, and I do not think that any of these amendments cut across that. There are three reasons why I suggest that the amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, which is supported by the Government, ought to be accepted. The first is the point made by the Constitution Committee that we need precision in this area. Secondly, there is the fundamental point that we should not be leaving this to the police or the courts to decide on a case-by-case basis; as Parliament, we should take the opportunity, and indeed the responsibility, to draw the bounds of the offences in this area. Thirdly, we need to remember that, at the moment, Section 3 of the Human Rights Act requires the court to read any legislation, if possible, consistently with the convention. Absent, I suggest, the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, there is a real risk that the court will read down clauses to make them consistent with how it considers convention rights should be applied.
On the basis of the approach of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, there is scope for reasonable excuse, but it is limited. That means we do not run the risk of the courts deciding cases on an unanticipated, or perhaps even incorrect, basis. We also do not need—despite my noble friend Lord Sandhurst’s amendment—to overturn the Ziegler case; what we will have, however, is a consistent, clear and precise approach to criminal law, which is precisely what we ought to have. I accept that some of my colleagues at the Bar may not be particularly happy with that, but, in this area and perhaps in others, their loss may indeed be the law’s gain.
(2 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in this country, we accept the principle of peaceful assembly in public places as a foundation of our system of participatory governance based on democracy, human rights, the rule of law and the arguing of ideas with which others do not agree. But that is a balance. It requires give and take. Our society acknowledges that such assembly may annoy or cause offence to others who oppose the ideas that a particular protest seeks to promote. As noble Lords have observed, in a democratic society based on the rule of law, political ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realisation is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression.
However, well-established law in this country protects only the right to peaceful assembly. Peaceful events often cause real but relatively modest disruption. We tolerate and permit that. On the other hand, seriously disruptive protests and invasions of private property do not deserve protection. The courts have rightly held that public authorities are entitled to interfere with protest where there is a legitimate purpose, such as the prevention of disorder and, importantly, the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
What we are talking about with this Bill is a balance for society as a whole. The right to protest in a public place is not unfettered. It must be balanced against the rights of the rest of society, and those have been held to include the right to move freely on public roads without restriction. So there is an important balancing act to be conducted for us as members of society as a whole.
We therefore have laws that regulate protests and give the police existing powers both to control assemblies and processions and to avoid serious—I emphasise “serious”—disruption to daily life. In this context, hitherto well established in this country, peaceful protests and demonstrations take place. They do so on notice to the relevant authorities. In London, we are told when there are to be major demonstrations and roads will be closed. The public and the emergency services can plan accordingly. There will of course be resulting disruption, but it is on notice and we can take steps to mitigate it. It is, as I said, a matter of necessary give and take.
When that happens, those of us who are protesting and participating in a demonstration, which may be a very large demonstration—some will be surprised to hear that I have marched on a demonstration—make our point. We receive the public attention that we have sought. The rest of London, or wherever it is, suffers a degree of inconvenience, but it is usually manageable and no serious harm is done. That is what is involved in living in a healthy, vibrant democracy.
However, in recent years, certain groups have gone beyond the norm. What they have done has been all take and no give. It is not about the subject matter. Of course climate change is very important, and of course people must have the right to demonstrate about it—we must all think carefully about how we are going to go forward and what will happen to our children and grandchildren after we have gone—but when protesters sit in the road and block and prevent all passage, they stop fellow members of society going about their lawful business and conducting their lives.
Importantly, such demonstrations, at which this Bill is aimed, are not done on notice. They are done unannounced and secretly. They are deliberately disruptive of society and where they go is far beyond what is acceptable. So what are we seeing? Fellow citizens are now taking matters into their own hands. That risks disorder, as the Metropolitan Police has said. Something has to be done. The difficult question is whether this Bill—all parts of it—provides the right answers. It is plain that we are going to have to look at that very carefully in Committee.
Let me address a few of the clauses. For my part, I do not see a problem with the essence of Clause 1. It is needed. The Bill focuses on what causes “serious disruption” to individuals or organisations. That is reasonable. It is not in accordance with the tradition of protest and demonstrations in our society. A business or organisation that has been invaded should get the protection that is proposed. That is why we have a police force; we are not back in the 18th century. Individually targeted businesses should not have to resort to their own private expense of injunctions and so on to justify themselves. In this democratic society, we rely on a proper police force to intervene so that we do not take matters into our own hands.
There is a place for the provisions related to tunnelling and the other provisions in Clauses 3 to 8, but Clause 9 is a difficult and delicate clause. Health workers and their patients should be spared intrusion of the sort that they suffer. They must be left in peace. The objective is sound. In Committee, we can look to see whether the drafting is as good as it may be.
I have serious reservations about Clauses 11 to 14, on stop and search without suspicion. Powers to stop and search have had an unhappy history in the magistrates’ courts—what used to be called the police courts—of this country. They have historically been misused. They alienate sections of society. People are picked on because they are the wrong colour or the police do not like the cut of their jib. We do not want to go back to that. I will look at those provisions with great care and will take some persuading that Clauses 11 to 14 are appropriate and necessary. Moving forward, I, like the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, am concerned about the wisdom of the injunctive powers in Clause 18.
I shall finish here. As I said, of course people should be free to demonstrate on climate change or anything else of significance, but this must be within bounds. It is not protests and marches in the form we all understand that are targeted by this Bill; it is what is done in the name of protests and how protests are conducted. Notwithstanding my concerns about some of the details of this Bill—and, indeed, the specific provisions to which I have drawn attention, all of which are important—there is a need for new powers to deal with specific types of aggressive protest that really are new to us. The Bill is needed, but it will need careful attention in Committee to consider which provisions are necessary and which should be revised or omitted.
(2 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberI do not think we need to slow it down—quite the contrary. It is important that this is done in a clear way: that the police explain why, who and where they are using their deployments. That must be explained by the police. I think this has great potential for good, and so I would not agree with the right reverend Prelate.
My Lords, I am sorry to press the Minister, but in the light of the forthcoming regulations that are going to be made in respect of non-crime hate speech, is not facial recognition likewise so important that it should not be left to mere guidance? Is it not time now for the College of Policing to be put on a statutory basis, and going forward, for facial recognition, like non-crime hate speech, to be made subject to regulations approved under the affirmative procedure?
I disagree with my noble friend, because it is not left to guidance. Where guidance comes in is in the deployment. There is a legal basis on which to deploy, using powers including common-law powers. It was on the back of the court judgment that it was recommended that its use be clarified: the when and where of the use of LFR.
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Oates, ran off an extremely impressive list of people and groups supporting this amendment for physical proof. I add the European Affairs Committee of your Lordships’ House, of which I am a member, along with the noble Earl sitting on the Woolsack. Last year, when we examined the implementation of the settled status system, we unanimously recommended that physical proof be made available. That committee contains members of all parties in your Lordships’ House and none, and we had no hesitation whatever about the recommendation we made. This was after the evidence had come from the Covid barcode system that it could be done at nil cost and would give tremendous relief to people like me who sometimes struggle a little with the digital world in which we now live.
I really hope that the Minister will now go back and accept that providing this physical proof will greatly increase the respect in which this country is held by member states of the European Union, which have unanimously asked for this. It will do nothing but good for the individuals who get the physical proof and for this country, which will have shown that it listens to the views of others. I hope the amendment can be accepted.
My Lords, I am pleased to follow my noble friend Lady Shackleton’s speech.
We had the Windrush disaster because people got nothing in writing. That was a shameful episode; many people suffered badly and we are now paying large sums of compensation. That does not assist the taxpayer, but no doubt the civil servants 30 years ago did not think about that. It costs us all money now, so if nothing else think about the money for future taxpayers. I see no reason why we should risk a repeat of the Windrush disaster.
If a modest charge is necessary, so be it. People will pay £10 for a piece of paper or for registration costs, but what is that? They will have comfort and security. The Home Office’s reluctance to issue proof in documentary form for European citizens living here, minding their own business, is difficult to understand.
There will be personal disasters in future. They will be disasters in 10, 15 or 20 years for the individuals who, for one reason or another, are unable to prove that they are settled in this country when they come back from time abroad. I ask the Minister to think of herself and her children and grandchildren in that position. Decent people living in this country deserve to be treated decently.
My Lords, I rise very briefly to say that the Green group would certainly have attached a signature to this motion had there been space. Like everyone else, my inbox has been utterly swollen with emails and letters about this.
I will make an additional point which no one else has. Travelling has now become much more stressful. There are extra stresses and worries. Not having a piece of paper just multiplies that. I draw here on my own example of helping an older gentleman to make some travels across the channel recently. He carries a whole wodge of printed-out Covid vaccine passports. Every time we travel, we must have a passenger locator form; there is huge stress until it is printed out. He is lucky enough to be a British citizen, so he then puts his passport with those printed-out pieces of paper, and there is a sigh of relief. However, there are additional difficulties if you do not have that piece of paper. In the case of this gentleman, several times recently the travel has gone wrong, his phone has run out of charge and he has been left relying on the kindness of strangers to pull through. However, if you need your phone to prove your settled status, that is not going to help. We cannot assume that people are always going to have charged, working devices with them. Just printing out a piece of paper would offer a level of assurance for travel in these difficult times.
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I begin by saying how grateful I am to my noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford for the time that she has given me, and others, since the debate in Committee on 1 November and for bringing forward these amendments. Having said that, I have some observations to make, in particular about freedom of expression.
Events since the debate in November have made the need for proper regulation even more pressing. Since that debate, as we have heard, the Court of Appeal in Miller has stressed the danger of the chilling effect of police intervention on individuals minded to speak on controversial public topics. The president of the Queen’s Bench Division, in her very powerful judgment, said that the revised guidance published by the College of Policing, which was then before the court, did not
“go very far, or not nearly far enough to address the chilling effect of perception-based recording more generally.”
She emphasised that
“additional safeguards should be put in place so that the incursion into freedom of expression is no more than strictly necessary.”
Finally, she said:
“Guidance should truly reflect what the police are expected to do and should not mislead by omission either the police who have to use it or the public.”
At much the same time as that judgment was being written, a similar matter came before the court in Strasbourg—the case of Dr Pal. It was decided against the United Kingdom on 30 November 2021—just two months ago. Dr Pal, a journalist, was arrested, detained and charged with hate speech in respect of a person called AB. Only when it came to the magistrates’ court did the CPS abandon the prosecution. Dr Pal then brought proceedings for wrongful arrest, or false imprisonment. The Strasbourg court observed that the arresting officer’s decision to arrest
“appears to have been based on the subjective viewpoint of AB”—
that is, the complainant himself —
“without any acknowledgement of the fact that the right to freedom of expression extends to information or ideas that defend, shock or disturb.”
The court said that
“there is no evidence that the criteria … relevant to the balancing of the rights to freedom of expression and the right to respect for private life … were taken into account prior to the applicant’s arrest. In particular, no consideration appears to have been given to the subject matter … and whether they could be said to have contributed to a debate of general interest.”
In short, there have been two important decisions from very senior courts which have stressed the vital importance of paying proper regard to freedom expression and to the need for those in authority to understand and reflect that the right to freedom of expression extends to ideas that may shock or disturb others. There must be fresh guidance, it must reflect those observations, it must be clear and decisive—and it must be soon.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing her two amendments, which we welcome. It was fair of her to point out the legacy of the recording of non-crime hate incidents and the legacy of the Macpherson report on Stephen Lawrence’s murder. We welcome that the existing guidance will be turned into statutory guidance. I have one question for the Minister: what is the likely timetable for that statutory guidance to be available to be reviewed by Parliament?
On Amendment 114E in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, I have a genuine question, and this is not a party-political point: how would his amendment have an impact on domestic abuse cases? As I have said before to the House, I sit as a magistrate in both family court and the criminal court, and I deal with a lot of cases related to domestic abuse. While non-hate crime incidents are not recorded on the police national computer, we see information on call-outs and it is common to see information on text records between the parties, usually a man and a woman. Sometimes those text records go on for pages and are relentlessly abusive. How would that information be affected by his amendment?
(3 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will speak to Amendments 320 and 328, which would repeal the Vagrancy Act. This 197 year-old Act does nothing to tackle and resolve homelessness, and nor does it prevent antisocial behaviour. In fact, by criminalising rough sleepers, it prevents them accessing vital services to support them to move off the streets. This is important in the context of people trafficking—modern slavery. Its victims are those likely to end up sleeping rough on the streets to escape danger. They need our help. Criminalising rough sleeping marginalises the most vulnerable and may mean that rough sleepers move away from, not towards vital support. It does not address the underlying causes.
The Act now has only two effective provisions. Section 3 makes it an offence in any public place to beg or cause a child to beg. An offender can be locked up for one month. Section 4 addresses what we call rough sleeping. It also encompasses those who are in enclosed premises for an unlawful purpose. This is used to deal with people who are thought to be “up to no good”. The fact is that there are perfectly good ways of dealing with all those people both within and without the criminal law. Indeed, on 9 March the then Secretary of State said in answer to a Parliamentary Question that the Act should be repealed. In this amendment, we offer a fully drafted way forward. If minor changes are needed, they can be made—there is no problem there.
The number of convictions for rough sleeping and begging have fallen consistently in the past 10 years. Indeed, in 2019—the most recent year for which figures are available—only one person received a custodial sentence for begging, and only 16 received a custodial sentence for being in enclosed premises for an unlawful purpose. The numbers are tiny. Let us throw away the sledgehammer. The police, local authorities and other agencies have ample powers.
Let me explain very briefly. The Highways Act 1980, Section 137, makes it an offence wilfully to block free passage along the highway. That is punishable by a fine. The Public Order Act 1986, Section 5, makes it an offence to use threatening or abusive words or behaviour. That, too, is punishable by a fine. Moving to civil measures, the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 introduced a wide range of measures to deal with the different types of anti-social behaviour. Recourse can properly be made to those measures for people who are repeat nuisances. They are all available under the 2014 Act.
Taking it very summarily in the short time available, there are civil injunctions to prevent nuisance and annoyance. Breach of those civil injunctions gives rise to civil contempt, with all the remedies available for that—up to 2 years’ imprisonment for the worst offenders, but it is done properly. Secondly, there are criminal behaviour orders. These can impose requirements as well as prohibit certain activities. Thirdly, there are community protection notices. These can be issued by the police, a social landlord or a local council if behaviour is detrimental to the quality of life of a local community. Fourthly, there are dispersal powers, under which a local council, following consultation with the police, may issue a public spaces protection order to place restrictions or impose conditions on activities that people may carry out in the designated area.
In respect of that, since 2014 the Home Office has issued statutory guidance under the 2014 Act, recently updated this January. Our amendment, as noble Lords will see from its terms, will strengthen that. We propose a co-ordinated package. Where something has to be done, the police and local authorities have the powers to do it. We ask the House to act now to put an end to this prehistoric, unjust and inappropriate law. I commend the amendments.
Briefly, I entirely support the repeal of the Vagrancy Act, and there is no point in repeating what have been compelling, eloquent and, I believe, unanswerable points. Long experience has shown that arguments do not get better by repetition.
What I wanted to do, however, was to make four quick points from my experience in support of Amendment 292J in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath. First, the category of person dealt with is easy to identify. Therefore, that is not an answer. Secondly, the evidence of the risk of future offending is compelling. That in relation to Wales is set out—I need not repeat it—in the report of the Commission on Justice that I chaired and there is masses of such evidence. Thirdly, the proposal is plainly value for money. One has only to look at the cost of what it takes to deal with those who have gone wrong. Fourthly—surprisingly, some may think—the proposal would have enormous public support. When we canvassed views about it, and when I did so as a judge, one always found that the overwhelming majority felt that these people deserved a chance and support.
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is an honour to speak in your Lordships’ House for the first time and to do so in support of this Bill, introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford. I am grateful for the kind words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and the noble Lords, Lord Bach and Lord Davies of Gower.
When I succeeded my father in 2002, I never in my dreams expected that I would take my seat as I thought we would no longer be here, but here I am—and after a contested election, if not the sort of election that some reformers might endorse. May I begin by saying how welcome everyone here has made me feel? I have received great support from the staff of this House, not least in the Library and at the digital drop-in, and of course from the doorkeepers.
I hope the House will forgive me if I say a little about myself. After Oxford I went to the Bar. I practised under my family name as Guy Mansfield. I was not the first barrister in my family; that was one James Mansfield. In 1772 he, with others, by habeas corpus, secured the liberty of Somerset the slave before the great Lord Mansfield—no relation. James was later Solicitor-General and Chief Justice of Common Pleas. His grandson William was not a lawyer. He went into the Army, was a distinguished soldier and reached the rank of full general. William Gladstone made him a Peer and he took the title “Sandhurst”.
My great-grandfather practised a little at the Chancery Bar. My grandfather and father both aspired to be lawyers but two world wars intervened. They both served with distinction and were lucky to survive, but they did not go back to the law afterwards,
My early practice covered a wide field, like many in my time: crime, civil and family, and a range of courts. I acted for clients from all backgrounds. I was lucky in my first two years to share a room in chambers with the future noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, who was a great exemplar.
Life was often quite tricky. I was not always very good. My wife, who is not a lawyer, came once to watch me give a plea in mitigation. Ever the kind but critical friend, she said: “Had you nothing better to say?”
Some years later I went off to represent a district council in a planning inquiry. It was my first such, so I had never been to or seen one. I was greeted rather breathlessly by the planning officer, who said: “Oh, Mr Mansfield, this is my first inquiry. I’m so glad you’re here to show me the ropes.” I kept my counsel, we survived and we were successful.
In 1994 I took Silk. I also became a recorder and later a deputy High Court judge. The 1990s were a time of great change for the Bar. It had to respond to High Court advocacy rights for solicitors and to the introduction of conditional fees. At that time I chaired two Bar committees in succession that had to address these. Next we had the competition inquiry into the legal professions. As a result of that, I chaired the working party that introduced direct access so that people did not have to go through a solicitor to see a barrister. In 2005 I became chairman of the Bar. On my doorstep was the Clementi report, which wanted to introduce widespread change in the regulation of the legal professions. I am proud that in that year we on the Bar Council created a new constitution in the space of the year that took effect from 1 January 2006 with a new separate and independent regulator, the Bar Standards Board, under a lay chair. I think that was a big achievement.
I returned to practice. In 2009 I chaired another working party, in response to Sir Rupert Jackson’s inquiry into costs in civil cases, to look at something called a contingent legal aid fund. We came to the conclusion that the Government should look at such a fund, which would be a privately funded not-for-profit scheme to fund civil litigation. Sadly, it went into the long grass, where it remains. That is not for today but we must do more to support access to justice in the civil and family courts.
In 2012 I took over leading the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s legal team defending claims by 40,000 Kenyans for damages for alleged assaults in Kenya during the Mau Mau insurrection. That trial lasted for 232 court days and was far and away the most complex thing that I have ever done. When it finished in 2018, I thought, “That’s it.” I retired and looked for a change of direction—so here I am. I feel greatly privileged to have been elected. I hope my background shows areas where I might be able to contribute, but I will wish to contribute on a wider canvas too.
Turning to the Bill, which I shall deal with quite shortly, I have looked at it not only with the eyes of one who sat in the Crown Court as a recorder but as a member of the public who lives in this great city and travels on public transport, like everyone else. I am conscious that the Bill has created controversy and that some parts are not necessarily easy, but I suggest that its broad principles are correct. Today, I shall focus on just three of its provisions.
First, there are the provisions to protect emergency workers. My daughter is a consultant in the NHS. She works on the wards and has told me, quite a lot of times, of incidents of assault—not just in A&E but actually on the wards. Doctors and nurses deserve protection. Secondly, I commend the provisions to make different local bodies work together to prevent serious violence. That must be wise. Thirdly, I identify the provisions for the extraction of information from electronic devices. I say nothing about possible improvements by amendment; the principle is sound. I commend the Bill to the House.